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Preface
an updated history of modern Lebanon is long overdue, as the last 
such attempt dates from the mid-1960s. much has happened since 
and a lot of new historical material uncovered and researched. The 
last civil war (1975–90) was the occasion for a wealth of intellectual 
production on Lebanon in a variety of fields, some of which are 
remarkable path-breaking works. nevertheless, the modern history 
of Lebanon is still full of serious gaps, especially concerning the 
post-Independence period. On the other hand, researchers have 
extensively drawn upon european government archives, leaving 
important primary sources untapped. The Ottoman archives, for 
one, have recently been organised and made accessible to the public. 
Unfortunately, the results of most of the research on this vast stock 
are not yet available for use. Other, more recent, untapped primary 
sources have been strangely ignored, such the US State Department 
archives. nevertheless, a number of secondary sources produced in 
arabic, French and english have made precious contributions to the 
study of different periods of Lebanese history and various aspects 
of Lebanese life. I am referring here to the works of ̀ abd al-rahim 
abu husayn, albert hourani, engin akarli, Leila Fawaz, Irene 
Gendzier, michael Johnson, Kamal Salibi, meir Zamir, Carolyn 
Gates, Theodor hanf, George Corm, Wajih Kawtharani, Salim nasr, 
ahmad beydoun, Samir Kassir, marwan buheiry, mas`ud Dhahir, 
Waddah Sharara, eyal Zisser, and others. Their contributions have 
enriched the present volume in many ways.
Two distinctive features have had a significant impact on the 
shaping of modern Lebanon: its sizeable Christian population, 
on the one hand, and the country’s long exposure to the West, 
on the other. Their combined effect largely accounts for the main 
themes around which Lebanon’s modern history is articulated: (1) 
a political system based on the institutionalisation of religious sects 
(‘sectarianism’); (2) an extroverted liberal economic system based 
on the service sector; and (3) a problematic relationship with its 
regional setting. Though my approach to the history of Lebanon will 
be mainly chronological, events and developments will be related 
and analysed in the light of these three themes.
vii
Traboulsi T02610 00 pre   7 23/04/2012   08:07
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The relationship between external and internal factors acquires 
crucial importance in a country with Lebanon’s size and exposure. 
as many writings have tended to emphasise external factors and 
external interpretations of its historical events, the present work 
would emphasise the often-neglected and obscured internal factors.
Writings on Lebanon, and perceptions of Lebanon, have often 
sacrificed economic and social history in favour of an exclusively 
political perspective. In order to avoid this political fixation and 
bring out the underlying economic and social factors that have also 
shaped Lebanon’s development, a political economy approach  will 
be employed here in order to contribute to a more comprehensive 
historiography.
religious and identitarian discourses greatly colour writings on 
Lebanon. The reduction of the identity of the Lebanese to one 
unique form of identity – their sectarian affiliation – is too simplistic 
and reductionist an approach to an extremely complex situation. 
Politicised religious sects would be treated as historical products, 
rather than ahistorical essences rooted in religious differences or 
as mere political entities. Sects in Lebanon are a perfect example of 
the way pre-capitalist formations are recycled to play new roles in a 
peripheral capitalist economy. They constitute multifunctional forms 
of identification and solidarity that came to permeate all aspects 
of Lebanon’s life with a specific mode of articulation between the 
struggle for power, on the one hand, and socio-economic structures 
and interests, on the other. Two major functions of sects are often 
neglected: first, their role as enlarged clientelist networks designed 
to resist the inequalities of the market, and compete for its benefits 
and for the appropriation of social wealth and services of the state; 
second, their long-standing habit of enlisting outside help in their 
struggle for power or for sheer survival. This book will address 
both these roles in the context of Lebanon. 
State–society relations in Lebanon have long been strained due 
to the combined effects of extreme laissez-faire policies and the 
extensive political, legal and, often, military, autonomy enjoyed by 
Lebanon’s sects. hence the resilience of the question of state-building, 
which has acquired a large bearing upon Lebanon’s national unity, 
its social cohesion, even upon the country’s very existence.
Finally, culture plays a major role in Lebanese life. The different 
approaches to the creation of Lebanon, perceptions of its role in the 
region as well as the representation and justification of its economic, 
social and political systems and the country’s role as a cultural 
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PrefACe ix
producer, provider and intermediary for the arab region will be 
given the importance they deserve throughout the work.
This book, addressed to both the general and the specialist reader, 
hopes to weave together the disparate and yet interrelated facets 
of Lebanese society and state in order to offer a comprehensive, 
insightful and nuanced look at the modern history of this 
complex country. 
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1
The Emirate of Mount Lebanon 
(1523–1842)
Men resemble their times more than they resemble their fathers. 
(Arab proverb)
Lebanon as a polity begins with the Emirate of Mount Lebanon, 
constituted in the late sixteenth century as an autonomous region 
inside the Ottoman Empire. The history of this Emirate is primarily 
the history of the integration of the entirety of Mount Lebanon 
under its authority and its expansion toward surrounding regions 
of Palestine and the Syrian hinterland. Within the Emirate there 
developed a number of distinguishing characteristics that would 
greatly impact the structure and developments of Lebanon in modern 
times: a sizeable Christian numerical majority; an early conversion 
to production for the market (silk) and to international trade; a 
long cultural exposure to Europe; and a tradition of intervention 
by European powers in its internal affairs. 
THE IQTA` IN MOUNT LEBANON
Under Ottoman rule the Emirate of Mount Lebanon was run 
according to the iqta` system, or iltizam, which allotted tax farming 
rights, in mountainous or desert areas to ethnic or tribal chiefs 
under the control of the Ottoman walis. The holders of the iqta`, the 
muqata`ji families, enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy in running 
the affairs of their iqta`s as long as they provided the High Porte 
(Istanbul) with a fixed amount of purses, provided armed men to 
the authorities when needed and generally kept order in the regions 
under their control. 
Life in Ottoman Mount Lebanon was characterised by a set of 
interrelated divisions and conflicts, most of which were shared with 
similar regions of the Empire. These can be itemised as follows.
First, Ottoman subjects were divided along the religiously based 
distinction codified in the millet system, which etablished a two-tier 
hierarchy between a higher community, made up of Muslims, and a 
3
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lower ‘protected’ community, made up of the ‘people of the Book’ 
– Christians and Jews. The latter enjoyed a measure of freedom 
of religious belief and the right to perform their religious rites in 
return for the payment of a protection tax, the jizya. This distinction 
implied tangible differences in the relations of the two communities 
to the social division of labour. Generally barred from the military/
administrative functions, Christians and Jews tended to specialise in 
commerce, finance and handicrafts. In Mount Lebanon, this uneven 
social location expressed itself in a Druze community dominated 
mainly by the tribal-warrior function and a Christian community 
dominated mainly by commoners, with a large peasant base. This 
imbalance would be largely responsible for transforming social and 
political conflicts into sectarian conflicts.
Second, the division between ranking orders (manasib) and 
commoners (`amma). The former held hereditary titles – emir, 
muqaddam and sheikh – bestowed upon them by the ruling emir 
of the Mountain, the Ottoman wali or the Sultan himself. The 
holders of iqta`, or muqata`ji families, controlled political/judiciary 
power and lived off their extraction of the social surplus through 
collection of taxes and control over land, all the while benefiting 
from tax exemptions and privileges. Alhough ̀ amma was the generic 
term for all untitled subjects, the majority of whom were peasants, 
this lower order also included rich farmers, merchants, artisans 
and manufacturers. Conflicts arising from the division between the 
two main orders, mainly revolving around taxation and political 
participation, frequently erupted in commoners’ revolts. 
Third, conflict between local rulers and the central authorities in 
Istanbul was a permanent aspect of Ottoman politics. Local rulers, 
Turkish walis in the main centres, or tribal chieftains – whether in 
the highlands of Yemen or in Mount Lebanon – generally controlled 
a port, trade route or vital produce (coffee, cotton, silk, and so on). 
When rich enough or strong enough, they would attempt to shake 
off the authority of Istanbul and stop payment of taxes, usually 
exploiting a military reversal of the Ottoman troops or a power 
struggle in Istanbul. These rebellions and autonomous movements 
were frequently encouraged and helped by one European power 
or another. 
Fourth, conflicts between muqata`ji families, and within each 
family, over competition for power or for the control of an iltizam 
(a tax-farming concession) were a natural outcome of the iltizam 
system. These conflicts invariably entailed competition over the 
favours of high-placed people in Istanbul or regional walis (through 
Traboulsi T02610 01 text   4 23/04/2012   08:06
THE EMIrATE Of MOUNT LEBANON (1523–1842) 5
bribes, gifts or military help). The traditional partisan form in the 
Arab East was the Qaysi/Yamani factionalism. In Mount Lebanon, 
this dichotomy – based on the supposed origin of the allied tribes 
from southern Arabia or Yemen – was later transformed into the 
Jumblatti–Arsalani cleavage within the Druze community.
Fifth, muqata`ji economic power was not limited to tax farming. 
They controlled land which they leased to peasant share-croppers 
for a share of the crops. In Mount Lebanon, landlord–peasant 
relations generated conflicts over rent and land ownership, and 
frequently erupted into violent peasant revolts.
fAKHr AL-dIN II, THE MErCHANT EMIr (1590–1633)
At the time of the Ottoman conquest of Syria in 1516, the greater 
part of the territories that would constitute present-day Lebanon was 
divided among a number of ethnic/tribal chiefs. The Tanukhs and 
the Arsalans, both Yemeni tribes, were brought by the Umayyads 
to defend the Mediterranean shores against Byzantine incursions. 
They settled on the western approaches of Beirut and later adopted 
the Druze faith. The `Assafs were the Turkomen Sunni rulers of 
Kisrawan and Beirut and the Sayfas, the Kurdish Sunni rulers of 
Tripoli and the north. In the southern Biqa`, the Sunni Shihabs ruled 
Wadi al-Taym and the Harfush were the Shi`i rulers of Ba`albak 
and the northern Biqa`. The Ma`ns were a South Arabian warrior 
tribe that had been invited by the Tanukhs to settle in Ba`aqlin; its 
chiefs soon became tax farmers of a few villages in the Shouf region. 
The early history of Ottoman rule in these parts of Syria was a 
series of rebellions, internecine fighting between the ethnic/tribal 
chiefs and local rulers, alliances and counter-alliances with the 
Ottoman authorities against the other/s, and frequent invitations 
to European powers seeking a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean 
to intervene in the conflicts. 
In 1518, the Ma`ns participated in the rebellion of the Sunni 
tribal sheikh Muhammad Ibn al-Hanash in the western Biqa`, which 
aimed at the restoration of the Mamluks. Three Ma`n chiefs were 
captured in the ensuing Ottoman punitive campaign, many of the 
rebels were beheaded, villages were plundered and women and 
children were taken captive. Not long after, the Ma`ns rallied to 
the Otomans to fight the Harfushs, allies of the Safavid rulers of 
Persia and bitter enemies of the Ottomans. Thus the Ma`n chieftain, 
Fakhr al-Din bin ̀ Uthman bin Mulhim (1516–1544) was appointed 
multazim of the Shouf; he became later emir liwa’ or sanjakbey, of 
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the sanjaks of Sidon–Beirut and Safad (in Palestine).1 However, the 
people of Mount Lebanon were soon on the path of revolt again 
and remained so for long decades to come. They were only pacified 
in 1585 after a major expedition by Ibrahim Pasha, the governor 
of Egypt, allegedly related to the theft, along the coastal road to 
Tripoli, of Egyptian tribute on its way to Istanbul. Qurqumaz Ma`n, 
emir of the Druze at that time (1544–84) fled from the punitive 
campaign to the Tyron cave (near Niha), where he died in 1584.
Qurqumaz’s son Fakhr al-Din Ma`n (born 1572), known as 
Fakhr al-Din II, took over after his father’s death. In 1590, he 
was appointed multazim of the Druze mountain by the wali of 
Damascus, then emir liwa’ of the sanjak of Sidon–Beirut. However, 
Fakhr al-Din joined forces with the Kurdish leader and governor of 
Aleppo, ̀ Ali Janbulad (later Jumblatt), as the latter rose in rebellion 
against the Ottomans in 1605–07. Janbulad was defeated and Fakhr 
al-Din managed to remain in power thanks to large bribes paid to 
the wali of Damascus. 
`Ali Janbulad’s rebellion was backed by Tuscany, the main 
European power active in the eastern Mediterranean. Catholic 
missionaries had began their activity among the Maronites of 
Mount Lebanon and Mansur ̀ Assaf, the ruler of Kisrawan, had put 
the Maronites under his protection and appointed a Maronite from 
the Hubaysh family as his mudabbir (secretary, adviser and educator 
of his children). Fakhr al-Din inherited the Tuscan connection from 
Janbulad, adopted the Khazins of Kisrawan as mudabbirs and 
established close ties with the ruling Medicis of Tuscany, who sent 
him arms and ammunitions. Pope Gregory XIII addressed a letter 
to the Maronite patriarch requesting that his community side with 
Fakhr al-Din in future wars.
Periods of rebellion would alternate with periods of service to the 
Sultanate. When the Sayfas took over Kisrawan and Beirut following 
the decline of the power of the `Assafs, the governor of Damascus 
called upon Fakhr al-Din to regain those territories. He enlisted the 
support of the Harfushs and expelled the Sayfas from Kisrawan and 
Beirut; he and was rewarded by receiving the sanjak of Safad and 
was charged with keeping its Shi`as and bedouin inhabitants under 
control.2 Strengthened by his alliance with Tuscany, Fakhr al-Din 
had by then an army of some 30,000 troops and controlled 30 forts 
in the region. He proceeded to dominate the Hawran plain and the 
Golan in southern Syria. In 1611 he sent Maronite Bishop Jirjis to 
conclude an anti-Ottoman alliance with Tuscany and the Holy See. 
News of the mission reached Istanbul and Ahmad Pasha al-Hafiz, 
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wali of Damascus, was ordered to pacify the Syrian coast. Fakhr 
al-Din fled just in time to Tuscany with his retinue. He was replaced 
by his brother Yunis Ma`n who managed to evade the Ottoman 
punitive expedition by paying a large indemnity. But the Ma`ns lost 
their authority over the coast and their status was reduced to the 
iltizam of the Shouf.
During the five years of his Italian exile, spent mainly in post-
Renaissance Florence (1613–18), the Lebanese emir studied life in 
the Italian city-states. He especially admired the banks, the central 
treasury, the local judicial system and the organisation of the militia. 
Although the Medicis were on the decline, Florence’s Cosimo II 
(1590–1621), the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and his suzerain Spanish 
king, Philip III, considered the Arab emir as a major asset in their 
plans to extend their influence to the eastern Mediterranean. 
Upon his return in September 1618, Fakhr al-Din set about to 
reaffirm his control over Mount Lebanon and regain the territories 
he had lost. This was a time when Sultan Othman II was occupied 
with consolidating his rule after taking power in a palace coup. By 
1621, Fakhr al-Din had taken control of Bsharri and subdued its 
Maronite muqaddams. Luckily for the Ma`n emir, Othman II was 
overthrown by the Janissary corps in 1622, just as he was about to 
launch a campaign against Mount Lebanon. In 1623, Fakhr al-Din 
had wrested control of `Akkar from the Sayfas and advanced into 
Safita and beyond in the Hums and Hama region (Tripoli fell to him 
later, in 1633). Having achieved full control over Mount Lebanon, 
Fakhr al-Din moved against the Harfushs and seized the Biqa`. The 
wali of Damascus, Mustafa Pasha, the Harfushs and the Sayfas 
joined forces against him but were defeated in November 1623 in 
the battle of ̀ Anjar, in which Mustapha Pasha was captured. Fakhr 
al-Din besieged the seat of the Harfush in Ba`lbak (which he later 
entered and destroyed), and had his men loot the Biqa` and plunder 
its agricultural produce. Finally, he agreed to release the wali of 
Damascus in return for the restoration of the Palestinian regions 
of Safad, `Ajlun and Nablus to his authority.3
Fakhr al-Din had gone too far in his expansion and was a threat 
to Damascus. Moreover, he was seeking military and financial help 
from the Tuscans for his project to finally secede from Ottoman 
rule. Following their military successes against the Persians in 1629, 
the Ottomans turned their attention to punishing and controlling 
the Syrian rebels, Fakhr al-Din at their head. In 1633, Kutshuk 
Pasha was appointed governor of Damascus with the express task 
of eliminating the Druze emir. When Kutshuk Pasha’s forces moved 
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against Fakhr al-Din, the Tuscans failed to come to his aid and 
Fakhr al-Din surrendered. He was brought to Istanbul in chains 
and decapitated on 13 April 1635.
Fakhr al-Din’s main achievement was the introduction of silk 
production to Mount Lebanon as a cash product for export to 
the Italian city-states. For that purpose, he encouraged Christian 
peasants, mainly Maronite, to emigrate from the settled northern 
parts of Mount Lebanon (especially in Kisrawan) to the Druze-
controlled regions, where they engaged in silk cultivation and other 
agricultural and artisanal occupations considered unworthy by the 
majority of the Druze.4 In addition, Druze muqata`jis and warrior 
families began expelling Shi`as from the villages on the frontiers of 
Druze territory, in the western Biqa` and the Iqlims, and settling 
Christian peasants in their place.5 Thus was launched a process 
that would have a lasting impact on the history of Mount Lebanon, 
gradually changing the social demography of the southern, Druze 
part of the area by transforming it into a Christian–Druze ‘mixed 
region’ in which the Christians would ultimately become a majority.
Intimately related to his introduction of silk production was the 
emir’s encouragement of foreign merchants to settle in his emirate. 
For this purpose, he attracted European merchants trading with 
the Empire to his emirate by constructing a travellers’ inn for them 
(Khan al-Faranj) in Sidon. Alhough Sidon remained his capital, 
Fakhr al-Din selected Beirut as a winter residence, enlarged its port 
and built a castle and a fort in it. The emir was a silk merchant in 
his own right. In one instance in 1631 we are told that he sent the 
Maronite Ibrahim al-Haqallani to Florence with 45 bales of silk. 
He offered one bale to Cardinal de Medici and sold the remaining 
44; the proceeds were deposited in the Monte de Pieta bank in the 
names of Fakhr al-Din and his three sons.
Fakhr al-Din was succeeded by his nephew Mulhim bin Yunus bin 
Qurqumaz (1635–58), who was appointed by the Ottomans to rule 
the five nahiyas of the Shouf, in addition to the Gharb, the Jurd, the 
Matn and Kisrawan. His reign lasted for 20 years. Upon his death 
those same regions were granted as an iltizam to Fakhr al-Din’s 
grandson, Ahmad Ma`n (1658–97) who followed his grandfather’s 
tradition of exploiting Ottoman weakness to seek autonomy. This 
time it was the military reversal on the Hungarian front (1683–99) 
that prompted him to take up arms. Ahmad managed to escape 
arrest by a punitive campaign and died without a male heir, thus 
ending the Ma`n dynasty. Summoned by the Ottomans to elect a 
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new ruler, the Druze muqata`jis, meeting in Simqaniyeh, could not 
agree on one from among themselves and chose Bashir Shihab, a 
Sunni emir and relative of the Ma`ns from Wadi al-Taym in the 
southern Biqa`.
THE CENTrALIsING POWEr Of BAsHIr sHIHAB II
During the early periods of Shihab rule (1697–1788) Mount 
Lebanon was marginalised and the Ottoman Pashas of Sidon, 
Acre and Damascus exercised direct control over the area, playing 
Shihabi factions competing for power against each other. Bashir 
I (1697–1707) should be mainly remembered for pursuing Fakhr 
al-Din’s efforts to extend the authority of the Lebanese Emirate 
to Jabal `Amil and Palestine. The rule of his successor Haydar 
Shihab (1707–32) achieved the final victory of the Qaysis, led by 
the Shihabs, over their Yamani challengers, led by the ̀ Alam al-Din 
family, in the battle of `Ayn Dara in 1711. Haydar extended his 
control over Bsharri (then ruled by the Shi`i Hamadeh family), 
Batrun, Jbeil, the Biqa`, and Jabal al-Rihan (the southern Shouf) 
and reorganised the muqata`ji system by redistributing the districts 
among the chiefs of his victorious faction. Upon Haydar’s death 
there began an interlude of Druze internal strife over his succession, 
exploited by the strong rulers of Acre, Dhahir al-`Umar (1750–75) 
and his successor Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar (1775–1804), to extend 
their control over Mount Lebanon.
Bashir Shihab II (1788–1840) took over power with the help of 
Jazzar, while supported locally by the chief Druze leader Bashir 
Jumblatt. Of humble origins, Bashir Shihab began his political life 
at the court of his cousin Yusuf in Dayr al-Qamar, but soon married 
Princess Shams, the rich widow of a distant cousin from Hasbaya, 
and stood as a candidate for the Emirate. Thus began his long 
and bloody rise to power; the assassinations of his rivals and the 
repression of opponents earning him the title of the ‘Red Emir’. 
In 1797, Bashir played off the Imad and Jumblatt clans against 
the Abu Nakad muqata`ji family, who were backing the sons of 
Emir Yusuf, his rivals for the princedom. Five young Abu Nakads 
were killed and their house in Dayr al-Qamar looted and burnt. 
At that time, the Sa`d al-Khoury family formed the first political 
leadership for the Christians in southern Mount Lebanon, an 
area which had been hitherto deprived of any form of political 
representation. Sheikh Sa`d (1722–86) and his son Ghandur had 
been attached to the service of Emir Yusuf. Sa`d’s nephew, Girgis 
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Baz (1768–1807), a Maronite from Dayr al-Qamar, would become 
the most illustrious of Christian mudabbirs. Regent to Yusuf’s sons, 
Husayn and Sa`d al-Din (governors of the Shouf and of Jbeil), Baz 
became the real holder of power in the Mountain during the violent 
struggles for supremacy among the Druze chiefs. His authority 
was further consolidated by his successful military campaigns to 
repulse the Hamadehs from Jbeil, subject the Sunni chiefs in ̀ Akkar 
and Dhunniya, and overcome the Ansaris of the Alawite region 
in northern Syria. Girgis Baz was close to the Maronite patriarch 
Tiyan and played a major role in the rise of Christian influence in 
the Emirate. Furthermore, the authority exercised by Baz and Bashir 
Jumblatt on their respective communities prefigured the emergence 
of sectarian leaderships, Maronite and Druze, at the expense of the 
multi-communitarian Qaysi–Yamani factionalism.6 To crown his 
struggle for power, Bashir Shihab had Girgis Baz and his brother 
`Abd al-Ahad assassinated and in 1807, he managed to neutralise 
the three sons of Emir Yusuf by blinding them. Then he turned 
against the other Druze muqata`jis: the Arsalans, Talhuq, Imads 
and `Abd al-Malik. Thus, the Maronites were for a time excluded 
from the post of mudabbir to the emir which was held by a Catholic 
Christian, while real power shifted to the temporary alliance of the 
two Bashirs: Bashir Shihab and Bashir Jumblatt.
The Antiliyas and Lihfid communes
The commoners’ tax revolt (`ammiya) of 1820–21 was the first 
serious affront to the centralising policy of Bashir II, and the 
muqata`ji order in general. Representatives of Christians, Sunnis, 
Shi`a and Druze, meeting in Mar Iliyas church in Antiliyas, the 
‘border’ between the two parts of Mount Lebanon, vowed ‘not to 
betray one another and to struggle together for the common good’. 
They demanded tax reductions (Bashir collected 9 million piastres 
in taxes of which he retained 5 million), the payment of only one 
combined tax at the end of the silk season and the ‘suspension of 
other injustices’. The revolt of 1820–21 signalled the introduction of 
the commoners into the political life of the Emirate and constituted 
the first challenge to the old modes of political allegiances and 
alliances. It was opposed by the majority of the Druze and Christian 
manasib, who, though opposed to Bashir II, refused to participate 
in the revolt under the leadership of Christian commoners. The 
latter were led by wakils, elected delegates of the villages, who 
were held accountable by the villagers and could be recalled by 
them. They would play a major role in the destabilisation of the 
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muqata`ji system.7 In all cases, the revolt that swept the Shouf, 
Matn, Kisrawan, Batrun and Jbeil regions was powerful enough to 
force Bashir II to seek refuge in Hawran for a year. Upon his return, 
he ensured the defection of a number of sheikhs and convinced the 
rebels of the Shouf and the Matn to lay down their arms in return 
for rich merchants paying their tax dues in their place. But the 
revolt was rekindled in the northern districts of Kisrawan, Jbeil, 
Batrun and `Akkar under the leadership of two intellectuals who 
had collaborated to write a history of Mount Lebanon: Archbishop 
Yusuf Istfan (1759–1823), founder and director of the famous 
Maronite college at `Ayn Waraqa, and the writer Abu Khattar 
al-`Anturini. Bashir Jumblatt rallied to the help of the Shihab emir 
and their joint forces marched upon the rebels. They engaged in a 
heroic resistance as they retreated to Lihfid, in the Jbeil highlands, 
where they led their final battle. `Anturini died under torture in 
Bashir’s prison while Yusuf Istfan was poisoned during a visit to 
Bashir in his Bayt al-Din palace. 
The break between the two Bashirs
Nevertheless, the alliance of the two Bashirs did not long survive 
the crushing of the commoners’ revolt. Their rupture, in 1825, 
constituted a decisive turning point in the history of the Emirate 
and a temporary victory for the centralising policy of Bashir Shihab, 
finally overcoming the last powerful Druze lord. Having mercilessly 
suppressed the northern Christian commoners, Shihab – having now 
officially converted to Christianity – relied on the numerical power 
of the Christians in the south to overcome the Druze muqata`jis. 
Jumblatt opposed him in the name of Muslim Ottoman identity and 
inticed the Ottomans against him as a Christian ruler holding power 
in the Muslim empire. The regional context of this confrontation 
was a power struggle between the Ottoman walis of Damascus and 
Acre: Jumblatt rallied Damascus to his side, while Shihab remained 
committed to his alliance with Acre. Finally, Shihab had the wali of 
that city lure Jumblatt to Acre where he was arrested and decapitated. 
With Bashir Jumblatt out of the way, the Druze muqata`jis were 
disposessed of their fiefs and a number of them went into exile to 
Hawran. Of the twelve seigneurial domains in the southern districts, 
only two remained in the hands of Druze lords. The rest were 
taken over by Bashir and distributed among his relatives. On the 
other hand, Bashir drew closer to the Maronite Church, already an 
impressive economic, social and cultural institution under its new 
patriarch, Yusuf Hubaysh (1823–45).
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Lebanon under Egyptian rule (1831–40)
Muhammad `Ali Pasha, the wali of Egypt, was summoned by 
Sultan Muhammad II to participate in the military campaign of the 
Sultanate against the Greek rebellion for independence. Although 
the Greeks finally achieved their goal and defeated the Sultan’s 
forces, Muhammad ̀ Ali was to be compensated by the Porte for his 
troubles. He asked for Syria but was offered Crete; he sent his army, 
commanded by his son Ibrahim, to take Syria. When the Egyptian 
troops besieged Acre, Ibrahim Pasha sought Bashir’s help. Reluctant 
at first, Bashir nevertheless put his armed men in the service of the 
Egyptians in their battles to occupy Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, Tripoli and 
finally Damascus, as the whole of Syria fell to Egyptian rule. As the 
Egyptian forces threatened Istanbul, the Porte recognised Ibrahim 
as ruler of Syria. However, it also started to prepare a counter-
offensive backed by Britain, the fierce enemy of Muhammad `Ali, 
who enjoyed extensive French support.
In Syria, Ibrahim Pasha followed the policies his father had 
drawn up for Egypt. He strengthened the administration, tried to 
fight corruption, set up representative councils in towns and cities, 
treated Christians and Muslims equally and encouraged industry 
and international trade. But he was especially interested in Mount 
Lebanon’s sericulture which he developed, declaring silk imports a 
State monopoly and establishing one scale for silk for all of Mount 
Lebanon, located in Beirut. For this purpose, Beirut’s port was 
enlarged and the city developed and provided with a council to 
run its affairs. 
Egyptian rule was contested from the beginning by the Druze 
manasib. The 1838 Druze revolt in Hawran led by Shibli al-`Aryan 
spread to the Biqa` and Wadi al-Taym and was soon joined by the 
`Imads and Jumblatts. To counter it, Ibrahim Pasha distributed 
arms to the Christians and asked Bashir to send his son Khalil to 
lead 4,000 armed Christians to fight the rebellion. It was the first 
time that the inhabitants of the Lebanese territories confronted 
each other on a sectarian basis. Defeated, the Druze rebels waged 
their last battle at Shib`a on the slopes of Mount Hermon. The 
next year, the Shi`a of Jabal `Amil rebelled and were also quelled 
with the help of Bashir’s forces. However, Ibrahim Pasha alienated 
wider sectors of the population with his exorbitant taxes, forced 
labour and military conscription. Revolts against him broke out 
in Palestine, Tripoli and northern Syria. Afraid that the Christians 
would be encouraged to join the Druze and Muslims in revolt 
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against Egyptian rule, Ibrahim Pasha asked Bashir to disarm the 
Christians. That put them on the trail of revolt.
The inhabitants of Dayr al-Qamar were summoned to hand over 
their arms; they refused and rebelled, both Christians and Druze, 
under the leadership of their Abu Nakad lords. In June 1840, repre-
sentatives of the Maronites, Druze, Sunnis and Shi`a met in Antiliyas 
and launched their rebellion against the Egyptians and Bashir. They 
called for a tax reduction, and demanded the abolition of the corvée 
(in the iron mines), the restitution of firearms, the abolition of 
Bashir’s monopoly over soap production, administrative reform, 
and the representation of the religious communities in the council 
(diwan) at Bayt al-Din. This last demand was directly aimed at 
the authority of the Druze manasib and contributed to alienating 
many of them from the revolt. Though some muqata`ji families 
joined the rebellion in the hope of regaining their privileges, the 
revolt was mainly organised around popular chiefs, the sheikhs 
shabab, and directed by a council of wakils in which the manasib 
sat side by side with the elected commoners. But the Church was 
reluctant to support the uprising, clinging to the Shihab Emirate and 
taking into consideration France’s support for Bashir and Ibrahim 
Pasha. Patriarch Hubaysh blessed the rebellion two months after its 
inception as its first wave was defeated by the forces of Bashir and 
the Egyptian pasha. The second phase was launched in September 
in support of the foreign military intervention of mid-July. Beirut 
was bombarded by Ottoman warships and Ottoman, British and 
Austrian sea-borne troops landed in Juniyeh, signalling the end 
of Egyptian rule in Syria. In October 1840, the Egyptian troops 
withdrew to Acre and Bashir was arrested and exiled to Malta. 
Paradoxically, the Christians, the great beneficiaries of the Emirate, 
had nevertheless contributed to its downfall. 
The patriarch’s programme
The Emirate did not outlast Bashir II for long. Appointed by the 
foreign powers, Bashir Milhim Qasim, now known as Bashir III, 
ruled for no more than one year and six months. Returning from 
exile, the Druze sheikhs tried to regain their domains and power 
over their Christian subjects, and faced the hostility of the new 
prince as well as the resistance of the Christians. Conflicts over 
landed property broke out everywhere and dominated the entire 
period. The inhabitants of Dayr al-Qamar obstructed the return 
of the Abu Nakads to their town, while the inhabitants of Jizzin 
forcibly expelled the agents of the Jumblatt family from their region. 
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Nevertheless, the Ottoman authorities and the British stood firm in 
support of Druze property ‘rights’. 
Although the Christian Emirate was now dead, it became 
transformed into a banner under which many Maronites would 
rally for decades to come. Patriarch Hubaysh supported Bashir 
III out of fear of a Muslim replacement and made the first serious 
attempt to unite the community around a common political 
programme. In October 1840, he addressed a memorandum to 
the Porte demanding that a Shihab Maronite prince rule Mount 
Lebanon, appointed for life by the Sultan and assisted by a Maronite 
mudabbir and twelve councillors representing the different sects, 
all elected for a period of three years. The prince would exercise 
his judiciary powers ‘according to the Law and after investigation’, 
and torture would be abolished. On the other hand, the right to 
judge and punish the Maronite clergy would become the exclusive 
prerogative of the Maronite patriarch, who would have a special 
representative in Istanbul. The patriarch’s memorandum reiterated 
the demand for a unified land tax and the abolition of the corvée. 
More importantly, it raised the demand that the Sultanate recognise 
France’s protection of the Maronites. In support of his programme, 
in March 1841, Hubaysh convened the Maronite notables from 
all regions of Mount Lebanon who vowed to remain united ‘in 
Christian love’ and renewed their allegiance to the Sultan. In order 
to assure the unity of the community, the programme established 
a delicate compromise between its two main social components. 
While respecting the titles and ranks of the manasib ‘according to 
tradition’, it called for the nomination of wakils for all regions of 
Mount Lebanon whose task would be to ‘reform and educate the 
people’.8 Thus the role of this popular representative institution was 
distorted: rather than represent the people, it should henceforth 
educate them. 
In fact, Hubaysh’s programme was a repetition of the main 
articles of the Ottoman centralisng and modernising reforms, the 
renowned Tanzimat, promulgated by the Sultan in his famous Edict 
of Gulhan in November 1839. Nevertheless, Hubaysh’s programme, 
based on the notion of the Christian majority, destabilised the 
established order in Mount Lebanon. The now-official Christian 
prince-ruler heralded the end of the Druze Emirate and deprived 
the Druze manasib of their main prerogative, the election of the 
Prince of Mount Lebanon, reducing Druze representation to a 
minority in the proposed consultative council. No wonder that the 
Druze manasib, more and more alienated by Bashir III’s hostility, 
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withdrew their support for the Shihab Emirate. In 1841, armed 
Druze attacked Bashir III in his palace in Dayr al-Qamar. Armed 
Christians hurried to his defence but were overcome. In response, 
Hubaysh called for a mass Christian uprising to take over power 
in the south. Significantly, the leadership of the Christian army, 
stationed in Ba`abda, was divided between sheikhs and wakils. 
The first group feared popular power and believed that the loss of 
power by the Druze sheikhs in the south would lead to the demise 
of the Christian sheikhs in the north. However, secret contacts 
between Christian and Druze sheikhs to form a united front against 
the commoners were offset by the patriarch, who threatened to 
excommunicate the sheikhs. They were later branded as ‘traitors’ 
by Tannus al-Shidyaq, a moderate Maronite historian. The fighting 
in 1841 ended inconclusively but it spelled the death of the Emirate. 
On 13 January 1842, the Porte declared the end of the special status 
of Mount Lebanon and appointed `Umar Pasha as governor. 
INEQUALITy Of OrIGINs TO UNEVEN dEVELOPMENT
The end of Egyptian rule in Syria was not only a military defeat 
for Muhammad `Ali Pasha, but also had important economic 
repercussions for the region: the victorious British did not impose 
free trade on Egypt alone, but on the whole of the Ottoman Empire. 
In fact, the 1840s signalled the entry of the Ottoman Empire into 
the world market, opening it up to European commodities and 
reducing customs duties to the bare minimum. The direct impact 
in Mount Lebanon was the transformation of the original uneven 
social locations of the Druze and Maronite communities into a 
pattern of uneven socio-economic development. By then, the 
Christians constituted a network of forces that were quickly eroding 
the Druze-dominated muqata`ji system. A brief social mapping of 
Mount Lebanon on the eve of the second half of the nineteenth 
century helps provide a clear picture of the major components of 
this process. 
At the basis of the developments of this entire period lies the 
effects of the expansion of the Maronites from the extreme north 
of Mount Lebanon toward the south that had began under Fakhr 
al-Din II and had been rapidly developing since. This contributed 
to the creation of an asymmetrical social system, in which the 
Druze primarily collected tributaries and served in the military 
and the Christians performed a wide number of peasant and 
artisan functions, with increasing commercial and financial weight. 
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There was also a distinction between the status of the Druze and 
Christian leadership. Salibi rightly notes that while the Maronite 
muqata`jis were tax collectors and quasi-feudal lords over their 
own co-religionists, the Druze sheikhs were primarily tax farmers 
and quasi-feudal lords over their Christian subjects. The Druze bloc 
was characterised by its cohesion, as it coalesced around a single 
sheikh, a Jumblatt, elected by all the manasib of the Shouf, and 
whose authority covered the entire community. More importantly, 
the political and social position enjoyed by the Druze sheikh implied 
a number of privileges and exemptions for his community. The 
large domains allotted to the Jumblatt family by the Porte were 
generally distributed among the various allied manasib; Druze 
commoners paid less taxes, if any; and all the Shouf benefited from 
the revenues collected by the Jumblatts from their domains outside 
this region. As early as the commoners’ revolts of 1820–21 and 
1840, the Christians were complaining about this inequality in the 
social division of labour and in taxation among the communities. 
A zajaliya (popular poem) by Father Yusuf al-Ma`luf complained of 
the injustice suffered by the Christians, peasant producers who paid 
taxes and were subject to impositions, while a large number of the 
Druze, mainly warriors and non-producers, benefited from many 
exemptions and privileges. This complex asymmetry served as the 
matrix upon which the sectarian system and sectarian mobilisation 
were built; both features would long preside over the destiny of 
Mount Lebanon. The main components of the Christian network 
were the peasantry, the merchant class and commercial towns, the 
mudabbirs and the clergy.
PEAsANTs, MErCHANTs, MUDABBIRs ANd CLErGy
sheikhs and peasants
In the principality of Mount Lebanon, the majority of the land 
was under the joint control of the Maronite Church (whose vast 
domains were exempted from taxation) and a limited number 
of big muqata`ji families. In the north, the Maronite Khazin and 
Hubaysh controlled 60 per cent of the lands of Kisrawan and a 
sizeable part of those of Batrun and Jbeil. In the south, the Jumblatts 
held, in addition to their iqta` in the Biqa`, most of the Shoufs 
(the lower and upper Shouf in addition to the Bayyadhi Shouf, 
covering most of the western Biqa`) and the Iqlims (of Jizzin, Tuffah, 
Rihan and Kharrub); in total some 100 villages, most of which were 
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inhabited by Christians.9 The rest of the lands were of two kinds: 
(1) ‘territories with an individual structure’ , as Jacques Weulersse 
calls them, which were either parcels of land cleared from a forest 
and mountainside by individual farmers, or were appropriated due 
to a form of tenant farming that allowed the tenant to own part 
of the plot of land he had been renting after six, eight or ten years’ 
uninterrupted cultivation of it;10 (2) the village commons (musha`), 
usually under the control of the muqata`jis. Thus, with the exception 
of a restricted number of small and middle-level agricultural owners, 
the majority of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon were landless 
peasants. This was the section of the population that produced 
tenant farmers, priests, hermits, agricultural workers, day labourers, 
artisans, muleteers, lumbermen, and so on. 
Share-cropping (sharaka) governed by yearly contracts constituted 
the main form of agricultural relations. Rent was paid in kind (a 
third or a quarter of the product) or in a mixture of rent in kind 
and monetary rent. Production was carried out inside ‘kin-ordered’ 
units in which social labour was allocated on the basis of family 
ties. Further, villages and towns specialised in different trades and 
handicrafts, such as bell production in Bayt Shabab, the making of 
silk ̀ abayas in Bayt al-Din or Zuq Mikhail, and tanning in Zahleh.
Tributary and rent-based relations coexisted with commercial 
activities, but not without contradiction. Merchants and middlemen 
frequently resorted to the muqata`jis in order to force peasants to 
deliver their share of the harvest or the payment of debts. A curious 
dialectic operated here: the exorbitant political rent imposed by the 
rulers on the merchants limited their scope of action and reduced 
their profits, but, on the other hand, the tendency of merchants 
to commercialise everything weakened the tribute system and 
increasingly submitted the muqata`jis to the whims of merchants 
and usurers.
As for the peasants, they were submitted to three levels of 
exploitation: tributary, rentier and commercial/usurer. Mikha’il 
Mashaqqa, an eyewitness of that period, said that 90 per cent of 
the silk harvest in Mount Lebanon (amounting to 1,500 quintals) 
was appropriated by the emirs, sheikhs, monasteries, middlemen 
and Beirut merchants and usurers, leaving a population of some 
300,000 people with no more than 10 per cent of the product of 
their toil.11 
Politically, while this system may not have been serfdom in the 
strict European feudal sense, it implied at least very strong political 
and military ties of dependence that bound the commoners to their 
Traboulsi T02610 01 text   17 23/04/2012   08:06
18 A HIsTOry Of MOdErN LEBANON
lords. In the seigneurial domain (the ̀ uhda), commoners were linked 
to the name of their lords by the ismiya. In a much larger context, 
factionalism (gharadhiya) mobilised blocs of seigneurial families 
and their subjects against other blocs. The inhabitants of Mount 
Lebanon, as was the case for most of Greater Syria, were divided 
into two major ‘parties’: the Qaysis, who claimed descent from the 
north Arabian tribes, and the Yamanis, who claimed descent from 
south Arabia. What was at stake in most of the factional struggles 
was, of course, the appropriation of the social surplus, the control 
of trade routes, of `uhdas, commercial centres and ports, or some 
lucrative commodity (coffee, cotton, silk, and so on).12
Mudabbirs
The asymmetry of the social formation of Mount Lebanon also 
entailed new forms of representation and leadership among the 
Maronites, notably in the regions where the Druze iqta` dominated. 
The mudabbir was the intellectual/administrative function by which 
Christians, more privileged in clerical and missionary education, 
achieved social mobility and avoided the many rigid constraints of 
the muqata`ji order. Private secretary, tutor of the children of the 
emir, sheikh or governor, treasurer and administrator of the domains 
of his master, the mudabbir was a trade based on merit earned 
through a multiplicity of economic, social and political functions. 
Initially, this post helped constitute the Maronite iqta` in the northern 
part of the country and also aided in the accumulation of merchant 
capital, especially among Catholic and Greek Orthodox families. 
The Sa`d al-Khoury family, already mentioned in connection 
with Bashir Shihab, were by no means the only mudabbirs in 
Mount Lebanon. Joseph Qassis and Joseph Diyab served the ruler 
of Acre, Zhahir al-`Umar. Ibrahim Sabbagh, the Sakroujs and the 
Mashaqqas, all Greek Catholic, took turns in serving his redoubtable 
successor, Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar of Acre. Among them were also 
Maronite families – the Iddis, and Jewish ones – the Farhis. Ibrahim 
Mashaqqa, father of Mikha’il, at the apex of his influence under 
Jazzar, collected taxes from some 300 villages and farms in Jabal 
`Amil for eight years, before being expropriated and expelled by 
Jazzar. He took refuge in Dumiyat, Egypt, and then went to Dayr 
al-Qamar, where he served Emir Bashir II as his mudabbir. Abu 
`Assaf Rizq Allah al-Khoury was secretary to `Ali Jumblatt and 
managed his properties in Jizzin and Iqlim al-Rihan. His son, Abu 
Shakir, inherited his father’s post at the service of `Ali Jumblatt’s 
successor, Sa`id. 
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In addition to its role in socio-economic promotion, the function 
of mudabbir was a hotbed for both the production of new leaders 
and notables, as in the case of the Iddis and the Khourys, and of a 
middle class of functionaries and members of the liberal professions. 
Merchants and merchant communes
The rise of a Christian middle class, another effect of the asymmetric 
social structure was the product of the extension of commercial 
production, mainly due to sericulture, the differentiation of the 
peasantry, and the development of commerce, finance and artisan 
production. 
In fact, Mount Lebanon, Syria and Palestine were already 
economically interdependent thanks to a network of trade exchanges 
centred on the supply of staples and livestock, the provision of raw 
materials and the circulation of artisan products. Mount Lebanon 
imported its cereals and livestock from the Biqa` and the north 
of Bilad al-Sham (the Syrian interior). Nablus, in Palestine, also 
exported cereals and livestock to Mount Lebanon and furnished 
Hasbaya with cotton for its looms. In return, Mount Lebanon 
furnished raw silk to the Damascus weavers. Zahleh merchants 
exported cereals to Damascus, Beirut and Mount Lebanon and 
received livestock from nomadic tribes which had been brought 
from Iraq and Palestine. 
The Christian artisanal/commercial towns lying at the intersection 
of commercial routes or linking the interior to the exterior were the 
vital points in this network. Progressively, they came to control an 
ever-expanding space of villages and farms and sap the foundations 
of muqata`ji power on which they depended. Both lords and peasants 
became ever more financially dependent on the towns and cities and 
indebted to their merchants and moneylenders. 
In Kisrawan and Jbeil, a trend emerged for merchants and 
moneylenders to invest part of their wealth in land. By the 
mid-nineteenth century, Zuq Mikhail, a mainly Greek Catholic 
town, possessed 150–300 weaving looms and distributed its 
products on a large scale. Along with its sister town, Juniyeh, it 
constituted a market for the whole region. ̀ Amshit, on the coast of 
Jbeil, developed outside muqata`ji suzerainty and was associated 
with the name of the Tubiya Zakhya, the partner of the Asfars, 
one of the oldest merchant families in Beirut and creditors to the 
Khazins. Zakhya lent money to peasants at a 12 per cent interest 
and provided silk eggs at double their price, to be repaid in kind in 
the form of raw silk at half its market price. He thus appropriated 
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the lands of peasants and farmers and soon became the biggest 
landowner in the Jbeil region. David Urquhart, who visited Zakhya, 
estimated his wealth at 5 million piastres and considered him a 
representative of the ‘rising Third Estate’.13
Dayr al-Qamar with 8,000 inhabitants was the most senior 
of the Mountain communes. A relay point on the route between 
Sidon, Damascus and the Syrian hinterland since the seventeenth 
century, it constituted a centre for the collection of raw silk, which 
its merchants exported to the Italian city-states and then to France 
starting in the eighteenth century. It was also a centre for weaving 
‘Arab silk’ and cotton and for the manufacture of traditional 
`abayas, worn by the sheikhs, not to speak of its role as a market for 
cereals and livestock. As an administrative centre, usually exempt 
from the payment of taxes, Dayr al-Qamar prospered and reinforced 
its autonomy under Bashir II, who expropriated its Druze lords, 
the Abu Nakad, and distributed their property and households 
among his Christian followers. But the affluence of the Christians 
had already sapped the authority of the Abu Nakad who were 
havily indebted and sold many of their properties to their Christian 
creditors. And at the end of Bashir’s reign, the inhabitants of Dayr 
al-Qamar already ruled themselves through a ‘council of twelve’ 
and had a militia of several hundred armed men at their disposal.14 
Jizzin was an ancient Shi`i agglomeration, progressively inhabited 
by Christians; however, 37 of its 43 villages and farms belonged to 
the Druze Jumblatts. Its Christian population benefited from the 
calamities suffered by their Druze lords in their attempts to take 
over their lands, with the resulting conflicts over tax arrears, shares 
of crops and land property. These exploded when the Jumblatts 
returned from Hawran after the fall of Bashir II, as the inhabitants 
of Jizzin forcibly expelled the agents of the clan from their region. 
In the southeastern part of the Biqa`, Rashaya and Hasbaya 
(some 60 kilometres southwest of Damascus) were two commercial/
artisanal enclaves under Druze control. Their Christian subjects 
progressively came to own the parcels of land they cultivated under 
the muqasama system of share-cropping, and their wealth became 
a ‘temptation for the Druze, whose villages formed like a circle of 
fire around the two localities’.15 
The way the town of Zahleh was constituted is a typical example 
of the birth of the communes in the domains of the iqta`. Situated on 
the borders of a tributary of the Litani, with its back leaning on the 
eastern slopes of Mount Lebanon, the mainly Greek Catholic town 
occupied an intermediary position between the Mountain and the 
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Plain, a position that would command its destiny. Originally, Zahleh 
was a Druze agglomeration of three seigneurial closures (hawch) in 
the domain of the Abil-l-Lama`, Druze lords of the Matn converted 
to the Maronite faith during the nineteenth century. Beginning in the 
mid-eighteenth century, peasants, artisans and shepherds who were 
principally Greek Catholic took refuge in Zahleh from Hawran, the 
Biqa` and the Matn and were put under the protection of its Druze 
lords. Its Christian population soon became a majority and indulged 
in commercial and artisanal activities, in addition to cultivating the 
lands of the Abi-l-Lama`s while preserving a hierarchical family 
and tribal structure, inherited from Bedouin society in Hawran. 
In the nineteenth century, Zahleh was already an important multi-
functional commercial centre for wheat grinding and supply to the 
Bedouins of the Plain, as well as a key cereal market for Mount 
Lebanon. Its merchants bought cereals from Hawran, Hums and 
the Qalamun and supplied Damascus with wheat. On the other 
hand, armed caravans from Zahleh travelled as far as Baghdad and 
Mosul to buy livestock, horses and wool in order to sell them in 
Beirut, with which the Biqa` city was progressively linked from the 
1840s. The town was also an artisan centre for a prospering textile 
industry, exporting its products to Hawran, Hums and Nablus 
(which provided it with cotton and raw wool), in addition to, for 
example, tanning, shoemaking, arms manufacture, tailoring, the 
dyeing industry, `arak distilleries and molasses pressing. Under the 
direction of its ‘seven families’ of merchants/warriors and landlords, 
the armed people of Zahleh put themselves at the service of the emirs 
of the Mountain against their adversaries. This was their means of 
acceding to greater autonomy vis-à-vis their Abil-l-Lama` overlords 
and the dominant forces in the Plain: the walis of Damascus, and 
the Shi`i and Kurdish tribes that imposed their laws and exactions 
and threatened the security of caravan routes. A durable alliance 
had linked the people of Zahleh to Bashir II. The town’s rich lent 
him money and the poor fought on his side, in return for which 
the emir granted the town the right to self-administration. In 1825, 
the people of Zahleh exploited the conflict between Bashir Shihab 
II and Bashir Jumblatt to expel the remaining Druze families in 
their town.16 
Beirut, whose economic role slumped under the Mamluks, 
prospered under the Egyptians. The town greatly benefited from 
the political turmoil in the competing ports of Tripoli, Sidon and 
Acre to become the principal port of Damascus, linked to it by 
a road that was opened to carriages in 1856. Between 1827 and 
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1862, the value of goods transiting through Beirut increased 800 
per cent. Its population increased more than four times in 25 years, 
from 6,000 inhabitants in 1830 to 25,000–50,000 in 1860. Its 
Christian population, which had tripled in 20 years (between 1840 
and 1860), had already become half of its population. ‘A wealthy 
class of Christians reside here, whose habits, both as regards dress 
and the consumption of other luxuries of civilised societies, exceed 
those of the generality of their countrymen’,17 wrote a British consul.
Raw silk was Beirut’s main export, accounting for a quarter of the 
value of its trade. Between 1840 and 1860, commercial capital 
in Beirut started to invest in silk reeling. In addition to the Asfar 
family, Levantine families such as the Sursuq, big landowners and 
merchants of silk and staple exporters, settled on Beirut beginning 
in mid-eighteenth century; the Bustrus, importers of manufactured 
products from Manchester, were represented in the city’s council 
under the Egyptians; the Fayyad, Jbeili, Naccache and Pharaon 
families also rose in social rank in Beirut. In 1840, the Bayhums, 
creditors to the Druze sheikhs, established the first Sunni Muslim 
trading house in the city. After 1840, foreign merchants came back 
in force but commercial leadership had already passed into the hands 
of the locals.18 British goods invaded the region from Beirut’s port 
and led to the collapse of the traditional textile industry. Merchants 
strengthened their positions by playing the role of intermediaries 
between foreign traders, on the one hand, and the peasants and 
the domestic market, on the other.19 During these years, interest on 
moneylending to peasants reached 40 per cent; it had not surpassed 
20 per cent under the Egyptians. In the city, the representation of 
the new social interests in Beirut slowly but surely slipped into the 
hands of the Maronite Church.
The Maronite Church
By the mid-nineteenth century, the Maronite Church had already 
become an important player in the political life of Mount Lebanon. 
Three major developments contributed to this development. 
First, the Maronite Church had become an impressive economic 
force in the life of Mount Lebanon. To begin with, it was the biggest 
landowner in the region, dominating at least a third of all the lands 
of Mount Lebanon, with its waqfs and some of the richest and 
largest lands owned by a large network of monastic orders and 
convents that had come under its control. In addition, the convents 
performed a number of extra-religious functions; they were artisan 
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centres for a wide variety of jobs like silk reeling, weaving, building, 
milling, and also housed schools, libraries and centres for copying, 
printing and bookmaking.20
Second, in the 1840s, the patriarchal see was moved from the 
Qannubin valley in the upper north of the Bisharri region to Bkirki 
in the heart of Kisrawan, signalling the extension of the Church’s 
influence to the southern parts of the country.
Third, as a reflection of the social mobility inside the Maronite 
community, in 1854, Bulus Mas`ad was the first cleric of common 
descent to be elected patriarch, breaking a long-established tradition 
of muqata`ji family monopoly over the patriarchal seat. His election, 
opposed by the manasib of the north, was acclaimed by popular 
demonstrations in support of the ‘patriarch of justice and equality’. 
A learned man educated by the Jesuits at the Propaganda School in 
Rome during the Catholic counter-offensive against Protestantism 
and the ideals of the French Revolution, the new patriarch was 
mainly attached to the purity of the Catholic doctrine. He had been 
the right-hand man of Patriarch Hubaysh when the latter launched 
his campaign against the ‘Protestant heresy’. Mas’ad possessed all 
the prerequisites to become a major actor in the events to come.
However, it would take 20 years of toil, blood and tears for the 
muqata`ji system to finally collapse.
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The Bloody death of the Muqata`ji 
system (1842–1861)
The responsibility for [the war of 1860] does not fall at all on the commoners but 
all of the responsibility falls on the muqata`jis. We should not blame only one party 
for what it has committed against the other. Had the people of the Iqlim [of Jizzin] 
won over those of the shouf, they would have done the same.
(Shakir al-Khoury, Majma‘ al-Masarrat) 
Nobody wins in civil wars. The losers lose, the winners lose.
(Druze sheikh Husayn Talhuq on the ‘1860 events’) 
The end of the Emirate of Mount Lebanon spelled the death of 
its muqata`ji system as well. The double Qa’im maqamiya – a 
subdivision of an Ottoman wilayet – declared in early 1843 divided 
Mount Lebanon into two administrative regions, exacerbating the 
struggle over its identity. It provided the context for the Harakat, a 
series of commoners’ uprisings, muqata`ji pre-emptive strikes and 
civil fighting that lasted from 1841 to 1861, marking the bloody 
transition from the muqata`ji system to peripheral capitalism. The 
crumbling of the predominantly Druze muqata`ji system led to the 
end of Druze political supremacy over Mount Lebanon and the insti-
tutionalisation of the sectarian system of political representation. 
THE QA’IM MAQAMIYA, A sysTEM Of dIsCOrd
The idea of dividing Mount Lebanon between Christians and 
Druze was a compromise proposed by the Austrian Chancellor 
Metternich between the British and the Ottomans, who backed 
the Druze demand for a Muslim governor, and the French, who 
insisted on the return of the Shihab principality. Druze emir Ahmad 
Arsalan was appointed qa’im maqam of the mixed southern district 
and Christian emir Haydar Ahmad Abi-l-Lama` qa’im maqam of 
the predominantly Christian northern district.1 Each qa’im maqam 
was to be seconded by two wakils, a Druze and a Christian, who 
24
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exercised their judicial and fiscal authority over the members of 
their respective communities. 
Both parties contested the new arrangement. The Maronite 
Church demanded that the Christians in the Qa’im maqamiya 
of the south (now around 60 per cent of the population) be put 
under the jurisdiction of the Christian qa’im maqam of the north, 
wrenching them definitively from the authority of their Druze 
chieftains. The Druze, on their part, insisted on their traditional 
right to rule over the whole of Mount Lebanon. It did not take long 
before the Ottoman governor alienated both communities and the 
Druze chieftain Shibli al-`Aryan took once again the path of revolt 
in Wadi al-Taym and the Hawran, backed by the `Imads and the 
Jumblatts. The Christians, invited to join the revolt, did not budge: 
their condition was the return of the Shihab principality.2
The identity of the land
The declaration of the Qa’im maqamiya triggered a new wave of 
violence, centred on the question of the identity of the Mountain. 
A memorandum by the people of Zahleh to the French consul, 
Poujade, in 1843 spelled out the asymmetry between the forces in 
conflict and the relationship between communitarian belonging 
and social status: 
We are sure that the Druze attack us only because they are forced 
to do so by their muqata`jis, even by baton blows. In fact, as long 
as the leaders enjoy privileges and immunities, Lebanon will never 
enjoy peace … Peace may well be achieved between Druze and 
Christian peasants but not with their leaders, who will always 
acquire unacceptable prerogatives over our brothers.3 
This definition distinguishes between muqata`ji and peasant among 
the Druze, whereas ‘Christians’ is taken to be a generic term for 
commoners, all equally subject to the Druze muqata`jis. More 
importantly, the inhabitants of Zahleh called for a ‘return’ to what 
they called ‘the Christian origin of the territory’ by claiming that the 
Christians, ‘original inhabitants’ of Mount Lebanon, had received 
the Druze when they were expelled from Egypt.4 This is a curious 
inversion of historical reality as it was the inhabitants of Zahleh 
who came from the Upper Matn and the Ba`albak region and were 
themselves received by the Druze overlords of Zahleh and allowed 
to inhabit the town!5 In its extreme form, this desire to appropriate 
the territory culminated in a project to expel the Druze of Mount 
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Lebanon to Hawran, ‘the favourite dream of the Maronites since 
1840’, in the words of a French eyewitness who named the bishop 
of Beirut, Tubiya `Awn, as a principal initiator of that project.6
Having become a numerical minority in Mount Lebanon, 
the Druze were afraid of losing status and power to a Christian 
majority. Hence the paradoxes of the new situation: the Christians, 
a majority in Mount Lebanon, were nevertheless a minority in the 
context of the Ottoman Empire, while the Druze, having become a 
minority in what was called not so long ago ‘the Druze Mountain’, 
considered themselves part of an oppressed Islamic majority in the 
Empire. The violence of the Druze reaction expressed their fear of 
a subaltern majority, increasingly attached to the monetary sectors 
of the economy, threatening not only to overthrow the privileged 
status of a semi-aristocratic tribal minority, but also to deprive 
that community of ‘its’ territory. This explains both the power of 
attraction exercised by the Druze overlords over their co-religionists 
and the fierce fighting they engaged in.
Troubled years (1845–58)
The Porte intervened in force in 1845 to end a new round of Druze–
Christian fighting in the mixed districts of the south. In April of that 
year, responding to a Druze rally at Mukhtara, a massive Maronite 
attack was launched against the fief of the Jumblatts, destroying a 
number of Druze villages inan advance that was eventually stopped 
by the Ottoman troops. But the Druze regained the upper hand, 
benefiting from the tacit neutrality of the Ottoman authorities, and 
in retribution many more Christian villages were destroyed, with 
civilians paying the price. 
Istanbul dispatched Shekib Effendi to establish order, confirm the 
Ottoman occupation of Mount Lebanon and disarm its inhabitants. 
Furthermore, the Ottoman emissary declared the end of European 
consuls’ intervention in the affairs of Mount Lebanon. That 
reorganisation of the Qa’im maqamiya, known as the règlement 
of Shekib Effendi, should first be remembered as the legalisation of 
sectarian political representation in Mount Lebanon. Each Qa’im 
maqamiya was endowed with a council to assist in the collection of 
taxes and the administeration of justice. Each council, presided by a 
qa’im maqam, was composed of twelve members: a councillor and a 
judge representing each of the six religious communities: Maronite, 
Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Sunni Muslim and Shi`i 
Muslim. As the latter did not have the right to be represented by 
a judge, since all of the Sultanate’s Muslims were subject to Sunni 
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jurisdiction, the twelfth member would be the vice-qa’im maqam 
– a Maronite in the north and a Druze in the south. Both qa’im 
maqams were considered Ottoman government officials and subject 
to the authority of the wali of Sayda, while Jbeil, Zahleh and Dayr 
al-Qamar were granted the status of autonomous towns and put 
under an Ottoman governor. 
Shekib Effendi’s settlement only served to exacerbate rather than 
resolve the deep crisis of the muqata`ji system. Indeed, the councils 
and wakils constituted alternative institutions to muqata`ji power, 
but they by no means had the ability and means to overcome it. 
While a heavy blow was dealt to the Druze muqata`jis who were 
theoretically deprived of most of their fiscal and judicial functions, 
they were nevertheless compensated by the appointment of the heads 
of the five main Druze muqata`ji families as administrators of the 
districts of the southern Qa’im maqamiya. A wakil would exercise 
first-instance judicial functions and tax collection regarding his co-
religionists in each district. The Christian wakils in the southern 
region were to be chosen by the governor, after consultation with 
the clergy and the notables of the community. In the north, the 
institutions of the council and the wakil were not applied nor were 
the feudal ̀ uhdas reorganised as administrative units: the Ottoman 
Sultanate recognised sectarian and not social divisions and conflicts. 
Thus, while the Christian commoners were already represented in 
the council and held the post of wakil in the south, their northern 
co-religionists were left without any form of political representation, 
at the mercy of the Khazin and Hubaysh Maronite muqata`jis 
who effectively retained all their political and judicial functions in 
addition to their privileges, exactions and impositions. 
A series of overlapping and complicated conflicts dominated the 
years that followed. First, the inter-muqata`ji rivalries arose as the 
Khazins opposed Bashir Ahmad Abi-l-Lama`, qa’im maqam of the 
north (succeeding Emir Haydar Ahmad Abi-l-Lama`, who died in 
1854) and the powerful Druze leader Sa`id Jumblatt refused to 
recognise the authority of Amin Arslan, qa’im maqam of the south. 
The Druze–Ottoman clash on that issue led to a Druze armed revolt 
in 1852. When the Ottoman troops were defeated in the first round 
of fighting in Jabal al-Duruz, they enlisted Christians for support, 
further poisoning sectarian relations. 
Second, the muqata`jis of all sects not only resisted the Shekib 
Effendi règlement but tried by all means to preserve their declining 
economic and political power. In 1858 the Ottoman government 
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issued the Land Code with the intention of creating a peasant-led 
market economy that would maximise state revenues from taxes. 
Land registration in Mount Lebanon exacerbated conflict over 
land ownership and was sabotaged by the muqata`jis of both 
communities, as they had done with the earlier land registration of 
1846. Under the pressure of the European consuls (excepting the 
French), the Ottoman authorities agreed to defer its implementation.
Third, muqata`ji/commoner conflicts raged in particular in the 
mixed districts where the returnee Druze sheikhs, especially the Abu 
Nakad and Jumblatt, demanded that Christian commoners pay 
their tax arrears and return plots of land seized during the sheikhs’ 
absence. The situation was serious enough for a delegation from 
Jizzin, led by three clerics, to meet with the Ottoman authorities 
in Beirut in 1850 and convey the determination of the town’s 
inhabitants to collectively immolate themselves if nothing was done 
to reduce taxes owed and solve their conflicts with their Jumblatt 
overlords concerning land ownership. The Ottoman authorities 
agreed to slash the taxes to one-third of their initial value but refused 
to take any measures concerning landed property.
Fourth, in 1857, at least four major merchant towns had finally 
shaken off muqata`ji control and ran their affairs by elected councils 
in which merchants, silk producers and middlemen predominated. 
The towns of `Amchit in Bilad Jbeil and Ghazir in Kisrawan 
liberated themselves from the Khazins and the Hubaysh respectively. 
Dayr al-Qamar, the central Christian town in the Shouf, overthrew 
its Druze overlords, the Abu Nakad, and was run by two elected 
delegates, one Druze and one Christian. Finally, Zahleh declared 
itself an independent commune under the leadership of a council 
of eight notable families, expelled the appointee of qa’im maqam 
Bashir Ahmad and expropriated the rest of the properties of the 
Abi-l-Lama`. In order to completely free itself from muqata`ji 
control, the Catholic town in the Biqa` requested to be detached 
from Mount Lebanon altogether. The Ottoman authorities obliged 
and Zahleh was attached to the wilaya of Beirut in the summer of 
1859, then to the wilaya of Sayda.
These years also witnessed considerable social agitation in Europe 
and in the other Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In the latter, 
agrarian revolts were mixed with dissent against the Tanzimat, 
social movements and bread riots. An obscure peasant rebellion 
rocked the `Urqub region in the eastern mountains of Lebanon, 
leaving 200 people dead. Lattakiya in the north of Syria witnessed 
a large peasant revolt in 1858. Bread riots erupted in Aleppo and 
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its surrounding region in October 1859. In May of that year, the 
rioters pillaged the houses of the mufti of the city, its chief notable 
and the Ottoman governor. They also attacked the police chief, 
before looting the stores and forcing the authorities and merchants 
to distribute wheat and bread to the population for free. On 24 
and 25 October 1859, a strange reversal of the situation occurred 
when the rioters suddenly altered their targets and attacked twelve 
stores owned by Christian merchants, looting and burning them. 
Riots and acts of violence against foreign merchants and foreigners 
in general reached as far as the Arabian peninsula, where, in July 
1858, an angry populace attacked British merchants in Jeddah and 
invaded the French and British consulates.
These revolts and riots constituted the regional context for the 
events of 1858–60 in Mount Lebanon. The main protagonists were 
the two parties that suffered most from the Qa’im maqamiya: the 
Maronite commoners and peasants of the north, and the Druze 
muqata`jis of the south.7 The ensuing events and developments could 
be seen as a commoners’ revolt against the muqata`ji system that 
produced two different types of movements following the uneven 
social demography of Mount Lebanon: a social revolt of Christian 
commoners against Christian overlords in the north and a sectarian 
civil war between Christian commoners and Druze overlords in 
the southern mixed districts. Indeed, an eyewitness, the American 
missionary William Thomson, described the war as ‘simply a rising 
of the people against the wishes of the ruling classes, on all sides’.8
THE COMMONErs’ rEVOLT Of KIsrAWAN
The Khazins’ opposition to qa’im maqam Bashir Ahmad Abi-l-Lama` 
was the spark that ignited the commoners revolt against the iqta` 
of Kisrawan. In fact, Kisrawan was already the ‘weakest link’ 
in the muqata`ji system of Mount Lebanon, a microcosm of its 
contradictions pushed to the point of rupture. The region was 
dominated by commercial production and dependent on the external 
market through its main economic activity, sericulture. Its sheikhs, 
increasingly indebted and their lands parceled out by inheritance, 
imposed more taxes and rents on the peasants, who were in turn 
over-indebted to silk courtiers, merchants and usurers who lent 
them money at exorbitant rates reaching 50 per cent.9 As early as 
the 1820s, Gérard de Nerval wrote of those ‘emirs of olive and 
cheese’ whose declining economic power was being compensated 
by a sick attachment to political and judicial privileges and social 
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distinction at the expense of their commoners.10 To make matters 
worse, the years 1856–58 were particularly cruel; a severe winter 
in 1857 was followed by an exceptionally dry season in 1858, 
when bad harvests and diseases beset the silkworms, olive trees and 
vinyards. In addition, the silk crisis in Lyon reduced silk production 
in Mount Lebanon by half. 
In the conflict between the Khazins and Bashir Ahmad, both 
parties solicited the backing of the commoners. The latter’s demands 
– lower taxes, revision of land rents and participation in the election 
of governor – were rejected by the sheikhs, focusing popular anger 
against them. The revolt broke out on Christmas Eve 1858 with 
a strike against the payment of taxes and rents. After a relatively 
moderate phase led by Salih Jirjis Sfayr, a notable from the coast 
and creditor of Bashir Ahmad, the revolt took a more radical turn in 
mid-January 1859 when a blacksmith from Rayfoun, Tanius Shahin 
(1815–1895), was elected ‘first delegate’ (wakil awwal) of the rebel 
council. In February, Ottoman troops entered Kisrawan and the 
emissaries of Khurshid Pasha to Shahin tried to convince him to seek 
Ottoman military intervention. But Ottoman troops soon withdrew 
after the intervention of the French consul. The latter visited Ghazir 
a few weeks later and was received by a massive crowd brandishing 
the tricolour flag and chanting in support of France. By the summer 
of 1859 peasants in arms had chased almost all of the Khazin clan, 
no fewer than 500 persons, out of the region. Shahin, elevated to 
‘general delegate’ (wakil `amm) in the fall of that year, moved the 
revolt headquarters from Zuk Mikayil, on the coast, to Rayfoun in 
the highlands, a confirmation of the rebellion’s radicalisation and 
of the rise of the peasant element within its ranks. 
Kisrawan, liberated from both the sheikhs and the qa’im maqam, 
lived under the control of rebel authority for more than two years. A 
council of some 100 members elected directly by the villagers under 
the presidency of Shahin, ruled by the ‘force of popular government’ 
(Bi-quwat al-Hukuma al-Jumhuriya), imposed new taxes, purchased 
arms, administered common property, intervened in local conflicts, 
and commanded a militia of some 1,000 men. More than half of the 
council members were small or landless peasants and the rest were 
comprised of 32 rich or middle-level farmers, ten clergymen and at 
least three merchants and moneylenders.11 Among the delegates was 
also Iliyas Habalin, a delegate of the market town of Zuq, known 
to be an anti-clerical and secular intellectual who publicly defended 
the ideas of the French Revolution.12
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The Kisrawan revolt’s main demands were as follows: Equality 
between sheikhs and commoners; the abolition of the former’s 
political and judicial privileges; the rescinding of additional taxes; 
the designation of one local governor, to be seconded by two 
elected commoners; the establishment of a tribunal of sheikhs and 
commoners to look into conflicts between the two parties; the 
abolition of extra impositions and injustices such as obligatory 
gifts (in the form of monetary goods such as coffee, tobacco, sugar 
and soap), sukhra (forced labour) and other ‘humiliating practices’ 
(ihtiqarat) such as discrimination in the port of dress and the 
obligation to kiss the hand of the sheikhs. 
In this sense, the Kisrawan rebels were pioneers in demanding 
the application of the Ottoman Tanzimat, the last edict of which 
had been promulgated only two years earlier. Their main slogan 
was inspired by the moving spirit of the Ottoman reform: ‘full 
equality and complete freedom’ (Taswiya `Umumiya wa Hurriya 
Kamila), to use the terms of Tanius Shahin himself. But Shahin 
would amalgamate the sectarian with the social by claiming that 
he received an official pledge from the European powers for the 
‘liberation of Christians from their servitude’.13 On the other hand, 
two criteria were competing among the rebels. One was the criterion 
of money and wealth, which required that ‘status and honor be 
granted on the basis of wealth and not birth’, according to a 
contemporary eyewitness.14 This was the demand of the new middle 
class of merchants, usurers and rich farmers, who were seeking free 
trade and social recognition. The other criterion represented the 
mainly peasant democratic component, which demanded land and 
autonomy for the village communes administered by their elected 
delegates and councils. This elective autonomy was the Christian 
peasants’ way of joining the two sides of their demands: establishing 
equality vis-à-vis their Christian manasib, on the one hand, and 
parity with the Muslim majority within the Ottoman Empire, on the 
other. Hence the crucial importance of the governorship (ma’mur) 
of the district of Kisrawan that dominated the entire period of 
the rebellion.
As the revolt gained ground, the rebels introduced the idea of a 
commoner governor chosen by the Maronite patriarch and finally 
advanced the idea of a governor directly elected by the people. 
Tanius Shahin and the majority of the delegates insisted on this 
latter demand, and the ‘general delegate’ went on signing petitions 
in the villages supporting his own claim to the post. All parties to 
the conflict, local and regional, put forward contradictory demands 
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regarding the famous governorship, yet all were agreed on barring 
access of a commoner to that post. 
On one occasion, the Church did envisage Shahin as ma’mur. 
Father Yuhanna Habib, emissary of the patriarch to Shahin, sent a 
note to his superior, on 24 October 1859, suggesting that, short of 
bloodily repressing the revolt, there was no way out but to choose 
Shahin as governor:
[The appointment of Shahin as ma’mur] is the best suggestion for 
achieving a return to calm, in addition to being most beneficial 
for the sheikhs. If anybody else becomes ma’mur, the sheikhs 
would not be able to regain their homes or property. But if 
Shahin is elected, they would be able to return and recuperate 
their occupied property and their expropriated crops, because 
the amigo, in the post of ma’mur, would enrich himself and be 
inclined toward equity, and divisions would run amock [among 
the rebels]. Rather than continuing to cook in cauldrons and 
lending his ear to the ignorants, he would be surrounded by 
wise men from whom he would draw counsel; and that course 
would be the best.15 
However ingenious this suggestion for socially corrupting a 
rebellion, it was nevertheless rejected by the patriarch.
It was not long before the commoners’ revolt gave way to a jacquerie 
(peasant mutiny), which demanded land distribution and better 
tenancy farming conditions. Armed peasants confiscated land, 
harvests and livestock belonging to the sheikhs while tenant farmers 
cultivated the land of their lords and took over the harvesting of 
mulberry leaves, silk cocoons, olives, cereals and livestock. Villagers 
collectively exploited the commons (forests and grazing land), which 
were traditionally under the control of the sheikhs. Bands of landless 
peasants – men and women, tenant farmers, unemployed workers 
from silk-reeling factories – roamed around the area’s villages 
tracking down the Khazins, looting and setting fire to houses, and 
assaulting and sometimes murdering the Khazin families.16 Scenes of 
collective drunkenness, characteristic of peasants’ uprisings, reached 
a degree that required the intervention of the patriarch himself, with 
Shahin, to put an end to them.17
Contrary to interpretations that stress the leading role of the 
Maronite Church in the commoners’ revolt, Bkirki’s main concern 
appeared to be the unity of the community, over any other 
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consideration. When the rebellion broke up, Patriarch Mas`ad was 
caught between contradictory pressures and interests. Inside the 
Church, members of the lower-ranking clergy had joined the rebel 
ranks and some of them were elected village representatives, while 
influential bishops were violently hostile to the revolt, which they 
considered a divisive movement. Pre-eminent among the latter group 
was Tubiya `Awn, the Maronite bishop of Beirut, who had backed 
Mas`ad’s candidacy for the patriarchal seat. ̀ Awn led the Maronite 
Youth League and a Committee of Public Safety, composed of 
Christian merchants and notables who were financing the purchase 
of arms for the inhabitants of the mixed districts. Yusuf Karam, 
son of a minor sheikh from Bisharri, was the revolt’s fiercest enemy, 
accusing Shahin of dividing Christian ranks and the patriarch of 
complicity with the rebel leader.18 This made it easy for the patriarch 
to pit him against Shahin. Mas`ad invited Karam to come, at the 
head of some 200 of his armed men, and police the coastal region. 
Demonstrations that headed toward Bkirki, organised by both 
partisans and opponents of the revolt, symbolised the contradictory 
pressures exerted on the patriarchal seat. However, Mas`ad refused 
to take sides. Indeed, the Church managed to establish direct links 
with the towns and villages of Kisrawan and Jbeil, without passing 
through the manasib, and Mas`ad became, in a way, the necessary 
intermediary for all parties to the conflict. But in its capacity as the 
biggest landowner in Mount Lebanon, the Church was determined 
to censor the peasant demands for land and better conditions of 
land tenure. However, there came a time when the Church was 
‘outflanked by the people’, to use the term of the Bentivoglio, 
the French consul in Beirut, and the rebellion directly challenged 
clerical authority.19 In short, the commoners’ movement was strong 
enough not to fall under the control of the Church, and the latter 
was sufficiently opposed to the muqata`ji system not to confront 
the rebellion and cause it to become a millenarian or anti-clerical 
movement, as often happened with peasant jacqueries. 
THE ‘EVENTs Of 1860’
The fighting in the southern part of Mount Lebanon was initiated 
by the Druze leadership as a pre-emptive measure to ward off 
the possible repercussions of the Kisrawan revolt, but, more 
importantly, to overcome the social and political agitation of their 
‘own’ Christian commoners. 
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The ‘events of 1860’, as they were called, reportedly started in 
August 1859 in Bayt Miri, a village in the ‘mixed regions’ and spread 
in the Matn region with a series of assassinations and limited armed 
confrontations. The winter and spring of 1860 passed without 
newsworthy events, as the ‘silk truce’ held. Toward the end of 
May 1860, fighting resumed with a Druze attack in the Matn. In the 
Shouf and the Iqlims, neighbouring villages and towns were pitted 
one against the other. The fighting lasted two months, from the end 
of May to the end of July. Jizzin was the first Christian town to 
fall, but this was after an armed detachment of its inhabitants had 
attacked and burnt Druze farms in the Niha region. Besieged in early 
June, Dayr al-Qamar negotiated for some three weeks until it finally 
surrendered, but it was nevertheless attacked, looted, and its people 
massacred. A Druze version claims that the inhabitants of Dayr 
al-Qamar still possessed 4,000 firearms when the town was taken, 
which explained the killings inside the town, while Christian sources 
maintain that the Ottoman authorities had already disarmed the 
inhabitants in return for assurances of official Ottoman protection 
and grouped them in the serail, where they were attacked. Whatever 
the case, the conquest of Dayr al-Qamar resulted in a massacre in 
which an estimated 900–2,000 Christians lost their lives. Christians 
who fled Jizzin and Dayr al-Qamar, and were lucky enough to evade 
the Druze fighters hunting for Christians on the roads, regrouped in 
Sayda, which had been neutral in the fighting. Many sought refuge 
in the Shi`i villages and were put under the protection of the Shi`i 
leaders of Zahrani, Nabatiyeh and Juba`. Other Christian refugees 
made it to Beirut, whose notables had managed to contain the rising 
tension between the two warring communities. 
On the other slope of the Mountain Druze fighters, led by `Ali 
Jumblatt, descended on Saghbin (the principal Maronite village in 
the western Biqa`) and occupied it. After having looted, destroyed 
and burnt Hasbaya and Rashaya, inhabited by Greek Orthodox 
Christians, they killed 17 Sunni Muslim Shihab princes in Hasbaya, 
presumably as a punishment for their alliance with the Christians. 
The Druze forces were then joined by armed men from Hawran 
and encircled Zahleh, eager to punish its inhabitants for their 
participation in the campaign of Ibrahim Pasha against Hawran 
in 1839 and their victory against the Druze in the battle of Shtura 
in 1841–42. The Catholic capital, victim of its numerous enemies, 
withstood the Druze offensive alone: its Shi`a allies from Ba`albak 
had deserted it and Yusuf Karam, who left Kisrawan at the head of 
500 armed men to rescue Zahleh, never arrived at his destination.20 
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The town, deserted by the majority of its population, was pillaged, 
burnt and partially destroyed.
Kisrawan and the north did not participate in the war. After an 
incursion by Tanius Shahin and his rebels into the Matn area, where 
he was stopped by Ottoman troops, the forces of the revolt limited 
themselves to patrolling their own territory. The patriarch had 
opposed the fighting from the beginning, despite pressures upon him 
by Bishops Abou Rizk, Bustani and ̀ Awn. To alleviate the pressure 
upon him, the patriarch nonetheless formed an army and put it 
under the joint command of a Hubaysh sheikh and Tanius Shahin. 
The latter, called upon to come to the rescue of the Christians of 
the mixed regions, declared that he was waiting for orders from 
the patriarch to move his armed men. So was Yusuf Karam. But 
the orders never came. 
Both camps practised what would now be called ‘sectarian 
cleansing’. In retaliation for the expulsion of their co-religionists 
from the Shouf and Jizzin by the Druze, the Kisrawanis, under 
Shahin, expelled the Druze from Antiliyas – the old demarcation line 
between the northern and southern parts of Mount Lebanon – and 
the Christians would later expel the Druze from the mixed villages 
of the Matn with the help of French troops. Interestingly, Christians 
and Druze, all the while fighting each other, took advantage of the 
occasion to get rid of Shi`i pockets in ‘their’ respective territories. In 
one known instance, Druze fighters invaded the predominantly Shi`i 
Iqlim al-Tuffah and expelled many of its inhabitants, forcing them to 
flee toward Harat Sayda. On the other hand, the Kisrawanis, led by 
Shahin, launched an attack on the Jbeil highlands in an attempt to 
expel the Shi`a of Jubbat al-Munaytra in the direction of the Biqa`. 
Some Shi`i villages were also plundered in other parts of Jbeil and 
Kisrawan. However, sectarian cleansing had its economic limits. 
Soon Sa`id Jumblatt called upon the Christians of the Shouf and 
Jizzin to come back: he needed them to work in his domains. 
damascus: an anti-Christian or anti-merchant ‘pogrom’?
As the events of 1860 in Lebanon died down, an anti-Christian 
riot exploded in Damascus. During the last week of July 1860 an 
angry Damascene mob, driven by a number of the city’s notables 
and enjoying the complicity of the local Ottoman authorities, killed, 
looted and burnt in the Christian quarter of Bab Touma. No fewer 
than 1,000 were killed, and many thousands were only saved from 
a similar fate by the intervention of Algerian emir `Abd al-Qadir, 
whose armed men helped them toward safety in Beirut.
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The Damascus riots, situated in their larger context, expressed 
two sets of predicaments in the Arab regions of the Empire: the 
negative reactions toward the Tanzimat, on the one hand, and the 
economic crisis, on the other. Damascus had led the opposition to 
the Ottoman reforms of 1839 and 1856, spurred by the fatwa of the 
city’s mufti rejecting the proclaimed equality between Christians and 
Muslims. The entire Tanzimat were even looked upon as a European 
and Christian conspiracy against Islam. The marked complicity of 
the Ottoman authorities of Damascus in the massacre of 1860 was 
a sure sign of this hostility to the new reforms. 
Against a background of soaring prices and a shortage of 
livestock and cereals, the Christians rose in business and in the 
administration of Damascus under Ibrahim Pasha.21 With numbers 
estimated in 1860 at about 20,000 out of a population of some 
120,000, the Christians were mainly artisans and members of the 
liberal professions. But they also comprised a small number of 
‘multimillionaire merchants’ who ‘lent money, with high interest 
rates, to individuals as well as governments’, according to a 
French eyewitness. Although traditional Damascene trade was 
still in the hands of Muslim merchants, Christians had come to 
play an increasingly important role in the supply of the city and in 
its foreign trade. Rather than enjoying monopolistic control, they 
represented an uneven commercial competition to the interests of 
Muslim merchants in internal trade, and benefited from privileged 
relations with Europe as importers and representatives of foreign 
commercial firms. This gives credence to the accusation that Muslim 
merchants played a role in the incitement to rioting. As for the 
rioters, research by Shelly Walter on 300 of the accused rioters 
who passed through the Damascene courts reveals that they were 
a typical mob mixture, grouping déclassé middle-class property 
owners who had to sell their landed estates to upper-class Christians, 
impoverished sayyids, military men and artisans, especially those 
related to the service sector.22 Significantly, the rioters spared the 
more socially modest Christian quarter of al-Midan.
Thus, many factors contributed to focusing popular violence 
against a minority that deployed typical ‘victimary signs’ (René 
Girard). In the Aleppo riots of the preceding year, the riotous 
mobs, previously directed against the city’s Muslim notables and 
its Ottoman governor, were diverted against Christian merchants.
The role of foreign powers
The Sultanate viewed the ‘events’ in Mount Lebanon as a proof of 
the failure of the Qa’im maqamiya and an opportunity to re-establish 
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its authority over Mount Lebanon. Beirut’s wali, Khurshid Pasha, 
contented himself with administering the crisis but the Damascus 
killings projected the ‘events of Syria’ on the international stage, 
and the pressure of the European powers prompted the Porte to 
dispatch Fu’ad Pasha, minister of foreign affairs, to the region. 
The Ottoman official arrived in Beirut on 18 July and arrested 
its governor, Khurshid Pasha, as well as a number of Druze leaders 
including Sa`id Jumblatt. On 28 July he entered Damascus at the 
head of 4,000 armed men, arrested and executed Ahmad Pasha, the 
city’s governor and military commander, three of his officers and 
117 Turkish soldiers and functionaries. Four hundred Damascenes 
accused of participation in the riots were arrested; 56 were hanged 
and the rest were condemned to prison on varied sentences. Around 
40 notables accused of sedition were locked up and sent to Istanbul 
in chains. 
Nevertheless, Emperor Napoleon III insisted on armed 
intervention in Lebanon. In mid-August 1860, 6,000 French 
troops landed on the Lebanese coast under the command of 
General Beaufort d’Hautpoul, who had served for two years under 
Ibrahim Pasha in Syria. D’Hautpoul had been tasked with varied 
and contradictory assignments: to cooperate with the Ottoman 
authorities, restore peace, help the Christians, contribute to the 
reconstruction of Mount Lebanon and get the silk workers back 
to work, as well as help create an autonomous Christian enclave 
in Mount Lebanon. That was not all. Napoleon III, as if eager to 
confirm Karl Marx’s accusation that he was just a farcical repetition 
of his illustrious relative, envisaged the Lebanon expedition as a 
re-enactment of Bonaparte’s Egyptian venture and sent Ernest Renan 
on an assignment to investigate the country’s distant Phoenician 
past. Cartographers were also dispatched to draft the first map of 
Mount Lebanon and its surroundings, which was to serve for future 
military purposes. Last but not least, d’Hautpoul was commissioned 
to buy pure-bred Arab horses from the Bedouins of the Syrian desert 
to rejuvenate the French army’s cavalry. 
This period saw especially bitter competition between France’s 
and Britain’s colonial designs and interests. Britain stuck to its 
policy of defending the unity of the Ottoman Empire and sought 
to influence its policies through relations with the Porte rather than 
encourage secessionist movements in the peripheries. As the British 
were primarily exporters of fabrics, rather than importers of raw 
materials, their main economic interest was to distribute their goods 
in the Syrian market. Traditionally, they were supportive of the 
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muqata`ji system and of the Druze, to whom they sent arms during 
the fighting. The French had to defend French capital invested in 
sericulture, and needed to rebuild the silk-reeling factories and bring 
the silk workers back to work. But the French military intervention 
was being played out within a much more ambitious project. 
Napoleon III had already launched his project for an Arab Kingdom 
in Algeria and envisaged his intervention in Mount Lebanon as 
an annex to his Maghreb project: an Arab Kingdom, attached to 
France, led by its faithful ally Emir `Abd al-Qadir, whose entity 
would play the role of a buffer state between Anatolia and the Suez 
Canal. In France, political parties were divided over the intervention. 
The Catholics, who were pressing for an armed intervention in Italy 
to save the Vatican from the march of the forces of Italian unity, 
suspected the Syrian campaign of being a cover for not defending 
the threatened papacy. Paradoxically, the enthusiastic supporters 
of the Syrian adventure were the secular parties, foremost among 
them the Saint-Simonian socialists, nostalgic for the repetition of 
the Muhammad `Ali experience. They supported `Abd al-Qadir as 
an enlightened despot who would build railways and roads, and 
above all the Suez Canal linking Europe to Asia.23
THE PAsT As PrEsENT
Though the Kisrawani rebels did not participate in the civil war, 
they still had to pay its costs. They resisted a mere return to the 
status quo ante. The Ottomans imposed an embargo for a number 
of weeks on the port of Juniyeh to oblige the rebels to negotiate. 
On 29 July 1860 an accord was signed with the Khazins, under 
the patronage of Bishop Tubiya `Awn and an Ottoman emissary, 
in which the revolt was described as an ‘exaggeration of a minor 
dispute’ exploited by ‘troublemakers’ who were moved by ‘suspect 
goals’ against the Ottoman government. The accord stipulated the 
return of the sheikhs, the restitution of their properties, and obliged 
the peasants to pay their arrears in rent and taxes. In return, all that 
the commoners got was a promise to put an end to the ‘inhuman 
practices’ of the muqata`jis. 
An international commission of the consuls of Britain, France, 
Prussia, Russia and Austria convened in Beirut with the participation 
of Fu’ad Pasha. It held meetings from 5 October 1860 to 5 March 
1861 to supervise the punishment of the accused, reparations and 
reconstruction, and to devise a new social and political status for 
Mount Lebanon. On 8 December 1860, a legal tribunal was set up 
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in Mukhtara in which 300 people were tried. Twenty-five Druze 
were sentenced to death and executed; the rest were later reprieved.
On 18 November 1860, Fu’ad Pasha, keen for a quick withdrawal 
of French troops, appointed Yusuf Karam qa’im maqam of the 
Christians. Karam’s first task was to put an end to the Kisrawan 
revolt. In March 1861, he launched an attack on the headquarters 
of Tanius Shahin in Rayfoun and set fire to it as Shahin fled to 
Beirut and put himself under the protection of the French consul. 
Karam earned the congratulations of Lord Duffrin, the British 
government representative in the international commission, 
for having re-established ‘social order’. But no sooner had the 
‘Règlement organique’ instituting the Mutasarrifiya been approved, 
and the French forces departed, than the first mutasarrif, Dawud 
Pasha, deposed Karam in May 1861. Majid Shihab, a candidate 
for the governorate of the whole of Mount Lebanon, was named 
governor of Kisrawan and was charged with collecting taxes from 
a population that had been bled white.
In the final tally, there were only a few dozen victims of the 
Kisrawan uprising while at least 5,000 perished in the civil conflicts 
of Mount Lebanon alone, with 200 villages burnt and 100,000 
people displaced. 
We are told that history does not repeat itself, yet it has a remarkable 
knack for reactualising past events and scenes. In this sense, the 
present serves sometimes to elucidate the past. For those Lebanese 
who lived through the 1975–90 wars, the ‘events of 1860’ seem 
strangely familiar. The trigger events, the `Ayn al-Rummaneh bus 
incident of 13 April 1975 and the ‘accident’ of the two muleteer 
boys of Bayt Meiri in 1859, both concern the question of the 
right of passage in a country where geography is sectarian. The 
front lines were the same, passing through Mutayn or along the 
Beirut–Damascus road. Sieges have been repeated in Zahleh, Dayr 
al-Qamar, Jizzin and Damur; inhabitants fled by sea from the latter 
on boats sent from Beirut by Bishop `Awn and from Juniyeh on 
French vessels, fearing a Druze and Shi`i invasion from the Biqa`. 
Last but not least, from this past emerges a scene that resumes the 
founding drama of civil violence in modern Lebanon. Here, born 
from the sea, like in the myths of old, are the ‘enemy brothers’ of 
the chronicler Abqarius:
During the fighting, a Druze got hold of a Christian. They battled 
and resisted each other and went on fighting until they reached 
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the waterfront from which they fell into the water still exchanging 
punches and blows. A huge wave unfurled and dragged them into 
the open sea where they were swallowed up by the tide. The next 
morning, their corpses were recovered on the beach scrunched up 
in a tight embrace and gripping each other’s hands.24
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Grandeur and Misery of the 
Mutasarrifiya (1861–1915)
Happy is he who has but a goat’s perch in Mount Lebanon. 
(Lebanese proverb)
A rELATIVE AUTONOMy
The Règlement organique of 9 June 1861 granted Mount Lebanon 
limited autonomy inside the Ottoman Empire, guaranteed by the 
European powers: France, Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia, later 
joined by Italy in 1867. The new organisation merged the two Qa’im 
maqamiyas of 1841–61 into a Mutasarrifiya, the first subdivision of 
a wilaya. Zahleh, in the east, which had been part of the wilaya of 
Damascus under the double Qa’im maqamiya, was reintegrated into 
Mount Lebanon, in addition to parts of the Hirmil district (eastern 
Biqa`). To the west, the Mutasarrifiya extended to the Mediterranean 
coast, with the exception of the main cities, Tripoli, Beirut and 
Sayda, that remained part of the wilaya of Damascus, along with 
the rest of the Biqa` plain. 
The governor of Mount Lebanon was a non-Arab Ottoman 
Christian who enjoyed wide-ranging executive powers and reported 
directly to the Porte. An Administrative Council (AC) of twelve 
elected members enjoyed only consultative powers vis-à-vis the 
mutasarrif, but was granted the right to veto his decisions on two 
crucial issues: the intervention of Ottoman troops in the territory 
of the Mutasarrifiya, and tax increases. Initially, the AC councillors 
were equally divided among Christians and Muslims, two for each 
of the six major sects (Maronite, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek 
Catholic, Sunni, Shi`i). But the revised Règlement organique of 1864 
modified it to seven Christians and five Muslims. 
Administratively, the territory of the Mutasarrifiya was divided 
into seven districts (cazas), governed according to the majoritarian 
community in each. The only armed force on Mutasarrifiya territory 
was a local police force, the gendarmerie, trained and organised by 
French officers, whose numbers were set at 1,400 but never reached 
41
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half that. Nevertheless, the mutasarrif – who enjoyed the rank of 
military ruler with the title of mushir – was granted the right to 
disarm the population. 
Taxes collected in Mount Lebanon constituted the basis for the 
budget, with any surplus being handed over to Istanbul, and the 
judicial system combined judges elected by the mutasarrif and 
elected village sheikhs. 
Finally, the Règlement organique reiterated the formal abolition 
of the muqata`ji system and declared the inhabitants of Mount 
Lebanon all equal before the law.
THE ‘LONG PEACE’
The ‘Long Peace’ (Engin Akerli) that Mount Lebanon enjoyed for 
more than a half century under the Mutasarrifiya was the product 
of a combination of factors: the economic growth generated by the 
silk economy; the movement of the surplus peasant population to 
outside Mount Lebanon; and the relatively weak intervention by 
the European powers in the affairs of the Mountain.
Politically, the Mutasarrifiya, under a Christian Ottoman 
administrator, was a compromise between the French-sponsored 
project for an independent Christian Emirate and the complete 
submission of Mount Lebanon to Ottoman authority. Accordingly, 
France withdrew its grandiose plan for an Arab kingdom in favour 
of what it called its ‘Catholic experience in the Orient’. Furthermore, 
the export of the French Revolutionary model was shelved in favour 
of the colonial model, which encouraged provincial and ethnic 
autonomy in the development of the world division of labour. 
 Furthermore, the Mutasarrifiya’s provision for political 
autonomy inside the Ottoman Empire became the framework for 
the development of a double economic dependence. Mount Lebanon 
was economically tied to Beirut and the European market, while 
it relied increasingly on the Syrian interior for the better part of 
its requirements in cereals and livestock. This double dependence 
would ultimately erode the foundations of political autonomy itself. 
Hence, evaluating the Mutasarrifiya reveals a clear dichotomy in the 
final balance sheet: its external dependence contributed to Mount 
Lebanon’s economic prosperity and privileged contribution to 
the Arab cultural renaissance of the mid-nineteenth century, but 
was also partly responsible for the successive waves of migration 
of its inhabitants to the New World and for the tragic famine of 
World War I.
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The war of 1860 had ended with a Christian military defeat despite 
the fact that Christians constituted a majority of the population and 
the biggest fighting force. Divided geographically and socially, they 
lacked a unifiying leadership and faced a cohesive minority fighting 
not only to preserve its privileges but also to ensure its survival. 
Nevertheless, the Christians’ military defeat was transformed into 






Map 2 The Mutasarrifiya
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Conversely, the Druze military victory could not halt their loss of 
political and social power, despite British attempts to mitigate the 
effects of this loss. The Druze defeat led to the collapse of the entire 
muqata`ji order, as the Druze leadership had fought in the name of 
all muqata`jis to preserve it. The balance of power in the Mountain 
had been turned upside down: the history of the Druze henceforth 
would be the history of their struggle to survive as a minority.
dAWUd PAsHA, yUsUf KArAM ANd `ABd AL-QAdIr
Yusuf Karam’s Christian emirate and ̀ Abd al-Qadir’s Arab kingdom 
were the victims of the Règlement organique. In compensation 
for the part he played in saving thousands of Christian lives in 
Damascus, `Abd al-Qadir was congratulated and decorated by 
Europe’s rulers and invited to France. In Marseilles, crowds greeted 
him as ‘saint `Abd al-Qadir’ and Emperor Napoleon III received 
him with great pomp at his residence in Saint-Cloud. On his way 
back to Damascus, the Algerian prince visited Istanbul where he 
obtained from the Sultan the release of Damascene notables accused 
of instigating the anti-Christian massacres of 1860. Retired in his 
Damascus home, he repeatedly declared his withdrawal from 
political affairs and spent the rest of his days in pious recollection 
and Sufi contemplation. He died on 24 May 1883.
Matters were more difficult concerning Yusuf Karam. After the 
revision of the Règlement organique in 1864, Dawud Pasha’s term 
in office was extended for five more years. Dawud took a number 
of conciliatory measures to appease the Christian opposition in the 
north: he left the appointment of the Maronite councillors to the 
Church rather than being elected by popular vote, and established 
the post of a Maronite Deputy Chairman of the AC unaccounted 
for in the initial Règlement. A month after the renewal of Dawud’s 
mandate, Yusuf Karam was allowed to return from his exile in 
Istanbul. The armistice between the two men lasted for a whole year. 
In January 1866, Karam launched an armed rebellion. Skirmishes 
between Karam’s armed men and Ottoman troops alternated 
between Kisrawan and his native Ihdin, and in early 1867 the 
northern bey decided to march on Bayt al-Din in an attempt to 
overthrow the Mutasarrifya. He was encircled and practically 
defeated near Bikfaya (in the Matn), but French mediation secured 
Ottoman approval to transport the rebellious bey to a European 
exile aboard a French gunship.
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After a short stay in France, Karam moved to Algeria, where he 
was granted land in the Constantine region and was approached 
to lend his support to the project of settling Lebanese Maronite 
peasants in Algeria.1 When the project was finally dropped, Karam 
returned to France where he commuted for years between the 
French capital, Austria, Belgium and Istanbul, repeatedly requesting 
permission to return to Lebanon, but to no avail. He finally settled 
in Italy, in 1878, where he spent the rest of his days. He died on 7 
April 1889. 
COLONIAL TrAdE ANd sILK PrOdUCTION
Yusuf Karam’s second rebellion (1864–67) was the last attempt 
to set up a Christian government in Mount Lebanon. After the 
rebellion’s defeat and the northern leader’s exile, the town of Bkirki 
assumed leadership of the autonomist tendency. In order to resist 
the pressures of Dawud Pasha (1861–68) and his successor Franco 
Pasha (1868–73) – who had demanded that the patriarch take an 
oath of loyalty to them and submit the nomination of bishops for 
their approval – Mas`ad headed to Istanbul in 1867. There he was 
cordially received and decorated by the Sultan, to whom he declared 
his allegiance. 
Throughout the Mutasarrifiya era, the political life of Mount 
Lebanon revolved around two poles: Bkirki, the home of the 
Maronite patriarcate, and Bayt al-Din (later Ba`abda), the 
headquarters of the mutassarrif and the Administrative Council. 
The AC soon established itself as the other pole of attraction and 
representation for the Maronites in the south of Mount Lebanon, 
as well as those of the north. 
At first, France was content to act as mediator between the 
patriarch and the Ottoman governors. Its main concern was its 
‘Catholic experience’ in Mount Lebanon, which it hoped would 
be a model for the whole Empire. In addition, the postwar 
reconstruction and economic take-off contributed to tempering 
the extreme autonomist demands, which had become deprived of 
any external backing.
Monoculture and emigration 
Economically, the Mutasarrifiya was primarily an enclave of 
monoculture and monoproduction of silk at the service of the silk 
industry of Lyons. Mount Lebanon, from Jizzin and the Shouf to 
`Akkar, was the centre of a silk production business that also covered 
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the Biqa`, Hasbayya and Hums in addition to the wilaya of Beirut. 
No wonder Gaston Ducousso speaks of a ‘French naturalised’ 
Syrian silk industry and ranks Syria among the ‘French sericulture 
departments’. The Lyons Chamber of commerce went even further, 
baptising all of Syria a ‘colony of Lyons’. 
  Soon, this dependence on the external market transformed 
Mount Lebanon into a principally exporting enclave, dominated 
by Beirut. Half of Mount Lebanon’s population were engaged 
in the silk economy, which generated around a third of its total 
revenue (the other sources being tobacco and olive oil). In 1867, 
there were 67 silk-reeling factories, the seven biggest and most 
modern being French-owned. In 1885, their number had reached 
105, with only five French factories, as foreign investment (mainly 
Lyons-based) moved from the productive sector to the control of 
sericulture through the market. Some 14,500 workers worked in the 
silk-reeling factories,12,000 of whom were women, with an overall 
majority of Maronites (8,500 Maronite workers compared to 2,500 
Greek Catholics, 2,500 Greek Orthodox and around 1,000 Druze). 
Working conditions were harsh, working hours were long and 
salaries were excessively low. Men’s salaries were three times those 
of women and child labour was employed abundantly, especially 
girls aged between 7 and 13, not to mention the free labour provided 
by the orphanages of French missionaries or local convents.
Rather than being a ‘leading sector’ of the economy, sericulture 
developed at the expense of other areas. In a principally mountainous 
region, where cultivated land amounted to no more than 4 per cent 
of the total surface, thousands of the best plots were devoted to 
the culture of mulberry trees, which came to cover some 45 per 
cent of Mount Lebanon’s cultivated surface. In fact, sericulture 
developed primarily at the expense of cereal culture. The result 
was the growing dependency of Mount Lebanon on the Biqa` and 
the Syrian interior (Bilad al-Sham) for two-thirds of its needs in 
cereals and livestock. The rapid regression of subsistence agriculture 
and the dominance of cash crops were responsible for this grave 
commercial deficit.2
The generalisation of the monetary economy in addition to the 
persistance of large landed holdings and the Church waqfs (the 
Church controlled no less than a third of the total land surface 
of Mount Lebanon) led to a succession of migration waves. In 
fact, the 1860s witnessed a ‘baby boom’, a frequent postwar 
phenomenon, which was also encouraged by the relative economic 
prosperity. But the limited growth of cultivable land in relation to 
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the rapid population growth was instrumental as a ‘push’ factor for 
emigration.3 Starting in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
the mainly Maronite peasant surplus, which hadpreviously migrated 
to the south of Mount Lebanon and the Biqa`, now went overseas. 
Christian migrants were accompanied by numerous Druze peasants 
and commoners, silent victims of the failure of the commoners’ and 
peasants’ revolts in which they did not even participate. Sericulture, 
far from halting or even reducing the haemorrhage of human 
resources, became one of its main causes. Between 1860 and World 
War I, roughly a third of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon left the 
country.4 Nevertheless, the remittances of the émigrés (45 per cent 
of total revenue) barely covered the commercial deficit, which also 
drained the country’s gold reserves.
In the beginning, a good portion of those who migrated returned 
after having gathered enough money to buy a plot of land. But those 
who owned the land would not sell. ‘Thus’, wrote Paul Jouplain, 
‘they were obliged to remain overseas and settle permanently with 
their families and found new homes. Even the extension of the 
Church waqf expelled yearly thousands of other Lebanese from their 
country and still does.’5 Migration from Mount Lebanon reached 
such proportions that the Ottoman authorities decided to intervene 
to control departures and in any event, peasant movements calling 
for the distribution of land did not cease. On the eve of World War 
I, a peasant movement in the northern part of the Mountain was still 
calling for the distribution of waqf lands among landless peasants. 
The movement seemed strong enough to alarm a francophile writer 
who saw in it a continuation of the 1858–60 commoners’ revolts, 
so he called for the progressive takeover by the state of the Church 
waqf in return for fair compensation, the only way to achieve 
‘gradual change’ that would forestall a ‘revolution’.6 
A NEW sOCIAL ANd POLITICAL fOrCE 
By the time the Mutasarrifiya was set up, Mount Lebanon’s 
demographic composition had clearly shifted in favour of a Christian, 
and more specifically Maronite, majority.7 But it was mainly in 
the socio-economic fields that the gap was widening between the 
two communities. First, there was a noticeable transfer of landed 
property from Druze to Christians. In 1862–63, three-quarters of 
those who sold land were Druze and two-thirds of those who bought 
land were Christians.8 Second, the Maronites were increasingly 
becoming anchored in the privileged sectors of the economy – 
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trade, services and sericulture – while the Druze remained linked to 
agricultural and artisanal production. This asymmetry between the 
two communities was further aggravated by the political dominance 
of the Christians, who now held a majority of seven to five votes in 
the Administrative Council. 
An internal development among the Druze themselves 
compounded the community’s troubles, when the strong Jumblatt 
leadership was temporarily challenged, after the death of Sa`id Bey 
Jumblatt in an Ottoman jail in Beirut in 1861, by the competing 
leadership of the Arsalans. Deprived of their judicial, fiscal and 
political privileges, the ex-muqata`jis – the Jumblatts, Arsalans, 
Khazins, Hubayshs, Dahdahs, Shihabs, Abi-l-Lam`s and others – 
were recycled into the administration.9 Mutasarrif Wassa Pasha 
(1883–92) recognised that this situation constituted a violation 
of the official Ottoman policy of the breaking up the iqta` system 
and declared:
We must prove that no family or group will have any privilege 
or any social status higher than that of the others, and that the 
nomination to the governing posts should depend, and depend 
solely, on the criteria of devotion, integrity and competence.10 
In reality, however, the status quo persisted. Commoners were only 
appointed to administrative posts with great difficulty, while the 
Mutasarrifiya continued to depend on the ex-Druze lords and to 
protect landed owners from peasant demands. 
However, the most salient socio-political aspect of life under the 
Mutasarrifiya was the rise of a new social class and political force 
linked to the development of sericulture, the penetration of colonial 
capital and emigration. It was composed of members of mudabbir 
families, middle-level landed notables, administrators and members 
of the liberal professions in addition to merchants and those directly 
related to the silk economy. But it was also being swelled by the 
influx of returnee migrants. This socio-political force was ‘middle’ 
in both senses: it was situated in between the two orders that 
underpinned social hierarchy, the sheikhs and the commoners, and 
it also was localised politically in between the two poles of Mount 
Lebanon politics: Bkirki and Bayt al-Din. In terms of ideological 
expression, this group could be considered nationalist and reformist.
The AC was the fortress of that new force. Habib Pasha al-Sa`d, 
scion of a family of mudabbirs and big landowner in the `Alay 
(Aley) region, was the AC’s president, while Sa`d Allah Huwayyik, 
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representative for Batrun and brother of Patriarch Iliyas Huwayik, 
was vice-president and leader of the reformist group. The represent-
atives of Kisrawan were grouped around the anti-Khazin ‘Popular 
Front’: Jirjis Zuwayn, elected in 1907 against a Hubaysh candidate 
backed by the Church; Habib al-Bitar and Na`um Bakhus, members 
of merchant notable families and landowners; and Muhammad 
al-Haj Hasan, a Shi`ite commoner. Shadid ̀ Aql, Maronite councillor 
for the Matn, was the owner of a silk-reeling factory; Iliyas Shuwayri, 
was a Greek Orthodox councillor for the Matn, and Sulayman 
Kin`an was a Maronite councillor for Jizzin. To those should be 
added the specialised functionaries of the judiciary and the bureaus 
of the Mutasarrifiya, the francophone intellectuals such as K.T. 
Khairallah, Bulus Nujaym (Paul Jouplain) who headed the ‘foreign 
affairs’ bureau, and Bishara Khalil al-Khoury, son of a family of 
landowning notables and silk-reelers of Rishmaya, whose father 
was director of the ‘Arabic Bureau’ (internal affairs).
This new force, united around the AC, and quite independent of 
the Maronite Church, was constantly wooed by the reformist and 
centralising mutasarrifs. But these AC members were frequently 
opposed to the mutassarrifs’ tendency to raise taxation levels, 
demanding more financial autonomy and greater financial support 
from Istanbul, while they deplored the old muqata`ji families’ 
monopoly of the administrative posts. The ideas of independence, 
Lebanonese nationalism and reformism germinated among 
their ranks. 
In fact, it was with great difficluty that the Mutasarrifiya system 
filtered the great reforms and transformations that the other 
regions of the Ottoman Empire were witnessing, especially after 
the declaration of the Ottoman constitution in 1876. Even when 
reforms were proposed, they were often blocked by the Maronite 
Church with the backing of France. French politics after 1879 relied 
more on the Maronite Church than on the mutasarrif, while trying 
to maintain the social and political status quo. Although French 
consul Joseph Sienkiewics was a republican and a secularist, he 
declared that ‘France should remain clerical in Lebanon’ and his 
successor in 1881 still considered the Maronite Church as ‘the 
only social force among the Maronites’. On the other hand, the 
reformist and secular mutasarrifs, such as Rustum Pasha (1873–83), 
tried to reduce the role of the clergy and the influence of private 
religious schools and backed the new notables of the AC against 
clerical authority. Muzaffar Pasha (1902–07), who was engaged in 
an ambitious project of administrative reform, took measures to 
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reduce Mount Lebanon’s dependence on Beirut. He developed the 
port of Juniyeh and tried to open it to foreign trade, in addition to 
introducing the secret ballot in elections to the AC. However, all 
his reforms were undone by his successor, the conservative Yusuf 
Bey (1907–12). 
COLONIAL dEsIGNs ANd INdEPENdENTIsT dEMANds
The Ottoman defeat in the Russian–Ottoman war of 1877 revived 
the hopes of independence in Mount Lebanon. However, by then, 
Paris and London had begun to envisage the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire, and their common interest was mainly focused 
on a comprehensive strategy for the entire region. At the request 
of Paris, the French military attaché in Beirut produced a plan for 
military intervention in Syria and Palestine using the Lebanese coast 
and Mount Lebanon as a ‘fort’ and ‘bridgehead’ for the occupation 
of Hawran and the port of Haifa.11 In 1902 the advisers to French 
prime minister Poincaré had envisaged a direct French military 
occupation of Mount Lebanon or, at the least, French support for 
the Maronites to create a ‘little France, free, industruous and loyal’.12
On the eve of World War I, Mount Lebanon witnessed the most 
difficult period under the Mutasarrifiya. A fall in the revenues of the 
silk sector and a fall in the taxable population, due to migration, 
increased the budget deficit and spurred the AC to demand financial 
aid from the central government and permission to open the ports 
on the coast for international trade in order to use customs duties 
to increase budget revenue. The AC also reiterated its call for 
widening its electoral base and increasing its fiscal and executive 
powers. The reformist struggle of the AC was backed by an emigrant 
intelligentsia organised by the Comités libanais in Beirut, Cairo 
and Paris. The Union libanaise (al-Ittihad al-Lubnani), founded 
in February 1909 in Cairo by Yusuf al-Sawda, Antoine Jumayil 
and Iskandar `Ammun, echoed the demands of the AC reformists, 
demanding one electoral college for elections to the AC.13 In June 
1912, K.T. Khairallah of the recently founded Paris Comité libanais, 
presented the Quai d’Orsay with a memorandum. It demanded 
the limitation of the prerogatives of the Mutasarrif; an increase in 
the number of members of the AC to 18, all elected by universal 
suffrage; the election of an independent president of the Council 
with executive powers; the right to open ports on the coast and levy 
customs duties; and the immediate payment of three years’ arrears 
by the central government in aid to the Mutasarrifiya.14
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The Quai d’Orsay showed little interest in this memorandum, 
which did not win the patriarch’s approval. As for the Ottoman 
administration, the defeats in the Balkans forced the Porte to 
make concessions to the reformists in order to counter French and 
British influence, which was becoming more and more menacing in 
Syria. The Protocol of December 1912, a modified version of the 
Règlements organiques of 1861 and of 1864, enlarged the electoral 
base of the AC and gave it a say in the elaboration of the budget 
and control over its implementation. It also allocated an additional 
Maronite seat to Dayr al-Qamar (but added another Druze seat for 
the Shouf to compensate for the loss of the Jizzin seat finally allotted 
to the Maronites) and opened the port of Juniyeh to the commerce 
of Mount Lebanon. This last concession – the only one that could 
have assured Mount Lebanon some measure of financial autonomy 
– was aborted by the joint opposition of the Beirut bourgeoisie and 
French interests. 
The reforms, associated with the mutasarrif Ohannes Pasha, 
were a step in the right direction, but they arrived too late. In 
1913, Bishara al-Khoury expressed the desire of many inhabitants 
of Mount Lebanon for a local ruler elected by the local population 
rather than appointed by the foreign powers. In addition, Khoury 
proposed the ‘restitution of Lebanon to its natural and historic 
frontiers’ and granting it financial autonomy. In November 1914, 
the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany and 
annulled the special status granted to Mount Lebanon, which was 
reincorporated into the Ottoman Empire and governed by a Muslim 
Ottoman Turk. 
In the end, the tragedies of World War I gave new meaning to the 
demands for the expansion of Mount Lebanon and for its autonomy.
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Beirut, Capital of Trade and Culture 
(1820–1918)
We are like the belly in relation to the other organs of the body, a belly that lives off 
the work of the hands and legs and is comfortably carried by them. 
(Salim Bustani, 1872)
THE ‘dOOr’ TO EAsT ANd WEsT
Beirut’s phenomenal rise and development in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century benefited from the two major trends 
that characterise the late Ottoman period: the post-Tanzimat 
modernisation and centralisation processes and the extensive 
penetration of European capital in the eastern Arab provinces of 
the Empire. A last attempt by the ailing Ottoman Empire to face up 
to European colonial domination and dismemberment, the Tanzimat 
produced the opposite of their desired effects as the ambitious 
infrastructure and modernisation projects inflated the Ottoman 
debt, increased the Empire’s colonial dependency and ultimately 
led to its demise. Paradoxically, Beirut benefited greatly from both 
trends: as a model of late-nineteenth-century Ottoman modernism 
and a base and bridgehead for European control over natural Syria.
As European colonialism radically changed international trade 
routes in the era of the second industrial revolution, the Beirut–
Damascus axis became the main avenue of international trade in the 
eastern Mediterranean. In addition to its control over the traditional 
export of grain from the Syrian hinterland, Beirut’s principal export 
was raw silk, the production of which had expanded under the 
Mutasarrifiya. In return, Beirut’s principal imports were cotton 
fabrics and manufactured goods. Raw silk was exported to France, 
while most manufactured goods arrived from England, invading the 
markets of Mount Lebanon and the Syrian interior and contributing 
to the collapse of traditional handicrafts and local production. As 
Beirut’s trade developed, imports exceeded exports by a factor of 
three. In 1887, the Ottoman authorities recognised Beirut’s role and 
named it the capital of a new Ottoman wilayet bearing its name and 
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Map 3 The wilayet of Beirut
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governing a territory of some 20,000 square kilometres, extending 
from Alexandretta in the north to Acre and Nablus in the south. 
In effect, Beirut had already become the economic, judicial, 
educational and cultural, if not political, capital of Mount Lebanon. 
The seat of the Mutasarrifiya was transferred from Bayt al-Din to 
Ba`abda to be closer to the new capital. Commercial disputes in 
Mount Lebanon were abjugated in the Beirut Commercial Court. 
Moreover, many consulates, foreign investors and missionaries 
adopted Beirut as their regional seat or upgraded their representation 
in the city. Both the silk economy and immigration contributed to 
the development of Beirut’s intermediary role, economic prosperity 
and dominance over the Mountain. The city became the base of 
maritime and insurance companies (the latter numbered 20 by the 
end of the century). Its usurers lent villagers the nawlun (money 
to buy their travel tickets) in return for mortgages and exorbitant 
rates of interest. Its strongmen (qabadays) organised the contraband 
between the wilayet and the territory of the Mutasarrifiya in 
addition to the transport of illegal passengers destined for travel 
abroad. Beirut banks advanced credit to silk farmers, financed silk 
manufacture and handled the remittances of émigrés, estimated at 
1 million pounds sterling per year in 1908.1
The constitution of Beirut into a separate Ottoman wilayet 
attracted considerable French and European investment, especially 
in infrastructure and communications. In 1863, a French–Ottoman 
company, the Compagnie Ottomane de la Route Beyrouth-
Damas, finished building a carriage road linking the two cities. 
The 110-kilometre trip from Beirut to Damascus took no more 
than 13 hours. Jacques Thobie described the road as the most 
lucrative French enterprise in the Ottoman Empire.2 The first 
telegraphic link with Europe was established in 1858 and in 1890, 
the Compagnie Impériale des Ports, des Quais et Entrepôts de 
Beyrouth (with capital of 5 million francs) obtained a 100-year 
concession for the construction and running of a new harbour, 
managing customs sheds and the loading and unloading of all goods. 
When the new harbour started work in 1895, a Franco-Belgian 
company, the Société Ottomane du Chemin de Fer Damas-Hamah 
et Prolongements (DHP), proceeded to build a railway line between 
Beirut, Damascus and the Hawran. The first trains ran in 1894–95. 
As Beirut’s regional economic role grew, competition between 
British and French interests became more pronounced. While 
the French monopolised the silk economy, the British dominated 
the export of manufactured goods and were gaining an edge in 
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insurance, maritime transport and banking. But more important 
was the scramble of the two colonial powers for control over ports 
and means of communication (at that time, roads and railways). 
French investment in this sector was greater, estimated at 168.3 
million francs in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. The British, out of 
favour in Beirut, started work on enlarging the Palestinian port of 
Haifa, which was rapidly replacing the traditional port of Acre, 
and constructing a railway line linking Haifa to Damascus. Thus 
began the long-term competition between Haifa and Beirut to win 
the role of gateway to the eastern Mediterranean. By the early 
twentieth century, however, Beirut port had superseded the port of 
Haifa as it came to handle 75 per cent of the trade of Barr al-Sham 
(the Syrian hinterland).
Perhaps the most eloquent expression of this new economic Beirut 
is found in an article by Salim al-Bustani (1848–84) entitled ‘Our 
Position’ (1872), which can be considered a founding text on the 
political economy of natural Syria and its coast in a changing world. 
‘We have become’, he wrote, ‘the door from which the West enters 
the East and the East accedes to the West.’ The ‘we’ refers to natural 
Syria, which occupies the ‘centre’ of the ‘Oriental nation’, flanked by 
Turkey in the north and by Egypt and Tunis in the south. The author 
recommends that economic activities should exploit this geostrategic 
position between the West, ‘land of civilisation and success’, and 
the East, ‘a demographically rich territory and a land of wealth and 
agricultural abundance’. Bustani thus conceived of an economic 
role for Syria based on agriculture and trade, the latter distributing 
the products of the former. To legitimise trade as the vocation for 
the Syrian coast, Bustani makes the first references to Phoenicia 
initiating a tradition that considers the ancient Canaanite statelets 
as the founding origins of the Lebanese entity and of Lebanon’s 
people as a ‘people of merchants’.3 
A NEW KINd Of CITy ANd sOCIETy
Commenting on the particularity of Beirut’s position and role, Albert 
Hourani has talked about ‘a new kind of city, a new kind of urban 
society with a new kind of relationship with the rural hinterland’. 
A convergence of factors – migration, rapid urbanisation, the 
symbiosis between the city and Mount Lebanon, the development 
of an enterprising indigenous bourgeoisie, and a rapidly growing 
educational and cultural infrastructure – accounted for much of 
what made this new city and society.
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Beirut’s population had already quadrupled in three decades 
(1830–60). On the eve of the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920, 
it had tripled again, to 120,000 inhabitants. Much of this growth 
must be attributed to the refugees fleeing civil strife in 1841–45 
and the 1860s. They came from Aleppo, Damascus, the Biqa` and, 
of course, Mount Lebanon. In 1860, some 20,000 had fled from 
the latter to Beirut alone. Affluent merchants and skilled artisans 
from Dayr al-Qamar, Jizzin and Damascus settled in the city and 
contributed to its economic growth. Later on, more numerous 
but less affluent migrants flocked from Mount Lebanon and the 
neighbouring countryside, seeking employment opportunities. 
Immigration altered the city’s sectarian composition, as most of 
the newcomers were Christians of all sects who, by the turn of the 
century, constituted at least 60 per cent of its population. 
The absence of strong artisan guilds greatly helped the unhindered 
development of Beirut’s international trade and services sector.4 
On the other hand, internal migration was an important factor in 
diversifying the city’s economic activities and helped to create a 
plural urban society characterised by fluid social mobility. At the 
close of the nineteenth century, Beirut had earned its title of the 
‘jewel in the crown of the Empire’, as German emperor Wilhelm II 
remarked during his visit in 1898. 
The city witnessed unprecedented urban development, thanks to 
the joint effect of ambitious Ottoman infrastructure projects and 
the efforts of the city’s municipality, set up in 1868. The municipal 
council, which brought together representatives of the city’s 
merchant and notable families with some middle-class professionals, 
enjoyed considerable powers. It collected taxes, maintained law and 
order, opened streets, managed public places, constructed public 
schools, controlled market prices and took over responsibility for 
the city’s sanitary infrastructure. But most importantly, Beirut’s 
municipal council ultimately became the representative of the city’s 
local interests, as opposed to those of the central government. 
The city’s centre shifted from the area around the port to the old 
city, now bisected by two major streets, one to connect the port to 
the souks and the other linking the city’s centre, Sahat al-Burj, to 
Bab Idriss, a southern gate on the city wall. Just outside the city 
walls rose new official Ottoman buildings, symbols of regenerated 
Ottoman bureaucratic and military control. The Serail, situated on 
the eastern flank of the city wall, was built on the location of the 
old fort constructed by Fakhr al-Din II. It housed local magistrates 
courts and administrative services. The new infantry barracks – later 
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called the Grand Serail and presently housing the office of the prime 
minister – and the adjacent military hospital (later the Palace of 
Justice), were architectural expressions of the new Ottoman military 
organisation. The barracks dominated Sahat al-Sur and the old 
city. A clock tower was erected in 1899, the first of its kind in the 
Arab region, symbolising Ottoman modernism in obvious contrast 
to mosques, more traditional symbols of the Ottoman presence. 
The city expanded rapidly beyond its walls, which virtually 
disappeared by the 1880s. A construction boom raised the price 
of land by 40 per cent in less than a decade as the city spread 
toward Nahr Beirut to the East and Ras Beirut to the West. By 
the end of the century, the majority of the city’s inhabitants were 
already living outside the walls. Families of the merchant aristocracy 
built villas and palaces with Italianised architecture on the hills of 
Ashrafieh, in the east overlooking the port, while the more recent 
bourgeois families moved to Zuqaq al-Bulat and Qantari in the 
west. New quarters developed further west: Bashura and Musaytiba, 
middle-class quarters of merchants and functionaries, in addition to 
the popular neighbourhoods of Basta and Mazra`at al-`Arab. Streets 
were enlarged and paved. A Belgian company, the Compagnie de 
Gaz de Beyrouth, which had provided Beirut streets with gas lighting 
in 1889, obtained the concession to build an electric tramway and 
provide the city with electric power under the name of Tramways 
et Eclairage de Beyrouth (TEB). Opened in 1909, the tramway 
had five lines. Many of the city’s streets were enlarged, paved and 
cleaned as the municipality imposed street cleaning taxes on houses, 
shops and cafés in 1891. Sanitary and health conditions generally 
improved and the quarantine for maritime visitors was moved from 
the quarter of Rumayl to a new location further north, near Nahr 
Beirut. Adjacent parts of the countryside swelled with newcomers 
who worked in Beirut but preferred to continue living within the 
Mutasarrifiya in areas that would soon become the city’s southern 
suburbs of Ghubayri, Shiyah and Burj al-Barajina.
New Europeanised souks developed outside the old city, offering 
imported manufactured and luxury goods. Beirut’s most impressive 
novelty in this field was the lavish Orozdi Bek department store, 
part of an Egyptian commercial chain with branches in many cities 
of Egypt and Bilad al-Sham, located in a Westernised multistorey 
building modelled after the Parisian galleries. The old khans were 
supplanted by no fewer than 17 modern hotels, including the 
prestigious Hôtel Bassoul in the Zaytuna quarter on the waterfront, 
later renamed Grand Hôtel d’Orient. 
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One major factor that explains Beirut’s unique position and role 
as a new city is the development of its indigenous bourgeoisie. Much 
of the city’s role in the colonial economy and the opportunities of 
wealth and profit it offered were exploited by its merchant class. 
Ultimately, European entrepreneurs played a smaller role in Beirut 
than in other Levantine ports like Alexandria. Local entrepreneurs 
imposed themselves as representatives of European companies, local 
retailers for European wholesalers, intermediaries in the silk market 
and brokers for local crops, in addition to their role as usurers. By 
the time Beirut became a separate wilayet, its trade had passed from 
European hands to local hands.5 Its local merchants invested part 
of their commercial profits in manufacture, especially silk reeling 
and banking. 
Inside the city’s merchant class, the balance of economic power 
rapidly tipped in favour of its Christian component. Christian 
merchants controlled the international import trade, whereas 
Muslim merchants had to content themselves with trade between 
the different ports of the Empire, the export of agricultural products 
from the Syrian interior to Europe and the local trade in grain, 
both in bulk and in retail. Indeed, Christian merchant aristocrats 
were associated with their Sunni counterparts – the Bayhum, 
Da`uq, Salam and Tabbara families, and others – in big farms, 
trade and franchise-holding companies. But, on the eve of World 
War I, Christian economic, if not political, interests had become 
preponderant in the city. Foreign trade, finance and representation 
of European firms (insurance and maritime companies) had become 
their semi-exclusive domain. Of the 26 houses engaged in the export 
of raw silk, only three belonged to Muslim families. Importers of 
manufactured products, building materials and pharmaceutical 
products were all Christians. There was only one Muslim among 
the eleven cotton merchants. Local banks were in the hands of 
Christian families, with the exception of two owned by Jewish 
families. Christians also dominated the liberal professions. There 
were only ten Muslim lawyers out of a total of 81 and two Muslim 
dentists out of a total of 20.6
The Christian merchant class was itself undergoing a process of dif-
ferentiation between an aristocratic and a bourgeois faction. Its older 
established merchant aristocracy was mainly composed of Greek 
Orthodox families, whose activities covered the various wilayas 
of the empire. The Abella, Sursuq, Bustrus, Trad, Fayyad, Jbeili, 
Tuwayni and Tabet families arrived in the city in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. Originally mudabbirs, tax and customs 
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duties collectors, merchants and moneylenders, they appropriated 
landed property and accumulated capital even before being attracted 
to the city’s commercial and financial possibilities. Almost all of 
them benefited from the protection of one consulate or the other, 
a privilege granted to Europeans under the famous capitulations.7 
Though partly engaged in the import trade and finance, the 
families of the merchant aristocracy remained primarily landowners 
–in Turkey, Egypt, Syria, and Palestine and, of course, Beirut and 
Mount Lebanon – and exporters of grain to Europe. Some of 
their commercial profits was invested in real estate and in modern 
agricultural projects in the ̀ Ammiq marshes (the Biqa`) or the Hula 
plain (Palestine). Politically, they were closely linked to the Ottoman 
authorities. Though their Greek Orthodox creed earned them aid 
and protection by Tsarist Russia, they also enjoyed close relations 
with Germany and Britain (Salim Bustrus was reputed to be a friend 
of Disraeli). Their matrimonial alliances with the Italian and British 
aristocracy earned them noble titles. 
Parallel to this merchant aristocracy and sometimes in competition 
with it, a financial, commercial and manufacturing bourgeoisie 
arose. Its families were mainly Greek Catholics of Syrian origin 
and more recent arrivals to the city. They were more closely related 
to European capital through the silk economy (exporters of raw 
silk, moneylenders to peasant producers and silk reelers), banking 
activities and the import of European manufactured products. 
The two associated and related families, Pharaon and Chiha, were 
typical representatives of this new class. In 1876, Antoine Chiha 
and his father-in-law Raphael Pharaon invested the big profits they 
earned from speculation on raw silk in establishing a commercial 
and financial society that became the ‘Banque Pharaon-Chiha’, one 
of the first indigenous banks in Lebanon. On the eve of World War I, 
the Pharaon–Chiha association had become the biggest silk-reeling 
firm in the wilayet of Beirut, and its commercial branch controlled 
12 per cent of the total volume of silk exports from Beirut. In 1894, 
it gained a quasi-monopoly on the import of British coal (the main 
energy source for the silk-reeling firms) transported by its merchant 
ship, flying the British flag, and kept warehouses in Mersine, Jaffa 
and Beirut.8 
EdUCATIONAL ANd CULTUrAL INfrAsTrUCTUrE
Foreign missionaries, local churches, central and local government 
authorities competed to provide Beirut with a sizeable and rapidly 
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growing educational and cultural infrastructure which would 
support the flowering of a distinctive intellectual climate. 
Education provision in Mount Lebanon had long preceded 
that in Beirut. The Maronite Church, a pioneer in the field, sent 
student missions to Rome, particularly after the establishment 
of the Maronite College in the Vatican in 1584, and adopted the 
establishment of schools for male children as official Church policy 
as early as the Synod of Luwayza in 1736. One such school was the 
renowned Maronite seminary of ̀ Ayn Waraqa, established in 1789, 
where the principal intellectuals of the Nahda studied. At about that 
time, the Greek Catholics established a similar school in ̀ Ayn Traz. 
The French envisaged their missionary and educational role as a 
supplementary asset in their competition with the British. As early 
as 1733, the Jesuits established their institutions in Kisrawan and 
the north before leaving the country for a relatively long period. 
Upon their return in 1839, they opened a school in Beirut. Three 
years later, they had a network of institutions in Ghazir, Zahleh, 
Bikfaya, Ta`nayil, Jizzin, Dayr al-Qamar and Sidon. Meanwhile, 
in 1834, the Lazarites opened their school at `Ayn Tura, the first 
to teach in French. 
Protestant missionaries, first British then American, started their 
activities on Lebanese territories in 1810 with a school for boys in 
Beirut. As`ad Shidyaq, a graduate of ̀ Ayn Waraqa, taught Arabic in 
that school and became the first Protestant convert. He wrote a letter 
against the adoration of icons and called for a direct interpretation 
of the Holy Book by believers. In 1820, the Maronite patriarch 
Hubaysh, under orders from Rome, launched his attack against 
Protestant ‘heresy’, banning any commerce with Protestants under 
the threat of excommunication. As`ad Shidyaq was arrested and 
incarcerated in the patriarchal seat at Qannubin (Bisharri), where 
he died of maltreatement in 1830. Following Shidyaq’s arrest, most 
Protestant missionaries left but returned under Muhammad `Ali to 
open a boys’ school in Beirut (1835), followed by a school for girls 
(1837) and later a boarding school for boys (1850). In 1838, they 
set up their leading Protestant seminary in `Ubay and, two years 
later, a school for Druze girls in Mount Lebanon. By 1862, the 
Protestants were running 41 schools with 948 students. 
After the 1860s, the tendency was to set up schools or upgrade 
them in Beirut or move them to the city. College education had 
begun in 1866 with the founding of the Protestant Syrian American 
College, which was to become the renowned American University 
of Beirut (AUB). The Jesuits followed suit as they transferred their 
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college from Ghazir (Kisrawan) to Beirut. In 1874–75, a medical 
school and a faculty for Oriental studies were added, marking the 
beginning of the Université Saint-Joseph. 
The Protestant challenge prompted local churches to engage in a 
new round of school construction in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. 
The Greek Orthodox built a school in the convent of Balamand near 
Tripoli (1833) and in Suq al-Gharb (1852). The Catholics founded 
the Ecole Patriarcale in 1865 and, in 1874, the Maronite bishop of 
Beirut established the Ecole de la Sagesse. 
Lay charitable institutions also contributed their share to this 
rapid growth of education. In 1878, a group of Sunni notables 
of Beirut founded Jam`iyat al-Maqasid al-Khayriya al-Islamiya 
(the Muslim Association for Benevolent Intentions) whose main 
goal was the spread of education among the city’s Muslim youth, 
as a reaction to missionary schooling. The first Maqasid schools 
were soon established in Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon. For the Greek 
Orthodox, Emilie Sursuq established Zahrat al-Ihsan (Flower of 
Charity), a school for girls in 1880. 
Finally, Ottoman public education should not be underrated. 
Sultan `Abd al-Hamid II had greatly encouraged the construction 
of public schools. Through the joint efforts of Ottoman walis and 
the city’s municipality, Beirut’s public schools grew from 153 in 
1886 to 359 in 1914.
Beirut also became a centre for printing and publishing. Book 
publishing in Arabic in the Arab regions of the Empire did not 
start until after 1727, when the Porte lifted the ban on printing in 
Arabic. Before then, books in Arabic were produced in Italy and 
France, although presses in Mount Lebanon had been established at 
an earlier period. The first known printing press in Mar Quzhayya 
monastery (in the north) began printing religious books in Syriac 
script as early as 1610. In 1723, Deacon `Abdalla Zakhir started a 
new Arabic press in the Greek Catholic monastery of Mar Yuhanna 
al-Shuwayr, which published the first book in Arabic in 1734. The 
Protestants’ concern with spreading the Bible in Arabic provided 
Beirut with its first printing press. In 1834, Eli Smith moved the 
American Press from Malta to Beirut and provided it with a new 
set of elegant Arabic letters. In 1848, the Jesuits followed suit and 
set up their Catholic Press, and local presses soon followed. 
In 1856 the poet and critic Khalil Khoury founded Hadiqat 
al-Akhbar, the first Arabic weekly in Syria. By 1914, there were 168 
publications in Beirut alone, ranging from daily and weekly political 
newspapers to academic and scientific journals. Among them were 
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a dozen women’s magazines pioneered by Hind Nawfal’s Al-Fatat 
in 1893. One of the leading newspapers was Lisan al-Hal (The 
Spokesman), published by Khalil Sarkis. In addition to Al-Mashriq 
(The Orient), the Jesuit orientalist journal, two professors at the 
Syrian Protestant College, Ya’qub Sarraf and Faris Nimr, started 
the scientific journal Al-Muqtataf. The journal, which transferred 
to Cairo in 1883, established itself as a forum of scientific thought, 
played an important role in the translation of scientific terms and 
published celebrated polemics on Darwin’s theories. Lebanese men of 
letters also played a key role in the development of Arab journalism 
in the rest of the Sultanate. Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq’s Al-Jawa’ib 
(The News), published in Istanbul in 1861, is considered to be the 
first pan-Arab modern newspaper. It enjoyed a wide distribution and 
considerable influence in all the capitals of the Arab provinces of 
the Empire. Intellectuals from Lebanon also played a major role in 
the development of journalism in Egypt. Jirji Zaydan (1861–1914) 
founded Al-Hilal (The Crescent) and the Taqla brothers Salim 
(1849–1912) and Bishara (1852–1911) established Al-Ahram (The 
Pyramids), both of which remain to this day the most influential 
monthly and daily publications, respectively, in Egypt. 
The first cultural associations in the region saw the light of day in 
Beirut. The Syrian Association for the Sciences and Arts a literary 
and scientific circle, was founded in 1847 in Beirut by Ibrahim 
al-Yazigi, Butrus al-Bustani and Mikha’il Mashaqqa, encouraged 
and influenced by the Protestant missionary and scholar Cornelius 
Van Dyck. The deliberations of the society, collected and published 
by Bustani, covered many themes on science, history, rationality, 
women’s rights, the fight against superstition, the history of Beirut 
and the importance of trade. The society was dissolved, but its 
members in 1852 and its inner circle founded the Syrian Scientific 
Association six years later, with a much wider and multi-sectarian 
audience and a membership of more than 180. There was also 
the short-lived Oriental Society founded in 1850, whose records 
have unfortunately disappeared. Literary salons also appeared at 
that time, with Ibrahim al-Yazigi’s wife Warda founding the most 
reputed salon. 
AL-NAHDA: THE CULTUrAL rENAIssANCE
The contribution of Lebanese territories to the renaissance of Arab 
writing and culture, the Nahda, was the product of a singular 
symbiosis between Beirut and Mount Lebanon in the wider context 
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of the opening of both to Europe and the Syrian interior. While 
Beirut offered the educational and cultural infrastructure and the 
urban setting, Mount Lebanon provided the human element and 
the experience of a dramatic transitional period that witnessed 
the collapse of the old muqata`ji order, amid a bloody civil war. 
The Nahda’s principal actors were recent migrants from Mount 
Lebanon to Beirut. The city transformed them into a new type of 
intellectuals. They had studied in the Mountain but perfected their 
education in the city. Almost all had been mudabbirs, serving as 
secretaries and copyists under muqata`jis and rulers. In the city they 
became educators, translators, journalists or simply writers. Their 
patrons were sometimes merchant bourgeois who advertised in their 
newspapers or financed the publication of their books. 
Typical of this class was Nasif al-Yazigi (1800–1871), who began 
his career as a private secretary to Prince Haydar al-Shihabi and 
Bashir Shihab II. He settled in Beirut around 1840 and came in 
contact with Protestant missionaries as a tutor in Arabic and later 
taught at the Syrian Protestant College. He wrote on philosophy, 
grammar, style, rhetoric and poetry, covering topics such as the 
poetry of al-Mutanabbi (915–955) and the muqata`ji system in 
Mount Lebanon. His son Ibrahim (1847–1906) was a grammarian, 
man of letters and educator who taught at the Ecole Patriarcale 
and the National School in Beirut. Nasif al-Yazigi made a valuable 
contribution to the modern study of Arabic poetry and his wide 
range of interests included music, painting and astronomy. Among 
his many innovations was the creation of a simplified Arab 
font, which reduced Arabic character forms from 300 to 60 and 
contributed to the creation of the Arabic typewriter. Ibrahim died 
in exile in Egypt after fleeing Ottoman repression.
Butrus al-Bustani (1819–1883) was the Nahda’s encyclopaedist. 
The Mu`allim (Master) was also a grammarian, educator, journalist, 
critic and pioneer in liberal, nationalist and secular thought. He 
studied in `Ayn Waraqa, the famous Maronite college, and taught 
at the Protestant seminary in Beirut then at the Syrian Protestant 
College. In 1863, Bustani founded the National School in Beirut, 
the first secular school in the Arab east, with instruction in Arabic, 
Turkish, French, English, Greek and Latin. Butrus al-Bustani 
published the first political bulletin, Nafir Suriya (September 1860–
April 1861). In 1870, he published the daily Al-Janna, edited by his 
son Salim, the weekly Al-Junayna, edited by his kinsman Sulayman 
(the translator in verse of Homer’s Iliad), and the monthly Al-Jinan.9 
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His main contributions, however, are the first modern Arabic 
dictionary (1870) and a six-volume encyclopaedia (1870–82). 
Faris Shidyaq (1805–1887) is undoubtedly the most radical 
and creative of the Nahda figures. Born in `Ashqut (in Kisrawan), 
he lived in Hadath, near Beirut, in a family that suffered greatly 
from the oppression of the Church and the local feudal leaders. 
His grandfather, father and brother died as ‘martyrs of freedom 
of thought and inclination’, as he was later to write. Faris also 
studied at `Ayn Waraqa and, upon the death of his father, worked 
as a copyist of manuscripts. However, he continued his studies 
under his elder brother As`ad, whose arrest and death completely 
changed the course of Faris’s life. He broke from the Maronite 
Church, converted to Protestantism and left the country to an exile 
from which he never returned. In Cairo, under Muhammad `Ali, 
he taught Arabic to American Protestant missionaries and studied 
under the sheikhs of al-Azhar. From 1834 to 1848 Shidyaq was 
in Malta, where he taught at the American missionary school and 
edited the publications of the American Press. Later, he spent a 
decade moving between England and France, during which he 
assisted Dr Samuel Lee in the translation of the Bible into Arabic. 
After a brief stay in Tunis in 1859, invited by its reformist governor, 
Ahmad Bey, to edit the official Al-Ra’id al-Tunis, he converted to 
Islam and went to settle in Istanbul where he spent the remainder 
of his days. In the Ottoman capital he worked at the Imperial 
Press, translated the Journal of Ottoman Court Orders into Arabic 
(1868–76) and founded the newspaper Al-Jawa’ib in 1861. Man of 
letters, philologist and grammarian, Faris is the author of two books 
relating his travels in Europe, Al-Wasita fi Ma`rifat Ahwal Malta 
(Means of Knowing Malta) and Kashf al-Mukhabba `Ann Funun 
Urubba (Unveiling the Hidden in European Arts), both published 
in 1863. His writings on philology and grammar include a number 
of dictionaries from French and English into Arabic; Al-Jasus 
`ala-l-Qamus (The Spy on the Dictionary), a monumental critique 
of Fayruzabadi’s classic dictionary; and two books on grammar 
and rhetoric. His masterpiece Al-Saq `ala-l-Saq (The Thigh Over 
the Thigh), written and published in Paris in 1855, is considered a 
founding text of Arab modernity, both in content and form. 
Yusuf al-Asir (1815–1889) was born in Sidon and stood out as 
the leading Muslim among the men of the Nahda. A graduate of 
al-Azhar in Cairo, he held the position of judge in Tripoli, mufti 
in `Akkar and attorney-general in Mount Lebanon under the 
Mutasarrifiya. In addition to a collection of poetry, his writings 
Traboulsi T02610 01 text   64 23/04/2012   08:06
BEIrUT, CAPITAL Of TrAdE ANd CULTUrE (1820–1918) 65
include a commentary on the Ottoman Code. He was also the 
founder of the first newspaper in Lebanon (1875) to be published 
by a Muslim.
A common concern of all the Nahda pioneers was to liberate Arabic 
writing from its lethargy and conventional styles. They succeeded 
brilliantly in prose and much less so in poetry. Undoubtedly the 
translation of the Bible into Arabic was a landmark in that effort 
as the process of translation itself contributed to the innovation of 
Arabic prose. Three translations were produced within a period 
of 15 years. The Shidyaq–Lee translation came out first, in 1857, 
but remained largely unknown. Eli Smith (1801–1852) started the 
project in 1847, assisted by Butrus al-Bustani and the translation 
was corrected by Nasif al-Yazigi. After Smith’s death, the effort was 
continued by Cornelius Van Dyck (1818–1895) helped by Yusuf 
al-Asir and the final version came out in 1865. In 1880, Ibrahim 
al-Yazigi produced the Bible translation for the Jesuits. Regardless 
of the controversies it gave rise to, the new translation of the Bible 
would influence generations of writers, including Gibran Khalil 
Gibran, author of The Prophet. 
Literary renewal did not stop at language. New literary forms 
appeared under the direct influence of Western literature. Marun 
Naqqash (1817–1855) introduced the theatrical arts. In 1848, he 
staged the first modern play in Arabic, the operetta Al-Bakhil, a 
loose translation of Molière’s L’Avare. Mikha’il Mashaqqa must 
be mentioned as a pioneer in the autobiography genre with his 
Al-Jawab `ala Iqtirah al-Ahbab (An Answer to the Enquiry of the 
Beloved Ones, 1873), while Salim al-Bustani initiated the novel 
form with his Al-Huyam fi Jinan al-Sham (Love in the Gardens 
of Sham) and Zannubiya (Zenobia). Jirji Zaydan wrote the first 
historical novels evoking glorious or dramatic episodes of Arab–
Muslim history along with his classic histories of Arabic literature 
and Muslim civilisation.
Those men lived through a dramatic transitional period in which 
the old society was disintegrating, and they were not content to 
be passive witnesses of its transformations. They were actively 
engaged in the struggle against the two pillars of the old order: 
the muqata`ji system and the Maronite Church. Equally important 
in understanding their motives, thought and positions is the 
decisive impact that the 1860 civil war left on their lives. Many 
factors account for the conversion of the Maronites Bustani and 
Shidyaq and the Greek Catholic Mashaqqa to Protestantism and 
the close association of the Greek Catholic Yazigis with Protestant 
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missionaries. Their views on the Maronite Church and their secular 
leaning certainly contributed to their decision. However, dissidents 
from their communities were not all Christians. Amir Muhammad 
Ibn `Abbas Arslan, appointed qa’im maqam of the Druze in 1858, 
resigned his post in protest against the horrors of the 1860 war and 
settled in Beirut, where he devoted himself to literature until the end 
of his days. He was later to preside over the Scientific Association.
Moreover, those Christian intellectuals did not turn to 
Christian Europe for inspiration, but to the secular Europe of the 
Enlightenment, of English liberalism, and the ideals of the French 
Revolution of 1789. Freedom of expression, the rule of law, the 
central role of the individual in society and the state and equality 
were the underlying themes in their writings. Shidyaq, questioning 
the arbitrary arrest and incarceration of his brother As`ad by 
the Maronite patriarch, writes: ‘suppose my brother argued and 
polemised in religious affairs and maintained you were in error, 
you did not have to kill him for that. You should have refuted his 
proofs and arguments by words, spoken or written …’10 Bustani, 
for his part, emphasised the need for good government (governance) 
and the respect for laws. 
Even so, European concepts were not uncritically assimilated. 
The attraction of civilisation, progress, democracy and freedom did 
not hide, in Shidyaq’s eyes, the misery of the working populations 
in mid-nineteenth-century Europe. As much as he admired equality 
among citizens in England, he was also deeply aware of the rigidity 
of the country’s social hierarchy and was shocked to find out that 
the condition of the English peasants was no better than that of 
peasants in Mount Lebanon. He soon discovered that the basis of 
the peasants’ misery in England was the system of land ownership, 
in which a few thousand families monopolised the majority of 
cultivable land. Shidyaq was opposed to inherited wealth, sceptical 
about the idealisation of poverty as propagated by religion; he 
meditated at length on the way money corrupts human relations 
and feelings. In Victorian London, where rich and poor quarters 
coexisted ‘as Heaven and Hell would coexist’, Shidyaq realised that 
poverty was at the basis of all social ills: crime, suicide, prostitution 
of adolescents, abortion, and so on. But he discovered that the 
misery of the many made the happiness of the few: ‘How could it be 
that a thousand human beings, nay two thousands, should labour 
for the happiness of only one man?’ Shidyaq’s deep sense of social 
justice led him to socialism (which he translated into Ishtirakiyyah 
in 1878). Ultimately, he believed that a society of peasants and 
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workers was more reasonable than one exclusively and entirely 
composed of rich people.
The Lebanese Nahda followed the tradition of its Egyptian 
counterpart in assigning the greatest importance to education as a 
principal mode of access to modernity and civilisation. However, 
Shidyaq departs from his colleagues in his emphasis on industrialisa-
tion and the value of work and of time, which he linked to the notion 
of progress. He further warned against reducing modernity and 
civilisation to living in the cities and speaking a foreign language. 
‘Education without work’, says he, ‘is like a tree without fruits or 
a river without water.’
The intellectuals of the Lebanese Nahda were also pioneers of 
feminism. Bustani, in his famous ‘Allocution On the Education of 
Women’ (1849), argued the case for the education of women perhaps 
for the first time in the Arab world. But the mu`allim essentially 
envisaged an ideal oriental woman, educated yet restricted to her 
household, where her main role was the education of her children. 
Shidyaq went much further than his contemporaries in calling for 
complete equality between women and men. He defended women’s 
right to work and to choose their husbands, and supported their 
equal right to divorce. However, the Lebanese libertarian’s most 
original contribution to women’s liberation, in the mid-nineteenth 
century, was his defence of women’s equal right to sexual pleasure, 
even justifying extra-marital relations!
Finally, the Lebanese Nahda was a movement for the national 
revival of the Arabs. Ibrahim al-Yazigi’s poem ‘Arabs, Arise and 
Awake!’ became the rallying call for the early generations of Arab 
nationalists. However, it was Butrus al-Bustani who elaborated the 
notion of homeland (watan). Although the national space was Syria 
(present Lebanon, Syria and Palestine), whose people were bound 
by the bonds of a common language, culture and history. In line 
with the Nahda’s passion for scientific concepts, Bustani used the 
metaphor of the magnet to describe the power of attraction that 
the homeland exercised on its people.
ArAB dECENTrALIsTs ANd INdEPENdENTIsTs
Beirut harboured one of the earliest manifestations of Arab 
nationalism, providing it with its cultural ethos. The turbulent 
developments inside the Ottoman Empire eventually transformed 
the idea into a movement.
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In 1876, the Grand Vizier, Midhat Pasha, backed by Ottoman 
reformers, deposed Sultan `Abd al-`Aziz, and replaced him by his 
brother Sultan `Abd al-Hamid II (1876–1909). The ‘Hamidian 
revolution’ marked a turning point in the history of the Ottoman 
Empire and the destiny of its Arab regions. The Ottoman reformers 
had envisaged a set of political reforms in order to save the Empire 
from European encroachment. On 23 December of that year, they 
declared the Ottoman constitution. Known as ‘Midhat Pasha’s 
constitution’, the new charter confirmed the equality of all the 
subjects of the Empire, guaranteed basic liberties and adopted a 
constitutional and limited parliamentary regime. 
Nationalist agitation in the Arab regions was a direct 
consequence of developments in Istanbul. In 1877, the project of 
an independent Arab kingdom, covering the territories of Lebanon, 
Syria and Palestine, was revived. Encouraged by the outbreak of 
the Russo-Ottoman war on 18 April 1877, Muslim notables and 
intellectuals from Syria’s major cities and rural centres converged 
upon Damascus to pay allegiance to `Abd al-Qadir and urge him 
to lead the movement for the unity of Bilad al-Sham.11 They still 
conceived of that unity inside the confines of the Ottoman Empire. 
Significantly, the movement welcomed a new recruit in Yusuf Karam, 
whose political beliefs had undergone a radical transformation while 
he was in exile.
As soon as the regions of the Empire had started to react favourably 
to the declaration of the constitution, `Abd al-Hamid suspended it 
under the pretext of the Russo-Ottoman war. Midhat Pasha was 
dismissed and sent into exile. The outcome of the Russo-Ottoman 
war shifted in favour of the Russians, laying a heavy burden on 
the Empire. According to the treaties of San Stephano and Berlin 
(March and April 1878), the Ottoman Empire lost territories to 
Russia and was forced to recognise the independence of Romania 
and Serbia and to concede additional Ottoman territory to the 
European powers. `Abd al-Hamid ceded Cyprus to Britain and the 
latter encouraged France to occupy Tunisia. More importantly, 
Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 under the guise of suppressing the 
anti-British `Urabi revolt by officers of the Egyptian army. In the 
end, Yusuf Karam was proven right: Britain and France had started 
planning the dismemberment of the ailing Ottoman Empire. Aware 
that Istanbul could no longer count on Britain to help preserve the 
unity of the Empire, ̀ Abd al-Hamid II resorted to an internal policy 
of massive repression and allied himself externally with Germany, 
the new and rival European imperial power. 
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When Midhat Pasha was reinstated in 1878 and appointed wali 
of Syria, a new lease of life was granted to Arab nationalists. The 
first clandestine brochures calling for revolt against the Turks and 
for Arab independence appeared on the walls of Beirut in 1881 and 
1882. They were attributed to a secret society founded in 1876 by 
a dozen Christian intellectuals, mostly former Syrian Protestant 
College (SPC) students. However, Midhat’s mandate was brief. 
Accused by the central government of seeking to detach the Arab 
provinces, he was arrested and exiled again to Ta’if (in the Arab 
peninsula) in 1881 and assassinated two years later, probably on the 
orders of `Abd al-Hamid. Midhat’s demise ended the first phase of 
Arab national agitation. In 1882–83, the ‘Arabist’ secret society was 
disbanded and its members, including Sarruf, Nimr and Yazigi, fled 
to Egypt and many of the pro-`Abd al-Qadir notables and ulemas 
were assigned to residence or exiled.
To consolidate his rule and face up to European designs, `Abd 
al-Hamid called for Islamic unity, now that Arabs and Muslims 
constituted the majority of his subjects. If this helped temporarily to 
appease Arab independentist agitation, it nevertheless unleashed a 
new wave of struggle against Hamidian authoritarianism. The major 
demands were the return to the constitution, decentralisation and a 
larger measure of participation for the Arabs in running the affairs 
of the Sultanate. In 1902, a secret circle calling for constitutional 
life and the end of Hamidian rule was founded in Damascus. 
Four years later, a group of Arab students in Istanbul formed the 
Association for Arab Renaissance (Jam`iyat al-Nahda al-`Arabiya), 
calling for reform and wider political Arab participation. In Paris, 
a group of Christian Lebanese notables and merchants founded 
the Ottoman League (1908), while Arab Muslims students formed 
the Young Arab League (al-Jam`iya al-`Arabiya al-Fatat) in 1911. 
Among them were Muhammad Rustum Haydar and Ghalib 
Mahmasani from Lebanon, `Awni `Abd al-Hadi from Palestine, 
Jamil Mardam from Syria, and Rafiq al-Tamimi from Iraq. Their 
aim was to ‘raise the Arab nation to the level of modern nations’. 
In response to the official policy of Islamisation, which emphasised 
the historical role of the Arabs in propagating Islam, decentralists 
demanded equal rights for Arabs and the officialisation of Arabic, 
and proclaimed the unity of the Arab regions of the empire. The 
multi-sectarian decentralists took residence in Cairo, where they 
founded the Ottoman Party for Administrative Decentralisation 
in 1912. 
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The revolt of the Young Turks in 1909 and the reactivation of 
the constitution revived nationalist agitation in the Arab provinces. 
In 1913, the Young Arab Society moved its offices to Beirut and 
published Al-Mufid, edited by `Abd al-Ghani `Uraysi. The most 
notable of the local movements for reform and decentralisation was 
the Beirut Reform Movement of 1912–13. In late 1912, 84 Beiruti 
notables and intellectuals met at the city’s municipality and elected 
a 25-member Preparatory Committee for Reform. They demanded 
the officialisation of Arabic, decentralisation, the extension of 
the powers of the wilaya’s council and the reduction of military 
service. It was also suggested that the council be formed of 30 
elected members, half Muslims and half non-Muslims (the latter 
comprised of 13 Christians and two Jews) and control a larger share 
of the budget revenues – in fact, everything except the revenues from 
customs, post and telegraph and the exemption tax from military 
service. The reformists further threatened to join the autonomous 
region of Mount Lebanon should their demands not be met. 
However, in the end the outcome of Beirut’s autonomist demands 
was no better than that of the Mountain. On 8 April 1913, the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) declared the movement’s 
demands ‘an act of treason against the Ottoman State’, dismissed 
wali Adham Beyk for his sympathies toward the city’s reformists and 
appointed Hazim Beyk, who disbanded the Reform Committee on 
that same day. The next day, all Beirut papers were bordered in black 
in sympathetic protest. Three days later, the Committee’s general 
assembly, convening in the meeting hall of the Syrian Protestant 
College, called for a general strike, and a memorandum signed 
by 1,300 of the city’s inhabitants (merchants, rentiers, physicians, 
lawyers and journalists) was addressed to the Porte, objecting to 
the disbanding of the Reform Committee as unconstitutional. 
The response came in the form of further repression. The police 
were ordered to force merchants to open shop, six members of 
the committee were arrested and accused of instigating the strike, 
and the two nationalist newspapers, ̀ Uraysi’s Al-Mufid and Sheikh 
Ahmad Tabbara’s Al-Ittihad al-`Uthmani, were closed. Though 
the detainees were released, the Ottoman authorities appointed a 
more restricted committee (with considerably fewer Christians). 
The movement fizzled out. 
The apogee of that period was the First Arab Congress in Paris 
representing the different nationalist tendencies among the elites 
of the Arab regions. Held on 17–23 June 1913 under the auspices 
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of the Ottoman Party, for Administrative Decentralisation, the 
congress was attended by delegates from Syria, Iraq, Palestine, 
Beirut and Mount Lebanon, in addition to the Lebanese support 
committees in Paris, Cairo, the United States and Mexico. The Syrian 
`Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi presided, and participants demanded 
Ottoman reform, decentralisation, the recognition of Arabic in the 
Ottoman Parliament and its officialisation in the Arab provinces, 
and the extension of the right for Arab conscripts to serve their 
terms in their own provinces in time of peace. The congress further 
supported the programme of the Beirut Reform movement and the 
increase of the Mutasarrifiya’s financial revenues. The dominant 
mood was set by ̀ Abd al-Ghani al-`Uraysi, who affirmed that Arabs 
were simultaneously members of a nation with specific character-
istics and Ottoman citizens, and consequently possessed legitimate 
rights in both capacities. An issue of discord revolved around 
the demand of some Christian delegates from Mount Lebanon 
who insisted that ‘foreign experts and advisers’ should assist in 
carrying out the reforms. The majority of the delegates saw in this 
proposal an attempt to introduce the idea of enlisting European help 
against Ottoman rule. That note of discord, which was eventually 
settled, foreshadowed the later rift between independentists and 
protectionists. 
Although the negotiations between a delegation from the Arab 
Congress and CUP members Jamal Pasha and Tal`at Pasha at first 
seemed promising, they yielded few results, allowing only the 
election of six Arab notables to the Ottoman Senate. In the end, 
the CUP’s abandonment of ̀ Abd al-Hamid’s policy of Islamic unity, 
its military dictatorship, and Turkish nationalist policies drove Arab 
nationalists and Lebanese independentists alike to seek independence 
by force, even with the help of European powers.
THE CATAsTrOPHIEs Of WOrLd WAr I
The catastrophies that befell the inhabitants of Beirut and Mount 
Lebanon during World War I would have a direct impact on later 
developments. Ottoman repression against the independentist 
movement in Beirut and the Mountain was particularly harsh. 
Under the iron hand of Ottoman envoy Jamal Pasha, the ‘Butcher’, 
in 1915 and 1916, 33 Lebanese and Arab nationalist activists were 
sentenced to death at court martial in ̀ Alay for high treason, accused 
of connections with the Allies. They were publicly hanged in Beirut 
and Damascus. 
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After the declaration of the war, the terrible Safar Barlik was 
imposed– a compulsory military service which still haunts the 
popular imagination today. The exemption tax – set at 44 gold 
pounds per head – put people at the mercy of the usurers. Ottoman 
authorities controlled trade, expropriated wheat and livestock, 
speculated, issued paper money (which they arbitrarily paid as 
equivalent in value to gold) and imposed a compulsory subscription 
to war bonds, payable in cash. Most importantly, the war revealed 
the economic insufficiency of autonomous Mount Lebanon, which 
depended on overseas trade for more than half of its revenues and 
mostly fulfilled its needs in cereals and livestock with imports 
from the Biqa` and the Syrian interior. The shortages of the war 
– aggravated by a locust invasion during the spring of summer of 
1915 – and the speculation of the usurers and governors made the 
territories of the Mutasarrifiya and Beirut the hardest hit by famine 
of all the Ottoman provinces. 
Father Yammin, a Maronite priest from the north, wrote a 
poignant account of Beirut and Mount Lebanon during the war 
years in which he describes, in painful detail, the ravages of locusts, 
the epidemics –- typhus, cholera and leprosy – and prostitution and 
famine. People devoured the meat of dead dogs and camels and cases 
of cannibalism were reported in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Tripoli 
and Jabal `Amil. In Beirut, famine victims stacked in the streets 
were collected by municipal carts and dumped into collective graves 
in the Al-Raml quarter on the city’s outskirts. Many were taken 
for dead and buried alive. Significantly, Yammin refused to follow 
the tradition of blaming all his country’s ills on the Ottomans. He 
likewise accuses rich Lebanese who had become ‘devoid of any 
feeling of tenderness and pity toward their kin’. But his rage was 
primarily directed against Beirut usurers, who lent money in return 
for exorbitant interest rates, set at 25–50 per cent at the beginning 
of the war, and raised to 70–150 per cent by 1916. These ‘traders 
in souls’, as Yammin calls them, had introduced the most cynical 
methods for robbing people of their properties and belongings.12
By the end of the war, an estimated 100,000 inhabitants of Beirut 
and Mount Lebanon had died of famine. 
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Greater Lebanon: The dialectics 
of Attachment and detachment 
(1915–1920)
Little Lebanon spells economic death; union with syria, political death. 
(Yusuf al-Sawda)
The modern state of Lebanon, in the frontiers defined on 1 
September 1920, never existed before in history. It is a product of 
the Franco-British colonial partition of the Middle East. Its creation 
did not imply a return to any ‘natural and historical’ boundaries, 
as Lebanese nationalists claimed, nor was it an ‘artificial’ entity, 
contrary to Arab nationalist pretences, as it is no more nor less 
artificial than any of the other eastern Arab states (Syria, Jordan, 
Palestine, Iraq) created by the partition process. Like the rest of 
these states, Lebanon’s borders were imposed against the will of the 
majority of its population. Greater Lebanon’s creation was mainly 
determined by the interests of France in dividing and controlling 
Syria, in the context of the partition of the Arab provinces of the 
ex-Ottoman Empire between Paris and London. Many Lebanese 
Christians had called for territorial expansion and separation from 
the rest of Syria, under some form or other of French protection 
or guarantee. However, the final product – Greater Lebanon under 
French mandate – hardly corresponded to the programme of any 
Lebanese political party.
LEBANON IN THE PArTITION Of THE MIddLE EAsT
As has become widely known, the Sykes–Picot Accords of 1916 
divided the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire into two broadly 
defined British and French zones, each of which was to exercise 
direct control over the coasts and retain zones of influence in the 
hinterland, with the Jerusalem region as an international zone. 
France’s interest in Syria was not new – an expedition funded 
by the Chambers of Commerce of Lyons and Marseille was sent 
75
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during World War I to ascertain whether the region was worth 
colonising. The mission’s report reached positive conclusions. But 
there lingered in the minds of the French the idea that Palestine 
constituted the southern part of Syria, while Britain had a strong 
claim over Palestine as a buffer zone between Sinai and the Levant 
to defend the Suez Canal and the road to India. British interest in 
the territory that constitutes present-day Iraq was mainly in its 
oil fields and control over the Gulf, which had become a zone of 
British influence. 
There was of course a marked difference between those colonial 
aims and their official justification. In a post-World War I period 
dominated by the right of nations to self-determination, a principle 
invoked with equal force by Wilson’s America and Lenin’s Soviet 
Russia, the legitimisation was rooted in the age-old minorities 
policy, focused on ethnic and religious communities. France justified 
its claim to Syria by the defence of the Christian, Druze, ̀ Alawi and 
Shi`i minorities, while Britain claimed Palestine in order to create a 
‘national homeland’ for the Jews. The text of the Balfour Declaration 
of November 1917 is a striking example of this ethnicisation of the 
peoples of the region.1 Whereas the Jews are taken for granted 
to be a people and a nationality, since the aim was to establish a 
‘national home’ for them in Palestine, the Arabs, the majority of 
the inhabitants of the country, were negatively defined by their 
non-Jewishness and reduced to the status of religious communities 
(Muslim and Christian) whose only rights were civil and religious, 
that is, neither national nor political. 
After having landed its troops under General Henri Gouraud in 
Lebanon, France’s priority was to ensure that it received the mandate 
over Greater Syria. Meanwhile, the troops of the anti-Ottoman Arab 
revolt, launched in 1917 by Sherif Hussein of Mecca, had reached 
Damascus under the leadership of Hussein’s son, Prince Faysal. 
Paris viewed the developments with suspicion that the British were 
breaking their Sykes–Picot commitments. An Arab prince, whose 
revolt was inspired, advised, financed and armed by Britain, ruled 
Damascus, which had become the seat of the Arab government. 
Ultimately, the Sykes–Picot agreement was revised and modified 
according to the recent developments: France dropped any claim 
to Palestine, and ceded the Mosul region – originally considered 
part of Syria – to Britain in return for a share in the Anglo-Persian 
Petroleum Company that had recently discovered oil in that region. 
In return, France’s control over Syria was legitimised, and the British 
advised the French to try and find a solution with Faysal. 
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France’s ‘Lebanese project’ was made subject to that priority. 
In order to obtain its mandate over the Syrian territories, France 
relied mainly on the Maronite Church, represented by Patriarch 
Elias Huwayik. But the elected representatives of Mount Lebanon 
were giving out different signals. In April 1919, the Administrative 
Council (AC) unilaterally declared Lebanon’s independence, under a 
‘democratic system’ based on the principles of ‘liberty, equality and 
fraternity’ and guaranteeing ‘the rights of minorities and freedom 
of belief’. However, at the Paris peace conference a month later, 
the AC delegation headed by Dawud `Ammun encountered heavy 
pressure by French officials to limit its demands to French protection 
and territorial expansion. 
During the following months, Lebanon’s fate was suspended 
as it awaited the outcome of negotiations between France and 
Emir Faysal. In October 1919, French prime minister Georges 
Clemenceau vaguely promised Patriarch Huwayik the annexation 
to Mount Lebanon of ‘territories in the Biqa`’ and ‘appropriate 
ports’ under ‘an autonomous government and an independent 
national status’. Negotiations between Clemenceau and Faysal led 
to a secret accord on the creation of an Arab state in Syria under 
Faysal according to which the capital would be Damascus while a 
French High Commissioner would be posted in Aleppo. In return, 
the prince agreed to resort exclusively to French civil and military 
advisers, and economic, cultural and military aid, while giving 
priority to French enterprises in his country’s economic projects. 
On the other hand, Faysal recognised ‘Lebanon’s independence 
and territorial integrity under French mandate’. Although the 
definition of Lebanon’s borders was left to the peace congress, it 
was understood that ‘Lebanon’ meant Mount Lebanon. 
To convince Damascus that the Biqa` was negotiable, French troops 
kept a modest presence on the Beirut–Damascus road, while the rest 
of the plain was left in the hands of Faysal’s armed partisans. From 
Ba`albak to Marj`uyun and from Tyre to Tripoli, armed operations 
were being conducted against French forces. Southern Lebanon 
had rallied to the Arab cause beginning in late 1918 and received 
Faysal’s personal emissary, the Christian Ilias Dhyb al-Khoury. 
Kamil al-As`ad, Shi`ite za`im of the south, was declared governor-
general of Jabal `Amil, and Riad al-Sulh, son of Rida al-Sulh, the 
Sunni patron of south Lebanon, was named governor of Sayda. 
Riad, who had of a law degree from the Université Saint-Joseph 
in Beirut and the University of Constantinople, had been engaged 
at an early age in the Arab national struggle against Ottoman rule 
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and condemned in absentia to life imprisonment. The southern 
rebellion was led by Adham Khanjar and Sadik Hamza, whose 
armed bands attacked French troops stationed in the Christian 
villages of Judayda (Marj`uyun) and `Ayn Ibil. On 24 April 1920, 
some 600 Shi`ite notables, ulemas and leaders of armed partisans 
of the Arab revolt met at the Hujayr Valley Congress to declare 
Jabal ̀ Amil an ‘independent district linked to the Syrian federation’.
On 7 March 1920, the Arab Congress, convened in Damascus, 
declared the integral independence of Syria and proclaimed Faysal 
King of Syria. Lebanon was the object of a vague promise to ‘take into 
consideration the national desiderata of the Lebanese regarding their 
country in its borders known before World War I on condition that 
Lebanon avoid any foreign influence’. Faysal, increasingly criticised 
by the nationalist opposition for his compromises with France and 
Britain, finally opted for the arbitration of the International Mandate 
Commission set up by the Allies to decide the fate of the populations 
of the Ottoman Empire. Boycotted by the French and the British, 
only the Commission’s American members – Chicago businessman 
Charles Crane and Henry King, president of Oberlin College – 
arrived in the region in June 1919. The King–Crane Commission, 
as it became known, met delegations from 36 cities and 1,520 
villages and received no less than 1,863 petitions. Fully 80 per cent 
of the respondents voted for a united Syria, 74 per cent supported 
independence and 60 per cent chose a ‘democratic and decentralised 
constitutional monarchy’. In the event of the imposition of a foreign 
mandate on Syria, 60 per cent opted for an American mandate, a 
much smaller percentage for a British mandate and only 14 per cent, 
mainly Lebanese Maronites, requested a French mandate. A total of 
72 per cent of the respondents were opposed to Zionist colonisation 
and to the separation of Palestine from the rest of the Arab east. In 
its report to the peace conference in Paris in 1919, the commission 
recommended a united state for all of natural Syria governed by 
Prince Faysal under one mandatory power. It also emphasised that 
the Zionist project of unlimited emigration of Jews into Palestine 
and its final goal, the creation of a Jewish state, required ‘serious 
modifications’ and concluded: ‘anything else would be tantamount 
to treason of the Syrian people’. The commission’s findings were 
shelved and a few weeks later, on 26 April 1920, the San Remo 
conference granted France its mandate over Syria and Lebanon.
Parallel to the Franco-Syrian negotiations, talks had begun 
between Prince Faysal, on the one hand and Patriarch Huwayik 
and the Administrative Council members, on the other. The latter 
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two opposed the independence declaration of the Arab Congress of 
March 1920, but when the Arab government recognised Lebanon’s 
right to territorial expansion and independence, the majority of the 
AC members accepted. They concluded an agreement with Damascus 
despite the objection of the patriarch, who was already won over to 
the idea of the French mandate. On 10 June 1920, a declaration by 
the AC reiterated the main points of its independence declaration, 
adding Lebanon’s desire to ‘live in peace with its neighbours’.
After Clemenceau’s fall and the formation of a new government 
under Alexandre Millerand, France broke its commitments to 
Faysal. Nevertheless, on 10 July 1920, eight of the AC’s 13 members 
(the Maronite seat for Kisrawan was vacant) were on their way 
to Damascus, to sign a joint declaration in which both parties 
would denounce the French mandate in return for Prince Faysal’s 
recognition of Lebanese independence, when they were intercepted 
and arrested by French troops in Sawfar, on the Beirut–Damascus 
road. The delegation, led by Sa`d Allah Huwayik, vice-president 
of the council and brother of Patriarch Huwayik, included four 
Christians (three Maronites and one Greek Orthodox), two Druze 
and one Shi`a (the Catholic councillor for Zahla was reportedly 
delayed in joining the delegation due to illness). Gouraud accused 
the delegation of planning to accompany Faysal to Europe, through 
a Palestinian port, where they would claim to represent Lebanon 
and declare the integration of Lebanon to a Syrian kingdom 
under Faysal. Two days later, on 12 July, Gouraud disbanded the 
Administrative Council and in September of that year, the eight AC 
members were convicted of corruption, accused of cashing money 
from Faysal’s men and exiled to Corsica.
On 14 July, Gouraud sent Prince Faysal a four-day ultimatum 
that ordered him to accept the French mandate, French currency, 
a French military presence on the Rayaq–Aleppo railway and 
the reduction of the Sheriffian army. First-hand accounts from 
Damascus relate that Faysal had cabled Gouraud accepting the 
terms of the ultimatum, but the French claimed that the answer came 
too late. Whatever the case, on 21 July, French troops under General 
Goybet crossed the Biqa`, occupied Rayaq and moved across the 
Anti-Lebanon Mountains. On 24 July they defeated the Arab army 
in Maysalun – led by Minister of Defence Yusuf al-`Azma, who was 
killed in a battle that pitted cavalry against tanks – and marched 
into Damascus. On the afternoon of 25 July, Gouraud entered the 
capital of the Arab revolt. Lebanon had served as a ‘bridgehead’ 
for the occupation of Syria, as the French military planners had 
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planned more than three decades earlier. The Arab revolt crushed, 
Faysal fled the country to be declared King of Iraq under British 
occupation a year later, and his brother `Abd Allah became Emir 
of Transjordan. Syria was divided into four ‘autonomous states’: 
Greater Lebanon, Aleppo, Damascus and the Alawi state. A fifth 
state, Jabal al-Duruz, was added in 1921. 
On 1 September 1920, General Gouraud officially declared 
the creation of Greater Lebanon under French mandate. To the 
original territory of the Mutasarrifiya were annexed the coastal 
cities of Beirut, Sidon, Tyre and Tripoli, and the four ex-Ottoman 
cazas of Hasbaya, Rashaya, Ba`albak and `Akkar. Its borders 
were set at Nahr al-Kabir in the north, Palestine in the south, the 
Mediterranean in the west and the summits of the Anti-Lebanon 
Mountains in the east. 
The imposition of French mandate on Lebanon was, according 
to Akarli’s apt formula, the victory of the Church of Patriarch 
Elias Huwayik over the secular Lebanon of his brother Sa`d Allah 
Huwayik.2 It was in Maysalun that this secular Lebanon – aspiring 
to independence – was defeated alongside the troops of the Arab 
revolt.
ATTACHMENT ANd dETACHMENT
Almost all of Greater Lebanon’s Muslim population rejected the 
Mandate, opting instead for an independent Arab state and, short 
of that, for annexation to Syria. The declaration of Greater Lebanon 
was met with widespread anti-French violence on the coast, Jabal 
`Amil, the Biqa` and Mount Lebanon. On 24 July 1920, Georges 
Picot and Admiral Mornet, commander of the naval forces in the 
eastern Mediterranean, suffered an attempt on their lives in the 
Shouf, and the house of Habib Pasha al-Sa`d (in Rishmaya, the ̀ Alay 
region) was ransacked and burnt. Between 6 December 1920 and 6 
January 1921, 30 Christian villages were attacked in south Lebanon, 
and in May 1921 a raid by the inhabitants of Bint Jbeil against the 
neighbouring Christian village of `Ayn Ibil left some 50 dead. The 
killing was in retaliation for French officers’ reliance on Christian 
collaborators in the conquest of the south. It took a number of 
months for the 3,600 French troops under the command of Colonel 
Nieger to control southern Lebanon, not without recourse to 
executions, collective punishment and ‘scorched earth’. In Beirut, 
an assassination attempt against As`ad Khurshid Pasha, the Sunni 
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director-general of the interior, led to the arrest and banishment of 
Salim `Ali Salam and three other of the city’s notables. 
The opposition of the annexed territories 
While Christian opponents of the mandate invoked the rights of 
nations to self-determination, Muslim annexationists expressed 
their opposition to the mandate and the partition of Syria in terms 
of it being an unjust economic, political, fiscal and administrative 
system. In their Mémorandum de Protestation des Populations des 
Territoires Annexés (1921), the notables of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, 
Tyre and Ba`albak refuted the historical justifications for ‘natural 
Lebanon’, which, they maintained, had never existed in history. 
The same thesis would be reiterated by the Congress of the Coast 
and the Four Cazas in its meetings of 1928, 1933 and 1936. But 
the population of the annexed territories mainly expressed their 
opposition to economic, administrative and fiscal injustices. The 
annexed territories had a greater population than Mount Lebanon 
(380,000 as opposed to 330,000 inhabitants) and their financial 
resources were richer. A total of 83 per cent of the fiscal revenues 
of the new state came from the annexed territories, while 80 per 
cent of those revenues were spent in Mount Lebanon. Regarding 
administrative posts, the majority of the functionaries of the 
administration of Greater Lebanon came from the administration 
of the ancient Mutasarrifiya and replaced the functionaries of the 
wilaya of Beirut. Last but not least, the coastal cities (Tripoli, Sidon, 
Beirut and Tyre) incurred heavy economic losses because their ports 
had been severed from the Syrian hinterland. The signatories of the 
memorandum concluded that ‘the commercial interests of the wilaya 
[of Beirut] and of all Syria require an immediate re-establishment of 
Syrian unity’. This last argument identifies economic interests with 
political unity. The first rupture in the Muslim unionists’ discourse 
would occur exactly on this issue and lead to the dissociation 
between economic unity and political unity. 
A substantial number of non-Maronite Christians (Orthodox 
and Greek Catholics) had expressed similar wishes to those of 
the Muslims. The majority of the inhabitants of Zahleh, with its 
Greek Catholic majority, voted in favour of annexation to Syria and 
against the mandate. Five hundred of its notables signed a petition 
to that effect, addressed to the King–Crane Commission. 
The position of the Maronites does not lend itself to over-simpli-
fication. There was much truth in what the Muslim representatives 
of the Coast and Four Cazas said in their memorandum to the 
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peace conference: Patriarch Elias Huwayik – imposed by the French 
as the spokesman for the ‘Lebanese nation’ with the exception of 
the Sunnis – did not even represent the majority of the Maronites. 
To begin with, the majority of the members of the Administrative 
Council, the only elected body capable of expressing public 
opinion of the time, including its Maronite members, had opposed 
the French mandate and opted for an independent Lebanon on 
close terms with Syria. Though an exact typology of the positions 
of the Maronites is difficult to determine, due to the diversity of 
their political projects and the constant shifting of positions that 
partly followed the meanderings of European diplomacy, four main 
currents can nevertheless be detected:
The Arab federalists were a small elite that supported the Arab 
kingdom in Damascus and an independent and united Arab state. 
They counted among their ranks Iskandar `Ammun, president of 
the Lebanese Union (who resigned his post and accepted a position 
as Faysal’s ambassador in Washington), and members of Beirut’s 
merchant aristocratic families and of mainly notable Maronite 
families from Mount Lebanon (`Aziz al-Hashim, Edward Dahdah, 
Farid al-Khazin, Emile Khoury, Emile Yazbak and others). The only 
known Greek Catholic was Amin Ma`luf.
The Syrian federalists, partisans of the federal unity of ‘natural 
Syria’, were mainly represented by the French-based Comité 
d’Orient and the Comité Central Syrien. The latter, led by George 
Samné and Chucri Ghanem (francophone poet and playwright), 
included a large number of Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox 
Christians. They were based in Paris with branches in Cairo and 
London, and a support committee in New York, which counted 
Gibran Khalil Gibran as a member. Some of them called for a 
‘Christian homeland’ inside the federation. But the Syrian federalists 
split on their position toward the mandate. Samné and Ghanem 
were supporters of the French mandate (they were even believed 
to be on the French government’s payroll) while others maintained 
the call for a united independent Syria. 
The protectionists, in their extreme form, demanded the annexation 
of Christian Lebanon to France. Ferdinand Tyan, who describes the 
Maronites as ‘French since times immemorial’ and historic allies 
of France in its ‘struggle against Islam’, called for a return to a 
Christian emirate attached to France on the Algerian colonial model. 
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Its official language would be French and the Druze would have the 
choice between accepting their minority status (and learning French) 
or simply leaving the country.3 This tendency conceived of Lebanon 
as a ‘Christian refuge’ whose ‘Frenchness’ differentiated it from 
Arab identity and Islam, both part of ‘barbaric Asia’. Another, more 
moderate version conceived of French protection as a guarantee 
against the submersion of the Christians in the surrounding Arab/
Islamic world. Patriarch Huwayik viewed Lebanon’s ‘autonomy’ 
as its independence from the rest of Syria, on the one hand, and its 
attachment to France, on the other. In a memorandum to the Quai 
d’Orsay, the patriarch spoke of Lebanon as a ‘far away extension 
of France’.4 Emile Edde was the politician most representative of 
the protectionists and Charles Corm its intellectual spokesman.
The Lebanese independentists drew heavily on the traditions of 
the nationalists and reformers of the Administrative Council (AC). 
Their chief organ was al-Ittihad al-Lubnani (the Lebanese Union) 
founded in Cairo by Yusuf al-Sawda. Al-Ittihad was opposed, 
since the beginning of World War I, to the reintegration of Mount 
Lebanon into the Ottoman Empire and demanded its neutrality 
and independence ‘without protection or annexation’.5 This trend 
imagined Greater Lebanon as an independent, democratic and multi-
sectarian republic where Christians would coexist with Muslims 
inside and outside Lebanon. The argument of the Lebanonists 
for Greater Lebanon was mainly economic: the need to provide 
Mount Lebanon with the required self-sufficiency in food and an 
outlet on the Mediterranean. Auguste Pasha Adib, president of the 
Lebanese Union, envisaged the annexation of the Biqa` as a colonial 
enterprise. Underpopulated, ‘its land abandoned and its inhabitants 
incapable of exploiting it in a fructuous manner’, the valley would 
best prosper if put in the hands of the ‘Lebanese’.6 Whatever the 
case, Lebanonists such as Adib, Sawda, K.T. Khairallah and Bulus 
Nujaym emphasised the ‘integral independence of Lebanon in its 
natural and historic frontiers’ with or without the guarantee of 
the Great Powers. Sawda departed from his colleagues with his 
clear anti-colonial position. Whilst paying due respect to France’s 
‘moral position’ among the Lebanese, he maintained that ‘French 
colonisation in Lebanon’ would only benefit a few ‘monopolist 
capitalists’ among the French and ‘a minority of job-seekers’ among 
the Lebanese.7 Further, Sawda called for extensive Syrian–Lebanese 
relations based on ‘mutual respect of the independence of both 
countries’ (Sawda). Bulus Nujaym, a pioneer of Lebanonism and 
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protectionist before the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, would 
later oppose the mandate and call for a ‘democratic Lebanon, 
economically viable and multi-sectarian’. He attributed to the 
Lebanese the role of the ‘Piedmontese of Syria’, which supposes a 
leading Lebanese role in a Syrian unified territory.8 K.T. Khairallah, 
also an early protectionist, soon opted for a Greater Lebanon built 
in collaboration with the Muslims and called for solidarity with 
the independence of Syria and the other Arab countries, ‘brothers 
in ethnicity and language’. Sulayman Kan`an, councillor for Jizzin, 
proposed two arguments against the mandate. First, the Lebanese 
had proved their capacity to rule themselves and had thus earned 
their right to self-determination, according to President Wilson’s 
principles. Second, the protection of a foreign power would be 
detrimental to the interests of the Christians themselves. Khairallah 
writes in a memorandum addressed to an American conference: 
We want to live at peace with our neighbours; but we cannot 
ever hope to do so while there is a foreign power in Syria, 
for which the majority of Mohammedans hold the minority 
Christians responsible. Thus those who come to protect us only 
arouse against us the enmity of our neighbours. We are indeed 
safer with them, as the past has proven, without this European 
protection … The ambition of France to have a naval base in 
Syria, and to extend her commerce, should not be realised at the 
expense of a people who have always admired her own political 
and social ideals at home and who are now being used as a pretext 
for occupation.9
Partisans of mandated Greater Lebanon
Few Christians called simultaneously for Greater Lebanon and the 
French mandate. Partisans of the mandate were mainly defectors 
from different currents who adapted to the new mandate status 
quo. From the federalists came Samné, Ghanem, Petro Trad, Ayub 
Thabit (the latter two would serve as prime minister and president 
of the republic, respectively) and Habib Pasha al-Sa`d, governor 
of Mount Lebanon under the Faysal regime, who rallied to the 
mandate and was appointed president of the republic in 1934. 
From the independentist camp came Auguste Adib, a future prime 
minister. Even Bishara al-Khoury and his brother-in-law Michel 
Chiha had started as members of Sawda’s Lebanese Union. In 
December 1921, the partisans of the mandate launched the Party 
of Progress (Hizb al-Taraqqi) under the slogan ‘For the preservation 
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of the independence of Greater Lebanon under French mandate’. 
They conceived of Lebanon’s independence as primarily vis-à-vis 
Syria and guaranteed by France. The party’s platform called for the 
defence of national traditions, freedom of religious belief and the 
nomination of government functionaries on the basis of competence 
and merit. Exclusively Maronite and Catholic, the party was the 
first political manifestation of the alliance of the Mount Lebanon 
notables with Beirut’s commercial/financial bourgeoisie. The former 
were represented by Emile Edde and Bishara al-Khoury, whose 
rivalry would dominate the political life of Lebanon throughout 
the mandate.10
GrEATEr, sMALLEr Or ‘MIddLE’ LEBANON: ECONOMy Or 
AUTONOMy?
Christian partisans of an ‘independent’ Lebanon obtained a ‘bigger’ 
Lebanon than they had asked for. The creation of Greater Lebanon 
under French mandate launched a series of debates and revisionist 
projects, which lasted for over 15 years. In these debates, the 
question of attachment/detachment had two dimensions, involving 
the detachment of Greater Lebanon from Syria and the detachment 
of the Christians, particularly the Maronites, from the Muslim 
majority in this newly annexed territory. The Maronite discourse 
was torn between the desire for a Christian state and the need to 
guarantee a minimum of economic viability and financial resources 
for the new political entity. It was indeed a tragic choice between 
the ‘Christian refuge’ and the spectre of the World War I famine.11 
George Samné eloquently expressed this contradiction. For 
him, the choice was clear: either a Syrian federation inside which 
Lebanese territory would be reduced to Mount Lebanon, or a 
Greater Lebanon which would renounce its claim to be a ‘Christian 
refuge’ in order to cooperate with the rest of Syria. The fact that 
Greater Lebanon corresponded to neither option led Samné to 
exclaim: ‘what kind of a “Christian homeland” is this, where half 
of the population is Muslim?’12
French officials were also divided on the question of the size of 
Greater Lebanon. Of course, they approached the question from 
a different angle: which was the better method to dominate the 
whole of Syria, especially its rebellious Sunni majority? Gouraud 
favoured partition into big entities: ‘It will be easy to maintain 
a balance among three or four [Syrian] states that will be large 
enough to achieve self-sufficiency and, if need be, pit one against the 
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other’, he wrote in a memorandum to his superiors.13 In September 
1920, he had his way. However, Prime Minister Millerand 
reprimanded him for including Tripoli in Greater Lebanon against 
the will of the French government, and ordered him to consider 
the arrangement a trial period.14 French foreign ministry official 
Robert de Caix envisaged a proliferation of mini-states – up to ten 
in number – in order to guarantee the weakening of the largely 
Sunni independentist and pan-Arab movement. He was critical of 
what he termed ‘Lebanese [Christian] megalomania’ in demanding 
Greater Lebanon and warned against the annexation of Muslim 
regions of Tripoli, the Biqa` and `Akkar as a threat to the stability 
of the future Christian state. 
As early as 1921, Aristide Bryant had suggested that the separation 
of Tripoli would assure Lebanon’s Christians a numerical majority. 
In 1926, de Caix (supported by Henri de Jouvenel) admitted that a 
mistake had been made in administrating a ‘much Greater Lebanon’, 
suggesting that Tripoli and the Muslim parts of ̀ Akkar and the Biqa` 
be reintegrated into Syria. The resulting ‘Middle Lebanon’ was 
supposed to reduce the number of Sunnis who, according to de Caix, 
had proved after six years of mandate that they did not consider 
themselves Lebanese but Muslims. Whatever the case, both the 
economic interests of the mandate and those of Beirut’s bourgeoisie 
were opposed to the return of the port of Tripoli to Syria. Retained 
inside Greater Lebanon, Tripoli was less likely to endanger Beirut’s 
preponderant economic position. As part of Syria, the risk involved 
seeing it become Syria’s principal port at the expense of the port 
of Beirut.15
drAWING THE sOUTHErN BOrdErs
The declaration of Greater Lebanon left the question of its southern 
borders pending, awaiting the delimitation of the Palestinian–Syrian 
borders. In fact, there were few partisans of Greater Lebanon 
who had demanded the annexation of Jabal `Amil to the new 
entity. There were even Christian voices that explicitly opposed 
the inclusion of the south, notably the Maronite Church and a 
number of Khazin sheikhs.16 
A joint military Franco-British commission headed by Colonels 
Paulet and Newcombe negotiated the demarcation of Lebanon’s 
southern borders from June 1921 to February 1922. The British 
asked that Palestine’s northern borders be set at the Litani river, 
to meet their commitment to provide a ‘national homeland for the 
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Jews’ in Palestine. In its memorandum of 3 February 1919 to the 
peace conference, the Zionist Organisation had set the northern 
borders of the ‘national homeland for the Jews’ at Sidon and the 
‘elbow of the Litani’ – the river’s westward diversion to join the 
Mediterranean where it is known as al-Qasmiya. In this case, 
Palestine was to include not only the (Lebanese) regions of Tyre 
and Jabal ̀ Amil but also the [Syrian] Golan Heights, Jabal al-Shaykh 
and Hawran. At stake were the tributaries of the Jordan river. The 
British wanted the Jordan and its tributaries in their mandatory 
zone. The French, determined not to make any new concession on 
the borders or on the waters of the Litani and the Yarmuk rivers, 
ultimately prevailed, despite Zionist objections, and the Galilee 
was divided between the two mandatory powers.17 The final accord 
between the two governments was ratified on 7 March 1923. It fixed 
the borders within a safe distance south of the Litani basin, retained 
the tributaries of the Jordan inside the French zone, ceded Hula 
Lake to Palestine and fixed the western borders at Ras al-Naqura 
on the Mediterranean.
However, the question of Lebanon’s size and borders was far 
from being settled.
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from Mandate to Independence 
(1920–1943)
By splitting off Greater Lebanon from its natural hinterland the french not only 
confirmed the financial and commercial hegemony of Beirut over the Mountain, but 
also strengthened a pattern of economic activity in which agriculture and industry 
had become subordinated to banking and trade. 
(Roger Owen, ‘The Political Economy of Grand Liban, 1920–1970’, 
in Owen (ed.), Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon)
Proponents of the mandate imagined their country being ruled by 
a Lebanese governor and Lebanese administrators under French 
protection. Instead, what they got was what Edmond Rabbath 
referred to as a French-imposed ‘regime of direct rule’. In 1921, 
Robert de Caix explained that the mandate implied ‘a gradual work 
of civic education and political emancipation’. High Commissioner 
Gouraud appointed Major Trabaud governor of Lebanon, helped 
by an executive of seven directors-general (of whom only two were 
Muslims), but real power in the administration was in the hands of 
the French ‘advisers’. Gouraud also appointed an Administrative 
Commission (AC) of 15 members, of whom only five were Muslims. 
Faced with a widespread Muslim boycott, the high commissioner 
enlarged the commission to 17 members (six Maronites, three 
Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Druze, four Sunnis 
and two Shi`ites) the majority of whom were landowners and 
merchant notables. Already, the sectarian quotas were established. 
Substantially, the commission held mainly consultative powers 
like its Mutasarrifiya predecessor. On 9 March 1922 the AC was 
replaced by a partly elected Representative Council, the elections 
to which were also boycotted by large sections of the Muslim 
population. Nevertheless, the AC, headed alternatively by Habib 
Pasha al-Sa`d, Na`um Labaki and Emile Edde, began to slowly 
attract Muslim participation. 
High Commissioner Maurice Sarrail’s interlude (1924–26) 
deserves mention, as the freemason and secular general represented 
the republican exception in French policy toward Lebanon. He 
88
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wanted to appoint a Lebanese governor, but opposed the choice 
of Emile Edde, the patriarch’s candidate, and finally appointed a 
Frenchman, Léon de Cayla, as provisional governor. Sarrail initiated 
a series of courageous reforms. He unified the fiscal system, reducing 
inequalities in imposition between the inhabitants of the annexed 
territories and those of Mount Lebanon, opened administrative 
posts to Muslims and proposed a secular and public education 
system. Sarrail also divided Lebanon into eleven mixed muhafazas 
and did not apply sectarian representation in the electoral system. 
A new Representative Council presided over by Mussa Nammour, 
a Maronite from Zahleh who had turned to freemasonry, elected 
de Cayla governor of Lebanon. But most of Sarrail’s reforms were 
rejected by the Quai d’Orsay under pressure from the Maronite 
Church and his policy of appeasement toward the Muslims was soon 
overshadowed by his repression of the Syrian revolt of 1925–27. 
The shock of the Syrian revolt and the approach of the League 
of Nations Mandate Commission drove France to grant Lebanon 
and Syria a constitution. High Commissioner Henri de Jouvenel 
(1926–29) appointed a parliamentary drafting commission, 
including Petro Trad, `Umar Da`uq, Shibl Dammus and Michel 
Map 4 Greater Lebanon in the partition of syria, 1920
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Chiha, that was immediately boycotted by the majority of Sunni 
and Shi`i leaders. Nevertheless, the final version of the constitutional 
text, adopted on 23 May 1926, renamed Greater Lebanon the 
‘Lebanese Republic’, defined its flag as the tricolour French flag 
with a cedar in the white strip, and adopted French as an official 
language alongside Arabic. Significantly, the constitution did not 
define Lebanon’s borders, as if to emphasise that they were open 
to modification. The Representative Council was renamed the 
Chamber of Deputies, and a Senate was set up to represent sects 
and regions. The constitution was a hybrid one: on a republican 
body, emphasising individual rights and liberties and political and 
judicial equality, were grafted articles concerning communal rights 
and representation – most probably at the initiative of Michel 
Chiha. Article 95 provided for the (temporary) fair distribution 
of government and administrative posts (but not of parliamentary 
seats) among the various sects. According to Article 9, the state 
relinquished to the religious communities its legislative rights and 
rulings on personal status (marriage, divorce, custody, adoption, 
inheritance, and so on) in the name of the freedom of religious 
belief. Article 10 summoned the state to defend private religious 
education on condition it did not conflict with public education. But 
above all, the constitution legalised the mandate, ensuring French 
control over the country’s foreign and military affairs and public 
security. The president of the republic was given extensive executive 
powers, helped by the cabinet whose ministers he had the right to 
dismiss; yet he was responsible to no one and no institution except 
the French high commissioner.
On 26 May 1926 Charles Dabbas, a Greek Orthodox notable, 
was elected head of state for three years in a joint meeting of the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, whose 16 members were 
appointed by de Jouvenel. Nevertheless, the Senate was abolished 
a year later and in 1929 the presidential mandate was prolonged 
from four to six years. From that time onwards, the Chamber of 
Deputies was elected on a sectarian basis under pressure from the 
Maronite Church and mainly Christian politicians.
The Armenian community finally took shape in Lebanon. 
Following the initial post-World War I campaigns of transfer and 
massacres in the Turkish camps, some 4,000 Armenians took refuge 
in Beirut in the autumn of 1918, coming from Aleppo. The second 
and bigger wave arrived in 1922 when hundreds of thousands of 
refugees fled from Cilicia as France decided to withdraw its troops 
from that district and officially ceded it to Turkish sovereignty. In 
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1924, the French mandatory authorities decided to settle Armenian 
refugees in Syria and Lebanon and naturalise them. In Lebanon, 
Emile Edde welcomed the decision as it increased the number of 
Christians in the country, as Muslim politicians opposed it. Two years 
later, High Commissioner de Jouvenel ordered the implementation 
of settlement and naturalisation. The United Nations supported his 
decision though it was implementing a project of settling Armenian 
refugees in Soviet Armenia. In 1929, Syria and Lebanon welcomed 
a new wave of Armenian refugees, raising their total number to 
90,000, 40,000 of whom were in Lebanon, where 30,000 refugees 
lived in tents then were allowed to move into wooden shacks in 
Beirut and its eastern suburb; the rest were distributed to camps 
and settlements in `Anjar, Saida, Sour, Zahleh and Tripoli. 
At another level, the debate over attachment and detachment went 
unabated. On the French side, some mandate functionaries found 
they had created a ‘too great a Lebanon’ that needed reduction. 
Among the Lebanese, Riad al-Sulh declared, in July 1928, that 
the French prime minister Aristide Bryant had promised him that 
he would re-annex the whole of Lebanon to Syria.1 At the other 
extreme, Emile Edde presented a memorandum to the Quai d’Orsay 
in which he argued that a Greater Lebanon with a population 
of 405,000 Muslims to 425,000 Christians did not contain a 
majority strong enough to ‘defend the country’. He proposed 
that Tripoli become a ‘free city’ under French administration – its 
Christians inhabitants would be given Lebanese nationality, and the 
Muslims, Syrian nationality – and south Lebanon would acquire 
an autonomous status similar to that of the Alawite country. As for 
the rest of the country – rid of some 55,000 Muslims from Tripoli 
and an additional 140,000 Sunnis and Shi`i from the south – it 
would constitute a reduced Lebanon but with a ‘secure’ Christian 
numerical majority of 80 per cent and sufficient agricultural area 
of the Biqa` to avert the danger of famine.2
The French opted for a different solution based not on the 
Christian/Muslim divide but on the notion that Lebanon was a land 
of religious minorities. Political supremacy of the Maronites was 
insured in their capacity as the biggest numerical minority according 
to the 1932 census, the last ever to be organised in Lebanon.3 
However, that year closed with an interruption of constitutional 
life on the occasion of the presidential elections planned for May. 
Tripoli leader Sheikh Muhammad al-Jisr submitted his candidature 
to make the point that a Muslim has the right to the post of head 
of state. Emile Edde, fearing he might lose the contest in favour of 
Traboulsi T02610 01 text   91 23/04/2012   08:06
92 A HIsTOry Of MOdErN LEBANON
his rival Bishara al-Khoury, withdrew in favour of Jisr, upon which 
High Commissioner Henri Ponsot (1929–32), refusing to create 
such a precedent, decreed the suspension of the constitution and 
disbanded the Chamber of Deputies. 
THE ECONOMIC MANdATE: PHOENICIA ANd sWITZErLANd
France treated Syria and Lebanon as one economic unit controlled 
by two sets of French companies – the Common Interests (Intérêts 
Communs) and the franchise-holding societies (Sociétés Conces-
sionaires) – that held among them monopoly control over public 
services and the main sectors of the economy.4
From the beginning, the definition of the borders of Greater 
Lebanon followed a precise vision of its economic role. As Roger 
Owen noted, Lebanon’s political detachment from Syria was the 
condition for its economic intermediary role vis-à-vis the Syrian 
hinterland.5 The mandate authorities encouraged that outward-
looking role. Beirut port, confirmed as the principal port of the 
Syrian interior, was enlarged and modernised, a second dock was 
constructed and the city, provided with an airport, progressed to 
become a centre for international communication. According to a 
new urban plan, the city was re-centred around Place de l’Étoile, 
designed on the model of that of the French capital, and the 
Parliament and a new business quarter were inaugurated there on the 
occasion of the French Colonial Exposition of 1921. These projects 
contributed to the development of a tertiary sector dominated by 
a merchant/financial bourgeoisie, which was becoming more and 
more embedded into the mandate system. This was supplemented 
by the expansion of education, another mandate policy, which 
helped create a middle class destined for liberal professions and 
the bureaucracy. 
In agriculture, the mandatory authorities initially envisaged 
encouraging the emergence of a class of middle-level farmers to 
serve as a social base for the mandate. But political considerations 
ultimately prevailed: attracting the loyalty of the inhabitants of the 
annexed territories by favouring their traditional landed notables. 
In `Akkar, the Biqa` and the south, French governors backed big 
landowners who became the main beneficiaries from government aid 
and projects of agricultural development. Paradoxically, sericulture, 
one of the original reasons for French interest in Lebanon, hardly 
survived its crisis of the 1920s and finally collapsed in the 1930s, 
contributing to a new wave of emigration. The Lebanese writer 
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Amin al-Rihani, an émigré to the US, described the combined effect 
of emigration and the collapse of sericulture that he witnessed on 
a visit to his homeland:
Here are the ghost villages, inhabited by unemployment, laziness 
and desolation. Nothing remains except factories and churches 
to console you of their disappearance … Here is the lost wealth, 
lamented by the newspapers … and the gentlemen dressed in 
European attire. National pride, dressed in artificial silk, eat their 
bread drenched in the sweat of Africa.6 
A new role was conjured up for Mount Lebanon: estivation and 
tourism. The idea was part of the project of the New Phoenicians, 
who were Christian and mainly Maronite, intellectuals of the 
francophile Beirut bourgeoisie. Grouped around Charles Corm’s 
La Revue Phénicienne, Michel Chiha, Albert and Alfred Naccache, 
Fu’ad al-Khoury, Jacques Tabet and others had revived Phoenicia as 
a cultural and national identity differentiated from the Arabs and as 
a model for an outward-looking service economy. The Phoenician 
model was complemented by the notion of ‘Lebanon, Switzerland 
of the East’. The term, first used by the French travellers Lamartine 
and Gérard de Nerval to compare the landscape of Mount Lebanon 
to that of the Alpine country, soon became a multifunctional model: 
Lebanon, bank of the region, federation of sectarian cantons and a 
country that exploits its natural beauty in tourism and estivation. 
While Rihani and his like were bemoaning the wounds and ruptures 
of emigration, the New Phoenicians glorified the peasants’ ‘dignified 
misery’ in Mount Lebanon, now presented as an abode of the spirit 
and of faith. They hailed migration as an age-old vocation of an 
entire people, expressing its spirit of freedom and adventure. 
Interests of the city, notables of the Mountain 
Under the mandate, Beirut enjoyed economic domination over 
Mount Lebanon and the rest of Greater Lebanon, but it was the 
Mountain that controlled the city politically and administratively. 
Soon, Sunni and Greek Orthodox politicians and functionaries 
of the city were replaced by those of the Mount Lebanon middle 
classes, who quickly linked up with the city’s commercial/
financial interests. 
But these political newcomers were far from being united. A great 
part of the political history of the mandate was dominated by the 
rivalry between Emile Edde and Bishara al-Khoury, exploited to 
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the full by the high commissioners. Both men had studied Law at 
the Jesuit College in Beirut. Edde, a francophile and the son of a 
drogoman at the French consulate in Damascus, was from Jbeil in 
the heart of the Christian north and was the favourite Maronite 
politician of Patriarch Huwayik. Khoury, a notable of Richmaya in 
the mixed districts of the southern part of the Mountain, was the 
son of an administrator of the Mutasarrifiya. He was a journalist 
and talented speaker, at ease with Arabic literature and Arab history 
and with a perfect and eloquent command of Arabic. 
In Cairo, where the two men were exiled during World War 
I, Khoury was close to the Union libanaise of Yusuf al-Sawda, 
while Edde, already considered France’s man, recruited Lebanese 
and Syrian volunteers to fight alongside the Franco-British troops 
of the Légion d’Orient. At the end of the war, Edde was brought 
home by the French navy and named first counsellor to the 
high commissioner. Khoury was named secretary-general of the 
administration of Mount Lebanon and counsellor to the French 
military governor, but he resigned his post two years later in 
opposition to the nomination of a French governor instead of a 
Lebanese; Edde, for his part, continued to serve the Mandate. Both 
men had been members of the legislature since 1922 and Edde was 
appointed prime minister for a short while in 1929–30, whereas 
Khoury occupied the post three times and the two men were rivals 
for the presidency of the republic. 
As a reaction to the suspension of the constitution in 1932, 
Khoury created the Constitutional Bloc, calling for the immediate 
activation of the constitution and the signing of a new agreement 
with France. Khoury’s men were grouped around the daily Le Jour, 
founded by Michel Chiha in 1934, while L’Orient, edited by Gabriel 
Khabbaz and Georges Naccache, was the mouthpiece of Edde’s 
partisans of the National Bloc. 
Soon, the positions of the two groups began to diverge. Edde 
envisaged Lebanon primarily as a Christian homeland, insisting on 
its Mediterranean identity, which differentiated it ‘ethnically’ from 
the rest of Syria and the Arabs, and looked upon the Muslims as a 
threat that necessitated his proposed territorial and demographic 
reduction. In a famous remark, he admonished the Muslims who 
did not want to live in a Christian Lebanon to emigrate to Mecca. In 
addition, Edde was a strong partisan of private religious education, 
with a firm bias toward the Christian missionaries. During his term 
as prime minister in 1930, he created a scandal by abolishing 111 
public schools, most of which were in Muslim-dominated regions. 
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Khoury, by contrast, envisaged Lebanon as an independent country 
built in collaboration with its Muslim population and enjoying 
close relations with Syria and the rest of the Arab countries. 
Christian rights, instead of being protected by foreign troops, were 
to be inscribed in the constitution, which guaranteed Maronite 
political supremacy.
Furthermore, the two men were considerably different when it 
came to their social status and interests. Edde was linked to the 
families of the declining merchant aristocracy of the Sursuq quarter 
and himself was married to a Sursuq, his law firm representing those 
families in addition to the French consulate and the big French 
corporations of the time. Khoury, by his marriage to Laure Chiha 
and that of his brother Fu’ad to Renée Haddad, the rich inheritor 
of a large firm that imported iron and construction materials, 
was embedded in the rising financial and commercial bourgeoisie 
that rapidly developed under the mandate. Among Khoury’s legal 
clients were the Établissements Darwich I Haddad and its cement 
factory in Shikka, and the Banque Misr, Syrie et Liban of Midhat 
Pasha and Tal`at Harb, the first bank with British and Arab capital 
established in Lebanon in 1929. More importantly, Khoury and his 
Constitutional Bloc had at their disposal the resources of the Banque 
Pharaon-Chiha, owned by the maternal cousins Michel Chiha and 
Henri Pharaon. Pharaon participated with French interests in the 
administration of the French conglomerate Société du port de 
Beyrouth, and was active in real estate. Politically, Pharaon was 
deputy for the Biqa` region and patron of the Workers’ Front, an 
anti-communist trade union. Michel Chiha (1891–1954) was the 
director of the family bank and one of the few Lebanese to sit on 
the board of administration of French franchise-holding companies, 
among which was the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, in addition to 
being the president of the Beirut Stock Market and the vice-president 
of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce. Chiha was appointed deputy 
for the minority seat in Beirut and played a major role in drafting 
the Lebanese constitution of 1926. 
The rivalry between Khoury and Edde was also expressed through 
the dominant intellectual figures of the times: Michel Chiha and 
Charles Corm. Corm, the apostle of a Christian Lebanon, considered 
Muslims as religious and historic adversaries who lacked loyalty to 
the polity. He emphasised French as the language of the Lebanese 
Christians and despised Arabic as ‘an Asian language’ that had been 
imposed by ‘massacres and fright’. In his long poem La Montagne 
Inspirée (1934), Corm writes: 
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Jesus made me love Mohamet and Moses
… to love our enemy, especially that he hurts us
Is to triumph against evil … 
His identification of Lebanon with the Christians was complete:
Muslim brother, understand my candor 
I am the real Lebanon, authentic and devoted … 
According to Corm, Christianity, the historical inheritor of 
Phoenicia, accomplished the elaboration of a Lebanese cultural 
identity distinct from the rest of the Arab world. Chiha, on his part, 
was no less a Phoenicianist, but he restricted Phoenicianism to the 
economic sphere, refusing to consider it as a hallmark of Lebanese 
identity. The Lebanese were a ‘Mediterranean variety’, a confounded 
mix of many origins. Lebanon had existed even before Phoenicia 
and its inhabitants were simply Lebanese. Chiha’s Lebanon was 
defined as both a ‘people of merchants’ and a ‘country of associated 
sectarian minorities’. He would be mainly known as the organic 
intellectual of the commercial/financial bourgeoisie.
ECONOMIC dIffICULTIEs ANd sOCIAL AGITATION 
The 1930s were a decade of great transformations and troubles in 
the economic, social and political spheres for Lebanon under the 
mandate. 
To begin with, the port of Beirut was losing ground to the 
Palestinian port of Haifa, which was developed at a rapid pace 
by the British mandatory authorities and also benefited from the 
growth of the Jewish sector in the Palestinian economy. Enlarged 
and modernised, the main dock of the Palestinian port had a surface 
of 35 hectares compared to 23 for its Beirut counterpart. For years, 
business circles in Beirut pressed the French to enlarge the city’s port 
facilities, create a free zone and modernise the Beirut–Damascus 
railway line. They also complained about the high customs duties 
on imports (10–30 per cent higher than Palestinian rates), which 
allowed Palestinian merchants and industrialists to compete with 
Lebanese products in the Arab markets and inside Lebanon itself. 
In addition, Palestine had become the centre for air traffic between 
Europe and the Far East. Finally, by 1934 the port of Haifa had 
surpassed Beirut port, despite the eventual enlargement and opening 
of a free zone in the latter facility.
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On the other hand, the economic privileges of the mandate 
were alienating larger sectors of society. Large bourgeois interests 
were coalescing against the monopoly exercised by the French 
concessionary companies, their fiscal exemptions and the export of 
their profits to France. They were calling for Syro-Lebanese control 
over the Common Interests. In 1931, a general strike by taxi drivers 
against the competition from the tramways merged with a protest 
by the inhabitants of Beirut and Tripoli against high electricity 
prices to unleash a mass boycott of the services of the Tramways 
et Eclairage de Beyrouth (TEB), the French concessionary company 
that ran both the city’s tramway lines and its electricity supply. After 
some months, the movement triumphed and imposed a reduction 
of the company’s fares by 49 per cent.
Socially, the repercussions of the Great Depression of 1929 
further aggravated the collapse of the general standard of living. 
The ensuing years witnessed a number of workers’ strikes against 
unemployment and the rise in the cost of living, all calling for a 
wage increases and the amelioration of working conditions. 
The situation in the rest of the country was no better. In 
November 1934, the French granted a monopoly for the cultivation 
of and commerce in tobacco (the second largest source of revenue 
for the Lebanese) and the manufacture of cigarettes to a French 
franchise-holding company, the Régie Co-intéressée Libano-Syri-
enne des Tabacs et Tombacs, controlled by the French colonial 
bank, Crédit Foncier d’Algérie et de Tunisie. A general protest 
strike was called in the two major areas of tobacco cultivation, 
the predominantly Maronite regions of Jbeil and Batrun in the 
north and the predominantly Shi`i region of Jabal `Amil in the 
south. Significantly, Maronite patriarch `Arida led the movement 
backed by a number of Maronite politicians. His conflict with the 
mandatory powers on this issue led him to a major breakthrough 
in Syrian–Lebanese relations as negotiations between Bkirki and 
the Syrian independentist National Bloc started at the end of 1935. 
In February 1936, `Arida came out with a clear declaration in 
favour of Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty while calling 
for a strengthening of Lebanon’s relations with ‘sister Syria’ in the 
economic and social spheres. Later, the patriarch had called upon 
the Lebanese to help the victims of the independence demonstrations 
in the Syrian cities, brutally suppressed by the French authorities. 
During that period, `Arida addressed numerous letters and memos 
to the French authorities in which he reminded them that the 
promise of independence made by Clemenceau to his predecessor, 
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Patriarch Huwayik, had ended in colonial occupation. He went on 
to enumerate the abuses of the mandatory powers: the submission 
of the Lebanese security forces to the French high commissioner, the 
domination of French so-called advisers over the administration, 
the constant intervention of the mandatory authorities in the 
workings of mixed tribunals (which examined the juridical conflict 
between Lebanese and Frenchmen), the constant violations of public 
liberties (suspension of the publication of newspapers, subjecting 
political parties to a official licensing, and so on), tax increases 
(from 330,000 piastres before World War I to 10 million under the 
mandate, although the demographic increase did not exceed 50 per 
cent), and last but not least, the monopoly control over the economy 
by the concessionary societies. In conclusion, the patriarch criticised 
the ‘short-sighted’ politics that saw friendship between the Lebanese 
and the Syrians as a ‘hostile act against France’.7 
In February 1935, a new wave of strikes had broken out against 
the TEB and the Société du Chemin de Fer Damas-Hamah et 
Prolongements (DHP), who were accused of imposing the cost of 
their financial deficits on the Lebanese and Syrians while distributing 
profit dividends to their stockholders with 5–6 per cent interest. In 
Lebanon, but mainly in the Syrian cities, the strike turned into a 
political protest and had a decisive effect on defining negotiations 
for the independence of the two countries.
1936: the year of crises
1936 was a turning point in Lebanon’s history in more than 
one sense. Various events and crises reactivated the polemics on 
attachment/detachment. But although sectarian and political 
tensions increased, social and regional developments gave rise to a 
new alignment of forces and the crystallisation of a multi-sectarian 
current aspiring to independence from France. 
Events in Lebanon and Syria that year formed part of a renewed 
cycle of nationalist and independentist unrest in the region. In Egypt, 
the nationalist movement imposed the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 
26 August 1936, which declared Egypt’s independence but ceded 
the administration of its foreign policy to Britain and a continued 
military presence of British troops in the Suez Canal zone for another 
20 years. Palestine was the scene of a large-scale popular uprising 
against the British mandate and Jewish immigration; it paralysed 
the country and lasted until the outbreak of World War II. A general 
strike that lasted from April to October, suspended upon the request 
of Arab rulers, was followed by prolonged guerrilla warfare. This 
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mobilised some 30,000 British troops, the biggest challenge to British 
colonialism in its history.8 In Syria, the anti-mandate demonstrations 
led the French high commissioner, Comte de Martel, to promise, 
on 24 February 1936, the re-establishment of parliamentary life 
and the conclusion of a treaty recognising Syria’s independence and 
backing its admission to the League of Nations. 
In Lebanon, 1936 started with the election of Emile Edde 
as president of the republic by only one vote, against Bishara 
al-Khoury. Following the Syrian precedent, seven deputies from 
the Constitutional Bloc addressed a memorandum to de Martel 
on 2 March requiring that Lebanon be treated on an equal footing 
with Syria by the application of the constitution and backing 
Lebanon’s admission to the League of Nations. A few weeks later, 
Pierre Viénot, director-general of the Quai d’Orsay, confirmed de 
Martel’s promises. But whereas Syria was promised independence, 
Lebanon had to be content with a mere ‘alliance of friendship’ 
and an ‘internal independence’: the country’s defence and foreign 
relations were to be remain in French hands.
The imminence of a Franco-Syrian treaty created two kinds of 
apprehension in Lebanon. Christian ‘protectionists’ feared that 
Lebanon, ‘independent’ from France, might soon be annexed 
by Syria. In turn, Muslim ‘unionists’ feared that the country’s 
independence would legitimise the Lebanese borders of 1 September 
1920 and destroy their hope of annexation. 
In the first week of March, the Congress of the Coast and the 
Four Cazas, which had reconvened to reiterate the ‘annexionist’ 
demands, suffered the defection of a moderate current represented 
by Riad al-Sulh and his cousins Kazim and Taqi al-Din. Although 
Sulh was a strong opponent of the mandate in Syria and Lebanon, 
he had maintained a distance from the Muslim unionists since the 
Congress of the Coast of 1928 and opened up to the Christian 
forces, advocating an inter-sectarian alliance against the mandate. In 
1931–33, he was active with Monseigneur Mubarak, the Maronite 
bishop of Beirut, in the transport and electricity strike. Settled in 
Beirut, Sulh, who shared the leadership of the south with the As`ads, 
also aspired to the leadership of the Muslims of the capital against 
their traditional leader, Salim `Ali Salam. He was also opposed 
to the mufti and leader of Tripoli, `Abd al-Hamid Karami, and 
publicly supported (in 1934) the maintenance of Tripoli within 
Lebanon’s borders. In 1935, Sulh served as an intermediary between 
Patriarch `Arida and the Syrian national movement. With his two 
cousins, Kazim and Taki al-Din, he founded the Republican Party 
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for Independence (Hizb al-Istiqlal al-Jumhuri) headed by `Aziz 
al-Hashim, a Maronite notable from ̀ Aqura in the Jbeil highlands. 
The party, representing a section of the professional middle classes, 
agitated for the political independence of Syria and Lebanon and 
their economic unity. For the first time, the economic interests of 
the inhabitants of the coast and the four cazas were not linked to 
political unity with Syria. 
Riad al-Sulh had not attended the Congress of the Coast in 1936 
as he was banished to the Jazira region in Syria for his role in the 
pro-independence strikes of the preceding year. Upon his release, a 
few months later, he travelled to Paris to join the Syrian delegation 
negotiating the independence treaty. Riad’s cousin Kazim, writing in 
a brochure that appeared a few days after the end of the congress, 
accused the majority of the congressmen of ignoring the new 
realities in the country. At the beginning of the mandate, he argued, 
‘Lebanonism’ was synonymous with Christianity and ‘unionism’ 
synonymous with Islamism. At that moment, the Christians were 
increasingly disappointed by France and ‘becoming aware that a 
great number of economic factors render their daily life as well as 
their destinies intimately linked to those of the destinies of the sons 
of Syria’.9 Prime among those factors was the Syrian–Lebanese desire 
to control the Common Interests as a shared terrain between the 
two ‘nationalisms’. Facing this new fact, the question of attachment 
had become secondary, for ‘how would the Syrian unionists benefit 
if the [annexed Lebanese] “territories” are “returned” to Syria 
while [Lesser] Lebanon becomes a colonial base that will menace 
Syria itself?’10 In return, Sulh proposed supporting the emergence 
of a new Lebanese patriotism that would surpass the attachment/
detachment dilemma in favour of a wider vision of Lebanon’s Arab 
national roots, which should not necessarily mean merger between 
Arab countries.
ABOrTEd INdEPENdENCE 
The independence negotiations in Paris opened in this atmosphere 
of flux. The Lebanese delegation was led by President Edde and 
included Prime Minister Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab – a notable from 
Tripoli and one of the first Sunnis to collaborate with the mandate 
– in addition to opposition leader Bishara al-Khoury. In order to 
allay Christian fears, Viénot reiterated, in a letter to President Edde 
on 23 April 1936, France’s guarantee of Lebanon’s independence 
in its 1 September 1920 borders. But this only fanned Muslim 
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dissent. A congress in Sidon reiterated the demand for annexation 
and organised street demonstrations, which the gendarmes fired 
upon killing one demonstrator.11
In this context, the question of sectarian representation took on 
a different turn. The Muslim negotiators in the Paris delegation, 
Najib `Usayran for the Shi`as and Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab for the 
Sunnis, insisted that France commit itself to defending the interests 
of the sectarian ‘minorities’ in independent Lebanon. Those 
Muslims who believed in an independent Lebanon not annexed 
to Syria were certain that that entity would evidently be under 
Christian, and particularly Maronite, domination. A few months 
before, Patriarch `Arida had asked that the office of president of 
the republic be officially reserved for a Maronite Christian. Thus, 
while the Christian negotiators were looking for French guarantees 
vis-à-vis Syria and the Lebanese Muslims, the Muslim negotiators 
were looking for French guarantees vis-à-vis the Christians. 
The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and 
Lebanon, signed on 13 November 1936, was approved unanimously 
by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. France recognised Lebanon 
as an independent state and undertook to help its admission to the 
League of Nations. In return, Lebanon guaranteed French capital 
and interests, and the continuation of the monetary parity between 
the two countries, and vowed to remain an ally of France in the 
event of war. France vowed to provide military aid to Lebanon if 
attacked by a third party. Lebanon would have its own army, but 
France would maintain a military presence for its Levantine troops 
(air force and navy) and would enjoy transport and communication 
facilities. For its part, France would provide military technical aid 
and advice to the Lebanese armed forces. Emile Edde threw all his 
weight behind an unlimited French military presence in Lebanon; 
he received a 25-year period renewable by tacit automatic renewal 
for the same duration.
Thus, the Franco-Syrian treaty, signed on 9 September 1936, 
contributed in more than one way to solving an important part of 
the above-mentioned problems. 
To begin with, the Syrian official delegation dropped its 
annexionist demands concerning Lebanon in return for France’s 
integration of the Druze and `Alawite autonomous zones into the 
Syrian Republic (whereas Alexandretta was definitely ceded to 
Turkey). Nonetheless, in their declarations to the press after the 
signature of the treaty, Hashim al-Atassi and Jamil Mardam insisted 
on a federal union between the two countries. 
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Second, in terms of independence and sovereignty, the Lebanese 
obtained more than the initially promised ‘internal independence’.
Finally, the question of ‘minorities’ rights’, which was not included 
in the text of the treaty, was relegated to an exchange of letters 
between de Martell and Edde, attached as annexes to the treaty. 
In letter no. 6, the president of the Lebanese Republic vowed to 
guarantee equal civic and political rights and to ensure the equitable 
representation of the country’s different ‘components’ (read ‘sects’) 
in government posts. Also, in letter no. 6B, the president informed 
the high commissioner that he would implement administrative 
reform aiming at a larger measure of administrative decentrali-
sation and grant municipal and governate (muhafaza) councils 
a consultative vote concerning their respective shares of state 
expenditure. A few weeks later, the high commissioner designated 
that Tripoli and its port become an independent qa’im maqamate. 
But nothing else was achieved in terms of decentralisation, or the 
increase in the prerogatives of municipal councils, or the setting up 
of regional councils in the muhafazas.
Though the Lebanese obtained more than the initially promised 
‘internal independence’, the Franco-Syrian treaty signed on 
9 September 1936 did not satisfy many, especially the clause 
concerning the stationing of French troops. Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre, 
Nabatiyeh and Bint Jbeil were rocked by waves of demonstrations 
and strikes from September to November of 1936. During his visit 
to the northern port, President Edde was met by demonstrators 
waving the Syrian flag and shouting slogans in support of unity 
with Syria. Some 20 protestors were wounded as the gendarmes 
fired on the crowd and `Abd al-Hamid Karami was arrested. 
The resulting general strike did not end until a delegation from 
the Syrian National Bloc intervened with the city’s leaders and 
obtained the release of Karami. In Beirut, bloody clashes between 
the populous quarters of Basta (Sunni) and Jummayzeh (Maronite) 
signalled the rise of paramilitary youth organisations expressing 
mounting sectarian tensions and the influence of the fascist parties 
of Europe. 
The first of these was the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), 
founded in 1932 by Antoun Sa`adeh and advocating integral Syrian 
unity including Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Palestine, Cyprus 
and the northern parts of Iraq. The SSNP was anti-communist, 
anti-Jewish, corporatist and secularist. It was followed by the Party 
of Lebanese Unity, the ‘white shirts’ of Tawfic `Awwad, sponsored 
by Patriarch `Arida and founded as a reaction to the resolutions 
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of the Congress of the Coast, whose members were branded as 
‘secessionists’. In November 1936, the Kata’ib party (Phalange) was 
founded by Pierre Jumayil, a pharmacist and football referee who 
was inspired by the discipline of the Hitler Youth during the 1936 
Olympic games in Munich. The party believed in Lebanon as the 
definitive homeland for its inhabitants within its 1920 borders, and 
professed a Lebanese nationalism distinct from the Arabs, all the 
while campaigning for Lebanon’s independence. The same month 
saw the founding of the Najjada (Rescuers) of `Adnan al-Hakim. 
These were Muslim independentists who called for integral Arab 
unity (clearly demarcated from Islamic unity), but did not insist on 
Syrian-Lebanese unity. In 1937, Rashid Baydun, a businessman and 
school owner in Beirut, founded al-Tala’i` (The Vanguards), a Shi`i 
paramilitary organisation.
Clearly, a simple dichotomy between Christian protectionism 
and Mulsim unionism was no longer accurate. The identity debate 
had mutated and fragmented, becoming more ideological and 
more urban. Identity politics was now both a tool and a master 
of the masses. Two versions of the identity of the country were 
clashing: Lebanonism versus Arabism. Between the two stood a 
third variant, the Syrian nationalism of Sa`adeh’s SSNP, representing 
marginal desires among non-Maronite Christians and the Muslims 
of the peripheries. More importantly, the stakes had changed; the 
identity debate was no longer defined in relation to the outside 
(attachment/detachment) but articulated the relations of power 
inside the country itself. 
Curiously, while the rank and file was being radicalised and 
polarised, the notables drew closer together. The opposition, led 
by Bishara al-Khoury, understood the Franco-Lebanese treaty as 
an engagement on the part of France to end the mandate in favour 
of Lebanon’s self-rule and independence. The guarantees for the 
Christians were written into the constitution and the electoral 
system and would be embodied in inter-sectarian alliances and in 
the relations with the leaders of Syria and the other Arab countries, 
‘brothers and partners in the struggle against colonialism and for 
freedom and independence’, as Khoury called them.12 The legislative 
elections of 1937 brought a large number of Constitutionalists to 
the chamber, with the Pharaon-Chiha bank financially supporting 
their nomination. Khoury was nominated prime minister, and the 
bank, representing the power of money in the capital, exerted 
considerable influence on the economic and financial policies of the 
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government in addition to benefiting greatly from the beneficence 
of the prime minister.
In addition to his strong support in business circles, Khoury was 
privileged vis-à-vis Edde by his inter-sectarian alliances. In contrast 
to the latter’s difficult relations with the Muslims, Khoury’s Consti-
tutionalist Bloc included a number of Muslim notables, especially 
from the peripheral regions of Lebanon: Muhammad ̀ Abd al-Razzaq 
in `Akkar, Majid Arsalan in `Alay and the Shouf, Sabri Hamadeh 
in the Biqa` and `Adil `Usayran in the south. 
This period also witnessed the emergence of a third force, which 
was democratic, reformist and multi-sectarian, and reflected the 
social and anti-monopolist struggles of the 1930s. This group 
crystallised around the National and Democratic Congress (NDC), 
which convened in Beirut in November 1938 at the initiative of the 
Lebanese Communist Party (LCP). The congress included members 
of the professional middle class, economists and trade unionists, 
in addition to merchants and notables opposed to the traditional 
za`ims. The congress’s resolutions condemned the intervention of the 
mandate functionaries in the work of the ministries, administrative 
corruption, and the mandatory authorities’ support for the fran-
chise-holding companies. They advocated a united budget for 
the state and the Common Interests. Politically, the resolutions 
stigmatised the Chamber of Deputies as a ‘chamber of notables 
and big landowners’ in which a dozen MPs were ready to be 
bought and sold, and called for its dissolution and the election 
of a Parliament of 44 deputies through popular suffrage. Other 
reforms proposed were the election of the president of the republic 
by direct popular vote and the ban on combining the posts of MP 
and cabinet minister. Noting that 80 per cent of fiscal revenues 
came from indirect taxes, which was detrimental to the poor and 
the middle classes, the congress called for the adoption of a direct 
and progressive income and inheritance tax.13
The outbreak of World War II suspended the crises of that fateful 
year. The French National Assembly did not ratify the independence 
treaties with Syria and Lebanon. In Lebanon, the high commissioner 
suspended the constitution and dissolved the Chamber of Deputies 
in early 1939, and though Edde was still nominally president of 
the republic, real power passed into the hands of the French high 
commissioners. In 1941, Edde was dismissed when the Vichy 
administration of General Dentz appointed Alfred Naccache to 
replace him as head of state. 
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TOWArd INdEPENdENCE
As World War I created the conditions for the emergence of Greater 
Lebanon under French mandate, it was during World War II that the 
conditions for Lebanon’s independence from France matured, in the 
context of Franco-British competition over the destinies of the peoples 
of the Near East. In 1940, France collapsed under Nazi occupation. 
In 1941, Free French and British troops attacked Syria and Lebanon 
from three directions and overthrew the pro-Vichy administration 
there. General de Gaulle was increasingly apprehensive that Britain’s 
intentions were motivated by the ‘preconceived idea of evicting’ 
France from the entire region. On 26 November 1941, in order 
to thwart the British outbidding the French, General Georges 
Catroux, who was nominated delegate-general of Free France 
in Syria and Lebanon, declared France’s recognition of the two 
countries’ independence and invited their respective governments 
to sign a new treaty with France to terminate the mandate. The 
declaration came to nothing. The Syrian and Lebanese independ-
entists rejected the idea of a new treaty as there already was one, 
and the French retorted by claiming that independence could not 
be accomplished before the League of Nations relieved France of 
its mandate. Nevertheless, Catroux confirmed Alfred Naccache as 
president of the republic and continued to behave as an all-powerful 
high commissioner. Britian, the US, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq immediately recognised the independence of the two countries. 
Lebanese independentists of all colours – the Constitutionalist 
Bloc, Riad al-Sulh and his friends, and Bkirki, who called for a 
national congress under the patronage of Patriarch ̀ Arida – stood up 
against that illusory and incomplete independence, calling for new 
elections and the complete handing over of powers to the Lebanese, 
including their right to elect their own president. The refusal of the 
French authorities was confirmed during General de Gaulle’s visit 
to Damascus and Beirut in August 1942 when he declared that war 
conditions did not allow the exercise of full independence. 
General Edward Spears was appointed mission chief for Britain 
in both countries, based in Beirut. Moreover, the Near East, as the 
region was called then, was a unified theatre of military operations 
and an economic union organised to support the war effort, with 
an HQ in Cairo, home of the Middle East Supply Centre, a body 
that administered the Allies’ communication lines and logistics while 
controlling agricultural and industrial production. In short, Britain 
dominated the whole region.
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Two economic factors motivated the financial/commercial 
oligarchy to opt for independence. The first was its desire, all 
sectarian factions included, to privatise and control the French 
‘Common Interests’ as well as the franchise-holding companies.14 
The second was the oligarchy’s desire to liberate itself from the 
constraints and restrictions of a weak and closed French monetary 
zone.15 In addition, the oligarchy had accumulated huge profits 
during the war and established many links with the Anglo-Saxon 
markets and the Arab oil-producing states. Already, Beirut was the 
centre of communication between Europe and the Gulf States and 
Saudi Arabia. The greater part of the gold purchased by the emirs 
and sheikhs of that oil-producing region transited through its port, 
and its banks had begun receiving the first deposits and investing 
Gulf money in real estate.
It was in Cairo that the accords concerning Lebanon’s independence 
were negotiated. Meeting under the patronage of Egypt’s prime 
minister, Mustafa Nahhas Pasha, in June 1942, Bishara al-Khoury 
and the nationalist Syrian leader Jamil Mardam agreed on the return 
to constitutional life and the integral independence of both countries, 
while refusing any privileges for France after independence. The two 
leaders also decided to take charge of the Common Interests. Khoury 
was thus recognised by the Syrian nationalists as the representative 
of the majority of the Lebanese Christians and Muslims. Also during 
that visit, the alliance between Bishara al-Khoury and Riad al-Sulh 
was sealed and elaborated in the famous National Pact, in which 
the former traded French protection for Christian political primacy 
guaranteed by the constitution and the latter dropped the idea of 
Muslim annexation to Syria in return for Muslim partnership in 
running the affairs of the country. Sulh, like many Arab nationalists 
of the time, had become closer to Britain as the Allies appeared 
to be heading for victory. During another visit to Cairo in May 
1943, Khoury, already being treated as the forthcoming president 
of Lebanon, signed an economic treaty with Egypt, Iraq, Syria and 
Jordan. In a declaration to the press – immediately denounced by 
the Constitutional Bloc in Beirut – he even declared his willingness 
to sign a federal union between Lebanon and Syria. Khoury was 
not an obvious British choice from the beginning, though Nahhas 
Pasha had already adopted him. General Spears, though a sworn 
enemy of Edde, whom he called a ‘French stooge’, was not very 
enthusiastic for Khoury and hoped to advance Kamil Sham`un. As 
late as July 1943, Britain’s men in the region were still testing the 
two candidates. Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri al-Sa`id, met Sham`un 
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and Khoury that month and was more convinced by the latter. No 
doubt Khoury’s support for a Syrian–Lebanese federal union struck 
a favourable note with the champion of the Greater Syria project. 
Nevertheless, Lebanon’s transition to independence did not 
occur without clashes and violence. The return to constitutional 
life was not implemented until late 1942, under pressure from 
General Spears, who insisted on the need to organise national 
elections and did not hide his sympathies for the independence of 
the two countries.16 When the French finally agreed to organise the 
elections, Ayyub Thabit, a Protestant politician close to Edde, was 
appointed to head an interim government. He decreed a ratio of 
32 Christian to 22 Muslim seats and granted immigrants the right 
to vote (estimated at 160,000, mostly Christians). Both provisions 
were rejected by the Muslim politicians and Thabit resigned; he 
was replaced by a Greek Orthodox lawyer, Petro Trad. Upon the 
mediation of Nahhas Pasha, an electoral law was decreed in the 
summer of 1943. It dropped the voting by immigrants and set up 
a Parliament of 55 seats, 30 for Christians and 25 for Muslims. 
This ratio of 6:5 remained the guideline for the Christian–Muslim 
sectarian quotas until 1990, when it was replaced by parity (50:50) 
according to the Ta’if Agreement. 
On 21 September 1943, the result of the summer’s elections was a 
net victory for the Constitutionalists. Bishara al-Khoury was elected 
president of the republic on 21 September and immediately appointed 
Riad al-Sulh to form the government. In October, a Syrian high-level 
delegation arrived in Beirut, headed by Prime Minister Jamil 
Mardam Bey who agreed with his Lebanese counterpart on three 
vital points: (1) Syria recognised and defended the independence and 
sovereignty of both countries; (2) Lebanon made the commitment 
that its territory would not be used as base or passageway for any 
foreign force that endangered Syria’s independence or security; (3) 
close collaboration between the two countries would take place in 
the economic and social domains. Following that, Lebanon asked 
the National Committee of Free France (CNFL) for a transfer of 
powers and of the Common Interests to the Lebanese authorities. 
The response was negative, with France declaring that as long as 
the country was still under mandate, there would be no question 
of terminating the mandate without a new treaty. In fact, General 
de Gaulle wanted a new treaty that would guarantee for France a 
privileged position in Lebanon and Syria in the cultural, economic 
and military domains. Lebanon answered that the CNFL had no 
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legal status or legitimacy to sign such treaties and that Lebanon 
would not grant a privileged status to any foreign power. 
On 8 November 1943, the Chamber of Deputies passed a series 
of constitutional revisions that abolished the clause stating that the 
French mandatory authority was the sole source of political power 
and jurisdiction, reinstated Arabic as the country’s only official 
language and adopted a new design for the Lebanese flag. 
Thus Lebanon’s independence was imposed as a fait accompli. 
On the following day, President Khoury promptly ratified the 
revisions. However, French delegate-general Jean Helleu declared 
the constitutional revisions null and void, as they were unilaterally 
carried out without prior consultation with the French authorities. 
On 11 November, at dawn, Khoury, Sulh, `Abd al-Hamid Karami 
and ministers Salim Takla and Kamil Sham`un were arrested and 
incarcerated in the fort of Rashaya in the southern Biqa`. Emile 
Edde, who had abstained from voting on the constitutional 
amendments, was appointed head of state and prime minister. 
Boycotted by the entire political class, Edde was incapable of forming 
a government as news of the arrests led to violent popular reaction. 
A country-wide general strike was decreed, and the officials who 
were still at large formed a provisional government under Habib Abi 
Shahla, the speaker of Parliament, and Majid Arsalan, the defence 
minister, and launched an appeal to national resistance. In Beirut, 
the Phalange and the Najjada formed a united command to wage 
the common battle and demonstrators took over the Parliament 
building, demanding the liberation of the incarcerated leaders. 
Helleu imposed a curfew and sent French and Senegalese troops 
to repress the demonstrations, which left 18 protestors dead and 
66 wounded. 
Pressed by the monarchs of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the 
British prime minister, Winston Churchill, intervened with General 
de Gaulle who dispatched General Catroux to Beirut to solve the 
crisis. On 19 November, General Spears submitted an ultimatum 
from his government to the Free French, demanding the liberation 
of Khoury and his friends, or else they would be freed by British 
troops. On the morning of 22 November, a few hours before the 
ultimatum was due to expire, Catroux ordered the liberation of 
Khoury, Sulh and their companions, dismissed Helleu and declared 
the end of the French mandate in Lebanon.17
Lebanon’s independence was largely a product of an entente 
between Britian and Egypt. The former’s role was decisive in the 
termination of the French mandate and the choice of the ruling 
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tandem. Explaining why the francophile oligarchy had accepted 
independence from the French, Michel Chiha cynically told his 
friend Charles Helou that Lebanon could not remain a French 
trading post in a region dominated by they British. Egypt– the 
first Arab country to recognise Lebanon’s independence – was the 
Arab guarantor of Lebanon’s ‘independence’, notably vis-à-vis 
Syria. Significantly, two months after the Lebanese crisis, the Syrian 
Parliament passed a law for amending the Syrian constitution to 
abolish all references to the French mandate.
Thus, a new tradition had been inaugurated in which the Lebanese 
entity periodically shifted and reformed according to the will of the 
dominant regional and international forces. This pattern was to be 
repeated many times in the following decades. 
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The Merchant republic (1943–1952)
Enrichissez-vous.
(Michel Chiha)
Prosperity, currency, money, prices, buildings and cars, the airport, the oil terminals, 
the banks, industry, commerce, hotels, cabarets …
Matter, matter, all is matter, matter that dazzles the eye, fills the pocket, satisfies 
the body …




Lebanon’s independent republic took off with two ‘founding 
documents’: a formal constitution and an informal verbal 
understanding between Bishara al-Khoury and Riad al-Sulh known 
as the National Pact, the only written trace of which is found in the 
latter’s ministerial declaration of 7 October 1943. 
The constitution itself contains a fundamental dichotomy. It 
establishes the judicial, civic and political equality of all Lebanese 
as citizens (muwatinin), while at the same time institutionalising 
their judicial and political inequality as subjects (ahlin) belonging to 
hierarchised religious communities with unequal access to political 
power and public office. In this sense, the 1943 constitution left 
untouched the three main Articles (9, 10 and 95) concerning 
sectarianism in the initial 1926 constitution.1 
Nevertheless, sectarian pluralism barely concealed Maronite 
political primacy represented by the exceptional powers that the 
constitution bestowed on the president of the republic, now firmly 
established by tradition as a Maronite. They were the powers of an 
‘autocrat’, or a ‘republican monarch’, says jurist Antoine Khayr,2 
while constitutional jurist Edmond Rabbath notes that the head of 
state ‘corporally incarnates … all the life of the state’.3 According 
to the 1943 constitution, as uncontested head of the executive, the 
110
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president names ministers, chooses a prime minister among them 
and holds the right to dismiss his cabinet, individually or collectively. 
Not only does he initiate legislation, but he holds the right to veto 
legislation passed in Parliament. Although himself elected by 
Parliament, the president could dissolve the legislature and call for 
new elections. More importantly, a head of state enjoying such wide 
powers was unaccountable for his ‘actions during office’ except 
in the case of the violation of the constitution and high treason 
(Article 60).
On the other hand, the National Pact acted to supplement and 
correct the constitution concerning essential questions of the 
country’s identity, its Arab and international relations and the 
incorporation of the Muslim communities in the power structure. 
There were four major principles involved.
First, the pact confirmed the power-sharing formula among 
the sects already established in Article 95 of the constitution: the 
6:5 ratio in political and administrative representation as well as 
the distribution of the three major posts of government among a 
Maronite president, a Shi`i speaker and a Sunni prime minister. 
Second, the pact defined the country’s identity, relations and 
obligations vis-à-vis the outside world. Whereas the constitution 
(Article 1) defined Lebanon as an ‘independent state enjoying 
indivisible unity and integral sovereignty’, the pact defines it as a 
‘country with an Arab profile that assimilates all that is beneficial 
and useful in Western civilisation’. Thus Lebanon’s ‘Arab profile’ 
was supposed to replace the (Muslim) demand for unity with Syria, 
and the cultural links with the West replaced the (Christian) demand 
for French military presence or Western protection in general. 
Third, a major principle of foreign policy pledged that ‘Lebanon 
shall not be a base or a passageway for colonialism’. This was 
designed to assuage traditional Syrian phobias, as General Gouraud’s 
1920 campaign to topple the Arab government in Damascus from 
Lebanese territory was still fresh in people’s minds.
Fourth, striking a different note from the constitution, the pact 
implied a virtual partnership in the running of the affairs of the 
state, between President Khoury and Prime Minister Sulh, and thus 
a better participation of the Muslims in power, decision-making 
and state functions. Sectarian quotas in the administration were 
supposed to favour Muslim access to it at the expense of traditional 
Maronite, and generally Christian, primacy in the public service, 
a legacy of the mandate period and of the Maronites’ historically 
accumulated educational and cultural privileges.
Traboulsi T02610 01 text   111 23/04/2012   08:07
112 A HIsTOry Of MOdErN LEBANON
Thus, the National Pact can be seen as a confirmation of 
political guarantees for the Christians in exchange for political and 
socio-cultural promises for the Muslims. These provisions were not 
incorporated in the body of the revised constitution of 1943, no 
doubt so as not to endow them with constitutional power, a further 
sign of the unevenness in the relationship between the representa-
tives of the two communities. 
The negative impacts of a country ‘taking off’ with two founding 
texts, instead of one, cannot be underestimated. A great part of the 
later history of Lebanon and of its conflicts would be articulated 
around the way those two texts were read, interpreted and assigned 
priority. To a great extent, the history of the application of the 
1943 compromise is the history of conflict between constitution 
and custom. 
NAVIGATING IN TrOUBLEd ArAB WATErs
Lebanon’s first years of independence were rife with problems and 
challenges. Looming over Lebanon’s newfound independent identity 
were the two Hashemite unity projects: the Greater Syria project 
of Emir `Abd Allah of Jordan and the Fertile Crescent project of 
Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri al-Sa`id. In order to attract the Lebanese 
Christians, King `Abd Allah proposed autonomy for Mount 
Lebanon inside a united Greater Syria. Khoury’s main contribution 
to Lebanese foreign policy was his capacity to navigate between the 
conflicting Arab camps of the time. Hashemite designs directed at 
annexing Syria helped attenuate Syrian politicians’ appetites for 
Lebanon. Official Lebanon, for its part, opted for the Arab League 
project as an excuse for refusing to join either Hashemite pact and 
relied on the protection of the anti-Hashemite camp led by Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, these two countries had their unity 
project embodied in the Arab League. Lebanon’s fidelity to its ‘Arab 
engagements’ within the context of the Arab League soon became 
a basic principle of its Arab policy. 
But what policy to follow in the Arab League? A skilful manoeuvre 
by the tandem of advisers, Pharaon and Chiha, provided the answer. 
`Abd al-Hamid Karami was invited to head a new government 
in January 1945. One reason given for his appointment was its 
contribution to the integration of Tripoli into national political life. 
But there was more. Under Sulh, Lebanon had become a founding 
member of the Arab League on 25 September 1944 and participated 
in the drafting of the league’s charter known as the Alexandria 
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Protocol. During that session, and at the initiative of the Syrian 
delegation, a special clause was introduced into the protocol calling 
upon all the Arab states to respect Lebanon’s independence and 
sovereignty in its current borders. In 1945, the Alexandria Protocol 
was to be signed and a decision taken on the federal union project 
presented by Egypt. Khoury and his advisers were afraid that Sulh 
might commit Lebanon to it. Karami, a local Syrian unionist who 
lacked the vision and Arab contacts of Sulh, ceded foreign policy to 
Henri Pharaon, named minister of foreign affairs, who threw all his 
weight into transforming the Arab League from a federal structure 
into a guardian of the existing Arab entities.4 Pharaon objected to 
compulsory arbitration in disputes between the member states and 
rejected majority rule: any executive decision of the league’s council 
should be taken unanimously. 
The battle for evacuation
Though formally independent, Syria and Lebanon’s problems with 
France were not finished. As soon as the latter was liberated, the 
French government went back to the idea of a bilateral treaty that 
would give France the privileged status that General – now President 
– de Gaulle had been asking for. Britain, at that time, backed the 
French request and advised the Syrian and Lebanese to sign.5 But 
Lebanon received unexpected support as the US recognised it as a 
fully independent state on 19 September 1945, rejecting a French 
request to delay recognition until after the treaty was signed. The 
USSR followed suit the next day. 
The blessing of the two superpowers gave added strength to 
the Syrian and Lebanese in the crisis that erupted in May 1945. 
On this occasion, Syria led the confrontation and Lebanon played 
second fiddle. After the end of military hostilities in Europe, France 
dispatched military reinforcements, mainly Senegalese troops, to 
Syria and Lebanon. Immediately, demonstrations were organised 
in Damascus and Beirut in opposition to the move. A general strike 
in Syrian cities and towns degenerated into violent clashes with 
French troops. The French retaliated with an aerial bombardment of 
Damascus on 29 and 30 May. This was too much for the British. On 
the next day, British troops in Syria ordered French troops back to 
their bases and took charge of law and order. In the United Nations, 
a US-brokered compromise was reached on 13 December 1945 to 
evacuate French (and British) troops from Syria and Lebanon. By 
31 December 1946, all foreign troops had departed. 
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Palestine 1948: the calamities of some …
Lebanon participated symbolically in the Arab–Israeli war of 1948. 
Its army’s assigned mission was to move from Ras al-Naqura on the 
coastal road in the direction of Acre and Haifa. The Syrian army, 
invited to reinforce the Lebanese front, was assigned the task of 
advancing from Bint Jbeil in the direction of Safad. The aim of the 
joint thrust was to reach the village of Malikiya in central Galilee, 
on the way to Haifa. The Arab volunteers of Jaysh al-Inqadh (The 
Army of Salvation) led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji, participated actively 
in the campaign and the forces reached Malikya. But a counter-
offensive of the Zionist forces in October 1948 regained Malikiya 
and occupied a strip of 14 villages inside Lebanese territory. 
Careful not to be the first Arab country to sign the armistice 
agreement, Lebanon waited for the Israeli–Egyptian armistice to be 
signed in Rhodes before engaging in Lebanese–Israeli negotiations in 
Naqura on 1 March 1949. On 23 March, the armistice agreement 
was signed, as Israel committed itself to withdraw from the territory 
it occupied in south Lebanon. 
The Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe) and the creation of the State 
of Israel had grave yet contradictory consequences for Lebanon. 
Economically, Lebanon’s service economy was the main beneficiary 
of the Arab economic boycott of Israel. Beirut took over Haifa’s 
role as the main port of the Arab hinterland and as an international 
communication centre between Europe, Asia and some parts of 
Africa.6 Palestinian capital, estimated at 150 million Palestinian 
pounds, flowed heavily into Lebanon followed by a large number 
of wealthy Palestinians. Nevertheless, industry was dealt a severe 
blow, as the value of its exports to Palestine was greater than its 
exports to France, Britain and the US combined. The economies of 
the regions neighbouring Palestine, whose products were destined 
for the Palestinian market (tanneries in Mashghara, pottery in 
Rashaya and shoemaking in Bint Jbeil), practically collapsed, which 
constituted a major factor in the migration of many southerners 
and Biqa`is to Beirut and overseas (Africa and the US).
Some 120,000 Palestinians from the Galilee had sought refuge in 
Lebanon. Declaring that they constituted an economic burden the 
country could not cope with, the Lebanese government made many 
attempts to dump them over the borders in Syria, in `Abdeh in the 
north and Masna` in the east. Rebuffed by the Syrian authorities, 
the Palestinian refugees were ultimately settled, upon demand 
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from business circles, in camps close to the citrus plantations of 
the coastal plain and Beirut’s industrial zones. 
Politically, the creation of the State of Israel and its expansionist 
designs added radically new dimensions to the issue of Lebanon’s 
security and protection: it was a challenge that would have many 
repercussions to come.
sa`adeh’s coup
Among the interrelated fallouts of the Palestinian Nakba of 1948 
was the Syrian coup d’état of Husni al-Za`im and the failed armed 
revolt of Antoun Sa`adeh’s SSNP in Lebanon. On 31 March 1949, 
the commander-in-chief of the Syrian army, Husni al-Za`im, blaming 
the civilian leadership for the military defeat in Palestine, seized 
power in Damascus in a military coup in which the CIA was heavily 
implicated.7 The Lebanese leaders had every reason to be suspicious 
of Za`im. He had overthrown their Syrian allies of the National 
Bloc and expressed sympathy for the Fertile Crescent and Greater 
Syria projects. In addition, Za`im’s coup came after the dissolution 
of the monetary union between the two countries and at a time 
of extreme anxiety over the future of their economic relations. It 
took more than a month for the Lebanese authorities to recognise 
the new regime in Damascus, which infuriated Za`im. Riad al-Sulh 
was especially targeted, accused of conspiring with the exiled Syrian 
leaders to overthrow the new regime. 
Za`im’s coup attracted the opposition parties in Lebanon, 
especially the SSNP. After independence, Sa`adeh, hoping for his 
party’s legalisation, had watered down his rejection of the Lebanese 
entity, declaring that he would accept it on political and religious 
grounds, not on ‘national’ grounds. But the Nakba in Palestine 
once again put the party on the path of radical opposition. Sa`adeh 
wrote that the Arab defeat in 1948 was the proof of the bankruptcy 
of Arab nationalism and held the Lebanese government, especially 
Sulh, responsible for the debacle. News of contacts between Sa`adeh 
and Za`im provided additional reasons for the government to be 
suspicious of him and his party. A clash on 9 June 1949 between the 
SSNP and the Phalange in the popular quarter of Jummayzeh – in 
which the building occupied by the SSNP organ al-Jil al-Jadid (The 
New Generation) was burnt to the ground – served as a pretext for 
a police campaign against the SSNP. Large-scale arrests were made 
and the discovery of arms fuelled the accusation that the party was 
plotting to bring down the government. Sa`adeh promptly fled to 
Damascus, where he was immediately granted political asylum and 
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declared a popular uprising on 1 July 1949. Bands of armed SSNP 
militants tried to take over government positions in the Biqa` and 
move from the Shouf and the suburbs to the capital; but they were 
quickly foiled by the army and the revolt collapsed within 72 hours, 
leaving a number of dead and wounded and a witch-hunt against 
SSNP members.
Meanwhile, Saudi and Egyptian mediation had helped mend 
fences between Damascus and Beirut as the erratic Syrian dictator 
switched camps and dropped his Hashemite alliance. Sulh had 
visited Za`im in Damascus and, on 24 June 1949, Khoury and Sulh 
received the Syrian leader in Shtura. Saudi and Egyptian pressure, 
in addition to a Lebanese agreement to sign a full economic union 
treaty with Syria, led Za`im to drop his protégé. On 6 July, Sa`adeh 
was promptly delivered in Damascus to two Lebanese officers, and 
the SSNP leader was summarily judged before a military court in 
Beirut and sentenced to death on charges of conspiring to overthrow 
the government and ‘collaboration with Israel’. He was executed 
by firing squad at dawn on 8 July.
‘THE CONsOrTIUM’ 
The Lebanese president’s exceptional executive and legislative 
powers made him the main pole of attraction for the country’s 
dominant economic interests. This tradition, which began under the 
independence regime, still constitutes a major aspect of Lebanon’s 
political economy.
The commercial/financial oligarchy that came to power with 
independence was estimated at some 30 families ranged around 
a nucleus composed of ‘the Consortium’: the president’s two 
brothers, his sons, and a dozen related families.8 The extent to 
which these families held monopolistic control over the main axes 
of the country’s economy is impressive, especially compared to 
the free trade pretentions of the ‘merchant republic’. In sectarian 
composition, the families of the oligarchy were mainly Christian: 24 
Christian families (nine Maronites, seven Greek Catholic, one Latin, 
one Protestant, four Greek Orthodox and one Armenian), to six 
Muslim (four Sunni, one Shi`ite and one Druze). Christian families 
practised extended endogamy in order to preserve or increase 
family wealth and property and advance business partnerships. 
In one generation at least ten of the oligarchy’s families (Pharaon, 
Chiha, Khoury, Haddad, Freige, Kettaneh, ̀ Arida, Bustrus, ̀ Asayli, 
Doumit) were associated by matrimonial bonds. Their capital came 
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from three main sources: the silk economy and the import trade 
during the Mutasarrifiya period; war profits (between 1940 and 
1944 allied troops spent £76 million in Syria and Lebanon);9 and 
emigrant money repatriated from Africa, the Americas and the 
oil-producing Arab countries (Iraq and Saudi Arabia especially).
Members of the Consortium held a position of control in all of 
the country’s economic sectors. In finance, they owned a dozen 
local or mixed banks, headed by the BSL, the bank that issued the 
currency, administered the state’s finances and controlled credit 
and commercial exchanges with France.10 The biggest insurance 
company, the Union Nationale, was a partnership between members 
of the Consortium and French capital. The above-mentioned 
interests were mainly importers of Western-manufactured products 
and controlled the biggest share of the market for food products, 
arms and ammunitions, agricultural and industrial equipment, 
beverages, medical and pharmaceutical products, construction 
material, electric equipment and telecommunications, stationery, 
wood, hardware, coffee, cars, spare parts, and so on. Of the 50 
agencies representing US firms, half were in the hands of one family, 
the Kettaneh, and the rest distributed among Fattal, Sahnawi and 
Pharaon. Members of the Consortium were also pioneers in tourism: 
they owned the country’s biggest and most luxurious hotels in 
Beirut (the St George’s and Bristol hotels), the summer centres of 
Bhamdun and Sawfar and the ski centres of Faraya and the Cedars. 
In the services sector, the Consortium, in association with French 
interests, controlled almost all of the franchise-holding societies 
and public services companies: the port of Beirut, the water and 
electricity companies (Beirut, Qadisha, Nahr al-Barid), the Régie 
des Tabacs et Tombacs, and so on. They also controlled the biggest 
construction companies in the country (Régie des Travaux) and one 
of the biggest in the Middle East (the CAT of Emile Bustani). The 
two principal air transport companies, Air Liban and Middle East 
Airlines, and the biggest land transport company were owned by 
members of the oligarchy. In industry, the Consortium controlled 
the main industrial firms in electricity, cement, textile, beer, matches, 
agricultural products, vegetable oil, paint, glass, and so on. Finally, 
all the families mentioned had large holdings in real estate in both 
the city and the countryside.11
An estimated value of the fortunes of 15 of those families 
amounted to 245 million Lebanese lira (LL), the equivalent of 
nine times the state budget for 1944 and more than 40 per cent of 
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national revenue for 1948. A significant portion of those fortunes 
was invested overseas.
Not only did the oligarchy enjoy economic dominance over the 
country, but they also wielded significant political power. During 
that period, 13 of the oligarchy’s members were elected deputies, 
five held cabinet posts and one was nominated prime minister. Most 
of the MPs of the oligarchy were ‘parachuted’ into the peripheries, 
particularly the Biqa` and the south, where they played the role of 
funders of the large lists of ‘political feudalists’. Iliyas Trabulsi, a 
wealthy trader in Dayr al-Qamar, financed Ahmad al-As`ad’s list 
in the south and ran on it. Pierre Pharaon, the cousin of Henri, 
and Nicolas Salim were elected MPs for Jizzin. For a time, Henri 
Pharaon was the political patron of the region of Zahleh and part 
of the Biqa`, where his relative Musa de Freige had a mechanised 
farm and a parliamentary seat. A member of the Sursuq family, 
big landowners in the `Ammiq region, was also MP for the Biqa`. 
Industrialist Butrus al-Khoury financed the lists of the northern 
leaders before running himself for Parliament. Under the Khoury 
regime 36 deputies (of whom 26 were Christians) were owners or 
shareholders in the country’s 230 biggest firms.12
Be that as it may, Michel Chiha had set up an interesting 
bifurcated model for the relationship between economic power and 
political power. According to his formula, economic power was to 
be exercised mainly through the executive. The president of the 
republic, rallying point and business partner of the commercial/
financial oligarchy, represented, served and defended its economic 
interests. Similarly, the administration’s main task was to speed up 
business deals and transactions. Hence, in the interests of efficiency, 
Chiha was opposed to sectarian quotas in the administration. 
On the other hand, Parliament, defined as an ‘assembly of 
notables’, was to be the reserve of the landed za`ims representing 
the country’s various sects. Its principal, if not exclusive, role was 
the establishment of ‘sectarian peace’. Nevertheless, the ‘conflict-
resolution function’ attributed to the legislature indirectly served the 
best interests of free trade, as it simply meant minimum legislation 
and very ‘soft’ budgets (implying also a minimum of taxes and 
customs duties). 
Chiha’s model was not followed to the letter. The oligarchy ceded 
the administration to the political bosses who soon filled it with their 
clients, and public function became a means to absorb some of the 
surplus labour power which the services economy could not absorb. 
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THE INTErMEdIAry rOLE 
The formation of Lebanon’s economic system under the 
independence regime involved a mixture of imposing the interests 
of the commercial/financial oligarchy and adapting to Arab and 
international developments, especially the burgeoning oil economies 
in Iraq, the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, which were encouraged by the 
Arab economic boycott of Israel and the breakup of the Syrian–
Lebanese economic union. 
Liberated from the confines of the franc zone and economic union 
with Syria, the Lebanese commercial/financial oligarchy established 
itself as an intermediary between Western markets and the entire 
Arab hinterland. Exchanges with the franc bloc declined in favour 
of the Anglo-Saxon zone and the Arab countries (Iraq, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf States).13 More important was the growing 
integration of Lebanon in the Arab oil economy. As early as 1948, 30 
per cent of the world’s gold transited through Beirut toward the Gulf 
as the monarchs, sheikhs and emirs exchanged their petrodollars 
for the precious metal. On the other hand, since 1934 Tripoli had 
become the terminal for the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and 
in 1946, an agreement was signed with TAPLINE, subsidiary of 
the American ARAMCO group, to build a refinery for Saudi oil in 
Sidon; another contract gave Standard Oil a concession to build a 
second refinery in Tripoli. 
Beirut was rapidly becoming a centre for international 
communications. Its modern airport, the privileged relay point for 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, was controlled by two local air transport 
companies. Air Liban, in which French interests controlled 30 per 
cent of the shares, was associated with the Busson group (Husayn 
al-`Uwayni, Antoine Sahnawi, Michel Khattar, Georges Karam, and 
so on) and benefited from ̀ Uwayni’s privileged relations with Saudi 
King `Abd al-`Aziz ibn Sa`ud. Middle East Airlines (MEA) of Sa’ib 
Salam, associated with Pan American Airlines (PAA), monopolised 
the Beirut–Kuwait line for a time, thanks to Salam’s excellent ties 
with the ruling sheikh of the oil emirate. The company grew from 
having just 60 employees in 1946 to having 900 a decade later, and 
was making a net profit of LL 1.9 million as early as 1951.
Integration into the Arab oil economy introduced Anglo-Saxon 
interests into the heart of the Lebanese economy and soon led to frantic 
competition with French interests. In fact, the country’s political 
independence from France had not hindered the reconstruction of 
neo-colonial ties between the ancient metropolis and the newly 
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independent country. The control exercised over the whole economy 
by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL), under its director René 
Busson, drained a good part of the war profits into France. Issuing 
bank and depositary of the state budget, the BSL came to control 
the credits of the banks that financed the big construction projects. 
In addition, French banks eventually came to dominate and control 
Lebanese banks: Crédit Lyonnais took over Banque G. Trad & Co., 
and the Banque d’Indochine-controlled Banque Sabbagh. Under 
Busson’s supervision, the Banque d’Indochine was responsible for 
buying gold bullion for the Lebanese lira’s gold cover.
The SERIAC group (Société d’Etudes et de Réalisation 
Industrielles, Agricoles et Commerciales) created by Busson 
provided projects and deals for the French contractors. In addition, 
it exercised monopoly control over Syria and Lebanon’s economic 
exchanges and financial transactions with France. The group’s 
lawyer was Hamid Franjiyeh and on its Adminstrative Council sat 
Fu’ad al-Khoury, the president’s brother, side by side with repre-
sentatives of the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie 
(BNCI), the Banque Française du Commerce Extérieur (BFCE) and 
Crédit Lyonnais (CL). On the other hand, al-Ittihad al-Watani, the 
local insurance company owned by the members of the Consortium 
(Yusuf Salim, Jean Fattal, Alfred Kettaneh and Husayn `Uwayni), 
represented the big French insurance company Union Nationale and 
acquired insurance contracts for the franchise-holding companies 
(Compagnie du Port, TEB, Régie des Travaux, Air Liban, and so on). 
French neo-colonial interests were better served by the strong 
presence of their local representatives in the heart of power, ensuring 
privileges and fiscal exemptions. According to opponents of 
Khoury’s regime, the BSL and other concessionary societies exported 
to France the tax-exempt sum of LL 50 million in profits annually.
The subordination of industry
Although Lebanese industry witnessed extensive growth during 
the war, its development was soon arrested by the increasing 
tertiarisation of the economy as the oligarchy used its dominant 
position in power to subject industrial interests to its own logic and 
needs. The industrialists, incapable of controlling or even finding a 
sizeable place in a domestic market dominated by imported goods, 
were forced to produce for export and distribute their products 
in the Arab and African markets. The Lebanon of the 1940s was 
a pioneer in rejecting ‘import substitution’ in favour of ‘export-
oriented’ industry. 
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Nevertheless, the intermediary role did not impose itself 
without resistance. Na`im Amiuni, assistant director-general of the 
Ministry of National Economy, was among those who presented 
an alternative view. In a lecture at the American Junior College 
(the present Lebanese American University (LAU)) in July 1946, he 
defined himself as a partisan of the development of the productive 
sectors, of greater self-sufficiency in staples and a wider differ-
entiation in exports. Reminding his audience that ‘commerce is 
the engine of the economy not the economy itself’, he expressed 
his anxiety at the rapid increase in the number of merchants and 
middlemen, the transfer of capital from landed ownership to trade 
and finance and the massive importation of consumer and luxury 
goods. As for tourism, Amiuni remarked that the country’s main 
sources of income were agriculture and industry, not tourism. Just 
two industrial sectors alone, cotton spinning and tannery, produced 
two and the half times more revenue than the entire tourism sector 
(LL 10 million against LL 4 million for 1944–45). Arguing against 
Chiha’s thesis that the Lebanese refused to be enslaved by industrial 
labour, he forecast that tourism would transform the Lebanese into 
a ‘class of servants’. 
Amiuni discussed at length the lost opportunities for Lebanese 
agriculture, which used to produce as much citrus fruit as Palestine 
before World War I, but produced ten times less at the end of 
the war, and noted the negative impact of the multiplication of 
middlemen on the price of agricultural products, which had risen 
at a rate of 150–200 per cent. 
Without underestimating the economic effects of the facilities 
granted to foreign firms and the country’s transit role (for airports, 
free zones, refineries and pipelines), Amiuni warned against the 
prevailing optimism. Tripoli, a prosperous port in earlier periods, 
spent years waiting for Iraqi oil as the population suffered high rates 
of unemployment. When the oil finally arrived, the dreams collapsed: 
one cotton-spinning factory in Tripoli employed four times as many 
workers as the IIPC terminal and the oil refinery combined.14 
Breakup of the Lebanese–syrian economic union
If the creation of Greater Lebanon achieved political detachment 
from Syria, the country’s independence in 1943, under the 
domination of the importers and middlemen, gradually led to its 
economic detachment from the ‘sister’ country. The dream of both 
Muslim and Christian independentists of a politically independent 
Lebanon entertaining the best possible economic, social and cultural 
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relations with Syria, not to mention being united economically with 
it, suddenly evaporated. Ironically, whereas French colonialism had 
unified Syria and Lebanon economically, the nationalist leaders of 
both countries succeeded in breaking up that unity.
By 1950, the final rupture of the monetary and customs union 
between the two countries and the separation of the Common 
Interests was consummated. There were linked political and 
economic reasons for this. On the Lebanese side, Maronite phobias 
considered economic union as an inevitable step to political unity. 
Georges Naccache likened the economic union to the Nazi invasion 
of Austria, ‘as economic Lebanon became a Syrian province, it would 
be integrated as such into the Syrian State’.15 These phobias merged 
easily with the laissez-faire attitudes of the importers and agents 
of foreign companies. The elements of conflict were aggravated 
by the uneven competition between two economic systems and 
the interests of two competing bourgeoisies. In fact, the Lebanese 
bourgeoisie was attached to the status quo ante: Beirut as an outlet 
for a Syrian hinterland specialised in agricultural monoproduction 
(cotton, wheat, cereals), leaving the importation and distribution 
of manufactured products to the Lebanese. Despite the fact that an 
active industrial sector had developed during World War II in both 
countries and sought to defend itself against foreign competition, 
Lebanese industry was subordinated to the dictates of import trade 
and progressively expelled from the local market to seek external 
markets. On the other hand, the industrial and commercial factions 
of the Syrian bourgeoisie joined forces to conduct a protectionist 
policy in defence of their internal market against the uneven 
competition of the outward-looking Lebanese bourgeoisie, richer 
in capital and in relations with world markets.
Post-independence negotiations between the two countries 
revolved around the three major divisive questions: Lebanon’s 
purchase of Syrian wheat, the monetary and customs union, and 
the commercial exchanges of the two countries.
First, Greater Lebanon, whose raison d’être was to provide its 
inhabitants with some measure of self-sufficiency, did not produce 
more than one-third of its requirements in cereals. Despite the 
annexation of the Biqa` plain to solve this very problem, cereal 
production was no more in proportion than it was under the 
Mutasarrifiya . The remaining two-thirds were imported from Syria, 
which demanded to be paid for its wheat in foreign currency, in 
order to counterbalance the difference of exchange rates between 
the Lebanese and Syrian liras. The Lebanese wanted to pay in 
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local currency and insisted on reciprocity in exchanges between 
them: Lebanon would continue to buy wheat from Syria on the 
condition that Syria open its markets for imported goods transited 
through Lebanon. 
Second, the conflict concerning the customs union revolved around 
two points: the distribution of revenues and the administration 
of the joint customs’ body. Syria reiterated its claim to a better 
distribution of the revenues as it received 51 per cent, for five times 
as many inhabitants, and called for a joint administration of the 
common body, managed solely by a Lebanese. The Lebanese insisted 
on a higher share than Syria as they imported more than the Syrians 
(Lebanese journalists even asked that Lebanon’s share be raised to 
70 per cent). Even the import statistics of the two countries were 
interpreted differently. Although an agreement was signed on 10 
July 1947 that modified the distribution of revenues in favour of 
Syria and confirmed the two directors, one Syrian and one Lebanese, 
at the head of the customs authority, Lebanon refused to put the 
measures into practice. 
 In 1948 came the breakup of the Syrian–Lebanese monetary 
union as Lebanon, in February of that year, in order to prevent 
the devaluation of its currency, renewed the monetary accord with 
France that linked the Lebanese lira to the French franc. Syria, less 
fearful of devaluation as its balance of trade was nearly balanced, 
preferred to leave the Franc zone and French monetary tutelage 
altogether. This divergence led Syria to suspend the customs and 
economic union between the two countries, abolish the interdepend-
ence of their currencies and impose a licensing system on all Syrian 
imports through Lebanon. Neither of the two countries benefited 
from this rupture. As early as September 1949, the Lebanese lira 
was devalued following the devaluation of sterling. On the other 
hand, some 500–700 members of Syria’s business families moved 
their capital and operations to Lebanon.16 
A compromise agreement was signed in July 1949, according 
to which Syria would maintain a number of selected imports from 
Lebanon, and in return Lebanon would give up importing some 
luxury articles and admit the principle of protection of agriculture 
and industry. But this agreement was mainly dictated by political 
considerations, after the Palestinian Nakba. The two countries could 
not agree on the list of the concerned foreign goods. Najib Rayyes, 
thinking of the famous Consortium, put all of the blame on the 
‘party of import merchants … whose families are closely linked to 
political power’. He raised a pertinent question: are the revenues 
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from transit trade more important than the Syrian market, with its 4 
million consumers? The import interests thought that yes, they were. 
There would be no concession on free trade. It was a question of life 
and death, for the oligarchy and its government at least. Lebanese 
economist Gabriel Menassa said it in so many words: ‘Importer ou 
mourir!’ (‘Import or die!’)
No compromise was in sight. On 5 November 1949, an economic 
congress in Damascus decided to achieve ‘economic independence 
vis-à-vis Lebanon’, and Michel Chiha insisted that Lebanon’s 
political independence could only be guaranteed by its economic 
independence.17 He was, of course, talking about Lebanon’s 
independence from Syria.
dOWNfALL
Despite a positive economic balance and unprecedented economic 
growth, the Khoury regime still generated fierce opposition. It was 
triggered after the truncated elections of May 1947, designed to give 
Khoury the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to modify 
the constitution and renew his term of office. The 1947 legislature 
was appropriately described by the journalist Iskandar Riyashi as 
‘the Parliament of 15 capitalists and 40 of their lackeys’. Several 
additional factors contributed to the rise of the opposition: the Arab 
defeat in Palestine, the profiteering of the ‘president’s men’, the 
influence-peddling of his brother Salim (nicknamed ‘Sultan Salim’) 
and the absence of his Sunni partner and supporter Riad al-Sulh, 
who, for his role in the summary execution of Antoun Sa`adeh, 
was assassinated in 1951 by a commando of the SSNP while on a 
visit to Amman.
A considerable part of the opposition also had to do with the 
conflict with French neo-colonial policies. Two ministers had 
opposed Busson and his ‘empire’. Kamal Jumblatt stood against 
the group’s attempts to monopolise the export of citrus fruits, and 
Philippe Taqla, minister of finance, had revised the franchise of 
the BSL and contributed to the dismissal of Busson, accused by 
the British shareholders of the BSL (in which the Ottoman Bank 
of London held 25 per cent of the shares) of running the bank like 
a dictator and using funds for his personal use. Taqla also waged 
a campaign to tax the franchise-holding companies on a par with 
Lebanese companies. He revealed that the Tramways et Eclairage de 
Beyrouth (TEB) bought electricity from the Compagnie Libanaise 
d’Électricité de Nahr Ibrahim for LL 400,000 per year, for which it 
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paid LL 125,000 in taxes before reselling it to Lebanese consumers 
for double the purchase price, at LL 800,000. The TEB profits were 
also tax-exempt. In fact, the opposition called for nationalising 
the TEB and critics detailed its surplus profits, bad services, the 
huge production costs and lack of planning for Lebanon’s future 
needs. An American company offered to generate electricity from 
the waters of the Litani river and sell it at 3 piastres/kilowatt, that 
is, three times less than the price at which the kilowatt was sold 
by the Nahr Ibrahim electricity company. But the TEB stood its 
ground and sabotaged the project, backed by its lawyer, no other 
than Sheikh Khalil al-Khoury, the president’s son. 
On 15 January 1952, Parliament decreed – upon a motion tabled 
by Kamal Jumblatt and Kamil Sham`un – to revise the agreements 
with the Compagnie du Port, the DHP and the TEB and abolish all 
of the privileges and concessions granted to foreign firms under the 
Ottoman Empire and the French mandate. When the government 
decided to subject the TEB to taxation, after a general strike and 
the boycott of the company’s services in autumn 1952, the company 
promised to pay starting from 1953. But it was nationalised by the 
Lebanese government under Sham`un in 1954 before having paid 
a penny in taxes or customs duties.
The consequences of the Korean war of 1951 aggravated the social 
crisis. Whereas the oligarchy made enormous profits on speculation 
in currency and goods, the population suffered a dramatic rise 
in the cost of living and unemployment. In 1951, Lebanon had 
57,000 unemployed out of a population of 1,250,000.18 The Sami 
al-Sulh cabinet, formed in February 1952, faced a widespread 
strike movement calling for reductions in the price of meat and 
bread and the abolition of the monopoly held by the franchise-
holding companies. Strikes covered a variety of sectors, such as 
industrial workers, postal workers, contractors, teachers, taxi 
drivers, journalists and lawyers. The latter were protesting the 
double-headed system of civil and religious legislation and courts, 
and were calling for a unified civil code for personal status. 
An alliance of the opposition forces and figures, led by Kamal 
Jumblatt, Kamil Sham`un, and Raymond and Pierre Edde, in 
addition to the Phalange, the Najjada, the SSNP and the LCP, 
formed the Patriotic Socialist Front (PSF) in early 1950. On 16 May 
1952, the PSF adopted an ambitious programme of democratic and 
anti-monopolist policies mainly inspired by Jumblatt’s Progressive 
Socialist Party (PSP): the independence of the judiciary, freedom of 
the press and of political parties, and the abolition of noble titles. 
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Socially, the programme called for social security; an unemployment 
insurance scheme for workers, peasants and intellectuals; the 
transformation of ‘exploitative companies’ into cooperatives in 
which the workers would be shareholders. Signed by Jumblatt, 
Sham`un, Anwar al-Khatib, Ghassan Tuwayni, `Abd Allah al-Hajj 
and Emile Bustani, the programme was made public during a mass 
rally by the PSF in Dayr al-Qamar in August of that year. In his 
speech, Jumblatt insisted on the abolition of the sectarian quotas 
in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies and called upon the 
president to apply those reforms or resign. 
At the new parliamentary session on 9 September, Prime Minister 
Sami al-Sulh exploded his political ‘bomb’. He declared that a 
‘covert power’ led the republic and blocked all reforms: ‘Men 
with authority hold power without being accountable and they 
interfere in all the affairs of the State’, he said in direct reference 
to the president’s advisers, whom he accused of influence-peddling, 
intervention in the course of justice, and financial scandals.19 Those 
whose fortunes were ‘safely outside the country’, Sulh continued, 
‘have impoverished the people and oppressed them’, and he 
concluded by accusing that same clique of the assassination of his 
cousin Riad, and presented his government’s resignation and his 
own.20 The next day, Michel Chiha replied in his Le Jour editorial, 
with a hefty dose of cynicism: ‘It may well be that authority and 
responsibility are disassociated whereas they should be joined. That 
may well be a mistake, but that is the way things are.’21 
Whatever the case, the death-knell of the Khoury regime had 
sounded, despite the fact that it could still count on a sizeable 
parliamentary majority. Khoury appointed Sa’ib Salam as prime 
minister, heading a three-man government. On 17 September, 
the opposition declared an open general political strike until 
Khoury resigned. The president stood his ground and rejected 
a parliamentary note signed by a number of deputies asking for 
his resignation. Salam resigned and Khoury’s last card was to call 
upon General Fu’ad Shihab, commander-in-chief of the army, to 
break the strike by force. Shihab declared his readiness to engage 
the army in keeping law and order, but not to use it against the 
people. Khoury’s resignation was announced at midday on 18 
September 1952.
An external factor in Khoury’s downfall was related to the question 
of Lebanon’s membership in Western military pacts. On this issue, 
the two guarantors of Lebanon’s independence –Britain and Egypt 
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– were at odds. In early 1950 the United States and Britain (in 
addition to France and Turkey) launched the Pact for the Collective 
Defense of the Mediterranean against communism. Egypt, invited to 
join the Western military pact with Syria and Lebanon, rejected the 
offer, setting as a precondition the closing of British military bases 
on Egyptian territory. At the initiative of Egypt, the countries of the 
Arab League signed a Treaty of Arab Collective Security (TACS) 
on 13 April of that year and asked European countries for arms to 
strengthen their defences against Israel. The Tripartite Declaration 
of May 1951, issued by the US, Britain and France, was a reply 
to that treaty. In it the signatories gave priority to defending the 
region against communism, criticised the Arab–Israeli arms race 
and declared the inviolability of the Middle East’s borders and the 
1949 armistice lines. 
In their collective response of June 1951, the Arab League states 
retained the Tripartite Declaration’s opposition to resorting to 
violence to solve the problems of the region or modify armistice 
lines. They insisted on the defensive character of Arab armaments, 
rejected all pressures to impose the status quo or negotiations with 
Israel, and reiterated their demand for the implementation of UN 
resolutions concerning the right of return for Palestinian refugees 
and compensation for their properties. The Arab states’ response 
concluded with the affirmation of the sovereignty and independence 
of their countries.22
Official Lebanon sided with Egypt, adhered to the TACS and 
signed the collective declaration. As early as 1950, Khoury and 
Sulh had rejected British offers to join the Mediterranean Collective 
Defense Pact; they had decided that Lebanon would be the last Arab 
state to join any foreign military pact. At best, both were ready for 
a bilateral defence agreement with any Western power, but not a 
collective military pact. Facing increased British pressure, Khoury 
convened an assembly of some 40 notables of the Constitution-
alist Bloc, who reiterated his position. The only dissenting voice 
was that of Henri Pharaon, who also expressed the opinion of his 
cousin Michel Chiha, the most vocal advocate of an immediate 
membership in the pact. Chiha had strongly disagreed with Khoury 
on that issue, to the point that relations between the president and 
his brother-in-law reached the point of rupture. 
Be that as it may, the divisions inside the Constitutionalist party 
between ‘protectionists’ and ‘neutralists’ broke out in the open when 
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their respective leaders ran to succeed Khoury: Kamil Sham`un, the 
protectionist, and Hamid Franjiyeh, for the neutralists. Franjiyeh 
withdrew from the race when Ahmad al-As`ad’s southern bloc of 
14 deputies declared their intention to vote for Sham`un.23 On 23 
September 1952, Sham`un was elected president. He had agreed 
to engage Lebanon in the Western pacts, and he kept his promise. 
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The Pro-Western Authoritarianism of 
Kamil sham`un (1952–1958)
Lebanon is important to the United states because of its lines of communication and 
bases which could be provided in the development of a forward defense in the Middle 
East. Lebanon possesses one of the best harbors and communications centers on the 
Eastern Mediterranean shore and potentially good air bases. Most of the pipelines 
which transport oil from the Persian Gulf area and Iraq terminate in Lebanon ports 
on the Mediterranean. 
(US Joint Chiefs of Staff, A Report by the Joint Committee on 
Programs for Military Aid for the Middle East, 3 February 1957)
During the presidency of Kamil Sham`un, Lebanon witnessed a 
period of economic prosperity that greatly benefited from favourable 
regional conditions: the boom in the oil economies of the Gulf and 
Saudi Arabia; the economic effects of the creation of the State of 
Israel; and the flow of Arab capital to Lebanese banks fleeing the 
first wave of nationalisations in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. The rise in 
gross domestic product (GDP) exceeded the demographic increase 
and record rates were registered in the construction, banking and 
tourism sectors, as well as in the number of agencies for foreign 
firms established in Lebanon. Revenues accruing from transit trade 
with Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia more than compensated for the 
losses incurred due to the breakup of the customs and monetary 
union with Syria. Sham`un’s uncontested merit was to provide 
the appropriate judicial framework, such as the 1954 law on the 
creation of joint-stock companies (exempted from taxes for six 
years) and the banking secrecy law of 1956. 
Despite the benefits accrued, Lebanon’s prosperity also served 
to aggravate social and regional disparities and tensions.  Most of 
the profits gained were absorbed by the commercial and financial 
sectors of the economy and concentrated in parts of the capital and 
Mount Lebanon. Sham`un was immediately surrounded by the same 
consortium of the Khoury days, enlarged to accommodate the new 
president’s men and the nouveaux riches of emigration. The first 
thing the newly elected president did was to break with his former 
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partner in the Patriotic Socialist Front (PSF) after representatives 
of US oil interests officially asked Sham`un not to give Jumblatt 
any ministerial post, as they suspected him to be a supporter of 
nationalising the oil interests.1 Nevertheless, in his nomination 
speech on 23 September 1952, the new president promised to 
fight corruption, talked about the ‘modesty and asceticism’ of 
the president’s post and promised to abolish the privileges and 
formalities attached to it, including the secret funds at the discretion 
of the president. In the PSF charter, he had committed himself to 
achieving Lebanon’s neutrality in international affairs, to reforming 
the administration and to creating a State Council to look into the 
constitutionality of legislation and abuses of power. The extent to 
which the new president did exactly the opposite of what he had 
committed himself to do is quite amazing. 
PrEsIdENTIAL AUTHOrITArIANIsM 
Sham`un pushed his exercise of power to the limits of autocracy, 
relying on the textual interpretation of the constitution at the 
expense of the spirit of the National Pact. 
Not only was an unprecedented pomp and ceremony attached 
to the presidency, but Sham`un established two traditions that 
contributed greatly to the concentration of power in his hands. 
First, the choice of weak prime ministers who, rather than represent 
their community’s interests and aspirations, were dependent on the 
favours and privileges of the president. Second, the president ruled 
by direct liaison with the directors-general of the major ministries 
(Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Justice and Internal Security 
– almost all these functionaries were Maronites), and therefore 
beyond the control of the respective ministers. 
Presidential control over the executive branch was further 
complemented by the subordination of the legislature. Sham`un 
opted for the small electoral district but reduced the number of 
deputies. According to the new electoral law of November 1952, 
the country was divided into 33 electoral districts (instead of the 
previous nine) and the deputies reduced from 77 to 44. This last 
measure was justified by the president’s alleged desire to ‘replace 
quantity by quality’.2 Theoretically, the adoption of the smaller 
electoral district would break the monopoly of the traditional 
leaders over the chamber, but in practical terms it guaranteed 
the president a safe majority in the legislature and amplified the 
sectarian character of the electoral district. According to the new 
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legislation, women were granted the right to vote for the first time, 
a measure that crowned the women’s movement’s long struggle for 
legal and political rights. 
The results of the 1952 elections partially fulfilled Sham`un’s goal. 
Twenty-two new individuals entered Parliament for the first time 
and the major heads of lists were weakened. Sham`un’s authori-
tarianism reached such proportions that led the leader writer of 
L’Orient, the francophone Christian daily, was prompted write 
in 1956: ‘The head of state has become the entire legislature and 
executive. This is so true that we notice each time he is absent, all 
the [state’s] prerogatives are absent with him.’3 Strengthened by 
foreign backing, the complicity of the bourgeoisie and Maronite 
mobilisation, Sham`un exacerbated sectarian tensions as no other 
political leader had done before. With the majority of the Muslim 
leaders outside Parliament, the attention of the Muslim ‘street’ 
turned to the Nasserist nationalist and anti-colonialist discourse.
THE ANGLO-sAXON ALIGNMENT
Undoubtedly, the rise of Jamal `Abd al-Nasir increased the US 
administration’s interest in Lebanon. Arab nationalism was seen 
as the enemy and its policy of non-alignment as a tacit alliance with 
the Soviet camp. In response, Washington’s strategy was based on 
three axes: to wean Saudi Arabia from `Abd al-Nasir, to transform 
Iraq into a competitor of Egypt, and to reinforce the Lebanese 
authorities. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles designated 
Israel, the oil of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon as the 
‘American positions’ to be defended against the rise of Arab 
nationalism.4 In economic terms, the US was interested in Lebanon 
as an oil terminal and a rapidly developing centre for agencies 
representing US firms for the entire region. Strategically, Lebanon 
attracted US interest for its infrastructure: military bases, ports, 
communication networks, and other facilities that could serve as 
a bridgehead in the event of military intervention in the region. In 
1953, the Lebanese government received $6 million in US arms and 
economic aid and, by 1954, Sham`un had allowed the US air force 
to use Lebanese air space for reconnaissance missions. A year later, 
a preferential commercial treaty long desired by Lebanese officials 
was finally signed.
The Baghdad Pact, declared in 1955 between Iraq, Pakistan, 
Turkey and Iran, was the best that Western powers could impose 
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on the region. Although Sham`un did not adhere officially to the 
anti-communist pact, he made it clear that he supported it without 
reservation. King Sa`ud even accused Sham`un of exerting pressure 
on his friend King Husayn of Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact. The 
latter’s hands were tied with nationalist agitation that had swept 
across Jordan and he had imposed the nationalist Sulayman Nabulsi 
to head a pro-Nasir government. In contrast, Sham`un refused to 
join the Arab Defence Pact signed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria 
in March 1955 as a response to the Baghdad Pact. 
The declaration of the Baghdad Pact was met with violent 
student and popular demonstrations that covered all of Lebanon, 
from Tripoli to Bint Jbeil. In the capital, the police opened fire on 
demonstrators at the gate of the AUB, killing the student Hassan 
Abu Isma`il, a militant of Jumblatt’s PSP, and wounding many 
others. Incapable of adapting to the president’s foreign policy, 
Hamid Franjiyeh resigned as minister of foreign affairs in September 
1955. He had previously assured `Abd al-Nasir, in the name of his 
government that Lebanon would oppose Western military pacts.
Thus, Sham`un undermined the bases of his predecessor’s 
neutralist Arab policy. His position on the Baghdad Pact put him 
at odds with `Abd al-Nasir’s Egypt, all the while poisoning his 
relations with neighbouring Syria. During the Suez crisis of 1956, 
official Lebanon offered qualified support to Egypt, while criticising 
the ‘abruptness’ of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. 
As a reaction to the tripartite aggression against Egypt, Sham`un 
called for a summit of Arab rulers in Beirut, a manoeuvre to outbid 
his domestic opposition. In the meantime, he left on an official visit 
to the Shah of Iran. When the Arab summit finally convened, the 
fighting on the Suez Canal zone had ended and Sham`un tried to 
divert discussions away from sanctions against France and Britain 
to demands for an Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory. 
Nevertheless, when the summit resolved to sever all diplomatic 
relations with France and Britain, official Lebanon refused to 
comply. This step marked the break with Prime Minister ̀ Abd Allah 
al-Yafi and Minister of State Sa’ib Salam. Both men resigned and 
joined the opposition. Sham`un rebutted by forming a five-man 
government headed by Sami al-Sulh. The defence portfolio was 
entrusted to General Shihab, who was asked to declare a state 
of emergency. More challenging was the appointment of Charles 
Malik to the post of minister of foreign affairs, given his extremely 
pro-American stances. In April of that year, Sham`un, accompanied 
by his prime minister, went on an official visit to Ankara. The joint 
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declaration insisted on the homogeneity of views and policies of 
the two countries at a time when Turkey was menacing Syria and 
amassing troops on its borders.
On 16 March 1957, Sham`un formally linked Lebanon to the 
Eisenhower doctrine via a joint communiqué drafted by the two 
governments and approved by a vote in Parliament on 4 April. In 
May 1957 Sham`un organised national elections ‘bought’ for him 
by the CIA, to use the term of CIA operative Wilbur Crane Eveland, 
in charge of the mission, who wrote:
Throughout the elections I travelled regularly to the presidential 
palace with a briefcase of Lebanese pounds, then returned late at 
night to the embassy with an empty twin case I’d carried away for 
Harvey Armada’s CIA finance-office to replenish. Soon my gold 
DeSoto with its stark white top was a common sight outside the 
palace, and I proposed to Chamoun that he use an intermediary 
and a more remote spot. When the president insisted that he 
handle each transaction by himself, I reconciled myself to the 
probability that anybody in Lebanon who really cared would 
have no trouble guessing precisely what I was doing.5 
The number of seats was increased from 44 to 66, but the leading 
Muslim figures Salam, Jumblatt, Yafi, As`ad and others lost their 
seats and were replaced by candidates loyal to the president. On 30 
May police opened fire on demonstrators objecting to the election 
results, which left several dead or wounded.
Sham`un’s policies not only alienated Muslim elites and the Muslim 
‘street’, but also divided Christian ranks. In addition to the growing 
Muslim opposition against him, there developed a predominantly 
Christian ‘third force’ including Pharaon, Yusuf Salim, Charles 
Helou and Georges Naccache, who called for Lebanon’s neutrality in 
Arab conflicts. Raymond Edde, who succeeded his father as the head 
of the National Bloc, openly opposed the renewal of the president’s 
mandate. More important was the opposition of Patriarch Ma`ushi, 
who was eager to address the new developments in the country and 
the region. He had urged the Lebanese government to formally reject 
the Baghdad Pact, applauded the Syrian–Egyptian merger under 
the United Arab Republic, and expressed courageous and lucid 
opinions on Christian–Muslim relations. The time had come, he 
confided to US ambassador Robert McClintock, for the Christians 
to face the realities of life: they were a minority in Lebanon and 
a small minority in the Arab world, although they still controlled 
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the best posts and entertained the fiction that they were a majority. 
The only way to preserve the existence of his people, he went on, 
would be to get used to the fact that the Christians constituted a 
minority, and the first step in that direction would be to put the 
biggest number of administrative posts in Lebanon at the disposal 
of the Muslims without delay.6
Corruption under Sham`un had reached great proportions: the 
president’s brokers imposed the granting of shares in the form of 
‘gifts’ to the president and his coterie in return for each licence 
granted to form a joint-stock company.7 Sham`un was also accused 
of diverting to his own accounts funds sent by Lebanese émigrés 
to the victims of the earthquake of 1956. The resignation of 
businessman Emile Bustani, minister in charge of reconstruction, 
lent weight to the accusations.
On 1 February 1958, the union of Syria and Egypt under the United 
Arab Republic (UAR) was celebrated by demonstrations of joy in 
Beirut and the coastal cities. When ̀ Abd al-Nasir visited Damascus, 
tens of thousands of Lebanese headed to the Syrian capital, led 
by Salam, Jumblatt, Yafi, Ahmad al-As`ad, Sabri Hamadeh, Fu’ad 
`Ammun, Rashid Karami, Ma`ruf Sa`d, and others.
THE 1958 INsUrrECTION 
The crisis that developed into an armed insurrection started in 
March 1958, when Sham`un refused to deny rumours about his 
intention to renew his mandate.
The American administration was not opposed in principle to 
a new mandate, but the embassy in Beirut feared that the division 
of Christian ranks on this issue would endanger Christian political 
dominance over the country. It sent highly sophisticated analyses to 
Washington on political discontent, economic and social difficulties, 
Christian privileges and the status of the country’s Muslim 
population as second-class citizens. Many leaders of the opposition 
did not hide their pro-American sympathies. Despite its knowledge 
of the generalised corruption of his regime, his many violations of 
the National Pact, and the need for economic and social reforms, 
the American administration decided to defend Sham`un in case he 
sought a second mandate. 
On 27 March 1958, 85 figures from the opposition and the 
‘third force’, of whom half were Christians, met and elected a 
three-man steering committee: Henri Pharaon (president), `Abd 
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Allah al-Yafi (vice-president) and Kamal Jumblatt (secretary). The 
meeting declared its opposition to a second mandate and accused 
Sham`un of promoting fears about the country’s security to serve 
his personal ends. Sham`un was seen as trying to conflate patriotism 
with allegiance to him. ‘A new political creed has been proposed to 
the Lebanese for the past eight months’, wrote Georges Naccache: 
‘If you are not a Sham`unist, that means that you are a traitor or 
a Syro-Bolshevik.’8
By the end of April, observers described Lebanon as a powder 
keg. The spark came with the assassination on 7 May of the leftist 
journalist Nasib al-Matni, the Maronite editor-in-chief and owner of 
the popular opposition daily Al-Tallaghraf (The Telegraph), known 
for his violent criticism of Sham`un’s foreign policy and his regime’s 
corruption. On the next day, the opposition called for a general 
strike, and the day of the assassinated journalist’s funeral witnessed 
massive demonstrations in `Akkar, Minyeh, Shouf, the Biqa` and 
Sidon. There were angry scenes, with hostile denunciations of foreign 
military pacts and demands for the resignation of the president. In 
Tripoli the partisans of Rashid Karami clashed with the army and 
barricades appeared in the streets of West Beirut.
After two months of fighting, the opposition managed to control 
three-quarters of Lebanese territory. The army, under Fu’ad 
Shihab, observed a policy of ‘active neutrality’, trying to contain 
the insurrection rather than crush it; an impossible mission in 
any event due to the rebellion’s geographical extension and the 
sectarian composition of his army.9 Shihab resisted Sham`un’s orders 
to occupy the bastions of the insurrection in the Beirut districts 
of Basta, Musaytibeh and Tariq al-Jadideh, but he nevertheless 
managed to stabilise the fronts in Tripoli and stop the offensive of 
the partisans of Kamal Jumblatt on two major axes: the attempt 
to control the Beirut–Damascus road (on the `Alay–Sawfar front) 
and to occupy Beirut International Airport. Fierce fighting raged on 
that second axis in Shimlan, where the army was backed by armed 
supporters of the SSNP, Sham`un, and his Druze ally, Majid Arsalan. 
Upon the outbreak of fighting, Charles Malik officially requested 
that the US intervene militarily in Lebanon. A month later, the White 
House was still opposed to engaging its troops. In a telegram to the 
embassy in Beirut, Secretary of State Dulles explained that military 
intervention ran the danger of provoking ‘sectarian conflicts’ or 
could even lead to ‘partition or the territorial amputation of the 
country’.10 On the other hand, the Americans considered the 
Lebanese army sufficiently strong to fulfil the demands of internal 
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security, especially since it had recently received large shipments of 
new US arms and ammunition. Nevertheless, from the autumn of 
1957, the plans for possible military intervention in Lebanon were 
ready in the Pentagon, under the codename ‘Operation Blue Bat’. 
However, this plan was drafted in relation to a much wider regional 
context, as we shall soon see.
Meanwhile, an American emissary was dispatched to Jamal ̀ Abd 
al-Nasir, whose relations with the Soviets had suddenly turned sour 
that year. The Egyptian leader – all the while criticising the American 
lack of understanding for the aspirations of the Arab peoples 
to liberate themselves from the established powers – proposed 
a compromise solution. He suggested a general amnesty; the 
nomination of Shihab as prime minister; a declaration by Sham`un 
that he would not seek a renewal of his mandate in return for 
serving the remainder of his term; and the organisation of immediate 
elections. `Abd al-Nasir’s proposal was even more moderate than 
that of Patriarch Ma`ushi, who had suggested that Sham`un leave 
the country, on the pretext of taking a vacation, and new elections 
organised in his absence. However, Sham`un rejected the amnesty, 
and to head off any accord between the US and the UAR, issued 
arrest warrants against 15 of the opposition leaders. 
In June 1958, the military situation had become untenable for 
Sham`un: the Popular Resistance of Sa’ib Salam was threatening 
the Presidential Palace in the Qantari district of West Beirut, and 
Jumblatt’s rebels were preparing for a final assault on the airport. 
The authorities’ biggest worry was seeing the two groups join forces 
in an operation to take over the airport. On the other hand, the UN 
group of observers (UNOGIL) dispatched to investigate the military 
intervention of the UAR in Lebanese internal affairs confirmed 
the flow of arms from Syria but not the Lebanese government’s 
allegations about the participation of Syrian or Egyptian troops in 
the fighting.11
‘OPErATION BLUE BAT’
On 14 July 1958, the Iraqi monarchy fell to rebel army units led by 
a group of Free Officers, as a mob invaded the streets of Baghdad 
with unprecedented violence against the symbols and figures of 
the regime. Exchanges between Washington and London make 
for interesting reading. When Eisenhower telephoned the British 
prime minister, Harold Macmillan, to tell him that the Americans 
would put ‘Operation Blue Bat’ into action, an interesting quid pro 
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quo arose. While the US president was thinking of intervention in 
Lebanon, Macmillan, believing that ‘oil was in jeopardy’, saw the 
Iraqi coup as a ‘showdown’ and viewed Lebanon as only one part 
of a wider military operation that would reach the Gulf, running 
all the way through Syria and Iraq. There was nothing surprising in 
this aggressive attitude toward the Syrian regime, as it was already 
known that Britain and the US were trying to topple the Syrian 
regime in 1957. But declassified British documents reveal that Prime 
Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower approved in that 
year a CIA–MI6 plan to stage border incidents and even acts of 
sabotage in the neighbouring countries, which would be used as a 
pretext for Syria’s neighbours (Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey) 
to invade Syria and topple its Ba`thi leftist regime. To facilitate the 
execution of this plan, fomenting internal uprisings in Syria itself 
was envisaged and it was decided to physically eliminate key figures 
of that regime, namely `Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj, head of military 
intelligence, `Afif al-Bizri, the chief of staff, and Khalid Bakdash, 
secretary-general of the Syrian Communist Party.12 
Apart from Turkey, no neighbouring country agreed to participate 
in the Anglo-American action. The following year, the Ba`thists and 
Nasserites moved against their Communist allies and pressured 
`Abd al-Nasir for a complete merger between Syria and Egypt 
or else the former would fall into the hands of the Communists. 
The US president referred to congressional restraints concerning a 
large military operation and settled with Macmillan on American 
intervention in Lebanon and British intervention in Jordan to save 
the two remaining pro-Western regimes. On that same 14 July, when 
Sham`un reiterated his request for US military intervention within 
48 hours ‘or else a second pro-western Arab regime will fall in its 
turn’, the US administration obliged in less than 24 hours.13 On the 
afternoon of 15 July, while British troops were landing in Amman 
airport, the first marines disembarked on the coast of Khaldeh, south 
of Beirut, and their tanks encircled the city, cannons pointing toward 
West Beirut. In the four days that followed, 15,000 American soldiers 
landed backed by another 40,000 on the 70 warships of the US navy’s 
Sixth Fleet, in the first operation of its kind since World War II.
Sham`un, who had believed the landing represented strategic 
support for him to achieve victory over his enemies, increased 
pressure on his commander-in-chief to occupy rebel neighbourhoods 
and ‘clean up Beirut’. Shihab seemed more concerned with 
expressing his apprehension at the entry of a foreign army, albeit 
a friendly one, into his country’s capital. On the following day, 
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Robert Murphy, undersecretary of state and special presidential 
envoy, arrived in Beirut, tasked with finding a peaceful settlement 
to the crisis ‘at any cost’. In the best tradition of gunboat diplomacy, 
Murphy sent a message to Sa’ib Salam that the firepower at his 
disposal could annihilate Basta in a few seconds. He also amicably 
informed General Shihab in their first meeting that the aircraft carrier 
Saratoga, anchored opposite the coast of Beirut, was armed with 
nuclear warheads. It did not take much more to reach a compromise: 
American troops entered the Lebanese capital escorted by elements 
of the Lebanese army. The airport, occupied by the marines, was 
safe from Jumblatt’s partisans. The rebellion was now essentially 
contained, giving the American emissary the chance to look into a 
political solution.
It soon turned out that the Sixth Fleet came to Beirut to impose a 
successor to Sham`un rather than defend him against the rebellion. 
The choice of Fu’ad Shihab was not surprising, as his name had 
already been mentioned during the negotiations with ̀ Abd al-Nasir 
and he fulfilled the wishes of Eisenhower, who wanted a military 
man. On 31 July 1958, Parliament convened and elected Fu’ad 
Shihab with 48 votes, with ten Sham`un loyalists staying away. 
Raymond Edde, who had presented his candidacy to protest the 
election of a military to the presidency, received seven votes. 
On 23 September Sham`un left office at the end of his term, and 
Shihab was finally sworn in, the new president asked Rashid Karami, 
the leader of the rebellion in Tripoli, to form the new government. 
Karami unveiled an eight-man cabinet that was immediately judged 
to be too biased in favour of the opposition, especially since the 
prime minister had declared his government’s intention to ‘reap 
the fruits of the rebellion’. That same day saw the abduction of 
Fu’ad Haddad, editor-in-chief of the Phalangist daily Al-`Amal, 
known for his bitter diatribes against President `Abd al-Nasir. On 
the following day, a general strike observed in the Christian regions 
following a call by the Phalange party, opened three weeks of armed 
conflict known as the ‘counter-rebellion’, which was characterised 
by sectarian clashes, kidnapping and violence in Beirut and the 
Mountain. The guns were silenced only after a four-man cabinet 
was formed, split between representatives of the loyalists and the 
rebels: Karami and `Uwayni for the Muslims, and Pierre Jumayil 
and Raymond Edde for the Christians, with reconciliation signalled 
by the slogan ‘no victor and vanquished’.
By the end of October, the American troops had left the country, 
leaving an uneasy peace in their wake.
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shihabism and the difficult Autonomy 
of the state (1958–1970)
The Lebanese state is but a pretext. It exists just enough to make the country into 
a fiscal paradise. 
(Philippe Simmonot, Le Monde, 29 October 1968)
THE sHIHAB rEfOrMs
Fu’ad Shihab’s personality and his political and social project 
dominated an entire decade of Lebanon’s life, spanning two 
presidential mandates. The man had drawn many lessons from 
his job as commander of the army and from the experience of the 
1958 rebellion. In direct contact with his NCOs and soldiers who 
came mainly from the peripheries, he was conscious of the social 
and political effects of regional disparities. 
It was no surprise that Shihab would inaugurate his term with 
a meeting with President `Abd al-Nasir on the Lebanese–Syrian 
border. He followed a policy of neutrality in Arab politics (in 
contrast to Sham`un’s blatant anti-Nasir policies and pro-Western 
pacts) and of close collaboration with the UAR, including in the 
realm of security. The UAR’s ambassador in Beirut, ̀ Abd al-Hamid 
Ghalib, soon enjoyed major influence in Lebanese politics. 
Benefiting from a relative lull in inter-Arab tensions, Shihab 
directed his attention to the principal task of building ‘the State 
of Independence’, assuming that the independence of the state had 
been achieved in 1943. The first two years of his mandate were 
devoted to defusing tensions, appealing for a return to national 
unity, and insisting on equality between the Lebanese. Following 
on from this, the second phase was initiated by a speech on the 
eve of Independence Day on 21 November 1960, in which Shihab 
called for ‘comprehensive social reform’ and the ‘building of a 
new society’. The message was clear: ‘those who benefited from 
prosperity should take care of the deprived Lebanese … some should 
sacrifice and the others should be patient’. His version of Lebanese 
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nationalism was unifying and egalitarian: ‘In being Lebanese there 
is neither discrimination nor privilege.’
The major domestic political event of this period contributed 
to strengthening the regime, but involved seriously negative 
repercussions. On New Year’s Eve – 31 December 1961/1 January 
1962  – Lebanon experienced its first military coup d’état when army 
units led by officers from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), 
backed by armed militias of the party, took over the Ministry of 
Defence, occupied officers’ quarters and kidnapped a number of 
senior officers. The coup was foiled by loyal troops, however, and 
the rebel officers were arrested. Internally, the coup was largely a 
reaction to the way the 1958 crisis was resolved: the SSNP, excluded 
from the solution that put an end to the fighting, felt that the crisis 
ended in an undeserved victory for the anti-Sham`un forces and 
an overstated influence of Nasserism in Lebanon. Regionally, 
there were strong suspicions that the SSNP’s anti-Nasserite and 
anti-Communist coup was encouraged and even financed by the 
British and Jordanians desiring to form an anti-Nasser federation 
comprising Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq.1
The aborted coup d’état rallied wide sectors of the public around 
Shihab, fed by Christian phobias about Greater Syria and by Muslim 
hostility against Sham`un (the SSNP’s ally), a convergence that 
the regime did not fail to exploit. The authorities arrested some 
12,000 suspects and put 300 of them on trial, while torture became 
standard practice in the detention centres and prisons. The SSNP 
coup gave the security agencies a golden opportunity to entrench 
themselves firmly in Lebanese politics. Transforming itself into a 
new patronage network, the men of the famous Deuxième Bureau – 
army intelligence – intervened in trade unions, rallied the qabadays 
(strong men) in the neighbourhoods, controlled the carrying of 
arms and exploited the state of emergency in the border regions 
(in the south and the Biqa`) to impose firm control over the life of 
their inhabitants. 
In fact, the Shihab project sought to provide the country with an 
alternative political body by co-opting the armed protagonists of 
the events of 1958, using the army, the intelligence agencies and the 
technocrats. This meant displacing the centre of power again, from 
the legislature to the executive. A new electoral law, which readopted 
the small electoral district but increased the number of deputies, had 
two functions: to aid the return of the notables excluded during the 
1957 elections and to encourage the rise of new figures backed by the 
security agencies. A firm parliamentary majority gave extraordinary 
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powers to the long cabinets of Rashid Karami to rule by decree-laws, 
without the need to refer to the legislature. 
By creating a parallel administration composed of independent 
services and agencies, Shihab was able to isolate the bureaucracy 
from the ‘political feudalists’. Thus, the state administration doubled 
in size through the employment of some 10,000 new functionaries, 
vetted by a Civil Service Council and a Central Inspection 
Council, which limited the role of MPs in job patronage, reduced 
administrative corruption and favoured recruitment on the basis 
of merit and specialisation. In addition, the sectarian composition 
inside the administration was clearly modified in favour of the 
Muslim communities, and the Shi`ites in particular. Under Sham`un, 
the Maronites constituted 29 per cent of the population but held at 
least half of the administrative posts; by the end of Shihab’s mandate 
they held no more than a third.2 
Shihab contented himself with those measures without questioning 
political sectarianism as such. His constitutionalist approach was 
limited to establishing sectarian equilibrium rather than abolishing 
sectarianism. In fact, Shihab wanted to correct the failures of the 
sectarian system by injecting it with large doses of economic and 
social justice. 
Economically, rationalising and organising the development of 
Lebanese capitalism became necessary for two major reasons. One 
was the anarchic development of the economy during the ‘boom’ 
years under Sham`un, especially in the banking sector. The other 
was the change in the foundation of the economy itself, from the 
productive sector to the tertiary sector. On the eve of World War 
II, the productive sector produced 50 per cent of national revenue; 
by the 1960s, that contribution had been slashed in half. 
The principal task involved organising the banking sector, the 
bellwether sector of the economy. When the Banque de Syrie et du 
Liban’s concession ended in 1964, the Banque du Liban (BDL) was 
established as a central bank. The Law on Credit and Currency, 
passed the year before, gave the BDL the right to issue currency, 
stabilise the exchange rates of the Lebanese pound and, in general, 
direct economic performance. To achieve this, the BDL imposed on 
the banks a compulsory deposit in its safes in order to regulate the 
interest rate and act as a safety valve for helping banks in difficulty. 
The Law on Credit and Currency was violently contested by the 
liberal bourgeoisie, despite the fact that Shihab named Philippe 
Taqla, a banker and liberal politician from the Constitutionlists’ 
ranks, to head the BDL. 
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In addition, labour relations were subject to strict regulation 
in the Law on Collective Labour Agreements, which organised 
the relations between the state, employers and employees, and 
codified regulations on strikes. But Shihab’s major social reform 
was the establishment of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), 
largely inspired by the French model. On the other hand, social 
conflicts were contained and the trade unions controlled by the 
intelligence agencies: there were practically no labour strikes during 
Shihab’s mandate.3
The state played an active role in regional development and in 
improving the social distribution of economic growth. Despite 
accusations that he was depleting the Treasury, Shihab spent 
sizeable funds on building an economic infrastructure and unifying 
the domestic market. New roads were constructed, water and 
electricity services were brought to remote villages, and hospitals 
and pharmacies were opened in rural areas. Two major projects were 
executed in agricultural development. The first was the building of 
a dam on the Litani river that irrigated large surfaces in the western 
Biqa` and allowed for the irrigation of southern Lebanon, although 
this was never implemented because of the objection of the As`ads. 
The second was the ambitious Green Plan, which involved clearing 
large tracts of land for cultivation.
A favoured Shihabist reform was the development of public 
education. In 1959, a law school was added to the Lebanese 
University, finally breaking the Jesuit University’s monopoly on 
teaching that profession. Thus began the rapid development of the 
free, public Lebanese University (LU), where instruction was in 
Arabic. In addition, members of the middle and lower middle classes, 
attracted by the chance of social promotion, began sending their sons 
to European universities, benefiting from the strong position of the 
Lebanese pound. Others obtained grants to study in the universities 
of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.
Despite these reforms, three major interests coalesced against 
Shihab’s programmes. First, a large section of the oligarchy, both 
Muslim and Christian, rejected any infringement on its rents and 
rates of profits, even in order to safeguard its mid- and long-range 
interests. Second, the ‘political feudalists’ reacted negatively against 
the new forms of patronage exercised by the Shihabist ‘services’ 
and their own reduced influence in the administration. Third, 
Maronite autonomism was challenged by what appeared to be the 
state’s bias toward Muslims and by increased state intervention in 
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society. In fact, these forces were bound by a common aversion to 
the fundamental basis of the Shihab project, described by Waddah 
Sharara as ‘the extension of the roots of the state into the heart of 
society and the founding of political domination on the ramparts 
and trenches of civil society’.4 
At the vanguard of the ideological campaign against Shihabism 
was Ghassan Tuwayni’s daily Al-Nahar, an influential forum of 
liberal pro-Western opposition to Nasserism and socialism. It was 
practically the only newspaper that dared publish Raymond Edde’s 
fiery declarations against Shihab’sregime. Al-Nahar by default had 
come to play the role of the ‘collective intellectual’ of the bourgeoisie, 
speaking for a wide section of the professional middle classes and 
some of the intelligentsia.
Political opposition was mainly represented by Raymond 
Edde, Kamil Sham`un and Sa’ib Salam. The latter, deprived of 
the premiership in favour of his northern rival, Rashid Karami, 
and frightened, like many among the Sunni bourgeoisie, by `Abd 
al-Nasir’s nationalisations in Egypt in 1961, was tilting more 
toward Saudi Arabia. The opposition succeeded in linking political 
liberalism to economic liberalism, while still addressing Christian 
fears of Nasserism. Its chief target was the army’s Deuxième 
Bureau. In a stormy and memorable session of Parliament on 23 
June 1963, Raymond Edde stood up against the marginalisation of 
the chamber and sniped against deputies for ceding their legislative 
rights to the executive. The MP for Jbeil accused the Deuxième 
Bureau of exploiting the SSNP coup to extend police control over 
the country. Though only responsible for external security, that 
service interfered in domestic political life; the administration; 
legislative and municipal elections; distributed licences for carrying 
firearms, and engaged in arbitrary arrests. Edde denounced the ‘self-
censorship’ of the press syndicate, imposed by an officer from the 
Deuxième Bureau. Finally, the leader of the National Bloc accused 
the Phalange of backing all of the country’s regimes at the beginning, 
only to turn against them later. Commenting on the Phalangist call 
for abolishing the income tax, he said: ‘At a time when socialism 
is at our doorstep, the Phalangists think of abolishing the only tax 
adopted by all the developed countries of the world in order to 
attain some measure of equality between rich and poor!’
On the other hand, the Shihab regime attracted the support of 
those in society who shared an immediate interest in the building of 
a proper state: a bourgeois faction that was either fighting against 
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the monopoly powers of the ‘Consortium’ or seeking political 
recognition and a place in the system; middle classes that had 
enjoyed social mobility through Arab capital invested in Lebanon; 
large sectors of the petite bourgeoisie, including some of the 
intelligentsia many civil servants; and, generally, the Muslim public.
The two main protagonists of 1958 – Jumayil’s Phalange party 
and Jumblatt’s PSP – constituted the social and political base of 
Shihab’s regime. Jumblatt aimed to link his marginalised and 
frustrated community with the pro-`Abd al-Nasir Sunni ‘street’, 
deprived of leadership after the defection of Sa’ib Salam. A recent 
convert to Nasserism – after having announced many reservations 
about the lack of democracy by the new Egyptian regime – Jumblatt 
saw in it a confirmation of his own socialistic ideas and in `Abd 
al-Nasir a strong and prestigious external ally. The Phalange’s 
relationship to Shihabism was more problematic. Their presence in 
the executive for the first time confirmed them as a serious Christian 
political force and allowed them to provide services to an increasing 
number of clients. In addition, the boost they received from the 
oppression that struck their main rival, the SSNP, and the Phalange’s 
traditional role as the surrogate force for the state and the army, 
were among the many factors that attracted them to Shihabism. 
However, they were also repulsed by Shihab’s statism and the 
growing influence of ̀ Abd al-Nasir in Lebanon, which went against 
their Maronite autonomism, their extreme Lebanese nationalism 
and their laissez-faire, anti-Nasserite and anti-Communist ideology. 
Despite these issues, both populist political forces were keen to 
preserve their political positions, which allowed them to modify 
the balance of power inside their respective communities in their 
own favour. 
Elections in the spring of 1964 gave a sweeping majority to the 
Shihabists. Money had played its role, largely dispensed by the 
sponsors of Shihabism (parvenus from emigration, arms dealers 
and contractors) and so did the strong-arm tactics of the Deuxième 
Bureau. A few weeks later, a petition by 79 loyalist MPs called for 
the renewal of Shihab’s mandate. A crisis broke out as the largely 
Christian opposition, led by Sham`un and Edde, threatened to resort 
to a ‘1958 in reverse’: just as the Muslims rebelled when the Christians 
sought to renew Sham`un’s mandate in 1958, the Christians would 
rebel if the Muslims tried to renew Shihab’s mandate. The crisis 
was diffused on 17 August when Shihab announced that he had no 
intention of renewing his term of office. A compromise candidate 
was chosen in the person of Charles Helou who was elected with 
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92 votes against the votes of the Phalange bloc: Pierre Jumayil had 
presented his candidacy to distinguish himself and his party from 
both factions of the political elite.
dUALITIEs ANd dIVIsIONs Of THE HELOU rEGIME 
Charles Helou was the first Lebanese president without a sizeable 
regional and popular base. A journalist and lawyer, and fervent 
disciple of Michel Chiha, he edited Le Jour before becoming 
Lebanon’s first ambassador to the Vatican. Politically, he participated 
in the foundation of the Phalange and belonged to the Consti-
tutionalist Bloc at the same time. Though those credentials were 
instrumental in bringing him to power as a compromise president, 
Helou soon fell victim to the polarisation between the Shihabists 
(the Nahj) and their opponents (the Hilf) as well as the polarisation 
between the two populist parties that constituted the basis of the 
preceding regime, Pierre Jumayil’s Phalange and Jumblatt’s PSP. 
These dualities and the social and political divisions of the time 
dominated his mandate.
Although Helou dropped Rashid Karami as prime minister of his 
first cabinet and replaced him with ̀ Abd Allah al-Yafi, the Shihabists 
were still a majority in the chamber and were firmly entrenched in 
the ‘agencies’ and the administration. In addition, Iliyas Sarkis, first 
lieutenant of the ex-president, was the secretary of the presidency, 
and Gaby Lahud, in his capacity as head of the army’s Deuxième 
Bureau and commander of the Unified Security Agency, attended 
all serious decision-making meetings, including those in which 
ministers were appointed. 
Regionally, the Helou regime corresponded to a period of intensi-
fication of the ‘Arab cold war’ between ̀ Abd al-Nasir and his Saudi 
and conservative rivals.5 While the former successfully managed 
Lebanon’s fragile neutrality, the latter used their economic and 
financial means to press for Lebanon’s decisive engagement with 
the Arab conservative camp, going as far as to threaten to abrogate 
the preferential commercial treaty between the two countries. The 
stakes were great, as no less than 40 per cent of the country’s exports 
were destined for the oil kingdom. 
Another burning issue was Israel’s diversion of the waters of 
the Jordan river and Arab efforts to counter it. `Ali `Ali `Amir, 
the Egyptian commander-in-chief of the Unified Arab Command, 
considered introducing Arab troops (notably Egyptian) under his 
command into Lebanon, to reinforce that part of the Northern Front. 
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Philippe Taqla, the minister of foreign affairs, objected in Lebanon’s 
name, arguing that the presence of these troops would become a 
pretext for Israeli aggression against his country. A compromise 
decided upon by ̀ Abd al-Nasir and Helou deferred the deployment 
and admitted Lebanon’s right to submit any decision of the Council 
of Arab Defence for prior approval in its Parliament. Nevertheless, 
for the first time since the signature of the armistice, Lebanon was 
being confronted by its obligations toward the Arab–Israeli conflict. 
Its traditional policy, based on the motto ‘Lebanon’s strength lies in 
its weakness’, would be severely tested in coming years.
THE sOCIAL MOVEMENTs IN THE POLITICAL QUAGMIrE 
In economic policy, Helou was keen to reassure the anti-statist 
oligarchy. Conceding that free enterprise was a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a sound economic policy, he maintained that 
the role of the state should be limited to building the infrastructure 
for the development of the service sector. He concluded that 
‘the Lebanese businessman is more enterprising and a better 
administrator than his government’.6 To back this role of the state 
as a facilitator of economic growth, Helou convinced Parliament 
to approve an ambitious development plan, worth LL 272 million, 
on 22 November 1965 that included the building of social housing, 
clinics, laboratories, technical schools, and a university campus 
for the LU – a diluted form of Shihabist developmentalism and 
planning.7 However, in the short term, the problems left unsettled 
by the Shihab reforms and the social movement that had begun 
under the former president continued to fester. 
A nearly uninterrupted series of strikes and protest movements 
unfolded in the period leading up to the June 1967 war. In the 
autumn of 1964, employees of the oil sector, public transport, 
the electricity company, and the central bank forced the General 
Workers’ Union of Lebanon (GWUL) to threaten a general strike 
if their demands were not met: a pay increase and a rise in the 
minimum wage. Parliament reacted in a manner that would become 
chronic: it decreed an 8 per cent pay increase for workers and a 20 
per cent salary increase for the deputies. 
This took place during the Husayn `Uwayni cabinet, nicknamed 
the ‘millionaires’ government’8 that had, upon the suggestion of the 
US administration, tabled a draft law guaranteeing foreign capital 
investments in Lebanon. Had the law been adopted, it would have 
allowed the governments of Europe and the US to represent their 
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nationals in the collection of debts and settlement of disputes. But 
a campaign launched by the leftist and nationalist parties against 
the legislation, led by the PSP, the LCP and the Arab Nationalist 
Movement (ANM), managed to foil the project.
The social movement continued unabated despite the pay increase. 
First, the trade union movement opposed the 1964 law on Collective 
Labour Agreements, which imposed obligatory arbitration of 15 
days in labour disputes and curtailed the right to strike. The second 
and more important conflict revolved around the National Social 
Security Law, passed at the end of Shihab’s mandate in September 
1963. Employers were sabotaging the law that came into effect 
in April 1965 by launching a massive wave of worker dismissals 
to avoid paying the social security fees. The working classes thus 
found themselves in a vicious circle: what they won in terms of 
social services was lost in terms of job security as Article 50 of the 
Labour Code, that allowed ‘arbitrary dismissal’, hung over them 
like the sword of Damocles. In the summer of 1966, public sector 
workers went on strike and imposed a 6.8 per cent pay increase 
and a rise in the monthly minimum wage from LL 145 to LL 175. 
In education, primary school teachers went on strike demanding 
a salary increase and a rise in the cost of living premium, but were 
forced back to school under a government threat to consider them 
all as having resigned. Law students at the Arab University and the 
LU also resorted to a strike to force the recognition of their law 
degrees and their right to practise the profession. 
In an attempt to impose order and halt the fragmentation of 
society along class lines, Prime Minister ̀ Abd Allah al-Yafi declared 
that national unity now meant ‘the unity of all the social classes 
that compose the Lebanese people’. 
But these years were dominated mostly by the crisis in 
agribusiness. Peasants and farmers launched a countrywide 
movement in opposition to the monopolies in agro-industries and 
to the exploitation of small and middle-level producers by the 
commercial/financial network. In the south, the tobacco producers 
refused to deliver their product to the Régie unless better terms of 
sale were agreed upon.9 In the Biqa`, thousands of beetroot farmers 
were in conflict with the sugar factory, the industrial monopoly and 
sole buyer of their product, and vegetable producers rose up against 
brokers and middlemen who tripled the price of their produce when 
sold to consumers. Some 60 per cent of Mount Lebanon’s farmers 
were apple cultivators, who were objecting to the high costs of 
production (including cold storage and distribution) and the control 
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by middlemen over the price of the products. In February 1965, 
the farmers’ unions of the Matn, Shouf, `Alay and north Lebanon 
jointly called for a set of actions that were supposed to end with 
a general strike. 
In August of that year, in solidarity with the agrarian movement, 
which had failed to attract the attention of the authorities, a big 
popular rally of the planters of fruit trees was organised by the Left 
(the PSP, LCP, ANM) in addition to trade unionists and independent 
figures. In Btikhnay, in the caza of `Alay, Kamal Jumblatt read the 
list of farmers’ demands, which revealedthe heart of the malaise: 
commercial monopoly.10 The Phalange’s reaction was not long in 
coming. In a press communiqué on 8 August 1965, Pierre Jumayil 
accused the organisers of the Btikhnay rally of being foreign-
inspired and seeking to destabilise the economy, whose prosperity 
was unfavourable to the propagation of Jumblatt’s socialist ideas. 
Jumayil joined Majid Arsalan, Jumblatt’s traditional Druze rival, 
to organise a counter-rally in which the speakers, putting aside 
agricultural problems, outbid each other in their profession of faith 
in the merits of free enterprise and their attacks on ‘destructive 
socialism’, a term they replaced with ‘socialism à la libanaise’.
sCAPEGOATs ANd THE ‘sPECTrE Of MArX’
In the autumn of 1965 the Maronite religious brotherhoods raised 
the question of the Karantina (Quarantine) shantytown, built 
on the ‘property of others’ in the eastern suburb of Beirut. Soon 
the Maronite League took up the issue and convened a ‘national 
congress’ in which voices were raised accusing the state of ‘selling 
out Lebanon’, and resolutions passed demanding a ban on the 
sale of landed property to ‘foreigners’. This linked two seemingly 
disparate groups: those who bought landed property were the rich 
Arabs of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, while the Karantina dwellers 
were poor Lebanese with a minority of Syrians and non-naturalised 
Kurds. In any event, the campaign opened the wider issue of the 
presence of ‘foreigners’ in Lebanon (Palestinians and Syrians in 
particular), and voices were raised against the widespread granting 
of Lebanese nationality to ‘outsiders’.11 In successive and rapid 
slippages, the connection was made between ‘poor’ and ‘strangers’. 
The scapegoat had been found. Father Sim`an Duwayhi, MP for 
Zgharta, in a speech in Parliament, called for a census of those 
‘miserable’ individuals who constituted a ‘source of corruption, 
petrifaction and illness that sap the moral, human and spiritual 
Traboulsi T02610 01 text   148 23/04/2012   08:07
sHIHABIsM ANd THE AUTONOMy Of THE sTATE (1958–1970) 149
values of Lebanon’. Duwayhi went on to denounce the decrease 
in the number of Lebanese due to emigration and the increase in 
the number of illegal immigrants. For those ‘miserable’ were the 
strangers who ‘spread among us, Lebanese, epidemics from those 
hotbeds of contagion and slums deposited, in all their noisiness, 
on the heart of our capital’. All strangers included were lumped 
together and accused of ‘snatching the piece of bread from the 
mouth of the Lebanese’; whether they were ‘miserable’ shantytown 
dwellers or ‘those who take our banking secrets and sell them to the 
first customer for profit’s sake’.12 The last insinuation was barely 
veiled: it was directed at the biggest bank in Lebanon, Intra Bank, 
directed by Yusuf Baydas, a Palestinian Christian of whom we 
shall hear more later. Pierre Jumayil, in his capacity as minister of 
the interior, obtained the cabinet’s approval for a law, hurriedly 
passed in Parliament, that banned the sale of landed property to 
non-Lebanese. Commenting on the parliamentary discussion of a 
new rent law, Al-`Amal opened fire on the ‘intruders’ and diverted 
attention from high rents, and the existence of 10,000 unrented 
luxury flats in Beirut alone, to instead denounce the existence of 
tents, huts and tin-roofed shanties inhabited mostly by Muslims, 
and the Palestinian refugee camps. 
Thus, the country’s problems were exteriorised: poverty was 
attributed to strangers and social problems seen as manifestations 
of a ‘foreign’ conspiracy aiming at destabilising the economy. Under 
the title ‘Marx is on our doorsteps’, Al-`Amal’s leader writer warned 
his readers that Syria was becoming the ‘Middle Eastern Cuba’ and 
that ‘international communism’ was the party pulling the strings 
in Cairo, as well as Damascus or Baghdad. In order to confront 
this danger, the Phalangist daily called for no less than ‘national 
resistance’: 
when Communism is knocking at Lebanon’s doors from the 
borders of Maysalun and Wadi al-Harir, it becomes our duty to 
mobilise all the vital forces of the Nation to stop this dangerous 
invasion and save Lebanon as it is, and it should remain for 
ever: a citadel of freedom and a haven of security, stability 
and prosperity.13
‘Marx is inside the borders’, reminded Jibran Hayik in the editorial 
of his afternoon daily Lisan al-Hal, incarnated by poverty in ‘some 
Lebanese regions’, huge inequalities between rich and poor and 
unemployment and vagrancy, all aggravated by the failure of 
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government, its carelessness and lack of foresight. Hayik concluded 
with a solemn appeal to officials to deal with these problems with 
the greatest lucidity, or else ‘the Marx of the interior will rise up to 
assassinate democracy in collaboration with the Syrian Marx and 
other Marxs’.14 
THE INTrA BANK CrAsH 
While the bourgeois press was exorcising the spectre of Marx, a real 
malaise struck the heart of the Lebanese economy. On 14 October 
1966 Intra Bank was declared insolvent, plunging the economy into 
one of its most serious crises since independence and signalling the 
drying up of the prosperity the country had enjoyed during the two 
previous decades. 
Yusuf Baydas had built an impressive financial empire. His bank, 
the biggest and strongest of the banks with Lebanese and Arab 
capital, had acquired international stature for attracting a big share 
of the influx of Arab capital into Lebanon and for investing in the 
Arab world and Africa in association with émigré capital. Intra 
group controlled a number of the country’s major companies: the 
Compagnie du Port de Beyrouth, Middle East Airlines, Radio Orient 
(the ex-franchise-holding French company), in addition to eight 
others in real estate (including the Société Immobilière Libanaise, 
the owner of the luxury Phœnicia Hotel), services, tourism and 
industry. Intra also financed the government’s infrastructure and 
big transactions such as the import of wheat. Overseas, the group 
had substantial investments in real estate in France (the Champs-
Elysées), controlling shares in the naval docks of La Ciotat, and 
owned major shares in a number of small banks in Switzerland. 
Yusuf Baydas’s bank was particularly proud of the high number 
of its small depositors, some 19,000 accounts. These individuals 
would be the biggest victims of the crash. 
The Intra Bank crash expressed a tendency for the reduction of 
the intermediary role of the Lebanese financial sector in favour of 
more direct relations between the two poles of that mediation: the 
oil-producing countries of the Gulf, on the one hand, and the Western 
financial centres, on the other. It was no secret that the financial 
powers in the West had raised interest rates and even employed 
direct political pressure in order to encourage direct investment 
and deposits in their capitals. But the bank’s solvency crisis resulted 
from a deeper cause: the contradiction between its mainly short-term 
deposits and its long-term investments, especially in real estate. 
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Indeed, the crisis revealed the adventurism and speculative character 
of the new bourgeois faction linked to Shihabism, represented by 
Baydas and his associates. A great portion of the favours that Intra 
benefited from were provided by the Deuxième Bureau, in return 
for which the bank financed elections, distributed cash gifts in the 
guise of loans, employed clients of Shihabist notables, and paid 
bribes of all types. 
Nevertheless, when the bank stopped payment, its assets greatly 
surpassed its liabilities. Recent research and revelations tend to point 
to the fact that the bank was most probably sunk by a governmental 
decision to not float it, under pressure from the traditional oligarchy 
linked to Western financial capital. Yusuf Baydas, who was in Europe 
when the crisis broke out, spoke of his ‘national bourgeois’ project 
which he claimed was sabotaged by the agents of Western interests. 
Included in the immediate fallout of the Intra crash were 
the bankruptcy of a number of local banks and capital flight 
from Lebanon. Between 30 September and 14 October 1966, 
LL 18.6 million was withdrawn from 20 Lebanese banks and 
reinvested abroad. 
The Lebanese ruling class was seized with panic while its 
various factions traded accusations over the responsibility for the 
crash. Kamil Sham`un, who declared the end of Lebanon as ‘the 
Switzerland of the Orient’, condemned the ‘adventurist policy of 
Intra Bank’, inaugurating the campaign to put the blame for the 
crash on the Shihabists. A more upbeat approach tried to raise 
morale over the state of the economy, all the while settling accounts 
with the statism of the Shihabists. 
This was the case of Al-Nahar and its talented leader writer 
Michel Abu-Jawda, whose first reaction to the crash was to call 
for endowing Lebanon with a ‘capitalist state’ on the model of 
Europe and the United States.15 When the Shihabist Rashid Karami 
was recalled to form a new government of technocrats, Abu-Jawda 
saluted him as a representative of the ‘intelligent Right’ and charged 
him with the task of building the ‘intelligent free economy’.16 But the 
financial scandals revealed by the Intra crash – and the arrest of a 
number of the banks’ major shareholders and Shihabist politicians 
– split the ruling class to the point that Abu-Jawda forgot all reform 
projects and launched a vibrant appeal to the ‘hundred families 
that govern the country to stop betraying each other and safeguard 
their unity’.17
‘The Miracle, shall we make it ourselves?’18 was the theme of an 
ardent editorial by Ghassan Tuwayni for Al-Nahar’s 1967 yearly 
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supplement, in which he attacked statism and insisted that ‘the 
Miracle’ was and will always be the achievement of the Lebanese 
individual, ‘who is stronger than his government, more lucid, more 
patient, and more resourceful and farsighted … the Lebanese barely 
needs government, as government can only bridle him and paralyse 
his efficiency’.
Tuwayni goes on to establish a number of basic principles 
highly representative of the ideology of the Lebanese ruling class 
in socio-economic matters. Denying the existence of big fortunes 
in Lebanon, since the Lebanese ‘fructify money that is not theirs, 
and the exception confirms the rule’, he admitted that a ‘temporary 
class war’ had recently erupted in Lebanon. However, its danger 
lay not in the social inequalities it revealed – as those hardly existed 
– but in the effects of the ‘scrambling up on the ladder of wealth’ 
practised in the same manner by all classes: by ‘over-indebtedness 
and spending (beyond their means)’. The danger in that ‘scrambling 
up on the ladder of wealth’ was that it ‘abolishes the real differences 
between rich and poor’ and creates ‘physical and mental gaps’ that 
separate the Lebanese. That is why, Tuwayni continued, all classes 
of Lebanese society were to be held responsible for the ‘suicidal 
turn’ that economic and social relations had recently taken. The 
labouring classes, ‘be they rich or poor … try hard to hate the only 
regime that allows them to aspire to more wealth’, whereas the rich 
classes – ‘whether their wealth is mere appearance or real’ – ‘are 
governed by fear, which prompts them to export their money or 
shy away from investment’. 
For all of these reasons, there is no historical basis for Right 
or Left in Lebanon. The country’s future would be made by the 
‘partnership in wealth rather than in the generalisation of poverty 
and depravation’. As for the role of the state, it was to ‘create the 
adequate legal context for prosperity and transform the budget 
and fiscal policy into means of development and justice’. This was 
the condition for developing trust between the individuals and the 
state. Tuwayni concluded by suggesting that 1967 be declared the 
year for achieving the ‘partnership in prosperity between money and 
labour’, a partnership that amounted to ‘the Miracle’ that people 
must perform themselves.
On a different level, the Intra crisis was the occasion for the 
Muslim faction of the oligarchy and the political class to reiterate 
their demand for a greater share in political power and decision-
making. ̀ Aliya’ al-Sulh, daughter of Riyadh, wrote in Al-Nahar that 
the socio-economic privileges of the Christians had always been the 
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source of all the country’s crises, while Sa’ib Salam revisited the 
question of parity in sectarian representation between Christians 
and Muslims (to replace the 6:5 ratio) and called for a ‘constituent 
assembly’ to revise the National Pact of 1943. 
The politicisation of the crisis involved the settling of accounts 
between the different factions of the bourgeoisie and the ruling 
class. Rare were the voices that asked about the responsibility of the 
regime and its men for the crisis. Reform projects were plentiful, but 
the only one that attracted attention was a project for administrative 
reform initiated before the Intra crisis. It was nevertheless sunk in 
the infighting between the factions of the ruling class, and ended 
in October 1966 in a partial laying off of a small number of high 
functionaries.
Instead of being the year of the ‘partnership in prosperity’ 
between rich and poor, 1967 became the year of the crisis of the 
partnership of the ruling class altogether, as official Lebanon faced 
the watershed Six Day war. 
THE PLO, sECUrITy ANd POLArIsATION
The June 1967 war plunged Lebanon into the Arab–Israeli conflict, 
which it had sought to evade for so long. The physical incarnation 
of that involvement was the entry of Palestinian fedayeen (fighters) 
to its territory and their accelerated implantation in the south, where 
they launched their raids against the Jewish state, triggering a policy 
of Israeli military retaliations that escalated to ‘preventive strikes’, 
transforming the southern part of the country into a battle front 
for years to come. 
In 1968, Palestinian commandos established bases in the ̀ Arqub 
region along the Syrian–Lebanese borders, later dubbed ‘Fatahland’ 
by the Western press and the Israeli military. They were favourably 
welcomed by a population shocked by the Arab defeat of 1967, 
during which the Lebanese army contented itself with defending 
foreign embassies and the headquarters of British and American oil 
companies in Beirut from an angry population. Young Lebanese 
joined their ranks, and the death of Khalil Jamal, the first Lebanese 
martyr (shahid), was the occasion for a massive and moving 
demonstration in Beirut in support of the PLO. In the south, the 
armed Palestinian presence acquired a domestic function as a large 
part of the local population found in it a recourse against two alien 
forces: the traditional leadership of the As`ads, on the one hand, 
and the iron hand of the Shihabist ‘agencies’, on the other. 
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The government was initially complicit with the establishment 
of fedayeen bases in the south, but soon found itself facing the 
hammer of the Israeli military and the anvil of Syrian pressure. The 
latter took the form of closures of the Syrian–Lebanese borders and 
economic sanctions. On 1 March 1968, the first of a series of armed 
clashes between the army and the fedayeen took place.
On the other hand, with `Abd al-Nasir’s astounding defeat 
in the June 1967 war, the inter-Arab balance of power started 
tipping, slowly but surely, in favour of the Saudi-led conservative 
camp. The repercussion for Lebanon was the formation of the 
Tripartite Alliance (al-Hilf al-Thulathi) by Sham`un, Edde and 
Jumayil against ‘Nasserism, Communism and Zionism’. In April 
1969, the Hilf registered a substantial victory in the parliamentary 
elections, resulting in a Parliament divided between the Hilf and 
the Nahj. In internal politics, the campaign against ‘strangers’, the 
first reactions to the armed Palestinian presence and the increasing 
hostility of large sections of Christian public opinion to the Shihab 
‘security agencies’, contributed to that electoral victory. In October 
1968, Helou, hoping to profit from all these changes, submitted 
his resignation as a means of pressure on the Nahj and ‘services’. 
He withdrew it after having received the support of the Hilf and 
imposed `Abd Allah al-Yafi as prime minister with a four-man 
government from which the Nahj-ists were excluded. Non-Shihabist 
moderate Muslims (Yafi himself and Husayn ̀ Uwayni) sat with two 
leaders of the Hilf, Raymond Edde and Pierre Jumayil.
Helou’s bias toward the Hilf was cut short by the first crisis on 
the presence of the Palestinian resistance. On 28 December 1968, 
13 Middle East Airlines planes were destroyed on the ground by an 
Israeli commando unit as retaliation for the hijacking of an El-Al 
plane to Athens claimed by George Habash’s Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Caught between popular anger 
at the state’s inability to defend its own airport, on the one hand, 
and the accusations of the Hilf that he was encouraging Palestinian 
armed presence, on the other, Yafi resigned. Helou put the army 
command in charge of internal security and designated Rashid 
Karami, leader of the Shihabist bloc, to head a new government. 
All that Karami could do was ask Parliament to recognise the right 
of the Palestinians to armed struggle. But not everybody was ready 
to accept this solution. On 23 April 1969, the army opened fire at a 
massive demonstration in solidarity with the Palestinian resistance 
in Sidon and Beirut, leaving a number of dead and wounded. 
The violent reactions to the army’s behaviour – especially in his 
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hometown, Tripoli – prompted Karami to resign. He was charged 
to form a new government and declare the state of emergency; but 
the country plunged into a ministerial and political crisis that will 
last for 215 days. 
At the end of September, after a series of confrontations with 
the resistance, the army launched a final attempt to control the 
situation. Syria reacted by closing its borders with Lebanon and 
imposing severe economic sanctions as a means to ease pressure on 
the Palestinian resistance. The crisis was temporarily resolved with 
the signing, on 8 November 1969, of the Cairo Accords by Yasser 
`Arafat, soon to be elected PLO chairman, and General Emile Bustani, 
commander-in-chief of the Lebanese army, under the patronage of 
President ̀ Abd al-Nasir. The accords, whose terms were kept secret 
at the time, were quickly ratified behind closed doors in Parliament. 
Only Raymond Edde and his parliamentary group voted against 
the accords, which they viewed as an infringement on Lebanese 
sovereignty. The accord recognised the armed fedayeen’s right to 
be present on and move around Lebanese territory, especially to 
and from the `Arqub region, and provided a form of extra-terri-
toriality for the Palestinian camps, long under the heavy hand of 
the Lebanese security services, and recognised a Higher Palestinian 
Commission, headed by a Palestinian veteran, Shafiq al-Hut, as a 
de facto Palestinian embassy in Lebanon. 
With the Syrian borders finally opened, Karami formed a 
government of national unity on 26 November 1969 with Kamal 
Jumblatt as minister of the interior, responsible for applying the 
Cairo Accords. But the crisis had already consummated the break 
between the Muslim ‘street’ and the ‘services’, and constituted the 
founding act for the alliance between the nationalist and leftist 
parties and the PLO. 
Jumblatt and Jumayil, who had alternated in occupying the post 
of minister of the interior, each presented his security policy to a 
divided ruling class and a hesitant bourgeoisie, while waging his 
own struggle to put an end to the power of the Shihabist ‘services’. 
Jumblatt proposed separating the security services from the army 
(a measure directed mainly at Gaby Lahud’s Common Security 
Agency), the abolition of military zones in the south and the Hirmil 
region – which were pretexts for the Shihabist services to reinforce 
their political control over those regions – and the reorganisation 
of the Palestinian presence on the basis of the Cairo Accords. In so 
doing, Jumblatt – who accused the Deuxième Bureau of seeking to 
liquidate the Palestinian presence in Lebanon – presented himself as 
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a mediator between the Lebanese State and the PLO in return for 
reforms and an enhanced share of political power for the Muslims. 
Pierre Jumayil responded by demanding that all of Lebanon be 
declared a military zone and reiterated his desire to see a ‘benevolent 
despot’ rule the country.19 The polemics came to a draw.
In September 1970, Sulayman Franjiyeh, a member of the Centrist 
group with Sa’ib Salam and Kamil al-As`ad, backed by the Hilf, was 
elected president against the Shihabist candidate Iliyas Sarkis. He 
owed his one-vote edge to Jumblatt, who had rallied the opponents 
of the Deuxième Bureau. His last act as minister of the interior was 
to legalise the nationalist and leftist parties: the LCP, the ANM, the 
SSNP and the pro-Iraqi Ba`th.
By the end of the Helou regime, the bourgeoisie were in shock, 
their unity under threat from the fallout of the Intra bank crash 
and the political division between the Hilf and the Nahj. However, 
they did manage to rebuild some measure of understanding and 
cooperation concerning economic policies and the role of the state 
in the economy. The opposition dropped its call for the abolition of 
the central bank and the Civil Service Council, but tried to curtail 
the state’s role in the economy. As for social security, the conflicts 
shifted to confrontations between employers and employees. 
Nevertheless, new divisions threatened the reconstituted unity in 
the socio-economic field. As seen above, the contradictory reactions 
to the social crisis and to the Palestinian armed presence destabilised 
the very foundations of Shihabism by dividing its social base, which 
was represented by the two ‘populist’ components: the Phalange 
party, on the one hand, and Jumblatt and the nationalist and leftist 
parties, on the other. But these were also the parties that were 
more representative of the petite bourgeoisie and the middle classes, 
classes that also constituted the social base of the Lebanese system. 
They would become the protagonists of the 1975 civil war.
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from social Crisis to Civil War 
(1968–1975)
If it were again a question of the liberal economy in which the strong oppresses and 
exploits the weak, if it were the case of the prosperity of the tiny capitalist minority 
and of bourgeois society, if the Lebanese Miracle should continue to express itself in 
terms of improvisation, approximation, lack of foresight, invisible revenues and non 
taxable returns, if it were finally the case of the Lebanon of the privileged few, we 
shall quickly see the positive security of the majority threatened by the gravest of 
dangers and face a catastrophe from which Lebanon will not stand up again. 
(Grégoire Haddad, Greek Catholic bishop of Beirut, 1975)
The Intra Bank crash inaugurated a tendency that would manifest 
itself fully in the 1970s: the rise in interest rates in Europe and the 
United States and the strong pressures on the rulers and the rich of 
the Gulf and Saudi Arabia succeeded in attracting petrodollars to be 
deposited and invested in Western capitals. This development would 
henceforth make Lebanon into a place for recycling petrodollars 
toward Western networks. As a result, the economy was further 
subjected to the vagaries of foreign capital, while exaggerating its 
monopolistic structure and strengthening the domination of the 
commercial/financial complex. 
MONOPOLIsTIC LAISSEZ-fAIRE
By 1969, non-Arab foreign banks already controlled 40 per cent 
of bank deposits in Lebanon. Five years later, this percentage had 
doubled. By 1970, a third of the Lebanon’s joint-stock companies 
(SARLs) and 20 per cent of limited liability companies (SALs) with 
mixed capital had become branches of foreign companies.1 
It should be noted that this extroverted function of banks had an 
adverse impact on the country’s economic development. Although 
banks operating in Lebanon possessed an impressive monetary 
mass that exceeded LL 6 billion, they contributed very meagrely 
to the development of the country’s productive sectors. Their 
major operations involved speculation in foreign currency and 
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bonds in Europe and the US (LL 2 billion in 1970), commercial 
short-term loans (60 per cent of total bank loans in 1971) and 
international long-term loans to the Régie Renault in France, the 
Indian government, and even the World Bank.
The commercial/financial oligarchy continued to dominate the 
economy. According to a survey carried out in 1973, 41 out of 
a total of 800 families controlled the majority of shares in 103 
joint-stock companies in trade and services (a third of the total), 
accounting for 70 per cent of their turnover.2 Five families among 
those controlled half of the country’s import/export trade.3 Five 
agents of European and American companies controlled 22 per cent 
of the market for the exports of these countries and 20 merchants 
controlled 85 per cent of the import of food products. Four of those 
families belonged to the ‘Consortium’. Furthermore, commercial 
monopoly was legally enshrined in law decree no. 134 of August 
1967, which limited commercial representation of foreign companies 
to an exclusive agent. 
However, the salient characteristic of this period was the rising 
encroachment by the commercial/financial complex over industry 
and agriculture. In the banking sector, 57 family ‘holdings’ – 
representing 32 per cent of the total – controlled 72 per cent of the 
capital of the industrial SARLs; 75 per cent of the deposits in the 
Lebanese banks; 52 per cent of the capital of the SARLs in trade, 
agriculture and services; 64 per cent of the capital of the insurance 
companies; 71 per cent of the capital of transport companies; 92 
per cent of the capital of financial joint-stock companies, and 37 
per cent of the capital of real estate companies.4 
A dependent industrial mediation
During the post-Intra years Lebanon witnessed rapid industrial 
growth. Industry’s share of GDP rose from 14 per cent to 18 per 
cent and investments in that sector rose from LL 987 million in 
1966 to LL 1.234 million in 1970. Closely related to foreign capital 
investments, this growth followed the logic of the recuperation 
of petrodollars by Western capital. Thus, multinationals came 
to directly control existing industries or established processing 
industries for their own products in Lebanon, producing mainly 
for Arab markets. Notably, the majority of these new industrial 
firms were financed by loans from Lebanese banks. 
Such industrial growth depended heavily on the intensive 
employment of labour. The number of industrial workers nearly 
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doubled in ten years, from 65,000 in 1965 to 120,000 when the 
1975 war broke out. 
Four major effects of this boom should be noted. First, as half 
of the domestic market had already been ceded to imported goods, 
foreign capital competed with local industry for the other half and 
for Arab markets (exports to Arab markets accounted for 80 per 
cent of total Lebanese exports, 40 per cent of which were destined 
for Saudi Arabia alone). Second, the external dependence of the 
industrial sector was aggravated by the rise in imports of raw 
materials and the payment of various royalties and licences. This 
led to a third result, namely that exports increased at a much slower 
rate than the increase in imports, and the deficit in the balance of 
trade shot up to LL 1.5 billion, four times the volume of exports. 
Fourth, industrial growth resulted in a double concentration: 
in the volume of industrial firms (50 per cent of the enterprises 
employed more than 187 workers) and in the share of industrial 
firms in production (20 enterprises produced half of total industrial 
production in 1973).5 
The crisis of agriculture
For its part, agriculture was invaded by the commercial/financial 
complex, which controlled direct producers through credit; 
prices; the sale of insecticides, fertilisers, agricultural machinery 
and tools; the packing and refrigeration industries, and, finally, 
distribution. Here, concentration was no different from the other 
sectors. Twenty-five brokers who also owned the main refrigerated 
storehouses controlled two-thirds of the market for apples; 20 
brokers controlled 81 per cent of the market for citrus fruit (three 
of whom controlled a third of the market), and two firms practically 
controlled all the imports of insecticides and fertilisers.6 
By the 1970s, share-cropping had practically disappeared. 
Despite the development of relatively large capitalist farms using 
salaried workers, the better part of agricultural production was still 
coming from relatively small family-based units that nevertheless 
increasingly resorted to Syrian agricultural workers. Between those 
two poles developed two hybrid forms of production. One, prevalent 
in the Biqa`, was a capitalist form of share-cropping: according to 
a yearly contract between a number of small landowning farmers 
and a capitalist entrepreneur, the latter would provide credit, grain, 
pesticides, and the use of machinery and pumps in return for a 
share of the harvest. The other form tied thousands of farmers and 
peasants to agribusiness monopoles. This was the case of hundreds 
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of families of beetroot farmers in the Biqa`, producing for the benefit 
of one sugar factory at ̀ Anjar and the 45,000 tobacco producers in 
the predominantly Shi`i south (and also in the Maronite districts of 
Jbeil and Batrun) producing for the tobacco monopoly, the Régie. 
However, commercial/financial control over agriculture followed 
the same logic as that of its control over industry. Since larger 
portions of the local market for agricultural products had already 
been taken over by importers (only 15 per cent of food consumption 
needs was being locally produced), agricultural production was 
driven to produce for external markets (two-thirds of exports were 
fruit and poultry products).7 
Debts and exploitation by merchants, moneylenders, banks, and 
suppliers of machinery, fertilisers and pesticides forced small farmers 
to leave for the cities and overseas at an accelerated pace. Half of 
the Lebanese population made their living from agriculture at the 
end of the 1950s, but by 1975, only 20 per cent remained engaged 
in the sector. Agriculture lost some 100,000 active members in 
barely two decades.8
sOCIAL CONsEQUENCEs
demographic and social mobility
Since its attachment to the world market, Lebanon has been 
characterised by a demographic flux in which rural migration and 
emigration carry out a permanent reconstruction of the country’s 
social stratification. Emigration is the process by which Lebanese 
society hides its high rates of unemployment and rids itself of the 
human surplus. It developed at a rate of 8,566 per year for the years 
1960–70 and rose to 10,000 for the years 1970–74. The share of 
émigré remittances of gross national product (GNP) experienced 
dramatic growth, rising from 5.38 per cent in 1951 to 30 per cent 
in 1974. While the local labour force was exported, non-Lebanese 
labour was brought in to replace those who left, or those who 
refuse to be reduced to wage labour. Before the war, Syrian workers 
already constituted the majority of agricultural workers and a high 
percentage of construction workers. 
On the other hand, many of the returnee émigrés had been 
elevated to middle-class status or even joined the ranks of the 
bourgeoisie, bolstering in both cases the dominant sectors of the 
economy by investing principally in commerce, finance and real 
estate. Social promotion acquired by migration and work abroad 
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spilled directly into politics, for it was principally through politics 
that the socially promoted hoped to obtain social distinction. 
Contemporary Lebanon became a country in which middle- and 
high-income nouveaux riches constituted a large part of the middle 
and upper classes. The dialectics of wealth/honour were implanted in 
the heart of social relations and regulated the relationship between 
the political and the social.
High cost of living 
The increasingly outward-looking nature of the economy, the 
absence of any price controls to check merchants’ lust for profits, 
and monopoly control directly impacted the standards of living of 
the majority of Lebanese. Between 1967 and 1975 the cost of living 
had doubled,9 and during this time Beirut was classified as being 
more expensive than Washington, DC. In one year, 1972–73, the 
price of imported goods rose by 10–15 per cent despite the fact 
that the Lebanese pound had registered a net rise compared to the 
US dollar and sterling. The only possible explanation for this was 
the arbitrary decision-making by importers and middlemen, opined 
Marwan Iskandar, a liberal conservative economist. He went on 
to add that the market price of imported meat was eight to ten 
times more than its purchase price c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) 
Beirut and that the price of agricultural products in Saudi Arabia 
(imported from Lebanon) was 40 per cent lower than in Lebanon! 
The same could be said for the high prices of pharmaceutical 
products, medicine and hospitalisation, determined by monopoly 
control and by the extroverted orientation of medical services, to 
satisfy the needs of the rich in the Gulf. 
Real estate speculation – the main form of investment by the 
commercial/financial oligarchy, the Gulf sheikhs and the émigrés 
– raised the price of land and imposed the construction of luxury 
apartment buildings. In the ‘forest of stone’ that Beirut had become, 
rent gobbled up no less than 40 per cent of family budgets, while 
low-cost social housing, promised for so long in ministerial 
declarations, never materialised. On the eve of the war, there were 
between 40,000 and 50,000 empty luxury apartments in Beirut 
alone, while successive waves of migrants from the rural areas 
crammed into shantytowns and squats, taking over entire suburbs. 
Class, sectarian and regional inequalities
On the eve of the 1975 war Lebanon’s social structure was one 
of small-scale privileges and distinctions produced by patronage 
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and the sectarian system, along with large-scale class privileges 
and divisions. 
The majority of the Lebanese had no more than 12–15 per cent 
of national income.10 Bishop Grégoire Haddad wrote that 79 per 
cent of the Lebanese received less than the minimum income for 
what he considered a decent living, estimated by him at LL 10,480 
per month.11 Meanwhile, 72 per cent of the workers did not earn 
more than LL 561 per month,12 and the official minimum wage 
barely changed between 1970 and 1975, increasing only from LL 
205 to LL 310.
Despite the ambitious Shihab reforms, great disparities persisted 
between centre and periphery. While the annual per capita revenue 
in Beirut was estimated at $803, it was $151 in south Lebanon. 
Beirut and the surrounding Mount Lebanon contained 64 per cent 
of private primary and complementary educational institutions, 73 
per cent of those in the secondary education and all universities. In 
the early 1970s, 65 per cent of all medical doctors lived and worked 
in Beirut, which accounted for 27 per cent of the population; 5.5 per 
cent were in the south for 18 per cent of the population; and only 
3 per cent in the Biqa`, where 13 per cent of the Lebanese lived.13
Beirut’s ‘poverty belt’
Rapid urbanisation surrounded Beirut with a ‘poverty belt’ 
stretching from Karantina in the east to the Raml al-`Ali and Laylaki 
neighbourhoods in the west. Between these lay a number of villages 
that had been rapidly transformed into the poor and working-class 
suburbs of Jdeideh, Sin al-Fil, Mudawar, Burj Hammud, Nab`a 
and Dikwaneh, in the east bordering Nahr Beirut; and Ghubayri, 
`Ayn al-Rummaneh, Shiyah, Haret Hreik, Burj al-Barajineh and 
Murayjeh, stretching west to the airport. The ‘belt’ was punctuated 
by the Palestinian camps of Tall al-Za`tar in the East, and Mar Iliyas, 
Sabra, Shatila and Burj al-Barajineh, further to the west. Some 
400,000 out of a total Beirut population of 1 million lived in these 
neighbourhoods which mushroomed within two decades, swelled by 
rural migrants who were victims of the collapse of share-cropping 
and the crisis of agriculture. But this rapid urbanisation was 
considerably accelerated by additional factors: the collapse of the 
economy of Jabal ̀ Amil and the southern Biqa` after the creation of 
the State of Israel in 1948, and the displacement caused by Israeli 
retaliation against the villages of the south for fedayeen operations. 
Although it primarily served the industrial locations of Mukallis 
in the east and Shuwayfat in the west, the ‘poverty belt’ was also 
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the location for a mass of sub-proletarians, whether members of 
a growing ‘informal’ artisan and manufacturing sector or simply 
masses of unemployed. The inhabitants were mixed. While Haret 
Hreik and Murayjeh, in the west, were still nearly exclusively 
Christian, the eastern suburb had become home to some 250,000 
Shi`a in the traditionally Armenian neighbourhoods of Burj 
Hammud and Nab`a, and in Dikwaneh. The Shi`a exhibited the 
most dramatic shift from rural to city living. While most of the 
community was rural in the post-independence years, more than 
three-quarters of it had become urbanised by the 1970s. 
While they were not the favelas of Rio de Janiero, their high 
density per square mile, squatting, very poor sanitary and health 
conditions, rare water supply and stolen electricity made these 
suburbs breeding grounds for the populist parties of the Left and the 
Right. The proximity of the Palestinian camps provided the Left with 
inspiration for change, and the Right with the necessary scapegoats. 
Sectarian distinctions
In the 1970s, business was still basically under Christian control. 
At the end of the 1950s, Yusuf Sayigh, in his pioneering study 
of Lebanese entrepreneurs, found that the ratio of Christians to 
Muslims was 10:2 in industry, 11:2 in finance and 16:2 in services.14 
In a later study in 1973, Boutros Labaki proved that these ratios 
had been sizeably modified but remained quite uneven: 75.5 per 
cent Christians/24.5 per cent Muslims in commercial firms (family 
firms and SARLs) 67.5 per cent/32.4 per cent in industrial firms 
and 71 per cent/29 per cent in the banking sector.15 Conversely, 
among the industrial working class, 75 per cent of the workers were 
Muslims, Shi`a in particular, against 25 per cent Christians, though 
the percentage of Christian wage earners would increase markedly 
when it came to the service sector. Kinship relations and regionalism 
played an important role in employment and in maintaining a 
balance of power inside firms that was favourable to employers. 
The middle classes: unity and difference 
The inflation of the middle classes was a significant characteristic 
of Lebanon’s social structure in the prewar period due primarily to 
emigration, the development of education, the inflated bureaucracy 
and the sizeable increase in the members of the liberal professions. 
By 1973, it was estimated that the middle classes accounted for 67 
per cent of the population.16 
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Among the large lower-middle and middle classes, small 
privileges based on sect and region immediately translated into 
socio-economic advantages. Two major domains of sectarian 
inequality were the privileges in the bureaucracy and the education 
system. As already noted, the Lebanese laissez-faire system did 
not prevent the existence of an inflated administration of some 
100,000 functionaries (including the military and security forces). 
The expansion of educational provision across the sects led to 
competition among the growing number of graduates for jobs in 
the bloated state administration. This prompted people to question 
the validity of sectarian quotas for posts and allowed the question 
of education in Lebanon to take on exaggerated importance, leading 
to political conflicts. Its function in the enlarged reproduction of 
the class structure operated by transforming the traditional petite 
bourgeoisie of farmers, tradesmen, artisans, village teachers, and so 
on, into a modern petite bourgeoisie of functionaries in the public 
sector, employees in the private sector, teachers in public education 
and the liberal professions. But the chaotic rush toward education 
widened the gap between the economic system and an education 
system that prepared ‘students for everything and for nothing’ and 
exported a big portion of its graduates to the foreign markets.17 
Under the impact of the general crisis, the pressures on class and 
sectarian selection and elimination increased in different ways: 
•	 discrimination	in	opportunities	of	access	to	higher	education:	
only 8 per cent of primary school students reached the end 
of secondary schooling and 6.1 per cent of those sat for 
the baccalaureate (secondary school) exams and made it to 
university; 
•	 the	elimination	grade	(less	than	5/20	for	French)	in	intermediate	
and secondary exams favoured the sons of the rich and 
Christian families and students of private schools in general 
who received a relatively good French education or spoke 
French at home; 
•	 regional	selection	manifested	itself	in	the	concentration	of	
educational institutions in the dominantly Christian ‘regional-
sectarian zones’; 
•	 the	flagrant	gaps	between	public	and	private	schooling.	
These inequalities were reflected in unequal access to higher posts 
in state administration and the private sector and in differences 
in salaries. A bank employee who graduated from the American 
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University of Beirut (AUB) would start with a monthly salary of LL 
2,000, a graduate of the Jesuit Université Saint-Joseph (USJ) with 
LL 1,500, while a graduate of the Lebanese University (LU) would 
only get LL 600.18 
Thus, while the development of public schooling at the LU 
integrated young men and women who were meeting for the first 
time – Christians of modest origins, mainly from the periphery in 
Jbeil, Batrun, `Akkar and the north with young Shi`as from the 
south and the Biqa` – the mass of students were divided on issues 
of public education versus private education and foreign language 
versus Arabic. The long struggle for the establishment of the LU, 
its development and the recognition of its diplomas is a strong 
example of this. 
Nevertheless, the middle classes were unified, ‘objectively’ at 
least, by their shared submission to the other and more dangerous 
effects of the crisis. Whereas the correspondent of Le Monde in 
Beirut spoke of the ‘slow death of the petite bourgeoisie’, economist 
Iskandar expressed the frustrations of the middle classes and their 
desire for change: 
The middle classes, hard-bitten by the high cost of living, are more 
and more ready to exchange a false liberty – that they supposedly 
possess – for any system on condition that that system hits at 
monopoly and demolishes its ramparts. As far as the middle 
Lebanese were concerned, any system, inasmuch as it contains a 
part of what its name denotes, is better than the prevailing system 
of arbitrary privileges and complete blindness.19
sOCIAL MOVEMENTs
On the eve of the 1975 war, all segments of the Lebanese population 
were in motion to contest the established order, resist the crisis and 
confront the policies of the commercial/financial oligarchy. They 
were expressing, in one way or another, a deep desire for political, 
economic and social change. 
from the convents of the north to the plantations of the south
The agrarian crisis set in motion struggles that combined the desire 
for land with resistance to capitalisation. In 1970, tenant farmers of 
the Maronite convents of Tannurin and Mayfuq (the highlands of 
Batrun and Jbeil respectively) organised strikes and demonstrations 
for better shares of the crops and for the distribution of Church 
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lands among them. In Mayfuq, the gendarmes intervened against 
the peasants. One year later, a violent conflict over land ownership 
broke out between the peasants of Hanin (southern Lebanon) and 
Kamil al-As`ad, speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. Twenty-three 
villagers were accused of violence and arrested. Qantara, property of 
the ̀ Usayran family, experienced a similar dispute in the same year. 
But the most important agrarian movement was the revolt of the 
peasants of the ̀ Akkar plain, starting in 1968 against a background 
of difficult conditions of share-cropping and a rush of capitalist 
entrepreneurs. To finance their new lifestyle in the cities, `Akkar’s 
absentee landowners resorted to semi-feudal exploitation of their 
share-croppers (obligatory gifts, free domestic work by the village 
womenfolk in the beyks’ households, and so on), when they did not 
sell or rent their lands to capitalist entrepreneurs. These reduced the 
share-croppers to the status of salaried workers or expelled them 
from their land and cottages altogether. Caught in the crossfire, 
share-croppers and peasants resorted to an armed rebellion helped 
by the Sa`iqa, the Palestinian faction of the Syrian Ba`th recently 
created by the government of Salah Jadid. After the fall of Jadid 
in 1970, the parties of the Lebanese Left took over the leadership 
of the movement. 
In the south, the Régie tobacco consortium had become the 
private reserve of the traditional za`ims, who packed it with their 
clients and controlled cultivation licences, which they distributed 
to their friends or rented to farmers. A private franchise-holding 
company since 1935, whose franchise was extended until 1973, the 
Régie also held the exclusive right to export Lebanese-produced 
tobacco, import cigarettes and produce local cigarettes. 
The problems of tobacco cultivation had been dragging on for a 
decade, articulated around the following planters’ demands: 
•	 ending	speculation	in	the	cultivation	licences	by	withdrawing	
them from those who were not engaged in agriculture; 
•	 limiting	the	area	cultivated	to	25	dunums	per	person	(70	
per cent of the farmers cultivated 5 dunums, but there were 
licences that covered 400 dunums); 
•	 increasing	the	purchase	price	of	tobacco	leaves;	
•	 nationalising	the	Régie,	which	was	a	major	demand	of	the	
tobacco planters, but which ran counter to a project by the 
Phalange minister Joseph Shadir to lease it to Phillip Morris, 
the big American cigarette conglomerate. 
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After years in limbo, on 22 January 1973 a procession of thousands 
of tobacco planters occupied the offices of the Régie in Nabatiyeh 
demanding a 20 per cent increase in the purchase price of their 
products. The following day, the army shot at the demonstrators 
and killed two peasants. A few days later, 20,000 demonstrated in 
the streets of Beirut in solidarity with the tobacco planters.
The agrarian movement was now organising itself at a rapid 
rate. In April 1973, the Unified Syndicate of Tobacco Farmers was 
founded. A month earlier, the first congress of the National Union of 
Agricultural Workers was convened, representing 163 villages from 
all parts of the country. In May of the same year, the first congress 
of the peasants and farmers of the Biqa` launched a campaign 
against the rise in the price of fertilisers and insecticides (which 
accounted for 20–30 per cent of production costs), demanded a new 
tenancy code, attacked the middlemen’s network and demanded the 
admission of peasants and farmers to the National Social Security 
Fund (NSSF). 
Militant working-class unity
The struggles for NSSF coverage united workers and employees 
around a common programme, led by a unified trade union 
federation, the General Workers’ Union of Lebanon (GWUL). Inside 
the GWUL the influence of the left-wing federation, the National 
Union of Workers’ Trade Unions (NUWTU) and the reformist trade 
unionists was on the rise. Large segments of the lower-income groups 
in the cities and countryside, were mobilised around a programme 
that integrated the demands of agricultural workers and mobilised 
all those who suffered from the rise in the cost of living.20
The threat of a general strike planned for February 1970 forced 
the authorities to activate medical coverage through the NSSF, which 
was supposed to benefit some 250,000 employees. But a counter-
offensive by employers succeeded in imposing equal representation 
in the administrative council of the NSSF, which meant practically 
controlling it. Further, under pressure from business circles, the 
government agreed to deposit NSSF funds in private banks at an 
interest rate of 3–4 per cent, much lower than the normal rate 
of 8–10 per cent. More serious was the extensive campaign of 
layoffs waged by employers against their old employees (salaried 
workers would automatically benefit from the NSSF after two years’ 
employment) in order to reduce the number of employees for which 
they would have to pay social security fees. These layoffs raised the 
question of job stability at work and the right to engage in trade 
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union activity and organisation, which required amending Article 
50 of the Labour Code. 
A new threat of a general strike by the GWUL planned for 25 
May 1971 demanded the immediate halt of arbitrary layoffs, a 
salary increase of 11 per cent, a 25 per cent reduction in rents, 
the importation by the state of medicine and essential foodstuffs, 
and legislation for agricultural workers within six months. The 
strike was deferred after a wage increase of 5 per cent was decreed. 
When the GWUL finally acted on its strike threat on 28 August 
1973, it also called for limiting commercial profits and encouraging 
cooperatives. This was the first time that the trade union movement 
touched upon the covert and sacrosanct power and privileges of 
the commercial/financial oligarchy. The government’s answer had 
become predictable: it decreed a new wage increase of 5 per cent (at 
a time when the price indexes spoke of a rise in the cost of living of 
at least 12 per cent) and raised the minimum wage to LL 225 and 
family allowances to LL 70. A compromise on Article 50 of the 
Labour Code imposed restrictions on the firing of trade unionists. 
None of the other demands were met. 
On another level, an uninterrupted series of strikes and shopfloor 
movements had rocked the industrial world since 1968. The rapid 
industrialisation and the exploitation of young manual workers of 
rural origin who were being rapidly and aggressively proletarised 
sharpened their class-consciousness and combativeness. Their 
demands covered all aspects of working-class life: 
•	 implementation	of	labour	legislation	concerning	working	
hours, the minimum wage, equal pay for men and women, 
family allowances, maternity and sickness leave, the right to 




its medical benefits branch; 
•	 improvements	 in	working	 conditions,	workplace	 safety,	
indemnities for work accidents, repression and abuse the 
foremen and sexual harassment of female workers.
The rank-and-file workers’ struggles culminated in a strike at the 
Ghandour biscuits and chocolate factory. Its 1,200 workers in 
Shiyah were the biggest non-unionised element of Lebanese industry. 
They struck in November 1972, demanding a wage increase, equal 
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pay for men and women workers, the recognition of the shopfloor 
committee and their right to trade union organisation. During 
their demonstration of 11 November 1972 at the factory gates, the 
police fired at the demonstrators, killing Yusuf al-`Attar, a militant 
of the Organisation for Communist Action’s (OCA’s) Workers’ 
Committees, and Fatima al-Khawaja, a member of the LCP, and 
wounding 14 others. The GWUL organised a one-day general 
strike to protest at the official violence and show solidarity with 
the Ghandour workers; a wave of indignation spread throughout 
the entire country, while the Salam government, unwilling even to 
investigate police firing on a peaceful demonstration, decided to 
require organisers of demonstrations to obtain an official permit. At 
the initiative of the progressive and leftist forces, a demonstration 
of some 20,000 led by Kamal Jumblatt ended in a large rally on 
the steps of Parliament where the socialist leader’s speech was 
interrupted by shouts of ‘99 thieves and 17 ruffians’ (for the 99 
deputies and the 17 ministers). On 15 December, Ghandour declared 
a lockout and laid off all his workers. He reopened a week later 
and re-employed them all, except 100 workers whom he considered 
the ringleaders. Although the Left organised another demonstration 
against the arbitrary layoffs, on 26 December, the outcome of the 
Ghandour battle left only frustration and resentment. The trade 
union attaché at the US embassy noted that the demonstration and 
the general strike had been a ‘moderate success’ for the Left, which 
had managed to go on the offensive and win the ‘propaganda war’. 
However, he concluded that neither the Left nor the trade unions 
had secured any concrete gains for workers.21
Effectively, the trade union movement had fallen into a vicious 
circle: wage increases, paid for mainly by the industrialists and the 
government, were sapped by the merchants, who immediately raised 
prices. The meagre results of years of trade union activity drove 
popular protest to the street. When, on 5 February 1973, the GWUL 
announced another postponement of its general strike, a movement 
of wildcat strikes and violent demonstrations swept the country: 
in Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Bint Jbeil, the south, the Biqa` and Tripoli 
(where demonstrators set fire to the offices of the pro-government 
Federation of Trade Unions of the North). More important were 
the demonstrations in the Christian localities of Juniyeh, Jabal and 
Hammana, not to speak of the mixed regions of the Shouf, `Alay, 
Shuwayfat, Jiyeh, and so on. On the following day a wildcat strike, 
organised by the Workers’ Committees of the OCA, closed the 
factories of the industrial zone of Mukallis–Tall al Za`tar (some 
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10,000 workers) and a workers’ demonstration blocked the Beirut–
Bayt Miri road for two days. ‘This wild strike cannot be reduced to 
its mere demands’, commented René Aggiouri, editor of the French-
language daily Al-Safa, ‘as it calls into question the political leaders 
in Lebanese society and, more importantly, its trade union leaders.’22
students against the ‘merchant society’
‘A revolt against our merchant society’: these are the words used 
by Edward Saab, the astute correspondent of Le Monde in Beirut, 
to describe the student movement.23 Much more than a protest 
movement, it was a radical questioning of Lebanese and Arab 
societies from a moral and cultural point of view, greatly influenced 
by the defeat of June 1967, the emergence of the Palestinian 
Resistance and the impact of May 1968 in France.
The movement started with a long strike by secondary students 
in March 1967 demanding lower fees, getting rid of the elimination 
grade in exams for foreign languages, and the unification of school 
textbooks. In Tyre, the gendarmes fired on a demonstration, killing 
a student, Edward Ghanima. June 1967 and the following months 
were marked by intense student activity concerning the Arab–Israeli 
war, which ultimately led to the official closure of the schools and 
universities and the occupation of the AUB campus by the police, 
and expulsion of striking students.
A 50-day strike by both the students and teachers of the Lebanese 
University (LU) began in April 1968. The latter were demanding 
a wage increase and tenure, the former sought the building of 
a unified university campus, an increase in scholarships and 
the provision of university restaurants. None of those demands 
were met, but the students managed at least to create a National 
Union of Lebanese University Students (NULUS). As a sign of the 
radicalisation of the student movement, the Left alliance (PSP, LCP 
and OCA) gained control over NULUS, which in March–April 
1972 launched a massive strike to press for its demands. Private 
universities – AUB, USJ, and the Beirut Arab University (BAU) – 
joined the strike in solidarity.
The LU strike was renewed the following year and was interrupted 
by police intervention and the laying off of a number of teachers. 
Three times during that year, 1973, teachers and students from the 
private and public sectors went on strike to demand wage increases 
and mutual aid funds, to no avail. 
In the cities and the countryside, technical schools saw considerable 
mobilisation in support of improving teaching conditions and a 
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better diversification of specialisations and job opportunities. Their 
movement culminated in a general strike at the beginning of 1974, 
although practically no substantial results were achieved. 
In the private university sector, AUB students, mainly belonging to 
the middle and upper classes, went on strike in 1971 to protest fee 
increases, occupied the premises and organised big demonstrations. 
The police and the Phalange militia intervened and students 
were expelled.
In 1972, Lebanon witnessed a major nationwide strike movement 
by the 16,000 public education school teachers demanding a wage 
increase, the right of trade union organisation and retirement after 
25 years of service. The strike, which lasted for two months, was 
broken after the ministry suspended the payment of salaries. When 
the strike was renewed from January to July 1973, 324 teachers 
were laid off, condemned as ‘agitators’ by Prime Minister Sa’ib 
Salam. Protest and solidarity movements with the teachers covered 
the entire country while their sit-ins and hunger strikes became a 
rallying point for all social movements. Even the Maronite Church 
intervened to demand that the expelled teachers be reinstated, also 
to no avail.
Student demonstrations, at times 25,000-strong, became an 
everyday scene in Beirut and major cities. Police repression only 
produced new demonstrations, so much so that President Franjiyeh 
contemplated closing the LU for that academic year, fearing that 
‘university agitation might unleash a revolutionary situation’.24 The 
last student demonstration occurred a few days before the beginning 
outbreak of the civil war.
POLITICAL sCLErOsIs 
A flagrant contradiction between the gravity of the socio-economic 
crisis and the return of the traditional notables to power dominated 
political life in the 1970s. The ‘centrist’ ruling troika – Franjiyeh/
As`ad/Salam – had given priority to its fight against the intervention 
of the army in political and civil life, and Franjiyeh inaugurated his 
mandate with the purge of the Shihabist intelligence officers. When 
the Shihabist commander-in-chief of the army, Jean Nujaym, was 
killed in a helicopter crash, he was quickly replaced with Iskandar 
Ghanim, a friend of the president. In addition, the patronage of the 
Shihabist security ‘agencies’ was quickly replaced by the northern 
clients of the president’s son, Tony, the minister of communications 
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(holding this post many times) who was accused of having made a 
fortune from telecommunication contracts. 
A dissociated representative system
The structure of Parliament and the electoral system were particularly 
indicative of the contradiction between the political system and 
the country’s new socio-economic realities. The chamber was 
dominated by true political dynasties: out of a total 425 deputies 
since 1920, 245 belonged to families of parliamentarians.25 On the 
other hand, the influence of ‘funders’ was increasing. Parliament, 
that ‘arrogant alliance between money and the feudal system’, in the 
words of Georges Naccache, was being increasingly dominated by 
moneyed interests, and the landed notables themselves (the ‘political 
feudalists’) were rapidly transformed into capitalist businessmen, 
shareholders in joint-stock companies and holders of import quotas 
distributed by the state. 
The rapid monetarisation of political mediation became a way 
to bridge the widening gap between these notables, increasingly 
incapable of providing effective services to their clients, and their 
public. In fact, massive migration toward the cities rendered the 
rural basis of the electoral system obsolete. A great part of the 
Lebanese public were obliged to vote in villages where their parents 
had been born, but in which they no longer had any interests or 
links, save perhaps memories of clan or family allegiances and 
disputes. Meanwhile, they were deprived of the right to vote in cities 
where they had been living for decades; where they worked, paid 
their taxes and fees, became individualised and grouped into socio-
professional and class forms of representation – in short, where 
they had interests to be defended and represented. For example, no 
more than 20 per cent of the inhabitants of the suburbs of Beirut 
voted in their localities. On election day, they would make the 
trek to their respective villages, where the effects of socio-economic 
integration were erased and family, clan and sectarian allegiances 
came to the fore.
Adding to this, the traditional rentier hierarchy that underwrote 
politics refused to accept the changing reality. On the eve of the 
1972 elections, during one of his many polemics on Jumblatt, 
Prime Minister Sa’ib Salam gave a perfect illustration of this logic. 
‘We welcome Kamal Jumblatt, in his capacity as the son of a well 
bred “house” and as an honourable chief of his [Druze] sect,’ said 
Salam, ‘but we categorically refuse to deal with him as one who 
invites destruction and sabotage, poses as the protector of the Left 
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and of Communism and exploits popular problems [for his own 
interests].’ If anything, the 1972 elections revealed the degree of 
impermeability to change that characterised the Lebanese political 
system and the many blockages that it imposed on the participation 
of new forces in society, especially cross-sectarian political parties. A 
few ‘independent’ candidates who ran on traditional lists managed 
to get elected. For the rest, the title of Le Monde’s article at the time 
says it all: ‘A team that hardly represents public opinion.’26
Aborted ‘revolution from above’
Sa’ib Salam, who formed the first cabinet under Franjiyeh, named it 
a ‘youth government’ and committed himself and his team to ‘carry 
out a revolution from above’ to undercut the possibility of ‘one from 
below’. But his ministers, technocrats and professionals had to face 
the covert power of the commercial/financial oligarchy; they ended 
up resigning, one after the other. Iliyas Saba, economic adviser to 
the president and minister of the economy, issued ministerial decree 
no. 1943, which contained a set of fiscal reforms and protective 
measures for national industry, but had to back down after the 
Merchants’ Association threatened to strike. Emile Bitar, minister 
of public health and member of a new reformist political formation, 
the Democratic Party, proposed government control over the 
price of medicine (fixing profit rates equal to those in France) and 
envisaged the NSSF importing a number of pharmaceuticals. That 
last suggestion meant discovering the cost price of medicine and, 
consequently, the profits of the importers. Vital medicines such as 
insulin disappeared from the market as the syndicates of drugstore 
owners and pharmacists threatened to strike, also backed by the 
Merchants’ Association. Eventually, Franjiyeh, who had friends 
and funders among the agents of big pharmaceutical companies, 
withdrew support from his minister and Bitar resigned. Architect 
Henri Edde, minister of public works, resigned in solidarity. 
Two other ministers were prompted to resign on the education 
question: Ghassan Tuwayni, the editor of Al-Nahar and minister 
of education, and his successor Michel Edde, could not enlist the 
president’s support for their projects of educational reforms. In 
1973, industrialists finally obtained their long-time demand for a 
ministry of industry, whose portfolio was entrusted to Pierre Helou, 
a rich businessman and industrialist of international stature. A few 
weeks later, Helou held a press conference in which he accused 
the commercial monopolies of controlling the government and 
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sabotaging his attempts to protect national industry and reinstate 
the workings of free competition.
As early as January 1965, a draft law (no. 189) limiting profit 
rates had been withdrawn, also under threat of a merchants’ strike. 
No such talk about this type of reform would be heard of again. 
The importers who were hoarding foodstuffs were known; the press 
had published lists of their names and the nature and quantity of 
goods they held in the port’s warehouses. But nothing was done 
about it.
To counter all reform projects, officials made the absurd argument 
that the state lacked funds. However, it was well known that the state 
systematically refused to increase its budget revenues, the major part 
of which came from customs duties and taxes; but not any direct 
taxes. Two-thirds of the country’s fiscal revenues came from indirect 
taxes on consumption and from income tax deducted directly ‘at 
source’ by employers from their employees’ salaries. This was to the 
disadvantage of most ordinary workers, while the rich evaded taxes 
and continued to enjoy their ‘invisible returns’. Progressive income 
tax simply did not exist. Bank profits were taxed according to an 
inclusive rate of 15–22 per cent. Moreover, one of the rare pieces 
of fiscal legislation of those years increased the income tax on the 
revenues of the middle-income groups (those who paid more than 
LL 1,000 in annual tax) by 50 per cent, without any concurrent 
increase for the higher-income categories! Furthermore, the ‘fiscal 
paradise’, as Lebanon became known, knew no tax on wealth or 
any form of inheritance rights, and many economic activities were 
not even taxed, such as interest on government bonds, real estate 
surplus value and the sale of bank licences (a lucrative activity as 
the government stopped issuing permits to open banks after the 
Intra crash). 
Thus, the reformist pretensions of the first two years of Franjiyeh’s 
mandate ended in a complete fiasco. ‘The Lebanese bourgeoisie and 
political establishment, in both their Muslim and Christian sectors, 
were unwilling to surrender any privileges for the cause of reform’, 
commented Kamal Salibi.27 
This was at a time when the oil boom had started and any 
vigilant self-interested businessman could have predicted the benefits 
accruing to his class and to Lebanon in general, provided some 
concessions were made to reinforce social peace in the country. 
Perhaps a few harboured such thoughts, but almost all refused to 
do anything about it. As revolution was not made ‘from above’, 
it was to be made, in the most vicious and destructive manner, 
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‘from below’. In a country where the rights and obligations of 
people were nearly always solely defined by the individual’s sectarian 
political community, social frustrations gradually slipped toward 
sectarian and regional division, aggravated by the political conflict 
between reform and security, the latter centred on the Palestinian 
armed presence. 
The army: for internal control or national defence? 
Salam’s second cabinet of 1972, composed of politicians this 
time, demonstrated a marked propensity for repression. Unable 
and unwilling to impose concessions on the bourgeoisie or defend 
Lebanon’s territory against Israeli incursions and air strikes, the 
state revealed its power through internal repression. 
This government was in office during the shootings of the striking 
workers at the Ghandour factory and the tobacco planters of 
Nabatiyeh, the mass layoff of teachers and the repression of student 
demonstrations. The anti-Shihab notables, who had returned to 
power, took their revenge by putting the ex-officers of the Deuxième 
Bureau on trial; even though they had advocated the return of the 
military to their barracks, they were quick to send the army against 
workers, students and peasants, and resort to the worst methods of 
the defunct ‘agencies’: telephone tapping and violations of freedom 
of opinion and of the press, including the arrest of journalists 
(half a dozen had been incarcerated, among them the editor of 
Al-Nahar, Ghassan Tuwayni). Finally, it was also under Salam 
that a law on political parties was drafted that greatly curtailed 
freedom of thought and association. The opposition to this draft 
law was the occasion for the launching of the Rally of National 
and Democratic Parties and Personalities (later to be known as the 
Lebanese National Movement – LNM) during a mass meeting at 
Byblos Cinema in June 1973.
Many in Lebanon demanded the defence of the south and the 
building of fortifications in border villages, if not the defence of 
the borders themselves, and at the least, the retaliation by the 
army for Israeli incursions on Lebanese territory. A Libyan offer to 
provide the country with an air defence system was rejected. Official 
Lebanon was seeking US guarantees for its security that never came. 
The official philosophy was expressed by Pierre Jumayil’s famous 
formula: ‘Lebanon’s strength lies in its weakness’. Lebanon was 
desperately trying to extricate itself from any responsibility for 
belonging to a region dominated by the Arab–Israeli conflict. As 
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Jonathan Randall says, the army was there to defend the system, 
not the homeland:
The Christians of Lebanon had never wanted a real national 
army, for – good merchant descendants of the Phoenicians that 
they claimed to be – they did not want to pay for it. They did not 
want to provoke Israel, and they did not want to encourage the 
growth of an armed force that might then stage a coup d’état, 
as so often had been the case in other Arab countries. But they 
were to pay the price.28
Be that as it may, some individuals were making good business 
out of the army and many an official figure was implicated in the 
scandals of the French Crotales anti-air missiles, the air-defence 
radar for the Baruk Mountain and the French Mirage jets.29 In 
1969, LL 200 million was disbursed by the state to modernise 
the army. After that, every arms purchase was accompanied by a 
financial scandal and it was also revealed that arms, bought in the 
name of national defence, were in fact destined for use in internal 
repression. General Fuad Lahhud, MP for the Matn and president 
of Parliament’s defence committee, exclaimed when he discovered 
the list of arms required: ‘We must define the task of the army. Has 
it been built to fight against the Left? … Has it been built to fight 
the fedayeen?’ He revealed flagrant irregularities in the purchase 
of French AMX-12 tanks, light tanks unfit for national defence 
purposes. Middlemen had pocketed large commissions despite the 
fact that the transaction was between the French and Lebanese 
governments. Worse, older models were bought only because the 
commissions on them were higher (30 per cent compared to 7 per 
cent for the more recent models).
In April 1973, an Israeli special operations unit called the Sayeret 
Mat`kal, commanded by Lieutenant Ehud Barak, assassinated two 
leaders of Fatah, Abu Yusuf al-Najjar, Kamal `Udwan, and the 
poet Kamal Nasir, spokesperson for the PLO, in Verdun Street 
in Beirut. They were just a hundred metres from a major police 
barracks. Prime Minister Sa’ib Salam demanded the resignation of 
the commander-in-chief of the army. Enjoying political cover by 
the president, the army and its chief were declared ‘untouchable’ 
and it was the prime minister who had to go, as a quarter of a 
million people took to the streets to bid their last farewell to the 
assassinated PLO leaders and vent their anger at an army that was 
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always present for internal repression and always absent when it 
came to national defence. 
BEIrUT, CAPITAL Of ArAB CULTUrE
From the 1950s to the early 1970s Beirut became the capital of Arab 
culture, witnessing what could be described as a second Nahda. 
Artists, writers, actors, publishers, journalists and translators 
flocked to the city, attracted by its relatively liberal political and 
social climate. By the 1960s, if you wanted a piece of news or an 
opinion to reach the widest number of Arab readers, you had to 
ensure it was published in a newspaper or weekly in Beirut. Poets 
gathered in the city’s cafés, political dissidents and student activists 
talked late into the night in the bars clustered around the AUB, 
and singers and actors came from around the world to perform 
in Lebanon’s festivals. Beirut, for a time, was at the heart of Arab 
cultural and political life. 
This second Nahda owed much to its predecessor. The cultural 
infrastructure put in place during the first Nahda in the middle of 
the nineteenth century paved the way for a more pluralistic, open 
society. The inauguration of the LU had broken the monopoly of 
private foreign universities over higher education and opened access 
to the sons of the middle and lower-middle classes. Not only did 
the LU broaden the intelligentsia in terms of numbers, quality and 
specialisation, but it provided Lebanon with a new generation of 
intellectuals, journalists, poets, novelists and politicians. Combined 
with Beirut’s position as an economic and cultural intermediary 
between Europe and the US, on one hand, and the Arab hinterland, 
on the other, the stage was set for a Lebanon-led Arab cultural 
renaissance. 
Much of the action took place in the capital city itself, 
concentrated in the cosmopolitan Ras Beirut district and focused 
around the AUB. Nearby Hamra Street had the first modern office 
and apartment buildings, hotels and furnished flats catering for the 
foreign community and a trendy commercial street. Ras Beirut was 
also the centre of Beirut’s café life. Faysal Restaurant, facing AUB, 
in addition to serving Lebanese home cooking, was famous for its 
political and intellectual circles. A few metres away, Uncle Sam or 
Sheikh and Cousin were better suited to consumers of American 
coffee and junk food. The most illustrious of the Hamra cafés was 
the Horse Shoe, favoured by journalists and refugee politicians from 
the neighbouring Arab countries. But cafés and restaurants were 
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not confined to the Ras Beirut area. Downtown, cafés ranged from 
Hajj Daoud, surviving from Ottoman times and built on wooden 
pillars over the Mediterranean, to the bohemian La Palette, the 
hiding place of Beirut’s artists and fine arts students near the Burj 
area. In between, the café of the Roxy Cinema served as the meeting 
place of the intellectuals of the independence period. Not content 
with the closing hours of the Hamra cafés, one could stroll to the 
seafront cafés of Raouche, which stayed open till daybreak, or 
simply plunge into the mysteries and pleasures of Beirut’s nightlife 
in the Zeitouneh quarter on the seaside. 
The printed press played a central role in Beirut’s cultural and 
political life, and the city’s newspapers were distributed from the 
Atlantic to the Gulf. Press plurality and freedom was enhanced by a 
tradition of liberties rather than by entrenched democratic traditions, 
legislations or institutions. The freedom of the press could be 
violated at the whim of the president, the folly of the prime minister 
or the authoritarianism of the security apparatus, and censorship 
did exist. Journalists from both sides of the political spectrum were 
incarcerated for their views, from Georges Hawi (later secretary-
general of the Lebanese Communist Party) to the conservative 
liberal Ghassan Tuwayni, editor of the right-wing Al-Nahar.
Before long, authoritarian and dictatorial regimes, as well as 
Israeli intelligence agencies, resorted to the gun to muzzle journalists 
and punish them for their opinions by death. The toll on Lebanese 
journalists was heavy, with the assassinations of Nassib al-Matni 
of Al-Tallaghraf; Kamil Mroua, editor of the conservative and 
anti-Nasser Al-Hayat; Ghassan Kanafani, the Palestinian novelist, 
journalist and militant; Farjallah al-Hilu, former leader of the LCP; 
and later Salim al-Lawzi, the editor of Al-Hawadeth; Riad Taha, 
president of the syndicate of journalists, and others. They were the 
precursors to journalists like Samir Kassir and Jibran Tuwayni, 
murdered in the postwar years, allegedly for their anti-Syrian views. 
The liberty and plurality of the Beirut media was not only 
guaranteed by lofty ideals; Arab and international money greased the 
wheels of the printing presses, with conservative, wealthy Gulf rulers 
and military dictators alike seeking a forum for their propaganda 
and ideology in the cold war between the two Arab camps. With 
the death of its founder, Al-Hayat was soon replaced by Al-Nahar 
as the intellectual organ of opposition to Shihabism, Nasserism and 
Communism. Its competitor was the pro-Nasser Al-Muharrir, edited 
by Hisham Abou Dhar, and to a lesser extent Al-Anwar published 
by Dar al-Sayyad. Eventually they gave way to Al-Safir, founded 
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by Talal Salman in 1974, edited by a new generation of nationalist 
and leftist journalists and closely linked to the dreams and struggles 
of Palestinian liberation. In addition to these leading dailies were 
the countless organs of the political parties,30 the foreign-language 
papers31 and myriad well-known weeklies.32  
Cultural magazines exercised a sizeable influence that went 
beyond Lebanon, speaking to a new generation of Arab youth and 
intellectuals. Some of the most popular and influential publications 
included Al-Adib, founded by Albert Adib, Al-Adaab by the novelist 
and publisher Suheil Idriss, Al-Tariq of the LCP and Dirassat 
`Arabiyyah edited by Bashir Da’ouq. In literature, Shi`r, illustrated 
by Yusuf al-Khal, was more than a cultural magazine: it became the 
vanguard of modernism in Arabic poetry. A whole literary school 
in itself, it was and remains known for its translations of modern 
Western poetry, innovations and the introduction of the prose poem. 
Shi`r’s Thursday meetings at the Plaza Hotel in Hamra Street were 
attended by the architects of new modern Arab poetry – Khalil 
Hawi, Adonis, Muhammad al-Maghout, Shawqi abu-Shaqra, 
Unsi al-Hajj, Fu’ad Rifqa, and others. More luxurious but also 
more short-lived was Hiwar, edited by the Palestian poet Tawfiq 
Sayigh. The novelist Idriss’s Al-Adaab, older and with a wider Arab 
circulation, managed to marry Arab nationalism to existentialism 
and defend engaged literature. Last but not least of the latecomers 
was Mahmoud Darwish’s Al-Karmel.
Publishing houses, both famous ones such as Dar al-Adaab and 
Dar al-Talai`a and lesser-known ones, published works of fiction, 
political treatises, histories and textbooks for the Arab world, from 
Yemen to Algeria. It was in Beirut that the new generations of 
encyclopaedias and dictionaries were composed and published, as 
were the reprints of classic Arabic literary, philosophical, religious, 
scientific and cultural texts published by Dar Sader, Dar al-`Ilm 
Lilmalayeen and al-Maktaba al-Sharqiyyah. Closely related was 
Beirut’s role in translation for the rest of the Arab World, in all 
fields and from the major foreign languages.
In literature, novelists Fu’ad Kin’an, Suheil Idriss, Yussuf Habshi 
al-Ashqar, Toufic Yousef Awwad, Emilie Nasrallah and Leila 
Baalbaki penned modern Arabic classics. Some were Lebanese; 
others, like the Syrian Ghada al-Samman and the Palestinian 
Ghassan Kanafani, came from the rest of the Arab world but found 
inspiration in Lebanon. 
Over and above publishing, the most important cultural event of 
the period was undoubtedly the inauguration under President Kamil 
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Sham`un in 1956 of the Ba`albak International Festival in the city’s 
majestic Roman ruins. The event, described as the most prestigious 
cultural event in the Middle East, welcomed some 40,000 spectators 
in July and August of each year to watch some of the world’s greatest 
artists. On the steps of the Roman temple, overlooked by its famous 
six columns, they could see Dame Margot Fonteyn and Rudolf 
Nureyev in Swan Lake with the Royal Ballet; listen to Mstislav 
Rostropovich; watch Herbert von Karajan conducting; listen to 
Sviatoslav Richter in a piano concerto; and attend Shakespearean 
plays or modern ones by Eugene Ionesco, Georges Schehadé, Jean 
Cocteau or Aragon. Ella Fitzgerald, Dizzy Gillespie, Miles Davis and 
the incomparable Umm Kalthoum graced the Ba`albak nights, and 
the festival reinvigorated Lebanese folklore with the help of poets 
and composers such as ̀ Assi and Mansour Rahbani and, of course, 
the famous singer Fayrouz. Wadi` al-Safi, Nasri Shamseddine, Zaki 
Nassif and the al-Anwar, and the Karakalla folklore and dance 
troupes played out the Lebanese renaissance. 
One other aspect of Beirut’s cultural Nahda was the flowering 
of the theatrical scene, ranging from classicism to experimentalism 
to realism, passing by the Brechtian theatre, the Russian theatre, 
and tburlesque. Directors and actors Mounir Abou Debs, Jalal 
Khouri, Yacoub Chedrawi, Raymond Jebara, Antoine Multaqa, 
Berge Fazlian and Roger Assaf, and playwright Issam Mahfouz, 
led the charge. The period also witnessed the rebirth of Lebanese 
cinema in the hands of a new generation of directors.
 Finally, the primary difference of the cultural renaissance of 
the 1960s from the nineteenth-century Nahda was the decisive 
contribution of Arab intellectuals. So many flocked to Beirut to 
be published, to visit, to settle down, to flee oppression in their 
countries, or because Beirut was their ‘last tent’, as Mahmoud 
Darwish puts it. The city provided an atmosphere of freedom and 
creativity and the promise of an Arab modernity. As Edward Said 
wrote in Under the Last Sky: ‘Beirut’s genius resided in that it 
immediately met our needs, we Arabs, in an Arab world that had 
become repressive, grey and just silly to an unbearable degree. For 
years, you could shine in Beirut like the glow of a jewel; even vice 
in it … had a brilliance you would not find anywhere else.’
The Syrian poet ̀ Ali Ahmad Sa`id – better known as Adonis – was 
among the earliest to arrive. Said to have converted to Christianity, 
he wrote his doctorate at USJ, supervised by a Jesuit priest, and 
taught at the LU. Muhammad al-Maghut, a Syrian Baudelaire, 
loitered in the city’s streets and cheap bars and was a pioneer in 
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prose poetry. In Beirut, Nizar Qabbani composed his more mature 
poems, singing the city-eternal-female, lampooning Arab regimes 
and rulers and bewailing the death of his wife, killed in an explosion 
at the Iraqi embassy. From Dayr al-Zor in the Syrian northeast 
came Yassin al-Hafez, who recalled how the Lebanese capital taught 
him to respect time and treat his wife is a civilised manner. Hafez 
produced some of the best pages on the 1967 Naksa (setback), the 
defeat of the Arabs in the Arab–Israeli war, delving deep into the 
very structure of rent-oriented and anachronistic Arab societies to 
call for a radical, structural, social and cultural upheaval. From 
nearby Damascus, Sadeq Jalal al-`Azm taught at the AUB, wrote 
a devastating autocritique of Arab politics, culture and myths that 
contributed to the 1967 debacle, and stirred a violent controversy 
with his Critique of Religious Thought, which was bitterly attacked 
by the Sunni religious establishment. `Abd al-Rahman Mounif, the 
Saudi oil engineer, settled quietly in Beirut after having resigned 
membership in the pan-Arab leadership in the Ba`ath party in order 
to devote himself to writing about his rich experiences and vent his 
anger in epic novels – most notably Cities of Salt. 
All were in search of something: solidarity with the Palestinian 
resistance, a refuge from persecution, promises of modernity, the 
discovery of self, the affirmation of individuality, the possibility of 
citizenship and the dream of freedom. As Beirut descended into 
the abyss of war, most of them left a city that had become their 
‘last star’.
sLIPPAGEs ANd dIVIsIONs 
In the 1970s Lebanese society walked a delicate tightrope, balancing 
between the drive to rebuild its unity through structural reforms 
and its conflict-laden division by an obsession with ‘security’, which 
failed to guarantee any security. If the unity of the bourgeoisie 
managed to obstruct any reform, the frustrations and divisions of 
the middle classes, the petite bourgeoisie and the poorer classes 
prepared the slippage to armed conflict. 
In fact, Jumblatt and his leftist and nationalist allies, on the one 
hand, and the Phalange and their allies, on the other, were disputing 
two contradictory versions of security. A supporter of a strong state 
based on an army backed by right-wing militias, opposed to any 
kind of reform, the Phalange party was only reprising its function 
as the defender of narrow sectarian privileges in the service of the 
big class interests. Jumblatt, now recognised in the Arab world 
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as the leading Muslim figure in Lebanon, emboldened by Syrian 
and Egyptian support and fully conscious that the presence of the 
Palestinian commandos had broken the Maronite ‘monopoly of 
violence’, proposed a bargain: moderate socio-economic reforms 
and more equitable participation by Muslims in managing the state, 
in return for an amicable limitation of PLO military activities by 
rigorously applying the Cairo Accords. Jumblatt’s rebellion, his 
calling into question the Lebanese socio-political regime in its 
entirety and his semi-suicidal adventure of 1975–76, were but the 
product of his exasperation after having failed to push through 
that choice. 
Before coming to the events of 1975–76, two movements deserve 
mention as they represent the impact of the social movement 
inside the Christian communities and the level of frustration on 
the Muslim side.
renewal and contestation in the religious institutions
At Christmas 1968, the Jeunesse Estudiantine Chrétienne (the 
Christian Student Youth – JEC) issued a manifesto that denounced 
the ‘material wealth and political might of our Church … which 
participates in the feudal and capitalist exploitation system in 
Lebanon and justifies it’. They called for a Church and Christians 
who consider themselves ‘an integral part of the Arab world and 
share in its problems, struggles and aspirations for liberation and the 
building of a developed society that belongs to all its members’. The 
manifesto concluded with a declaration of solidarity with the struggle 
of the Palestinian people and called upon fellow believers to commit 
themselves to a ‘radical transformation of Lebanese society’.33 
A multitude of organisations actively sought a radical renewal 
of the Maronite Church. Prominent among them were students 
at the Clerical College of Ghazir, the members of the seminary 
of Christ-the-King and the parish priests of the poor Christian 
suburbs of Jdeideh and Dikwaneh. In addition, worker-priests, 
influenced by the liberation theology of Latin America, had made 
their appearance in the Matn and the suburbs of Beirut, where 
they engaged in social work and literacy classes. The Rally of 
Committed Christians, established in 1974, a movement close to 
the Communists and the Lebanese National Movement, called 
for an open democratic and secular form of Arabism. The Young 
Orthodox Movement, led by Bishop George Khudr, represented 
the renaissance of Eastern Christianity, open to dialogue with 
Islam. In early 1974, a movement for ‘ecumenical renewal with 
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an independent perspective’ took shape around Grégoire Haddad, 
Greek Catholic bishop of Beirut. In his magazine Afaq (Horizons), 
Haddad critiqued the ‘exploitative social system’ in Lebanon, called 
for a serious commitment to ‘the cause of Arab Man’ and demanded 
‘change that will permit our society to become more equitable, more 
civilized and richer in human values’. Haddad’s popularity saved 
him from excommunication, but he was relieved of his bishopry. He 
had called for the abolition of religious marriage, which encouraged 
sectarianism and worked for the adoption of secularism. In the first 
weeks of the war, Haddad wrote that social inequality constituted 
the main cause of the crisis that led to the war. The solution lay in 
social justice, ensuring work, food, housing and health care for all. 
Rather than evade the security issue, Haddad reversed its terms. 
Change did not threaten security; maintaining the status quo did.34
Amal: the ‘third way’
In the early 1960s, a young Iranian imam arrived in Lebanon with 
substantial funds to launch social projects for the Shi`a community. 
His stay may have been relatively brief, but Musa al-Sadr was to 
have a deep and lasting impact on the Lebanese Shi`a. He settled 
in Tyre, where he attempted to fill the religious vacuum created 
by the death of the leading mujtahid Sayid `Abd al-Husayn Sharaf 
al-Din, and the political vacuum created by the death of Muhammad 
al Zayyat, the popular leader of the Arab Nationalist Movement 
(ANM) against the al-Khalil clan of local za`ims. Sadr, who 
advocated an enlightened and open religious discourse, tried to 
build a third force between the traditional leadership of the As`ads 
and the parties of the Left, especially the LCP, the OCA and the 
Ba`th, which were highly influential among the southern public, 
especially the youth. In his first endeavour, he managed to enlist 
the support of Sabri Hamadeh, Shi`i za`im of Ba`albak–Hirmil. As 
early as 1966, the reports of the US embassy in Beirut described 
Sadr as a bulwark against the influence of ̀ Abd al-Nasir on the Shi`i 
masses.35 In 1974, Sadr confessed to US ambassador G. McMurtrie 
Godley that his main concern was to counter Communist influence 
among Shi`i youth.36 
Snubbed by the Shi`i clergy, who were traditionally hostile to the 
government and za`ims and loyal to the religious authority in Najaf, 
Sadr attracted the attention of Charles Helou, the Shihabist ‘services’ 
and Michel Asmar’s Cénacle Libanais, a think tank of Maronite-style 
Lebanese nationalism. All were in search of a new Muslim ally 
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against the Sunni leadership and the Sunni ‘street’, considered too 
committed to `Abd al-Nasir and the Palestinian fedayeen. 
Upon Sadr’s initiative, the Shi`a completed their transformation 
into a structured and official sect. Law no. 72/76 of 19 December 
1967 recognised the right of the representatives of the Shi`i 
community to act and express themselves ‘in conformity with the 
fatwas emanating from the supreme authority of the community 
in the world’ (Article 1) and granted a Higher Islamic Shi`i Council 
(HISC) the prerogative of ‘defending the rights’ of the community 
and ‘improving its social and economic conditions’ (Article 5). The 
reference to a religious authority outside Lebanon was not new 
regarding the rights of Lebanese sects, but granting the HISC the role 
of defending the political, economic and social rights constituted a 
precedent. Two years later, in 1969, the HISC was created and Sadr 
nominated as its president. In May 1970, after an official day of 
solidarity with the south, the government recognised the new Shi`i 
body and disbursed $10 million in aid for the south.
During the rise of the social movements, Sadr’s populist discourse 
mainly emphasised the sectarian and regionalist aspects. His 
ambiguous message on the rights of the deprived (al-mahrumin) 
interpellated a multiplicity of social sectors: rich Shi`i émigrés from 
Africa, looking for a place in the political Lebanese system and 
a new social status befitting their newly acquired wealth; a wide 
sector of Shi`i intellectuals and government functionaries in search 
of employment or promotion, at a disadvantage compared to their 
Maronite and Sunni counterparts; and those southerners who had 
traditionally sat on the fence between the traditional leaders and 
the Left, many of whom had been organised by the ‘agencies’ in 
what was called the Partisans of the Army (Ansar al-Jaysh). Fouad 
Ajami, an American Shi`i intellectual of Lebanese origins, did not 
fail to notice and laud Sadr’s ‘concrete sectarian project for Lebanon’ 
that ‘crushes class differences’.37
Sadr emphasised the need to develop the south as a deprived 
region ‘before a revolution breaks out’. In order to do this, he 
demanded a share of the national budget, the expansion of the 
Litani project to irrigate southern land, and the construction of 
hospitals and schools. Perhaps more controversially, he found no 
contradiction between the armed Palestinian presence and Lebanese 
sovereignty. In response to demands for the cessation of Palestinian 
military operations, he said that safeguarding the borders of Israel 
was not Lebanon’s responsibility. Later, he proposed an Arab force 
for the defence of the south and an Arab fund for its development. 
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Yasser `Arafat’s Fatah movement, looking for allies outside the 
confines of the Left, played an important role in the creation of the 
Sadr’s Movement of the Deprived and its development. 
A large part of Sadr’s struggle on the eve of the war was devoted 
to imposing himself as principal spokesman for the South and 
the Shi`i community and confirming his presidency of the HISC. 
Contested by Kamil al-As`ad – who, in July 1972, founded his 
Democratic Socialist Party to also ‘counter Communist and Ba`thist 
influence in south Lebanon’ – Sadr managed to rally a number of 
Shi`i deputies, including Husayn al-Husayni, future president of 
Amal and speaker of Parliament. Sadr imposed the formation of a 
ministerial committee to discuss Shi`i demands, and in a meeting 
with Franjiyeh, 13 of the 19 Shi`i deputies threatened to resign if 
their community’s full rights were not recognised. 
During this period, Sadr distinguished himself by his populist 
meetings and tours of the South after Israeli bombing. In March 
1973, during a mass meeting of some 50,000 persons in Ba`albak, he 
unveiled his famous motto ‘arms are the ornaments of men’. Sidon 
and Tripoli, cities with a Sunni majority, welcomed him enthusi-
astically, and 190 personalities from all sects signed a petition in 
support of his Movement of the Deprived. In 1974, Sadr threatened 
civil disobedience if his demands were not met. In a mass meeting 
in Bidnayil (Ba`albak–Hirmil) he exclaimed: ‘We are Matawila [a 
pejorative term for the Shi`a] no more, we are rejectionists, avengers, 
a people in revolt against injustice’, and he threatened to launch 
his followers in an assault against the palaces of the rich and the 
mighty if their demands were not met.
‘Here is another one lost to the cause of revolution’, exclaimed the 
correspondent for The Economist in March 1974. This was not quite 
the case. Even as Sadr’s discourse was being radicalised, he became 
more reconciled with the system and moved closer to Franjiyeh. The 
president, on bad terms with Salam and isolated in the Sunni ‘street’, 
was looking for a Shi`i ally to face the Sunni leaders and the Left. 
The occasion was quickly seized. In the by-elections of Nabatiyeh in 
December 1974, Sadr’s candidate, a rich and obscure émigré from 
Africa, defeated Kamil al-As`ad’s candidate for the parliamentary 
seat. On the steps of the Presidential Palace, a few days later, Sadr 
declared that he had decided to ‘open a new page with the state’. 
While the Left and Nationalist parties were trying to link the 
southern question to demands that covered the entire national space, 
Sadr’s exclusivist position appeared problematic, at best. The two 
currents tested their weight in the elections for the Executive Bureau 
Traboulsi T02610 01 text   185 23/04/2012   08:07
186 A HIsTOry Of MOdErN LEBANON
of the HISC. The result was a draw: the Left managed to secure 
half of the body’s seats.
displaced frustrations 
Sadr had managed to put his finger on a burning question when 
he coined his slogan about the alliance between ‘those deprived 
in their homeland and those deprived of their homeland’. Young 
people humiliated by the defeat of June 1967, which continued to 
be played out in the daily war that Israel was waging in southern 
Lebanon, inspired by the example of Che Guevara and contesting 
the ‘merchant society’,, identified increasingly with the Palestinian 
resistance. The accumulated failures and frustrations of the social 
movements pushed some of the public in the same direction. A poem 
by `Abbas Baydun, the most promising of the new generation of 
Lebanese poets, is a good illustration of that spirit. His words, put 
into music by Marcel Khalifa, are addressed to `Ali, symbol of the 
‘people of the south / the barefooted of the cities’:
You have resisted 
to liberate your blood
from the garages of grease
and your mouth from the sugar warehouses
and your bones form the seats of the beyks and the charlatans.
But, `Ali, where will you find a land
For a proud head and two free hands?
Here the liberating influence of the fedayeen model operates 
indirectly by a slippage from the national to the social, not devoid 
of violence:
Every morning, a gun falls on the mountain
and we are but silent witnesses.
But a day will come 
when we will direct our ploughshares
To their obese 
and debauched hearts.
The evolution of the following events was a succession of attempts 
at armed liquidation of the fedayeen, alternating with concessions 
that always came too late.
Amin al-Hafiz, an economist and deputy for Tripoli in Karami’s 
parliamentary bloc, known for his good relations with the PLO, was 
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called upon to form a new government in April 1973. Presenting his 
cabinet as a revised version of the ‘youth’ cabinet, his short-lived 
tenure was dominated by an army offensive, ordered by the 
president, against the Palestinian camps in Sidon and Beirut. On 3 
May, the air force joined in and bombarded Burj al-Barajina refugee 
camp. Violent battles raged for two weeks between the army, backed 
by the Phalange, and the PLO, supported by the organisations of 
the Left. Syria’s decision to close its borders with Lebanon, coupled 
with a threat to close its airspace, imposed a cease-fire and the 
conclusion of a new accord between the Lebanese government and 
the PLO, known as the Melkart Accord. A month later, on 14 June, 
Hafiz resigned. 
Taqi al-Din al-Sulh, who succeeded him, was chosen primarily 
because of his Iraqi sympathies, in order to counter Syrian influence 
and rally the support of Muslim notables. The suggestion that 
Jumblatt take the ministry of the interior was met with a veto by 
Sham`un, Jumayil and Franjiyeh. In August 1973, the government 
announced 140 appointments to administrative posts and the 
‘abolition of sectarianism in the public function’: Grade One posts 
of directors-general would no longer be the reserved of a specific sect 
and the lower posts would be distributed on a parity basis between 
Christians and Muslims (compared to the earlier tradition of six 
Christians to five Muslims). Edde and Sham`un opposed the new 
measures in the name of Christian rights, while Jumayil accepted 
them ‘grudgingly’ as concessions to the ‘so-called disfavoured sects 
at the expense of the Maronites’.38 In fact the appointments were 
mainly designed to substitute Shihabist functionaries by partisans of 
the returning notables, Franjiyeh, Sulh, As`ad, Skaff and Hamadeh, 
and they had practically no impact on public opinion. 
During the Sulh mandate, it had become known that the 
Phalange and Sham`un’s National Liberal Party (NLP) were 
training and arming their followers, leading Jumblatt to accuse 
them of seeking to ‘liquidate’ the Palestinian resistance. In July 
1973, the first confrontation between armed Palestinians and the 
army, the Phalange and the partisans of Raymond Edde broke 
out in Dikwaneh (the southeast suburb of Beirut, adjacent to the 
Palestinian camp at Tall al-Za`tar). 
But the far more important development was the outbreak of 
the October 1973 Arab–Israeli war. Lebanon did not participate 
in the conflict but the Biqa` was transformed into a corridor used 
by the Israeli air force to raid Damascus and the Syrian cities of 
the interior, bypassing the strongly fortified southern approaches 
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to the Syrian capital defended by a sophisticated network of Soviet 
missiles.39 The war provided the occasion for the beginning of a 
new friendship between the Lebanese and Syrian presidents. On 
7 January 1974, the Franjiyeh–`Asad summit was a major event: 
a Syrian president was visiting Lebanon for the first time in 18 
years. On the agenda were shared water resources, the problem 
of Syrian workers in Lebanon, transport, transit and commercial 
exchange. The visit was crowned by the signature of a joint defence 
treaty granting Syria early-warning facilities on Lebanese territory 
against air strikes, in return for which Damascus committed itself 
to defend Lebanon against Israeli aggression upon the request of 
the Lebanese government. 
In September 1974, following confrontations in Tarshish (the 
Matn) between armed Phalange members and the Jumblatt’s PSP, 
Taqi al-Din al-Sulh submitted his resignation, accusing Franjiyeh 
of covering up a shipment of arms that arrived at Juniyeh for the 
Christian militias and was unloaded with the complicity of the army.
When Rashid al-Sulh succeeded his cousin Taqi al-Din, his 
government was supposed to please, or at least appease Jumblatt. 
But the division concerning Palestinian presence and the question of 
the defence of the south was widening. The year 1975 started with 
a general strike in the south and demonstrations in Beirut, precisely 
on that matter. A few weeks later, Jumayil declared that the Lebanese 
were split on the Palestinian presence and the military activities 
of the PLO, claiming the existence of ‘two governments and two 
armies’. He called upon the president to organise a referendum on 
the presence of the fedayeen on Lebanese territory. 
On 26 February 1975, a demonstration by fishermen in Sidon 
protesting against Protein, a fishing company in which Kamil 
Sham`un was a major shareholder, was fired upon by the army, 
leaving a number of dead and wounded. Among the casualties 
was Nasserite deputy Ma`ruf Sa`d, who was at the head of the 
demonstration, and died a few days later in hospital. The army 
was still ‘untouchable’ and Franjiyeh blocked an investigation into 
the shooting. Violent confrontations broke out between the army 
and the PLO fedayeen, and Nasserite and leftist organisations, 
at the beginning of March in Sidon. In response, the Phalange 
organised a counter-demonstration of solidarity with the army in 
East Beirut. It was only on 12 March that the cabinet acceded to 
some demands by the people of Sidon and the National Movement: 
two army officers were transferred and the governor of Sidon put 
on administrative leave for one month. Pierre Jumayil objected to 
Traboulsi T02610 01 text   188 23/04/2012   08:07
frOM sOCIAL CrIsIs TO CIVIL WAr (1968–1975) 189
the rotation of the officers; ‘they could no longer remain silent in 
the face of defiance and provocation’, he said. A month later, the 
same cabinet announced the cancellation of the Protein project and 
decided to compensate the fishermen. But it was too late, as usual. 
On the following day, 13 April 1975, shots were fired from a car 
at a congregation of Phalange partisans in front of a church in ̀ Ayn 
al-Rummaneh, wounding a number of people. Phalangist militiamen 
reacted a few hours later by machine-gunning a bus heading for 
the Tall al-Za`tar refugee camp, killing 21 Palestinians. Fighting 
broke out throughout the southeastern suburb of Beirut between 
the Phalange and the Palestinian resistance and their Lebanese allies. 
A war that was to last for 15 years had just begun.
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reform by Arms (1975–1976)
The adventure was worth the try … (Kamal Jumblatt)
The ‘Two Years’ War’, although commonly referred to as a ‘Christian–
Palestinian war’, was one in which internal factors played a major 
role. A duel had been engaged between two ‘modern’ populist forces 
that sprung from the country’s social crisis: the Phalange party and 
its allies in the Lebanese Front1 on the one hand and the nationalist 
and progressive movements of the Lebanese National Movement 
(LNM)2 on the other. Each attempted to impose itself on the country 
while simultaneously imposing itself as the unique representative 
of its own ‘camp’, while the increased involvement of the PLO in 
the fighting encouraged the intervention of outside parties, notably 
Israel and Syria.
sECUrITy Or rEfOrMs?
In the first phase of the war, two dynamics were at work: a game of 
exclusion between the two protagonists, and an armed ‘dialogue’ 
between security (through the deployment of the army) and 
political reforms. 
Throughout this phase of the conflict, the Phalange used arms to 
resist political and social reforms. When, after four days of violent 
fighting, they agreed to hand over two of their militiamen accused 
of the killing in ̀ Ayn al-Rummaneh, they launched a virulent attack 
against the Left, describing it as ‘malicious, vicious and on the 
payroll of foreigners … to destroy Lebanon and the Palestinian 
Resistance’; hence the urgency to ‘eradicate that infectious source’. 
The only error that the Phalange acknowledged was that they had 
‘made too many concessions’ that had been exploited by the Left.3 
The LNM’s answer was on the same level: it called for the ‘isolation’ 
of the party, an official ban on its activities and the expulsion of its 
ministers from the cabinet. Paradoxically, the party of Pierre Jumayil, 
blamed by the LNM for its ‘isolationism’ (in`izaliya) vis-à-vis the 
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rest of the Arab world, was being punished with isolation (`azl)! 
The rhetoric only increased the influence of the Phalange among 
the Christian public.
As the Christian ministers resigned in solidarity with the Phalange, 
Sulh presented his government’s resignation in an accusatory speech 
against the Phalange during a turbulent session of Parliament. 
Franjiyeh’s reaction expressed his inability to manage a crisis on 
which he had lost all influence. On 23 May, he named a military 
cabinet headed by a retired army officer, Brigadier-General Nur 
al-Din al-Rifa`i, charged with ‘establishing law and order’. This 
stillborn military government resigned three days later under 
pressure from a general strike called by the LNM, and backed 
by the Muslim political community along with Raymond Edde 
and a number of Christian figures. Franjiyeh promptly made an 
about-face and asked Rashid Karami to form a new government. 
Map 5 Beirut in the civil war, 1975–76
`
`
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Karami’s government, composed of six ministers excluding both 
the Phalange and Jumblatt, but providing a triumphant return of 
Kamil Sham`un to the political scene, negotiated a cease-fire with 
the help of Syrian mediators –who were intervening for the first 
time in the Lebanese crisis. 
Nevertheless, the fighting continued unabated. One party used 
the fighting to charge the army with the enforcement of ‘law and 
order’ while the other used armed pressure to impose reforms. In 
August 1975, the LNM issued its ‘Transitional Programme for the 
Democratic Reform of the Lebanese System’. Its highlights were 
the abolition of the system of political and administrative sectarian 
quotas; a voluntary civil code for personal status; a new electoral 
law based on proportional representation in which Lebanon would 
become a single electoral district; extensive administrative decen-
tralisation and the convocation of a constituent assembly on a 
non-sectarian basis. Jumayil’s response was to warn that reform 
meant ‘playing with fire’ and Al-`Amal insisted that the political 
domination of the Maronites was the only guarantee of protection 
for a minority condemned to oppression by a majority that was 
oppressive by its very nature, ‘involuntarily and even unconsciously’.4 
A few days later, on 22 August, Pierre Jumayil, influenced by the 
positive reactions to the LNM reform programme, called for the 
secularisation of the state – reduced to a unified personal status 
system and the distribution of administrative posts on the basis 
of competence. But he conceded that secularisation would be a 
transition toward abolishing political sectarianism in parliamentary 
representation and administrative posts (sectarian quotas would 
still apply to the three top state posts). Strangely enough, Jumayil 
concluded that the constitution and the National Pact of 1943 were 
untouchable and could only be modified if the unanimous approval 
of the Lebanese was secured. This was the same Jumayil who had 
called for a referendum to gauge the opinion of Lebanese about the 
armed Palestinian presence (requiring a threshold of at least 60 per 
cent public support) and rejected the recourse to a referendum on 
the abolition of political sectarianism.
‘No reforms, no army’, was the LNM’s response. In September, 
Karami tasked the army with ensuring internal security after having 
changed its controversial commander-in-chief. But the veto imposed 
by the LNM and the PLO against any engagement of the army in 
keeping order without prior acceptance of the reforms provoked 
two new rounds of fighting in Zahleh and Zgharta, called the 
fourth and fifth rounds of hostilities. Much of the military tension 
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between Zgharta and Tripoli was attributed to the Liberation Army 
of Zgharta (later renamed the Marada Forces, after the supposed 
ancestors of the Maronites), commanded by President Franjiyeh’s 
son Tony. When the army intervened to create a buffer zone between 
the two northern cities, it was accused of complicity with Zgharta. 
A call for a general strike by the LNM against the intervention of 
the army in the north provoked a new round of fighting in Beirut, 
in which the Phalange took the initiative to bombard the downtown 
district of the city, while their spokesperson declared that the fighting 
would not stop until the Lebanese army was deployed. 
sECULArIsM ANd THE ‘ABOLITION Of sECTArIANIsM’
A new cease-fire was declared and reinforced by the formation of 
a 20-member Committee for National Dialogue (CND) to discuss 
reforms, presided over jointly by Sham`un and Karami.5 However, 
the exchanges of fire between the protagonists continued throughout 
September and October. Despite this, the dialogue still sent a message 
of hope to the embattled country. A PLO delegation submitted a 
memorandum to the CND in which it reiterated its commitment to 
respect Lebanese sovereignty and reject any substitute homeland for 
the Palestinians. Musa al-Sadr exhorted the committee, in the name 
of the country’s religious dignitaries, to return to ‘coexistence among 
the country’s spiritual families (sects)’ while a joint delegation of 
the employers’ associations and the workers’ trade unions led by 
`Adnan Qassar and Iliyas al-Habr, threatened to occupy the CND’s 
headquarters until a programme of reforms was agreed upon. 
Inside the CND’s subcommittee on political reforms, discussion 
touched on the vital questions of public life, perhaps for the first time 
in the country’s history. The LNM reform programme dominated 
the discussions. Pierre Jumayil, who noted that the place for such 
discussions should be the Chamber of Deputies in circumstances 
other than those of armed conflict, threatened to leave the committee 
if it adopted any amendment to the constitution, and opposed 
any modification of the 6:5 Christian/Muslim ratio for sectarian 
political and administrative representation. When Raymond Edde 
called for secularism – reduced to the adoption of a civil code for 
personal status – as a transitional step toward abolishing political 
sectarianism, he provoked the expected reaction from the Muslim 
notables. `Abd Allah al-Yafi opposed civil marriage as a violation 
of a principal article of the Muslim faith (the ban on the marriage 
of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man). 
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The eminent constitutional jurist Edmond Rabbath, attempting 
to clarify the matter, started by defining the ongoing civil war as 
‘sectarian in form, and social in content and demands’, and held 
the system of ‘free enterprise’ responsible for the ‘social inequalities, 
covered by sectarian packaging’ and consequently the prevailing 
violence. Rabbat went on to distinguish between the abolition 
of political sectarianism and secularism. Sectarian pluralism, the 
independence of the sects and the political and administrative 
representation according to (presumed) numerical percentages 
of each sect among the population, he noted, were contrary to 
the fundamental democratic principle of the legal and political 
equality among citizens. He went on to say that the constitution had 
attempted to reconcile two irreconcilables: equality between citizens 
before the law, and the sectarian system of political representation. 
From the same angle, Rabbat discussed the question of personal 
status: the legislation on personal status violated the sovereignty 
of the state and the constitution as it subjected Lebanese to the 
legislation and decisions of non-Lebanese authorities such as 
the Vatican in Rome, al-Azhar in Cairo, and the Najaf in Iraq. 
In conclusion, Rabbat proposed two solutions: either civil court 
jurisdiction in cases of personal status according to the sect of those 
concerned, or the adoption of a unified civil code to which citizens 
adhere voluntarily, thus consecrating the key principle of democracy, 
that of personal choice. 
The committee voted almost unanimously to abolish sectarian 
quotas in Parliament and the administration – the only dissenter 
was Pierre Jumayil. Nevertheless, the Sham`un–Jumayil–Franjiyeh 
troika sabotaged the CND decision. Weeks later, Franjiyeh presented 
the cabinet with a totally different reform programme. Barring the 
road to any reform by any means – including the use of violence 
– was the aim of Phalangist politics throughout that phase of the 
war. Amin Jumayil said it in so many words: ‘We have tried to save 
institutions from any change. Although violence leads nowhere, it 
has helped us at least to save what could be saved. It was violence 
to conserve the system.’ He concluded: ‘We believe in dialogue; this 
is why we have had recourse to violence.’6
MILITAry EsCALATION
After the failure of dialogue on reforms, the dialogue of arms took 
over. Franjiyeh and his super-minister Sham`un, whose militias 
were actively participating in the fighting, were both directing the 
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government and commanding the army and the security forces. 
Karami, marginalised, shut himself up in the government building in 
West Beirut before suspending his government activity in November 
1975 to protest at the army’s complicity in unloading an arms 
shipment for the Christian militias in the port of Juniyeh.
Meanwhile, the LNM had gone on the offensive in West Beirut, 
insisting that it was impossible to establish order as long as Franjiyeh 
remained in power. They launched the ‘Battle of the Hotels’ to 
dislodge the Phalange militia from a mixed quarter of West Beirut 
that was located on the strategic road to the central bank. The 
offensive was a reaction to ‘Black Saturday’: on 6 December, as Pierre 
Jumayil and members of his politburo were on a visit to Damascus, 
the Phalange militia carried out a massacre in East Beirut. Triggered 
by the discovery of the corpses of four slain Phalange members, 
they murdered some 200 Muslim civilians, mostly port workers. 
On 9 December, the intervention of the army to recover the 
Saint-Georges and Phœnicia hotels led to a more direct intervention 
of the Palestinian organisations in the fighting. Franjiyeh joined the 
Phalangist , denouncing the ‘Zionist-leftist conspiracy’ and rejecting 
any dialogue as long as order was not established. The president, 
more and more isolated, still enjoyed the support of Al-Nahar and 
the ‘third force’ of pro-Syrian parties, especially the Lebanese branch 
of the Ba`th party and the partisans of Musa al-Sadr. At the beginning 
of armed hostilities, the Shi`i leader, shocked and marginalised by 
the war, refused to take sides and declared a hunger strike at the 
`Amiliya school until the formation of a new government of national 
unity. A month later, on 6 June 1975, he announced the creation 
of the Amal movement7 and soon an explosion in a Fatah training 
camp in the Ba`lbak region revealed that the imam already possessed 
an armed militia.
At the beginning of the new year Sham`un’s Numur (Tigers) and 
the Phalange militia launched their first ‘cleansing’ operation on their 
territory when al-Dhubayeh Palestinian Christian refugee camp, on 
the Matn coast, was attacked and its inhabitants expelled from the 
Christian part of the country. Simultaneously, the first attacks were 
launched against the Karantina (Quarantine) and Maslakh (the 
public slaughterhouse) shantytowns on Beirut’s northern coast. The 
Joint Forces of the LNM and the PLO responded by laying siege to 
Damur on the coast of the Shouf, a Maronite-majority town of some 
20,000 inhabitants that controlled the Beirut–Sidon road. Sham`un, 
entrenched nearby in his villa at Sa`diyat, ordered the army and the 
air force to defend Damur. Karantina fell to the Phalange militias 
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on 22 January 1976, and two days later the Joint Forces invaded 
Damur, Sa`diyat and Jiyeh. Massacres were committed in both cases.
After these rounds of fighting, the Phalange readjusted their aim 
and directly accused the Palestinians of intervention in the country’s 
internal affairs. Moreover, by February 1976 Pierre Jumayil had 
started calling for distributing the Palestinians of Lebanon among 
neighbouring Arab countries. At a time when Franjiyeh’s authority 
had become identified with the right-wing militias, the Phalange 
politburo found no better solution to the crisis than the ‘unity 
of force and of the will of the state’, accusing the Muslims of 
weakening both.8 That conception of unity ultimately contributed 
to the division of the army. Units with a majority of Muslim soldiers 
in the Biqa`, the north and the south rebelled under the leadership of 
second-rank Muslim officers. Thus a parallel army was born under 
the command of Colonel Ahmad al-Khatib, supported by Fatah and 
financed by Libya. Fighting flared up on all fronts, aggravated by 
the fighting for the control of the army’s military barracks.
On 23 January 1976, renewed Syrian mediation negotiated a 
cease-fire and decided to deploy units of the Palestinian Liberation 
Army (PLA) stationed in Syria along the ‘Green Line’ separating the 
two halves of the capital. Karami, who had resigned in opposition 
to the army’s siding with the Lebanese Front, accompanied 
Franjiyeh to Damascus where a constitutional charter was drafted 
establishing parity in political and administrative representation 
between Muslims and Christians and increasing the prerogatives 
of the prime minister. Announced in mid-February, the Charter was 
immediately rejected by the LNM, which insisted on abolishing 
political sectarianism and reforming the electoral system. On the 
other hand, the formation of a new cabinet was blocked by Sham`un 
and Jumayil who vetoed Jumblatt’s participation in the government.
As the ministerial crisis unfolded, retired Brigadier-General ̀ Aziz 
al-Ahdab took control of the state television station on 11 March 
1976 and decreed the removal of Sulayman Franjiyeh. Khatib’s rebel 
troops joined the coup. Despite the fact that the ‘television general’, 
as he was nicknamed, lacked the means to impose his decision he 
nevertheless succeeded in putting the president’s resignation on the 
agenda. The only ‘legitimate’ body remaining in the country, the 
Chamber of Deputies, soon joined the call for Franjiyeh’s departure, 
as its speaker, Kamil al-As`ad, presented the president with a 
petition signed by 69 deputies (out of 99), more than the two-thirds 
constitutionally required for that purpose. Inside the Phalange 
politburo, the majority supported Franjiyeh’s departure, but Jumayil 
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personally intervened to stop them from publicly announcing that 
decision.9 As`ad, Salam and Karami left for Damascus to request 
the intervention of Syrian authorities to convince Franjiyeh to take 
the ultimate salutary decision. President Assad remained committed 
to Franjiyeh but found him an honourable discharge: the election 
of his successor before the end of his term. However, on 25 March 
the Presidential Palace was bombarded and Franjiyeh took refuge 
in East Beirut, a sad indication of the breakdown of the state.
Meanwhile, another breakthrough occurred at the end of March, 
when Jumblatt and Assad met for the final time. The former, 
heading a Palestinian–Lebanese coalition that controlled 80 per 
cent of Lebanese territory, was engaging in his last bid to change 
the political system. In front of him sat a head of state gripped by 
a strategic vision to unify under his leadership four peoples and 
three countries (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians) as 
a counterweight to Sadat, who was inaugurating his step-by-step 
march toward a bilateral peace with Israel. Assad was hardly 
interested in the question of internal change in Lebanon, especially 
as a democratic and secular Lebanon was not exactly to his liking. 
In addition, he had committed himself to supporting Franjiyeh and 
the Phalange. A dialogue of the deaf ensued and lasted for more 
than seven hours. Jumblatt pleaded for Franjiyeh’s departure, the 
abolition of sectarianism and electoral reform before the election 
of the new president. Assad, reminding his visitor that Syria was a 
secular state that refused to pose issues in sectarian terms, continued 
to back Franjiyeh and the constitutional document that confirmed 
sectarianism. The meeting was doomed to end with a dangerous 
rupture between the two men, as each had revealed to the other 
his true motives and aims. Jumblatt avowed that he was seeking to 
inflict a military defeat on the Lebanese Front and Assad revealed 
his intention to carry out a Syrian military incursion into Lebanon 
to control the PLO. 
THE syrIAN–IsrAELI ‘dETErrENT dIALOGUE’ 
This sudden and unexpected turnabout in Syrian politics was 
noticed by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and put to use in 
his step-by-step strategy for solving the Arab–Israeli conflict. He 
could also not have failed to notice a BBC interview with Assad 
in 1975 in which the Syrian president declared that he stood for a 
settlement with Israel formalised by a peace treaty. In his attempt to 
integrate both Arab protagonists of the October 1973 war, Kissinger 
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had already coined a famous slogan: ‘There can be no war in the 
Middle East without Egypt and no peace without Syria.’ 
Since January 1976, the US administration had lauded the positive 
political role of Syria in Lebanon and supported the constitutional 
document signed in Damascus by Franjiyeh and Karami. But when, 
on 14 March 1976, Brigadier-General Hikmat Shihabi approached 
US ambassador Richard Murphy in Damascus and spoke vaguely 
of Syria’s intention to intervene militarily in Lebanon, Kissinger 
instructed Murphy to clarify the matter with President Assad. On 
March 18, Assad informed Murphy that President Franjiyeh had 
requested Syrian military assistance and that he planned to ‘extend 
a helping hand to our brothers’. When Murphy mentioned the 
sensitive issue of the security of Israel’s borders, Assad answered 
that he could not guarantee anything concerning Israel’s borders 
but hoped the US would urge Israel to understand that ‘they have 
nothing to do with this internal Arab affair’. 
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin’s first reaction was to inform the 
Americans on 23 March that Israeli forces would occupy strategic 
positions on Lebanese territory ‘as quietly as they can’ in the event 
of Syrian military intervention. Nevertheless, on the following day, 
an Israeli memorandum specified that the Israeli cabinet would 
consider a Syrian military presence above brigade size unacceptable 
and would not tolerate movement of Syrian forces beyond an area of 
ten kilometres south of the Beirut–Damascus road. The famous ‘red 
lines’ between the two regional powers had already been laid down.10 
Upon Kissinger’s recommendation, Dean Brown was dispatched 
to Beirut as a special emissary of US President Ford. Brown, who 
served as ambassador to Amman during the bloody confrontations 
between King Hussein’s army and the fedayeen in September 1970, 
arrived in Beirut on 31 March to be greeted by a ten-day cease-fire 
agreement. Brown reported to his superior on 1 April that the 
Christians ‘want the Syrians to save them’. Inside the Lebanese 
Front, Franjiyeh and the Phalange had already won over to Syrian 
military intervention, but Sham`un and Charles Malik hoped for an 
American military intervention under UN auspices. Brown made it 
clear to them that a new military venture, barely one year after the 
Vietnam debacle, would not be understood or accepted by American 
public opinion.11 
In fact, the Lebanese Front’s decision to ask for Syrian military 
intervention came after failing to directly involve Israel militarily 
in the Lebanese conflict. The first contacts between the Lebanese 
Front and Israel began in September 1975 when George `Adwan, 
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a leader of the extreme right-wing organisation Tanzim, known for 
its close links to the army, arrived at the Israeli embassy in Paris, 
declared his identity and asked to meet an official. He was received 
by David Kimche, coordinator of Lebanese activities for Mossad, 
who happened to be passing through Paris. A few days later, Kimche 
and Colonel Benyamin bin-Elezier (alias Fuad) arrived in Juniyeh 
and held separate meetings with Pierre Jumayil and his son Bashir, 
and with Kamil Sham`un and his son Dany. Another secret meeting 
was organised in mid-September between Kamil Sham`un and Pierre 
Jumayil and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on board an Israeli navy 
speedboat off the Lebanese coast. The Israelis decided to give the 
Phalange arms, ammunitions and training but there was no question 
of their direct intervention in the Lebanese conflict.12 On 12 March 
1976, Bashir Jumayil sent a Phalange delegation headed by Joseph 
Abu Khalil to Tel Aviv where they met Prime Minister Peres and, 
some time later, Elezier visited Lebanon and attended the siege of 
Tall al-Za`tar.13 Peres and Elezier reiterated that Israel was neither 
ready nor willing to engage itself in a direct military intervention 
in Lebanon. This position was highly instrumental in the Lebanese 
Front’s opting for Syrian military intervention. 
Be that as it may, Brown was not worried about the Christian 
military situation – ‘they could probably hold out indefinitely 
against the Leftist–Moslem alliance alone unless fedayeen gave them 
all out support’, he wrote to Kissinger.14 On the other hand, the 
American emissary harboured no illusions that the Lebanese army 
was capable of putting an end to the armed conflict.15 
Brown had left the US with instructions from Kissinger that the 
‘Syrians should be kept out’ of Lebanon militarily. However, during 
his Lebanese mission, the US-brokered Syrian military intervention 
had been arranged. Reassured by his superior that Israel would not 
object to a limited military incursion by Damascus, he had no doubt 
that the Left and the PLO would be its victims: 
If Lebanon’s neighbor to the East has not overly disturbed 
Lebanon’s neighbor to the South, the same cannot be said 
about the Lebanese Left and the Palestinians. These groups, first 
informed that there was no significant buildup, are now faced with 
a fait accompli, softened only by the alleged assurance (obviously 
false) that the intervention is designed to strengthen the position 
of the Left. Assad’s tough speech drives for fast thought that the 
Syrians will not let Arafat or Jumblatt obstruct Syrian actions.16
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On 12 April, President Assad, during a Ba`th party youth rally, 
violently attacked the LNM and the PLO and described their leaders 
as ‘criminals who buy and sell politics and revolution’, before 
declaring his country’s determination to intervene in Lebanon in 
order to ‘defend every oppressed against every oppressor’. Already 
on 9 April, units of al-Sa`iqa had entered Lebanon and started to lift 
the siege of Zahleh – a siege that the pro-Syrian fida’i organisation 
had originally imposed – while tanks of the Syrian regular army 
appeared inside Lebanese territory in ̀ Anjar, a few kilometres from 
the Syrian–Lebanese border, and at Judaydat Yabus and Bayadir 
al-`Adas further to the south. Brown ‘reassured’ Jumblatt when he 
inquired about these troop movements by telling him that the Syrians 
were on Lebanese territory in order to clear roads in the Biqa`, and 
denied that their intervention constituted any form of ‘occupation’. 
When it was brought to his attention that the clearing of roads 
did not require such a deployment of troops, Brown promised to 
inquire into the true size of the Syrian forces. In conclusion the 
envoy expressed the hope that Damascus would eventually control 
the Palestinians in Lebanon: ‘If one makes allowances for plans in 
this imperfect world, it is not out of the question that the Syrians 
will “enforce” the Cairo agreement against the Palestinians.’17
On 21 April 1976, Israel’s approval of the Syrian intervention 
was made public alongside its conditions. After reiterating its policy 
of non-intervention in Lebanese affairs, Israel made it clear that 
the Litani was a ‘red line’: any Syrian advance south of it would 
be regarded as a security threat to Israel. In fact, the ‘red line’ had 
shifted many kilometres southwards.
Thus, Syria and Israel were implicated in the Lebanese crisis and 
the Syrian–Israeli ‘deterrence dialogue’ on Lebanese territory was 
inaugurated.18 Kissinger left no doubt about the convergence of the 
two regional powers. He wrote in his memoirs: ‘We encouraged 
Israel to serve as arms supplier of the Christians even while Syria was 
acting – temporarily at least – as their protector.’19 Furthermore, he 
had every reason to be happy with the ‘astonishing reversal of fronts’ 
he had helped create: Syria, the main advocate of the representation 
of the PLO in the peace talks (rejected by the US) was fighting the 
PLO or abstaining from doing so while Christian militias were 
besieging Palestinian camps. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, 
Syria’s main ally, was turning against Damascus because of the 
military and political pressure it was exerting on the Palestinians. 
Ironically, ‘moderate’ Egypt was backing the ‘radicals’.20 
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Brown disappeared just in time for the presidential elections to 
take place in his absence. But on the eve of his departure, the Los 
Angeles Times had already hinted that the US was backing Iliyas 
Sarkis. On 8 May, the MPs were accompanied by Syrian soldiers 
to Villa Mansour, on the front line separating the two halves of the 
city, while LNM and PLO mortar fire failed to sabotage the election. 
Saudi Arabia and the CIA spent large sums of money to buy votes 
and Sarkis was elected with the support of 66 votes. His rival, 
Raymond Edde, boycotted the elections as there was no guarantee 
that the vote would be free; he was followed by some 20 MPs from 
the parliamentary blocs of Jumblatt and Salam. 
THE rACE BETWEEN ArAB MEdIATION ANd MILITAry VICTOry
The eight months of fighting between spring and autumn 1976 
were the longest continuous period of military operations of all 
the war, and constituted one of its most destructive and murderous 
phases. During this period, the LNM and the PLO had a double 
strategy: to liberate Tall al-Za`tar, besieged since mid-March by the 
Phalange of Amin Jumayil and Sham`un’s Numur, and to impose 
military faits accomplis before the imminent massive intervention 
of the Syrian army. 
In Beirut, fighting flared on two fronts. On 22 March 1976, as 
the fall of Holiday Inn ended the Battle of the Hotels and signalled 
the end of Phalange presence in West Beirut, the front was stabilised 
along the Beirut–Damascus road. Further to the east, the Joint 
Forces of the LNM and the PLO deployed considerable efforts to 
open a breach in Phalange defences in the Shiyah/Sin al-Fil/Galerie 
Sim`an area in the vain hope of relieving the siege of Tall al-Za`tar. 
But the main thrust of the Joint Forces’ offensive aimed at breaking 
the defences of the Christian-held territories on three axes: upper 
Kisrawan, upper Matn (where the localities of `Ayn Tura and 
Mutayn had fallen to the Joint Forces in early April while Bikfaya, 
fief of the Jumayil clan, was now within reach of their artillery), and 
the ̀ Alay–Kahhaleh front, overlooking Ba`abda and East Beirut. The 
latter was defended by a Lebanese army contingent and saw some 
of the most deadly battles, with Lebanese and Palestinian fighters 
suffering heavy casualties (no fewer than a 1,000) without being 
able to breach the defences of the other side. 
On 1 June, President Assad, declaring that he was responding 
to a call for help from the inhabitants of the Maronite villages of 
Qubayat and `Andqit in `Akkar attacked by units of the Lebanese 
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Arab Army, announced that he had ordered the entry of 6,000 
Syrian soldiers into Lebanon. In a few days, the Syrian troops had 
reached 15,000 and had forked in three directions, toward `Akkar 
in the north, Zahleh in the Biqa` and Sidon in the south. A meeting 
of the Arab League in Cairo decided to send an Arab Deterrent 
Force (ADF) to Lebanon, a preparation for granting Syrian military 
intervention pan-Arab cover and legitimacy.
The Joint Forces declared a general mobilisation and put their 
fighters under a unified military command to face the Syrian 
offensive. In Sawfar, on the Beirut–Damascus road, the first thrust 
of the Syrian forces was halted, while in Sidon, Syrian tanks 
arriving from Jizzin met ferocious resistance by Fatah fighters and 
had to retreat after having lost some 20 tanks – they were left 
charred and destroyed in the city centre, an affront that President 
Assad referred to as a ‘cowardly massacre’. Meanwhile, the Sa`iqa 
troops and militants of the pro-Syrian Ba`th were crushed in the 
regions under the control of the Joint Forces. The Amal movement 
went underground, covered by the PLO. Sadr, definitively allied 
to Damascus and supporting its political and military initiatives, 
accused Jumblatt and the Left of being responsible for the war 
and wanting to continue fighting Christians ‘until the last Shi`i’. 
His positions in favour of Shi`i neutrality in the war earned him a 
promise by Pierre Jumayil to spare Nab`a, a predominantly Shi`ite 
enclave in the eastern suburb of Beirut – a promise that would not 
be kept. Shocked and distressed by the fall of Nab`a, following 
the Phalangist devastation of the Palestinian Tall al-Za`tar camp 
and the displacement of practically all of its 200,000 inhabitants, 
Sadr spent a good part of the next two years actively engaged in 
supporting the Iranian opposition. 
In Beirut, Jumblatt formed a ‘civil administration’ which he hoped 
to transform into a shadow government by including in it a number 
of Muslim figures from outside the LNM. He was disappointed by 
the refusal of the almost all of those invited to participate and had 
to put the civil administration in the hands of the LNM parties, 
headed by Albert Mansour, an independent deputy for the Biqa`. 
In a speech in Suhmur (the western Biqa`) in May 1976, Jumblatt 
accused the Arab regimes of opposing a ‘progressive and democratic 
regime in Lebanon’. ‘We are their mortal sin’, he concluded.21 Short 
of an upheaval of the Arab masses to revolt against their rulers, 
the only recourse that remained was to seek an internal solution. 
On 2 June 1976, Bashir Jumayil and Kamal Jumblatt met secretly 
at the apartment of Muhsin Dalloul, the vice-president of the 
Traboulsi T02610 01 text   205 23/04/2012   08:07
206 A HIsTOry Of MOdErN LEBANON
Progressive Socialist Party, in West Beirut. The meeting was held 
at the request of Jumayil who wanted to present his condolences 
to Kamal on the assassination of his sister, Linda al-Atrash, in her 
apartment in East Beirut a few days earlier. Bashir made it a point 
to provide the head of the LNM with information on the identity 
of his sister’s assassins, which was supposed to clear him of any 
responsibility for the murder. As for the subject of their encounter, 
the two men, equally opposed to a Syrian intervention, outdid each 
other in offering concessions. Jumblatt proposed that the president 
of the republic remain a Maronite Christian and insisted on a second 
chamber (the Senate) to represent the sects and counterbalance the 
non-sectarian Chamber of Deputies. Bashir, on the other hand, 
recited an act of faith in the complete secularisation of the state, 
including the abolition of political and administrative sectarianism. 
In return, he had only one request: the lifting of military pressure on 
the Christian regions, and particularly on his hometown of Bikfaya, 
a request that Jumblatt took it upon himself to fulfil. Encouraged by 
this encounter, the LNM called for a ‘peace of the brave’ through 
direct negotiations between the armed protagonists, the LNM and 
the Lebanese Front, in order to reach a ‘historic compromise’ that 
would end the war. Only Bashir Jumayil answered the call, declaring 
that he was amenable to the LNM’s programme of democratic 
reforms and that he accepted Palestinian presence in Lebanon as a 
fait accompli. He went on to attack the traditional political leaders 
(excluding Jumblatt and his own father) as well as the bourgeois 
of East Beirut who had fled the country with their capital. It was 
the poor who defended the Holiday Inn, he said, though they had 
never set foot in the luxurious hotel.22 But Bashir, at that time 
vice-commander of the Party’s ‘Regular Forces’ but not a member 
of its politburo, was incapable of meeting his commitments: all 
members of the party leadership had come around to backing the 
Syrian option.
In addition, the truce observed by the PLO and the LNM in 
support of a peaceful solution was shattered by the deterioration 
in conditions at Tall al-Za`tar, as the Lebanese Front exerted 
ever greater military pressure on the camp. The following weeks 
witnessed a revolving door of Arab mediations: one by the Arab 
League; the other, an interminable mission of reconciliation between 
the LNM, the Lebanese Front and Syria by `Abd al-Salam Jallud, 
the number-two man in the Libyan regime. The only result: a new 
cease-fire announced by `Arafat and Assad on 29 July 1976, soon 
violated by the counter-offensive of the Phalange, which occupied 
Traboulsi T02610 01 text   206 23/04/2012   08:07
rEfOrM By ArMs (1975–1976) 207
Nab`a on 6 August – expelling some 200,000 Shi`a Muslims 
from East Beirut – before launching their final assault on Tall 
al-Za`tar. On 12 August, the Palestinian camp fell after six months 
of resistance. The devastated camp was ‘the scene of one of the 
worst massacres of the war perpetrated by either side’, wrote John 
Bulloch, correspondent for the London Daily Telegraph.23 Hundreds 
of Palestinians (and Lebanese) were killed inside the camp and 
more still as they were trying to flee, not to speak of the kidnapped 
and disappeared. 
On 23 September 1976, Sarkis replaced Franjiyeh as president 
as the Syrian forces launched their final offensive against the Joint 
Forces in the Mountain and Sidon and encircled Beirut. Meanwhile, 
Jumblatt had left West Beirut – besieged by Israeli speedboats and 
Syrian troops who had occupied the airport – by sea to Cyprus for 
a tour of Arab states and France. This was his last effort to balance 
the Syrian troops in the ADF with contingents from the major Arab 
countries. In Cairo, Sadat refused any involvement of his troops in 
peacekeeping in Lebanon and advised the head of the LNM to mend 
fences with Syria. In Algeria, President Boumeddiene explained 
that the Riyadh–Cairo–Damascus axis controlled all decisions 
concerning Lebanon. In France, the Lebanese socialist leader was 
warmly welcomed, but his meetings with the French authorities 
and with the leaders of the Left opposition of François Mitterrand 
convinced him that France would be unable to play any role in 
Lebanon as long as Syria and the US opposed it. 
A few days later, on 16 October, a mini-Arab Summit in Riyadh 
sealed the reconciliation between Assad and Sadat under the 
patronage of King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, and declared a cease-fire 
in Lebanon as of 21 October. Syrian troops were rebaptised the Arab 
Deterrent Forces with a symbolic participation of detachments from 
Saudi Arabia, the two Yemens and the United Arab Emirates. The 
free hand accorded to Syria by the Arabs in Lebanon was ratified by 
the eighth Arab summit in Cairo a few days later. In mid-November, 
the ADF made its unopposed entry into West Beirut. 
PArAdOXEs ANd ILLUsIONs Of THE LNM–PLO ALLIANCE
The LNM–PLO alliance was based on common interests that 
intersected but were never identical. The PLO’s main concern was to 
pursue its military operations against Israel from Lebanese territory, 
its last refuge after the Jordanian debacle of Black September in 1970. 
No doubt the PLO had benefited from the internal contradictions 
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and divisions of Lebanese society and the weakness of the state to 
achieve this aim. For its part, the LNM, in addition to its support for 
the PLO’s right to pursue its liberation struggle from Lebanon, was 
mainly interested in investing the PLO’s military weight to impose 
political reform, a goal toward which the PLO organisations held 
ambiguous if not contradictory positions. In any event, the mere 
presence of the Palestinian fedayeen served as a substitute army 
vis-à-vis a Lebanese army increasingly subject to the command of 
the Maronite leadership. This PLO military force permitted the 
LNM not only to face the stronger right-wing militias but also 
to move to the offensive in order to change the balance of power 
inside the country. On the other hand, armed Palestinian presence 
endowed the Lebanese conflicts with an additional weight that 
modified its very nature. What the LNM gained in terms of military 
strength, it lost in terms of popular support because of the sectarian 
division that this presence introduced into the Lebanese conflicts. 
This asymmetry of interests between two allies also expressed itself 
in the regional reactions toward the Lebanese crisis: there was no 
place in the positions of the different Arab regimes for a democratic 
secular Lebanon, but there still was some place for the PLO in the 
politics of an Arab world that was heading, with small steps and 
big divisions, toward a political solution of the Arab–Israeli conflict.
On the Palestinian side, the spectre of the Jordanian drama was 
still fresh in people’s minds and induced different reactions. One was 
uneasiness about supporting one group of the Lebanese protagonists 
against another. The other was a desperate search for a stable 
anchorage in the Lebanese population by strengthening the PLO’s 
alliance with the LNM. A conservative tendency, highly sensitive 
to the positions of the oil-producing Arab regimes, represented 
by Khalid al-Hasan, was against any involvement in the Lebanese 
war. The second tendency was represented by the left wing of Fatah 
led by Nimr Salih (alias ‘Abu Salih’, a member of the triumvirate 
leadership of the `Asifa, the military wing of Fatah, with `Arafat 
and Abu Jihad), Majid Abu Sharar, who headed the information 
departments of the PLO, and a number of influential officers who 
controlled the ‘regular’ forces of Fatah, namely Abu Musa and Abu 
Khalid al-`Amleh, who was a strong supporter of the alliance with 
the LNM. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
of George Habash and Nayif Hawatmeh’s Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) held a similar position, though 
the DFLP later rallied to the Syrian stance. Between the two lay the 
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‘centre’ around the leading troika of `Arafat–Abu Jihad–Abu Iyad, 
although the latter leaned more toward the Left. 
Fatah units in the Biqa`, under the direct command of Abu 
Jihad, did not oppose the Syrian advance, although the localities 
of ̀ Anjar, Bayadir al-`Adas and especially the mountain pass of Dahr 
al-Baydar were ideal territory for such a resistance. Nevertheless, 
the Palestinian fedayeen engaged Syrian troops at Sawfar-Bhamdun, 
under the direct leadership of Abu Jihad, most probably in order 
to impose the interposition of Arab troops in Lebanon and also as 
a manoeuvre to make Syria suffer the consequences of the spilled 
Palestinian blood. On the other hand, the biggest deployment of 
Lebanese and Palestinian fighters, concentrated in the high Matn 
under the command of Abu Khalid al-`Amleh, did not even engage 
in battle against the advancing Syrian troops in September.
The Lebanese Marxist Left played an important role in the 
elaboration of the LNM programme. They had drawn the conclusion 
from the results of the 1972 elections and the politicisation of the 
social movements of the prewar years that it had no chance of 
achieving any of its socio-economic reforms without prior political 
reforms. The principal tactics of the LNM were to impose a new 
superstructure on the Lebanese oligarchy, ‘bourgeois’, modern and 
non-sectarian instead of its ‘feudal’, sectarian and ‘underdeveloped’ 
superstructure. Hassan ̀ Awada, representing the Left in the National 
Dialogue Committee, insisted that the reform programme of the 
LNM involved simple democratic reforms ‘within the context of the 
capitalist system’. It was also said that these reforms were destined to 
‘strengthen the [Lebanese political] system and enable it to respond 
to the requirements of the century’.24 However, the imposition 
of bourgeois rationality was exercised by threatening bourgeois 
economic interests. By this the LNM hoped that the bourgeoisie, 
rather than see its economy destabilised, would put pressure on 
the Phalange and Franjiyeh to compromise on the issue of reforms. 
In fact, the bourgeoisie in its different components opted for the 
‘security’ solution against reform; it sided with a strong government, 
namely a strong president of the republic. Nothing illustrated this 
dramatic choice more than the marginalisation of Raymond Edde, 
the representative of a ‘reformist bourgeois rationality’.
Be that as it may, the attempts to impose reforms through the 
force of arms were broken by the force of Syrian arms. At the end 
of 1976, Sarkis, crowned ‘king of the Arabs’ by the Arab heads of 
state, had under his command the 30,000 soldiers of the ADF. His 
government, headed by Salim al-Huss – a respected economist who 
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had served in the banking sector – started its activity by imposing 
press censorship and summoning the various militias to hand in 
their arms before 5 December. 
As if to close the Two Years’ War, its most notable protagonist, 
Kamal Jumblatt, was assassinated on his way from Mukhtara to 
Beirut on 16 March 1977, a punishment for venturing to change 
the Lebanese system and for his opposition to Syrian intervention 
in Lebanon. 
Everything indicated that Lebanon was finally moving toward 
peace. It was but the beginning of a new phase of the war.
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for the first time the nation has taken charge of the state. 
(Bashir Jumayil, proposed inaugural address)
When Bashir Jumayil was elected president of the Lebanese 
Republic in September 1982, Karim Pakradoni, one of his close 
collaborators, commented that it was the longest coup d’état in the 
history of Lebanon. The second phase of the war can be seen as the 
story of the unfolding of that coup against the background of the 
developments of the Arab–Israeli peace process and the collapse 
of the tripartite alliance between Syria, President Sarkis and the 
Lebanese Front, ending in the propulsion of Bashir Jumayil to the 
presidency of Lebanon backed by the US and the tanks of the Israeli 
army occupying Lebanon.
BrEAKUP Of THE TrIPArTITE ALLIANCE
Iliyas Sarkis took office as a partner in a tripartite alliance comprising 
Syria and the Lebanese Front. During the first years of his term, major 
events related to the American-brokered peace process between 
Egypt and Israel dissolved that alliance. On 19–21 November 1977, 
the Egyptian president made his spectacular visit to Jerusalem. Less 
than a year later, in September 1978, the Israeli–Egyptian Accords 
were signed in Camp David under the patronage of President Carter, 
and in March 1979 Menachem Begin and Anwar al-Sadat signed the 
Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty. Three factors related to that process 
undermined the basis of the Sarkis regime: the contradictory Arab 
reactions to Camp David; the Israeli counter-offensive against the 
Syrian role and the Palestinian presence in Lebanon; the shift in the 
Phalange alliance from Syria to Israel and the latter’s decision to 
intervene directly in Lebanese affairs. 
The immediate effect of the Camp David Accords was a change 
in Damascus’s priorities toward the PLO. ̀ Abd al-Halim Khaddam, 
who boasted that he would disarm the Palestinians in Lebanon ‘until 
the last kitchen knife’, did not even achieve the much pressed-for 
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application of the Cairo Accords, as Brown had hoped. The Syrian 
authorities needed to wean the PLO away from Sadat’s fold to 
join Assad’s strategic alliance. The Syrian leader’s project was 
double-edged: it aimed at forming an Arab bloc to fill the gap left 
by Sadat’s defection, but it could equally serve Assad to negotiate, 
from a position of force, a peace accord with the Jewish state, in the 
name of three countries and four peoples (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan 
and the Palestinians). ̀ Arafat, having survived the Syrian onslaught, 
including the attempts to replace him at the head of Fatah and the 
PLO, found a reprieve in the Syrian advances. Paradoxically, it was 
during that phase of the Lebanese war that ̀ Arafat’s mini-state was 
built on Lebanese territory in spite of the massive presence of the 
predominantly Syrian Arab Deterrent Force.
On the other hand, the mounting Israeli offensive in Lebanon went 
hand in hand with the progress registered in the peace negotiations 
with Egypt, especially after the coming to power of Menachem 
Begin in 1977. In June 1976, Israel opened the ‘good frontier’ in 
the south and co-opted the dissidents of the units of the Lebanese 
army under Major Sa`d Haddad, who founded the Army of Free 
Lebanon (AFL). The Phalange used the southern militias to put 
pressure on Syria and the central government to abrogate the Cairo 
Accords, disarm the Palestinian organisations and redistribute the 
Palestinians of Lebanon among the Arab countries. The PLO, for 
its part, responded to the pressing demands for the deployment of 
the army in the south by imposing two conditions: the closure of the 
‘good frontier’ and a break in relations between the Lebanese Front 
and the Jewish state. Israel’s offensive escalated with Operation 
Litani of March 1978 which led to the creation of the frontier zone 
under the control of Haddad’s AFL, financed, armed and officered 
by the Israeli army. Rabin’s warning to the US that the Israelis would 
occupy strategic positions on Lebanese territory ‘as quietly as they 
can’ had been put into practice. The UN sent an international force 
to the south to try and diffuse the situation, but the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mostly served as a safety net to 
reinforce Israel’s control over the border strip.
Meanwhile, talks between Damascus and its Phalange allies were 
becoming increasingly pointless. Damascus used the argument 
that its intervention had saved the Lebanese Front from inevitable 
defeat, in order to demand allegiance and the cutting of the Lebanese 
Front’s ties with Israel. Reinforced by these same Israeli ties, the 
Lebanese Front demanded that Syria disarm the PLO. 
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THE sECUrITy drEAM Of ILIyAs sArKIs
It has been written that Syria and the US, by electing Sarkis, had 
staged a coup d’état to avert a revolution. The new president did all 
he could to implement that coup d’état. He was practically the exact 
opposite of his mentor Fu’ad Shihab. True, the latter based his rule 
on the army and the security services; however, in order to achieve 
political stability and social control, he achieved a series of major 
economic, social, educational, administrative and political reforms. 
Whereas Shihab took seriously his own motto of ‘no vanquished 
and no victor’, his disciple believed the war had ended with a victory 
for the Lebanese Front and defeat for the PLO, the LNM and, by 
extension, the Muslims.
Sarkis’s first task was to consolidate his presidential prerogatives. 
Salim al-Huss had formed a government of technocrats and 
businessmen. But the real power lay in the hands of the president’s 
men: Fu’ad Butrus, Sarkis’s alter ego and the only politician in 
the cabinet, who held the posts of minister of foreign affairs and 
minister of defence;1 Faruq Abillama`, a personal friend, was named 
director of general security; Ahmad al-Hajj, a Shihabi officer, headed 
the Arab Deterrent Force but failed to win over Syrian sympathy 
and was soon replaced by the more amenable Sami al-Khatib. 
Finally, Johnny ̀ Abdu, an army officer of Palestinian origin known 
for his American sympathies, took over the rehabilitated Military 
Intelligence (formerly the Deuxième Bureau). Sarkis had inherited a 
weak and divided army; `Abdu transformed part of it into a strike 
force under his direct command. 
In the economic and social fields, Sarkis’s security fixation 
was expressed in his motto ‘security before bread’, a pretext for 
attributing all of the socio-economic difficulties to the absence of 
security. His reconstruction policies revolved around the banking 
sector, increasingly subject to foreign capital, and pursued 
privatisation policies initiated under Franjiyeh.
The only relic of Shihabism that Sarkis preserved was a project 
to rebuild the political system on the basis of a Maronite–Druze 
alliance represented by Kamal Jumblatt’s son, Walid, and Bashir 
Jumayil, but with a power relationship neatly tipped in favour of the 
latter. Johnny `Abdu deployed considerable effort to dissociate the 
Druze chief from his partners in the LNM and the PLO, including 
dispatching booby-trapped cars to West Beirut.
One of the rare political initiatives of the president was a project 
for ‘national concord’ presented in 1980. All the parties to the 
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conflict approved it, but the initiative was killed by a veto from Pierre 
Jumayil. Less than a month later, in February of that year, Sarkis 
returned from the Arab summit at Ta’if, insisting on the priority 
of the deploying the army over political reforms. Convinced that 
the Camp David peace process would not dissociate Lebanon from 
the Arab–Israeli conflict, Sarkis opted for the unity of presidential 
prerogatives, and for the unity of Bashir Jumayil’s political 
representation of the Christians. After a campaign against the 
duality of power between president and prime minister, he replaced 
Salim al-Huss with Shafiq al-Wazzan, a more conservative and 
malleable politician. Caught between the contradictory pressures 
of his two allies, Syria and the Phalange party, and having to deal 
with two mini-states, the Marounistan of Bashir Jumayil – as the 
foreign press called the Phalange refuge – and the Fakhani statelet 
of Yasser ̀ Arafat, Sarkis finally opted to help and protect the former. 
Incapable of fully executing his own coup d’état, he decided to help 
prepare one for Bashir. 
THE rEsIsTIBLE rIsE Of BAsHIr JUMAyIL 
Bashir Jumayil began his rise to power when he succeeded William 
Hawi as chief of the Phalange’s Security Council upon the latter’s 
death during the siege of Tall al-Za`tar camp. Bashir, who had 
resigned from all his posts in protest at the entry of Syrian troops 
into East Beirut and already enjoying firm Israeli backing, accepted 
a compromise brokered by his father. He was granted funds to build 
new military units and transform Karantina into a headquarters for 
his Security Council, which was baptised Military Council. Thus the 
1,000-strong SKS (Section Kata’ib de Sécurité) was created, under 
Bashir’s sole command, which he used to dominate local chiefs and 
establish his control over East Beirut. In 1977, Bashir had rallied the 
party’s Kisrawan section to his side and besieged his older brother 
Amin’s fief in the Matn.2 
Two major factors contributed to Bashir’s rise: first, the 
stabilisation of the military front in Beirut, pacified for a while by 
the ADF, which led to the withdrawal of each camp to its ‘own’ 
region. Second, the progressive crumbling of the tripartite alliance 
between Sarkis, Syria and the Phalange party. But the constituents 
of what became the Lebanese Forces had a deeper social meaning. 
They represented the rise of new social forces (youth, fighters, 
members of the professional middle class, members of subaltern 
families or villages, the salaried, and so on), all opposed in one 
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way or another to the traditional Christian leaders, including the 
Phalange leadership itself. 
Incapable of imposing himself directly on the family-run party, 
Bashir made a detour through the two weakest and most contested 
regions, the north and the Biqa`. In the north, a bitter conflict raged 
between the Phalange and the Franjiyeh clan. Sulayman Franjiyeh, 
faithful ally of Damascus, had left the Lebanese Front in protest 
at its Israeli connection. But the Phalange, well-entrenched in the 
villages and ‘farms’ subordinated to the ruling families of Zgharta, 
presented a serious challenge to the authority of the Franjiyehs. 
In June 1978, a unit of some 200 Phalange militiamen under the 
command of Samir Ja`ja`, the party leader of Bisharri, attacked 
Sulayman Franjiyeh’s villa in Ihdin. His son, Tony, Tony’s wife and 
their small daughter were killed in the battle. Bashir, who justified 
the attack as retaliation for the assassination of the northern 
Phalange leader, Jud al-Bayi`, attributed to the Franjiyeh clan, denied 
having given the order to kill the family of the ex-president’s son. 
He nevertheless qualified the military operation as an insurrection 
by ‘farmers’ against injustice and feudalism’. Bashir’s act divided 
the fighting Christian camp for the first time. With the advance of 
Syrian forces in the north, the control exercised by the Marada over 
Ihdin, Zgharta, `Akkar and parts of Batrun in the north of Mount 
Lebanon, and the control of the SSNP militia over the Matn town 
of Duhur al-Shuwayr, ‘Marounistan’ shrank to some 800 square 
kilometres, a mere one-thirteenth of Lebanese territory.3
More importantly, the Ihdin killing triggered the first Syrian–
Phalange confrontation in the summer and fall of 1978. Syrian 
troops, still forbidden by the ‘red lines’ agreement from invading 
East Beirut and the Christian part of Mount Lebanon, subjected 
them to a deluge of artillery fire. However, the ‘100 days’ battle’ 
ended with the withdrawal of Syrian positions from East Beirut, and 
Bashir, emerging from the rubble of East Beirut as the champion 
of the ‘Lebanese resistance’, began imposing himself as sole leader 
of the Christian zone. In 1978 and 1979, the regular Phalangist 
forces and Sham`un’s Numur gradually imposed their control over 
the militias of the Armenian parties in Beirut’s eastern suburbs, 
blaming them for being neutral in the war and refusing to pay 
taxes and protection money. On 7 July 1980, Sham`un’s Numur 
was overrun in turn in a bloodbath that left 150–200 dead, most 
of them civilians. Bashir wanted also to eliminate any competitor 
in his relationship with the Jewish state. Dany Sham`un left for 
exile while his father remained and adapted to the new situation. 
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In the name of ‘military unification within political pluralism’, the 
Lebanese Forces (LF) were created, run by an executive committee 
of eight members headed by Bashir, with three representatives from 
the Phalange, now firmly under Bashir’s control, two from the NLP, 
two from the Tanzim and one from the Guardians of the Cedars. 
The LF could mobilise 5,000 armed men, 4,000 of whom belonged 
to the Phalange militia. A few months later, the last armed enclave 
in the Matn, commanded by Amin Jumayil, fell under the control 
of the younger brother. 
Economically, Bashir articulated his political power on the 
tertiary sector of the economy. He took over the fifth basin of the 
Beirut port, organised a tax system on individuals and enterprises 
and administered the state’s public services. With the help of Sarkis, 
the vital state administrations in West Beirut (the central bank, the 
Lebanese University, and so on) were duplicated in East Beirut.
In order to extend his control over Lebanon’s Christian 
communities, the leader of the LF targeted Zahleh. Torn between 
its economic interests in the mainly Muslim Biqa` plain, its status 
as a Catholic city and its political sympathies that drew it toward 
the Mountain, the political paralysis that hit the city in the absence 
of any real internal leadership allowed Bashir to take over the 
capital of the Biqa` at the end of 1980 with a few dozen LF fighters 
sent from Beirut. He thus managed to escape Syrian control over 
the Matn highlands and provide his Christian ghetto with some 
depth. In March 1981 Syrian troops reacted, besieging the city 
and pounding the LF’s strongholds in Mount Sannin, demanding 
that the LF militiamen withdraw from the city and disengage the 
Beirut–Damascus road. As the conditions were rejected, Zahleh was 
besieged and bombarded. The battle of Zahleh allowed the LF to 
launch a successful campaign in the West against the danger of a 
‘genocide’ that threatened the ‘last Christian city in the Arab world’. 
Bashir had hoped to implicate Israel in a confrontation with 
Damascus through the Zahleh crisis. The long ‘missiles crisis’ 
between Israel and Syria was provoked by an incident related to 
the Zahleh fighting, as two Syrian helicopters transporting troops 
to Mount Sannin were downed by Israeli fighter planes. Tel Aviv 
charged that the helicopters were on fighting missions, a breach 
of the ‘red lines’ agreement. Damascus said they were merely 
transporting troops, and responded by introducing three batteries 
of Soviet-made SAM-3 surface-to-air missiles into the Biqa` and 
positioned a number of longer-range ones along the Syrian borders 
with Lebanon. Israel felt that the strategic balance between the 
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two countries had been disrupted, and demanded the immediate 
withdrawal of the missiles. The crisis was defused at the end of long 
mediation by Philip Habib, a veteran diplomat of Lebanese origin, 
acting as the personal envoy of President Reagan. 
As for Zahleh, the LF fighters eventually vacated the town and 
Syrian troops were prevented from taking their place. The ‘red 
lines’ had withstood the test and Bashir Jumayil was saved thanks 
to the intervention of Kuwaiti and Saudi emissaries, who tried to 
convince him to sever his relations with Israel. Assad had accepted 
that the commander of the LF entrust Sarkis with a letter pledging 
to comply with that demand. But the Zahleh crisis introduced Bashir 
to the US administration; invited to Washington, Bashir was to be 
groomed for the Lebanese presidency. Ultimately, he did submit the 
famous letter but it had no effect: the US and Israel were already 
preparing the invasion of Lebanon. 
In March 1980, the LNM organised a military parade on the 
occasion of the third anniversary of the assassination of Kamal 
Jumblatt during which it launched a programme for ‘the peace 
of the brave’ that called for the reconstitution of national unity 
on the basis of political balance between the two warring camps. 
Al-`Amal responded (on 20 March 1980) by insisting that there 
would never be Lebanese unity as long as half a million Palestinians 
were on Lebanese territory, and demanded that priority be given 
to the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south. In October 
1980, the Phalange daily went on the offensive: the partition of 
the country had taken place in West Beirut, which had fallen under 
the control of the ‘Syrian Ba`thist, Palestinian, Communist and 
Arab Nationalist invasion’ that sought to change Lebanon’s identity 
in order to Arabise and Islamise the country. ‘Real Lebanon’ had 
been reduced to what was pejoratively called the ‘Christian ghetto’, 
concluded Al-`Amal.
Secure inside his ‘ghetto’, Bashir set about preparing a military 
takeover in the country with the help of Sarkis, as represented by 
Johnny `Abdu. Whereas the Lebanese Front fought the 1975–76 
war to defend the ‘sacred constitution’ against any amendment or 
change, it was now preparing a military campaign to impose radical 
modifications to that same constitution, to wipe out any trace of 
Muslim–Christian partnership in running the country’s affairs and 
establish decisive Christian control over the state. 
‘Study for seizure of power by Bashir’ was the title of a plan drafted 
in September 1980 by Lieutenant-Colonel Michel ̀ Awn and Antoine 
Najm for the eventuality of a power vacuum or the expiration of 
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Sarkis’s term of office. ̀ Awn – at the time, commander of the army’s 
8th Brigade in Mount Lebanon – was the closest Lebanese army 
officer to the LF. Najm, a philosophy teacher and ideologue of 
the Phalange, who resigned from the party in 1976 in opposition 
to Pierre Jumayil’s soft line, was Bashir’s closest adviser and the 
initiator of a federal plan that divided Lebanon into five regions. 
The plan ensured LF control over the largest and richest regions 
of Lebanon, while still sharing power in the others. The ‘study’, 
assuming that the putschists would be quite weak facing Syrian 
and Palestinian opposition, suggested an immediate agreement with 
Israel, mutual recognition by the two countries and a defence treaty.4 
A second plan drafted in December 1980 by Karim Pakradoni and 
Joseph Abu Khalil expressly called for a ‘federation, a new structure 
for Lebanon to replace the 1926 constitution’.5 Presented to Ba`thist 
Iraq by Elie Hobeika and Zahi Bustani, the plan was welcomed by 
Tariq `Aziz, and the Iraqi leadership granted the LF generous aid 
in money, arms and ammunitions. Christian Lebanon was sold to 
the US ambassador as a second Israel with all the benefits for the 
US of the first, minus its inconveniences (meaning that it would be 
accepted by the Arab world). As for the Saudis, they were promised 
a tripartite coalition between Lebanon, the US and Saudi Arabia 
against Communism and the Soviet Union’s allies, Syria and the 
PLO. Bashir even discussed his proposed coup d’état with General 
Muhammad al-Khuli, commander of the Syrian air force and an 
emissary of President Assad. In all these encounters, Bashir repeated 
‘I want the whole country’ and insisted that Lebanon needed a 
‘strong president’. In early 1982, another plan for the military–LF 
takeover was drafted after Ariel Sharon had informed Bashir of 
the Israeli plan to invade Lebanon. Unsure of the support of the 
majority of Parliament for Bashir’s election to the presidency, it 
was decided to attempt a military–LF takeover during the Israeli 
invasion. As the Israeli troops advanced, President Sarkis would 
dissolve Parliament, suspend the constitution and appoint Bashir 
Jumayil to head a government, the main portfolios in which would 
be held by LF leaders.6 
LEBANON, sUBsTITUTE sTATE Or BArGAINING CHIP?
During the Sarkis regime, the PLO was in control of the country’s 
predominantly Muslim regions. Brandishing the threat of the 
Phalangist mini-state and the Phalangist–Israeli connection, the 
PLO refused to cede territories under its control to the army and 
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proceeded to build its own mini-state, ‘the Fakhani canton’ as it was 
called (after the location of `Arafat’s Beirut headquarters). 
During the ‘Two Years’ War’, the Palestinian faction had been 
invested in the project to impose the reforms of the LNM. In this 
new phase of the war, the roles were reversed, with Lebanese 
factions mainly serving a Palestinian agenda. `Arafat faced the 
whole world with the following message: give us an independent 
state in Palestine in return for the dismantling of the temporary 
mini-state on Lebanese territory. Years had passed since the PLO 
adopted the two-state solution and had been recognised as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people by all the Arab countries 
and some 20 foreign states, and accepted at the UN with observer 
status. Yet no progress had been achieved regarding its role in the 
Middle East peace process.
With their incursions across the Lebanese–Israeli border severely 
restricted by the establishment of the Israeli-controlled border strip, 
the Palestinian fedayeen resorted to artillery or missile attacks 
against the settlements of the Upper Galilee. This development 
acquired a new political function, that of imposing the PLO as a 
belligerent in the Arab–Israeli conflict and a partner in the peace 
process. For some time, it seemed that this tactic was bearing fruit. 
In July 1981, the Israeli prime minister, Menachem Begin, after 
a visit to the settlements of Upper Galilee, gave the green light 
for a cease-fire agreement with the PLO on the Lebanese border, 
negotiated by Habib and ̀ Arafat. The cease-fire survived for almost 
one year, but it turned out to be a diversion to cover ‘Operation 
Peace for Galilee’, the goals of which involved destroying the PLO 
infrastructure and expelling the fedayeen from Lebanon altogether.
For many Lebanese in the dominantly Muslim regions, the 
Palestinian mini-state was a buffer against the extension of Phalange 
domination over the entire Lebanese territory. But the price was high: 
the deterioration of life in West Beirut and the other areas under PLO 
control with the concomitant exactions and suffering, especially 
among the inhabitants of south Lebanon who had been subjected 
for the past ten years to Israeli bombardment and incursions.
The LNM, having returned to the scene after the assassination of 
Kamal Jumblatt, provided itself with a more centralised structure 
under the presidency of Walid Jumblatt ,with Muhsin Ibrahim of the 
OCA as executive secretary-general, and the general secretaries of 
the major parties and organisations as vice-presidents. But the LNM 
now presented a purely defensive programme. At the initiative of the 
LCP, seconded by the OCA, it had dropped the Article concerning 
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the voluntary civil personal status law from its reform programme, 
allegedly to reassure the Muslim ‘street’ and notables. Its discourse 
was progressively slipping toward an Arab nationalist one with 
sectarian colours, in which sects were divided between ‘patriotic’ 
and ‘non-patriotic’ ones.
Syria, for its part, incapable of disarming and controlling the PLO, 
contributed to the deterioration of the situation in the predominantly 
Muslim regions. A bitter struggle between Damascus and the PLO 
was launched to win over Walid Jumblatt and the LNM. Jumblatt 
opened up to Syria, in the hope that the sister country would oblige 
by backing the establishment of his own mini-state and the creation 
of ‘local councils’ to administer public affairs in the predominantly 
Muslim regions. But the battle for the ‘local councils’ did not take 
place. Strongly opposed by the Amal movement and the traditional 
Muslim leadership, it received the coup de grâce from Damascus. 
It was left to the Left and the LNM to serve as Lebanese cover for 
the Palestinian military presence. 
Amal movement, presided over by the lawyer Nabih Birri 
since 1980, took the lead in opposing the Palestinian mini-state, 
demanding the halt of fedayeen operations in Lebanese territory 
and the return of Lebanese authorities to the south. The last two 
years that preceded the Israeli invasion of June 1982 witnessed 
frequent clashes between Amal, on the one hand, and the Palestinian 
organisations and the LNM, on the other. 
‘OPErATION PEACE fOr GALILEE’ 
In March 1980, an American spokesman invited Lebanon to join 
the Camp David Accords, as the question of power in Lebanon was 
on the agenda in Israel. Sharon’s vision for a new regional order 
envisaged a Christian Lebanon, under Bashir Jumayil, an Israeli 
West Bank and a Palestinian Jordan. On 6 June 1982, the Israeli 
army began its invasion of Lebanon to put that vision into effect. 
At first, the initial thrust was thought to stop at Sayda after having 
pushed the PLO fighters northwards to a distance from which no 
PLO artillery could reach the Israeli settlements in north Galilee. A 
sudden second thrust into Sayda and beyond resulted in the Israeli 
forces clashing with the Syrian forces, which had pushed north of 
the Beirut–Damascus road. By then, it had become clear that the 
invasion was intended to besiege Beirut. 
On 20 June, as Israeli troops were encircling the Presidential Palace 
in Ba`abda, Sarkis, backed by Habib, convoked a six-man ‘salvation 
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committee’ of representatives of the six major sects: Prime Minister 
Shafiq al-Wazzan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fu’ad Butrus, Bashir 
Jumayil, Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Birri and Nasri al-Ma`luf, a veteran 
Greek Catholic politician close to Sham`un. Sarkis congratulated 
himself for having finally succeeded in organising a meeting between 
Jumayil and Jumblatt. But both Jumayil and Jumblatt were focusing 
elsewhere. Jumayil was thinking of the Sunnis whom he exhorted 
to liberate themselves from Palestinian influence or else ‘there will 
never be a Sunni left to participate in government’. Jumblatt, for 
his part, was preoccupied by the Israeli occupation and Habib’s 
diktats to the PLO, accusing him of ‘preparing a genocide against 
the Palestinian people’, not an ‘honourable surrender’ for the PLO 
fighters. As for Jumayil, Jumblatt accused him of seeking to profit 
from the Israeli occupation, to which Jumayil cynically replied, 
‘we can all profit from it’. Significantly, the Israeli occupation was 
not even on the agenda of the meeting. When Jumblatt mentioned 
the government’s neutral stance vis-à-vis Israeli occupation, 
Butrus explained that the government had already submitted two 
complaints to the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, the point on 
the meeting’s agenda was the formation of a restricted cabinet to 
negotiate the withdrawal not of the Israeli troops but of the PLO. 
Not surprisingly, the committee members could not agree on the 
aims or procedures. Nabih Birri suspended his participation, while 
Walid Jumblatt, refusing to ‘deal the final blow to the Palestinians’, 
resigned altogether from the committee and the government with 
minister Marwan Hamadeh. 
23 dAys Of AN ABOrTEd CoUp D’ETAT
Philip Habib had the Israeli army at his disposal to wield pressure in 
his negotiations for the withdrawal of the Palestinian fedayeen and 
the election of a new president. Sarkis had been chosen by Brown in 
accord with Syria and elected under the protection of the pro-Syrian 
Sa`iqa organisation as the Syrian army was extending its control 
over the country. Bashir, already promised the presidency by Begin, 
was confirmed in the post by Habib (‘I’ll make you president’, he 
told him) and elected with the Israeli army occupying Lebanon. 
On 23 August, West Beirut was bidding farewell to the last 
PLO fedayeen under the supervision of a Multinational Force 
(MNF) composed of troops from the United States, France and 
Italy. Overlooking the capital, in an army barracks in Fayadhiyeh, 
Bashir Jumayil was elected president of the Lebanese Republic. The 
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‘candidate of the Israeli tanks’, as Walid Jumblatt described him, 
needed a quorum of 62 deputies. He got them by intimidation, terror 
and buying MPs’ votes, his campaign directors acknowledged.7
The major event of the following days was the forced visit of the 
president-elect to Natania on 1 September 1982, to meet Begin who 
was spending his vacation in the Galilee. After reminding him of the 
efforts Israel made to ‘save the Christians from extermination’, the 
Israeli prime minister – addressing the president-elect as he always 
had done, as ‘my son’ – asked Bashir to open immediate negotiations 
with the Jewish state to conclude a peace treaty between their two 
countries. Bashir, with strong American support and advised to 
win over the Lebanese Muslims and not alienate the Arabs, asked 
for a respite of six to nine months to establish his authority. Upon 
the insistence of Begin, he conceded to an agreement to ‘normalise’ 
relations between the two countries. Begin still wanted a peace 
treaty, or else, he threatened, the Israeli army would occupy a 
40–50-kilometre strip deep inside Lebanese territory.8 Lebanon’s 
president-elect left the meeting humiliated. An intentional Israeli 
leak to the press added insult to injury as, on the following day, 
everyone concerned knew about Bashir’s ‘secret’ visit. 
 Bashir’s inaugural speech, published posthumously, reveals 
the key outlines of his vision for Lebanon. In a pronunciamento 
instituting a ‘constitutional despotism’, Bashir saw himself as the 
winner of a war rather than a winner of a presidential election. He 
made it clear that he was taking his constitutional oath in Parliament 
for the six years to come after having ‘delivered its content during 
eight years of resistance’. This is why the president did not feel he 
had to thank the MPs for their confidence; the obligation was on 
them: ‘You have elected me, now help me!’, he exhorted them. 
Moreover, the fundamentalist Christian nationalist president now 
saw himself as the incarnation of the nation embodied in the state, 
‘it is the first time that the nation takes charge of the state’, he 
affirmed. Having presented his election as the result of unanimity 
around his person, he felt that all of Lebanon’s ‘civilisation groups’ 
(read: religious communities) should feel themselves associated to 
government by the mere fact of his election, 
The first task of this pronunciamento was a new definition of the 
country. ‘Lebanon is not a Christian country,’ Bashir announced, 
‘but a country of Lebanese Christians and Muslims.’ Nevertheless, 
Lebanon was purged of any Arab identity, defined by its ‘oriental 
belonging’ and ‘Arab links’.9 No wonder that this muscular Libanity 
was alien to any form of pluralism or opposition: the state was 
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a single whole. Legitimacy cannot be opposed. No opposition to 
an institution of the state or an agency of the administration will 
be tolerated, threatened the president-elect, who said ‘opposition 
stops at the borders of the policy of the state and cannot reach 
its institutions’. 
On the other hand, Bashir invited ‘all foreign forces’ to withdraw 
from Lebanese territory ‘in favour of the Lebanese army and security 
forces’. As for the conflict, it was never a ‘civil war’ but a ‘war 
against Lebanon’, which formed part of the war of succession waged 
by the three monotheistic religions for the control of the Middle 
East. In this war, Lebanon was presented as the only Christian 
country that criticised the two other religions; one for seeking to 
bring it back to ‘the time of the Caliphs’ and the other to that of 
‘the Prophets’. Finally, Lebanon was defined as an integral part of 
the ‘free world’, which was seeking to become a ‘partner’ of that 
world instead of its victim. 
According to his advisers, Bashir had envisaged the creation of 
an office of Vice President to be occupied by a Maronite Christian, 
and considered naming Sulayman al-`Ali as prime minister. This 
was a highly significant choice, as Bashir’s ‘new Lebanon’ was to be 
built by the victorious fighting Christians and the old marginalised 
conservative notables of political Islam.10 
Bashir’s socio-economic programme had already been presented 
in his May Day speech, a few weeks before his election; he proposed 
a social contract based on ‘freedom and planning … production and 
equality of opportunities … participation … and … social justice and 
welfare’. This amalgam is the closest approximation to a fascistic 
vision that mixes a profession of faith in economic laissez-faire with 
the desire to purge dependent tertiary capitalism of its ‘defects’ and 
‘excesses’, without proposing an alternative mode of socio-economic 
organisation. The programme further sought to liberate Lebanon 
from economic dependence on the outside by developing the 
country’s productive sectors, as it was ‘no longer permitted to leave 
[its] economy at the mercy of brokerage and speculation’. The idea 
of ‘reducing envy and bringing classes together’ reveals a corporatist 
function of the state to which a moral role is attributed, that of 
‘purifying’ the economic system of monopoly, brokerage, patronage 
and corruption. Employment and promotion in the public sector 
should be based on merit, competence and specialisation, not on 
the privileges of birth or of patronage. ‘Tomorrow will end the 
era of favouritism and be the advent of the era of accountability’, 
promised the president-elect. Finally, the defence of the narrow 
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socio-cultural privileges of sectarian origin was already manifest 
in the federation project. Bashir Jumayil answered the problem of 
the ‘deprived regions’ with a double rejection: he would not allow 
one region to absorb another or be parasitical on it. Regions under 
a federal system would finance their own development projects.11 
In any case, Bashir did not have the opportunity to implement his 
project. On the night of 14 September 1982, barely one week before 
his inauguration, his body was unearthed from under the rubble 
of the Phalange party headquarters in Ashrafieh, destroyed by an 
explosive charge activated by remote control. 
On the next morning, Israeli troops entered West Beirut, which 
had resisted them for over three months, ostensibly ‘in order to 
prevent a bloodbath’; in fact, they initiated one. On Wednesday 
the 15th and for the whole of Thursday the 16th and early Friday 
the 17th, hundreds of special security units of the LF, seconded by 
regular troops stationed at the airport, were mainly responsible for 
committing the massacre of more than 1,000 Palestinian (and no 
fewer than 100 Lebanese12) in the twin camps of Sabra and Shatila, 
not to speak of hundreds who disappeared. They were let in by the 
Israeli troops who were encircling the camps and helped by the 
hundreds of flares launched by these same troops. Ariel Sharon had 
visited Bikfaya the day before and informed the mourning Jumayils 
that Bashir had been killed by Palestinians.13 George Shultz, the then 
US Secretary of State, later recalled that on Friday 17 September 
1982, Ariel Sharon informed Maurice Draper, US special envoy to 
Lebanon, that he had asked the Lebanese army to enter the camp and 
‘clean them out’. He added: ‘They can kill the terrorists. But if they 
don’t we will.’14 The Lebanese army failed to do so. On Wednesday 
the 15th, units of the elite Israeli army ‘reconnaissance’ force, the 
Sayeret Mat`kal, which had already carried out the assassination of 
the three PLO leaders in Beirut, entered the camps with a mission 
to liquidate selected number of Palestinian cadres. The next day, 
two units of killers were introduced into the camps, troops from 
Sa`d Haddad’s South Lebanese Army (SLA), attached to the Israeli 
forces in Beirut, and the LF security units of Elie Hobeika, called the 
Apaches, led by Marun Mash`alani, Michel Zuwayn and Georges 
Melko.
Presented as a reaction to the assassination of the LF leader, the 
massacre was rather a posthumous achievement of Bashir’s ‘radical 
solution’ to the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, which he conceived 
as a ‘people too many’ in the region.15 
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Commenting on the massacre, Skira Hodechith, the Israeli army’s 
monthly journal, wrote that the LF hoped to provoke ‘the general 
exodus of the Palestinian population, first from Beirut, then from 
all over Lebanon’. It added: ‘The Christians wanted thus to create 
a new demographic balance in Lebanon.’16 
Be that as it may, Ariel Sharon was found ‘indirectly responsible’ 
for the massacre by the Israeli Kahan Commission of Inquiry and 
had to resign his post as minister of defence. The US administration’s 
responsibility was considerable. The American peacekeeping force 
that oversaw the evacuation of the PLO was also assigned the task of 
guaranteeing the safety of ‘law-abiding Palestinian non-combatants 
in Beirut, including the families of those who have departed’. 
However, the US administration withdrew the marines detachment 
two weeks before the end of its 30-day mandate, forcing the French 
and the Italian forces to follow suit. George Shultz later confessed 
that the marines of the MNF had been ‘hurriedly withdrawn’.17 
On 20 September, President Reagan recalled the MNF to Beirut.
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for war is a banker, its gold, human flesh. 
(Aeschylus, The Oresteian Trilogy)
AMIN JUMAyIL ANd THE PHALANGIsT sTATE 
Amin Jumayil was elected to the presidency to succeed his 
assassinated brother on 21 September 1982 in the same Lebanese 
army barracks in which Bashir had been elected under the protection 
of Israeli tanks. The next day, Iliyas Sarkis left the Presidential 
Palace in Ba`abda: a sad sortie for a grim and sad president. His 
mandate had started with the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt and 
the entry of Syrian troops to Beirut and here he was terminating 
it with the assassination of Bashir Jumayil and the Israeli forces 
occupying his capital. 
With Amin Jumayil’s presidency the Phalange party came to 
power. This, at least, was the opinion of many Lebanese. Lebanon 
was being governed by the ‘Somoza-type regime of the Jumayils’, 
as Raymond Edde put it: the country had two presidents of the 
republic – the father and the son – and two commanders-in-chief 
of its armed forces; one commanding the regular army and the 
other the Lebanese Forces, both controlled by the Israeli army. 
The family ruled over a party that ruled over a part of the country 
and wielded both legitimacy and illegitimacy.1 As if to confirm this 
bitter accusation, the first thing that the new president did was to 
visit the LF Military Council and vow to emulate his brother Bashir, 
even as far offering his life for the cause. He used the presence of 
international troops to dominate his adversaries. Thomas Friedman 
remarked that Amin Jumayil, instead of using the US marines as 
a crutch for the reconstruction of his country, used them as a club 
with which to beat his Muslim adversaries.2 A number of Bashir’s 
men held key posts in the administration while the economic posts 
were reserved for Amin’s men.3 Fadi Frem, the successor to Bashir at 
the head of the LF, sent his troops to the Shouf, under the cover of 
the Israeli troops, explaining that his militiamen had been installed 
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there in order to ‘dissipate any ambiguity concerning its identity’, 
implying that that identity was Christian rather than mixed Druze 
and Christian. 
During the first days of Amin’s presidency, the Lebanese Forces 
and the army invaded West Beirut, implementing a plan prepared 
under Bashir, and kidnapped many hundreds of Palestinians and 
Lebanese Muslims, whose whereabouts remain unknown at the time 
of writing.4 Beirut had its ‘women in black’, inquiring about the fate 
of a husband, a brother, a son, and demanding their return. Barely 
a month later, Amin sent a police force, backed by bulldozers, to 
raze ‘illegally squatted’ areas in the poor shantytowns of Uza`i and 
Raml al-`Ali in the southern suburbs, on the pretext that they were 
too close to the airport and endangered international air travel. The 
gendarmes shot at the demonstrating inhabitants and left a number 
of dead and wounded. Finally, in August 1983, Amin ordered his 
army to occupy West Beirut and its southern suburb. After no more 
than a year in power, the Phalangist president had failed all those 
who hoped he would build a state and guide the country to a just 
and lasting peace. He had asked the protagonists to rally to his 
support and received a positive reaction only from Nabih Birri, 
the leader of Amal. After a brief entente with the president, Birri, 
shocked by the monopoly of power exercised by the Phalange, 
rallied to the opposition.5
sOME NEGOTIATE, OTHErs rEsIsT
On 24 September 1982, the Multinational Forces (MNF) were back 
in Beirut, driven by the anger of international public opinion at 
the massacres at Sabra and Shatila. Their mission was to help the 
Lebanese army restore sovereignty and authority in the capital. 
On the eve of 1983, two groups competed to dictate Lebanon’s 
policy towards Israel: one resisted the Israeli occupation with arms, 
and the other negotiated a peace accord. To the first group belonged 
the militants of the Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF) 
who, since the first days of the occupation, had been harassing the 
Israeli troops in the capital, Mount Lebanon and especially the 
south and the Biqa`. The LNRF, which was created on 16 September 
1982 at the initiative of the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) the 
Organisation for Communist Action (OCA) and the Socialist Arab 
Action Party (SAAP), served as an umbrella for the activities of the 
organisations and parties of the ex-Lebanese National Movement 
(LNM), including the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and 
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the Palestinian organisations still present and active in the Biqa`. 
Armed resistance to occupation was the determinant factor that 
transformed the ‘two-weeks’ stroll’ that Ariel Sharon had promised 
Begin into a bloody adventure that would cost the Israeli army 
hundreds of soldiers killed and leave the bitter taste of the impotency 
of arms in the face of a people’s will to freedom. Ultimately this 
resistance contributed to isolate Begin in his depression, stupefied 
by the shocks and failures of his Lebanese venture as well as by 
the loss of his wife. 
Increasingly embarrassed by the reactions to the Sabra and Shatila 
massacres and the escalation of armed operations against its troops, 
Israel executed a partial retreat from West Beirut on 27 September. 
‘Just in time’, noted Robert Fisk in The Times, as the occupying 
army had been bogged down in a guerrilla war and assassinations 
targeting its soldiers ‘at the rate of one operation every five hours’.6 
In other parts of the country, small groups of militants harassed 
the occupation forces: they threw grenades, planted land mines, 
attacked isolated soldiers, launched raids against posts, roadblocks 
and camps and organised ambushes against military convoys. They 
also succeeded in triggering massive civil resistance movements 
in villages in the south and among the thousands of prisoners 
in the Ansar camp in the Nabatiyeh region: there were women’s 
demonstrations in front of the prison gates, hunger strikes by the 
prisoners, coordinated revolts in the whole camp by burning tents 
(of which the most violent occurred in September 1982 and August 
1983), mass escapes, and so on. In early 1983, an editorial in Le 
Monde was already writing of a Lebanon ‘that was frightening its 
occupation forces’.7 
As a year passed under occupation, the popular mood in the 
south and the Biqa` was turned upside down. Those who had 
entertained the illusion that Israeli troops would dislodge the 
Palestinian resistance and retreat behind the borders had realised by 
then that the occupation was there to stay. Cadres and rank-and-file 
of Amal in the south were mobilised and played a major role in the 
resistance. On the first anniversary of the invasion, in June 1983, 
strikes and insurrections occurred in most towns and villages of the 
south and the western Biqa`, mobilising tens of thousands of men 
and women. The courage and determination of the first resistance 
members had revealed that the Israeli army ,deprived of air cover 
and incapable of using its tanks and sophisticated armament, 
was no longer frightening. To civilian insurrections and military 
operations was now added the redoubtable suicide operations of 
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Hezbollah, recently created and operating under the banner of the 
‘Islamic Resistance’. 
The creation of Hezbollah is a direct product of Israel’s 1982 
invasion and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The 
decision by Amal leader Nabih Berri to participate, alongside Bashir 
Jumayil, in the National Salvation Committee, led to a secession in 
Amal, led by Hussein al-Musawi, and the establishment of Islamic 
Amal (Amal al-Islamiya) immediately supported by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, as Amal had not recognised Wilayat al-Faqih 
since the days of Imam Musa al-Sadr.
A detachment of some 1,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards, 
deployed in June 1982 in Ba`albak to join the resistance to the Israeli 
invasion, provided military training and religious indoctrination to 
the Amal defectors. Many of the first group of trainees – including 
the young Hassan Nasrallah – were members of the religious 
seminaries (al-Hawzat al-Diniya) proliferating in rural and urban 
Shi`ite localities.
This initial group soon merged with the Lebanese branch of 
the Da`wa party (Hizb al-Da`wah al-Islamiyya), led by Sayyid 
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, and with its youth front, the 
Lebanese Union of Muslim Students (al-Ittihad al-Lubnani lil-Talaba 
al-Muslimin).
Ayatollah Khomeini blessed the creation of the new party, which 
was officially established on 16 February 1985 by Sayyid Ibrahim 
Amin al-Sayyid, who made public the party’s ‘Open Letter to the 
Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World’ which subscribed to the 
doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, considered the party a detachment of 
Khomeini’s ‘army’ destined to liberate Jerusalem, and called for the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. 
Meanwhile, Amin Jumayil, who in his inaugural address had 
made verbal concessions concerning Lebanon’s Arab relations ‘as a 
voluntarily choice’, did not demand the withdrawal of Israeli forces. 
He and Sharon had agreed to conclude a peace treaty between the 
two countries. Negotiations started as the Phalange party insisted 
on the need for a Palestinian and Syrian withdrawal. In December 
1983, Fadi Frem talked about a ‘civilised dialogue’ and ‘special 
relations’ among all the minorities of the Middle East. The peace 
accord with Israel, signed on 17 May 1983, stipulated the end of the 
state of war between Lebanon and Israel, Lebanese arrangements 
to ensure security on Israel’s northern borders, the integration of 
Sa`d Haddad’s SLA into the Lebanese Armed Forces, in addition to 
restrictions on Lebanon’s Arab and foreign relations. In return for 
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all this, Israel committed itself to withdraw from Lebanon pending 
the withdrawal of the Syrian troops. 
The accord, openly opposed by a minority of the Lebanese, met 
with reservations and ambiguous reactions from the majority. The 
initial position of the Syrian regime to go along with the negotiations 
helped this state of affairs. Ultimately, when the final text was 
published, President Assad described it to US Secretary of State 
Shultz as a ‘pact of domination’, highlighting the Articles that gave 
Israel the right to oversee Lebanon’s foreign policy and normalising 
relations between the two countries. But President Assad’s main 
objection was making the Israeli withdrawal dependent on Syrian 
withdrawal. Although Parliament ratified the accord with 65 votes 
against only two, and four abstentions, it was stillborn. Amin, eager 
not to antagonise Damascus, did not sign it and his government 
officially renounced it on 5 March 1984. This was the second Israeli 
setback in Lebanon, after the loss of Bashir Jumayil.
Meanwhile, the parties of the former LNM and the Palestinian 
organisations in addition to the Amal movement under Nabih 
Birri, Rashid Karami and the young leader of Zgharta, Sulayman 
Franjiyeh, rallied to Damascus to launch a counter-offensive under 
the banner of the National Salvation Front (NSF) founded in 23 
July 1983 to re-establish the equilibrium disrupted by the Israeli 
invasion. Hafiz al-Assad, believing that he had been duped by 
the Americans who, under the cover of an operation against the 
Palestinian infrastructure, encouraged Israel to strike hard and 
humiliating blows against the Syrian army, was determined to return 
the situation in Lebanon to the status quo ante.
In early September 1983, the Israeli army withdrew from ` Alay 
and the Shouf in order to exert pressure on Jumayil to sign the peace 
accord and with the hope of attracting the sympathy of the Druze. 
The withdrawal spelled disaster for the LF in Mount Lebanon, 
who had committed scores of atrocities, including killings and the 
desecration of Druze religious sites. Thomas Friedman likened the 
Phalangists to ‘tin soldiers’ when deprived of the protection of the 
Israelis and the Lebanese army.8 Under the leadership of Samir 
Ja`ja` the LF troops were swept from ̀ Alay and the Shouf within 48 
hours, dragging with them thousands of Christian villagers to take 
refuge in Dayr al-Qamar, which was besieged by Walid Jumblatt’s 
militia for weeks between September and December 1983. The ‘War 
of the Mountain’ ended with massacres perpetrated by Jumblatt’s 
militiamen in which no fewer than 1,500 Christian civilians were 
killed and 62 villages destroyed, and the majority of the Christians of 
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the Mixed Districts of Mount Lebanon simply left. An international 
campaign and long negotiations finally obtained the lifting of the 
siege and the evacuation of Ja`ja` and his troops to East Beirut.
A conference of the Lebanese belligerents, convened in Geneva 
under the patronage of Syria and Saudi Arabia, ended in failure. A 
determined duo composed of Jumblatt and Birri faced the irredentism 
of Sham`un and Pierre Jumayil. Amin Jumayil contributed to the 
sabotage of the agreed-upon reforms and the genuine representation 
of Muslims in political power. He explicitly rejected the abolition of 
sectarianism as a way of achieving equality between the Lebanese 
and insisted on the distinction between democracy and pluralism. 
He wrote later:
Applying the rules of simple democracy founded on the principle 
of ‘one man one vote’ would definitely not contribute to the 
salvation of Lebanese pluralism, as one component of the national 
collectivity would monopolise the totality of power.9
In his counter-offensive Assad held many trump cards, including the 
military pressure on the Presidential Palace exercised by his allied 
Lebanese and Palestinian militias which kept Jumayil in check, and 
the formidable threat of kidnappings and executions carried out 
by Hezbollah commandos. These factors combined to push for 
the withdrawal of the the MNF and provide renewed legitimacy 
for the Syrian role in Lebanon. In early 1984, Jumblatt declared 
that the fighting would continue until the resignation of Jumayil’s 
government, ‘even if this means the destruction of Lebanon’.10 On 6 
February 1984, Amin Jumayil, in an attempt to prevent the link-up 
of PSP militiamen in the Mountain with their Amal counterparts in 
Beirut’s southern suburb, sent army units to take over West Beirut. 
The result was a new division of the army as the predominantly 
Shi`i units rallied to the rebels and West Beirut and its southern 
suburb fell under the control of the militias of Jumblatt and Birri. 
Following this radical reversal in the balance of power, the MNF 
left Beirut, after having suffered heavy casualties in the October 1983 
suicide attacks against the US and French contingents. Jumayil’s rule 
held by a thin thread; besieged in his Ba`abda palace by Jumblatt’s 
fighters and the Palestinian fedayeen from Suq al-Gharb, he was 
protected only by loyal army units under General Michel ̀ Awn and 
by the US aircraft carrier New Jersey, which subjected the country 
to the bombardment of its imposing artillery, the biggest naval fire 
force in the world. 
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 In an attempt to save his floundering regime, in which he exercised 
mainly economic power, Jumayil decided to cede larger political 
participation to the traditional Muslim za`ims and militia leaders. 
Rashid Karami, designated prime minister after the Lausanne 
Conference, formed a government of national unity in which Walid 
Jumblatt and Nabih Birri participated. This inaugurated a short 
period of precarious coexistence between the Phalangist state and 
the militia forces. 
On 17 February 1985, Israeli forces withdrew from Sidon and 
the approaches of the Beirut–Damascus road into the border strip, 
putting an end to the occupation resulting from the 1982 war, 
with the exception of the Jizzin region. Israel had lost some 500 
soldiers in its Lebanese adventure. Maariv’s military correspondent 
spoke of an Israeli army that ‘had suffered the unforgivable’ at 
the hands of ‘those who organized the Lebanese war’. He added 
that the big lesson to draw from this adventure was ‘how Israel’s 
military omnipotence could be transformed into impotence and 
precariousness’.11According to a tacit agreement mediated by the 
US, Israel left security in the south to the Amal movement; the 
price to be paid was its anti-Palestinian role in the war against 
the Palestinian camps during 1984–85. In the western Biqa`, the 
accord negotiated by US officials stipulated that Syrian troops would 
not enter the zones south of the Beirut–Damascus road, though 
Lebanese army units loyal to Damascus were tolerated, with the 
discreet participation of Syrian intelligence officers in them. 
PrOGrEssION Of THE syrIAN COUNTEr-OffENsIVE
At the end of the year, the Syrian counter-offensive saw a new push 
in Lebanon. On 28 December 1985, a Tripartite Agreement was 
signed in Damascus by the three leading militia chieftains, Jumblatt, 
Birri and Elie Hobeika. Hobeika had taken over the leadership of 
the LF on 9 September 1985, in association with Samir Ja`ja`, the 
northern militia leader who was named commander-in-chief of the 
LF. Hobeika – who consummated the break with Amin Jumayil and 
the Phalange – had tried to wash his hands of the Sabra and Shatila 
massacre and executed an about-face, in the direction of Damascus 
where he was embraced and his public image cleansed. This break 
signalled the first division inside the Christian camp, which had 
hitherto been united, at least vis-à-vis Syria. The signatories to the 
accord pledged to end the war and dissolve all the militias within 
one year. Politically, it confirmed parity in sectarian representation 
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between Christians and Muslims, the abolition of political 
sectarianism after a short transitional period, and established a 
new balance in the prerogatives of the president of the republic, in 
favour of the prime minister and the cabinet. 
In direct response to Bashir Jumayil’s revisionism, the Tripartite 
Agreement document redefined Lebanon as an ‘Arab country as 
regards its belonging and identity’. Provision was made for amending 
the electoral law in order to increase the number of deputies, reduce 
the voting age (from 21 to 18) and create a Senate – this body 
would be chosen along sectarian lines and rule on ‘vital questions’ 
regarding constitutional amendments, naturalisation, the declaration 
of war and peace, the signing of treaties with foreign parties and 
the like. Finally, the accord provided for the signature of bilateral 
treaties between Syria and Lebanon to give concrete expression 
to the ‘strategic complementarity’ between the two countries. 
Economically, the accord stipulated close bilateral collaboration 
while respecting the differences between their respective economic 
systems. During the banquet to celebrate the event in Khaddam’s 
office, the vice-president in charge of the Lebanese file reiterated 
the desire of Damascush to preserve Lebanon’s economic system, 
and launched the idea that Syria could well become ‘a consumer 
market for Lebanon’. 
Amin Jumayil opposed the accord, despite the attempts to convince 
him to the contrary during his many meetings with President Assad; 
the final session, which marked the break between the two, was 
on 13–14 January 1986. Jumayil argued that the accord deprived 
the president of his role as an arbiter, replaced a ‘truly complex 
democracy’ by numerical democracy, and responded to the call for 
the abolition of sectarianism by advocating complete secularisation. 
Damascus responded by organising a conference of the signatories, 
who declared war on the Phalangist government. Jumayil reacted 
by using Parliament to oppose the Tripartite Agreement and, in 
conjunction with Samir Ja`ja`, engineered an armed coup on 12 
March 1986 that ousted Hobeika from Marounistan along with 
hundreds of his partisans. The Tripartite Agreement thus met 
its end, to be resurrected after some years as the basis for the 
Ta’if Agreement. 
THE ECONOMIC dEBACLE
Meanwhile, the country was on the verge of economic catastrophe. 
In 1984, ‘war in a time of abundance’ ended. Many factors 
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contributed to this: the withdrawal of PLO deposits in Lebanese 
banks and the end of PLO spending; the massive destruction caused 
by the Israeli invaders, part of which was intentional and involved 
economic objectives; the decrease in bank deposits (from $12 
billion in 1982 to $3 billion in 1990); the increased subjection of 
the economy, and particularly the banks, to foreign capital and 
the flow of a good part of the deposits outside the country. The 
president’s profiteering and that of his men accounted for much of 
this deterioration. Nicknamed ‘Mr Two Percent’ at the beginning 
of the war for the percentages he levied on all transactions in East 
Beirut, Amin Jumayil saw his popular appellation rise to the rank 
of Mr Twenty Percent.
 The end of the ‘war in time of abundance’ period was also the 
beginning of the dollarisation of the economy and the devaluation 
of the Lebanese lira. Indeed, the devaluation of the currency had a 
lot to do with the speculation on the dollar. Practised by the state 
(through the central bank) as well as the president’s men and the 
militias, speculation was soon transformed into a national sport: 
there were no fewer than 200,000 bank accounts in US dollars in 
1988. But a structural cause is frequently neglected when it comes 
to dollarisation: the country was producing almost nothing and 
importing practically everything. 
Two effects of this crisis are worth mentioning. First, public debt 
rose from LL 7 billion in 1981 to LL 35 billion in 1985, partly 
due to the decrease in state revenues because of spoliation by the 
militias and the increase in expenses and military spending. The 
Jumayil government had agreed to arms purchases, especially from 
Washington, for $1.1 billion, paid in cash. A second effect was 
the soaring increase in the cost of living and the depreciation of 
incomes. The vital minimum income for a worker’s family was 
estimated at LL 3,000 per week, while the average worker’s salary 
did not exceed LL 952. 
rETUrN Of THE syrIAN fOrCEs
On 28 February 1987 Syrian troops returned to Beirut, invited 
by Muslim leaders and favourably welcomed by the capital’s 
population to put an end to the murderous infighting between 
Amal and the PSP. Once more, the ‘red lines’ had functioned. The 
confrontations between Amal and the PSP threatened to produce a 
PSP victory that would have rendered the PLO, still the single most 
important military force in West Beirut, masters of the city, which 
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would overturn all of the ‘achievements’ of the June 1982 invasion. 
Damascus received the American ‘green light’ this time to prevent 
this eventuality and in the hope that Syrian troops would find a way 
to release the Western hostages.12 Thus, Assad’s counter-offensive 
achieved a return to the pre-Israeli invasion situation of 5 June 1982. 
Internally, the hegemony of the Phalange contributed to a situation 
in which an already marginalised state had to accommodate a de 
facto partition of Lebanese territory among a number of armed 
sectarian cantons that were robbing it of a good part of its resources, 
revenues and political power. At times, history plays curious tricks 
on its actors. Encouraged by the progress of the US–Israeli offensive, 
the Phalange under Bashir abandoned regionalism in favour of 
muscular domination of the whole country. Amin’s attempts to 
implement this control triggered a process of disintegration in 
which cantonisation covered all Lebanese territory. Bashir Jumayil 
bequeathed to his comrades in the Phalange and the LF a heavy 
inheritance that divided them; however, he bequeathed to his ‘enemy 
brothers’, the other warlords, a poisoned gift: a desire to emulate 
his model of territorial mini-states. This period was dominated 
by a proliferation of mini-states, run by militias who claimed to 
be defending their region/sect against the expansionism of the 
Phalangist state. Seventeen sects, a dozen cantons, some 20 ports 
and a multitude of armed organisations – this was the Lebanese 
scene after 1983. 
THE rEPrOdUCTION Of ArMEd sECTs
The war, partially the result of sectarian conflicts, was to become 
the crucible in which those sects were reproduced.
The marginalisation of the Sunni community is a hallmark of 
the post-1983 period. A combination of factors contributed to this 
development, such as the impact of the Palestinian withdrawal and 
the disappearance of prestigious leaders (Sa’ib Salam in voluntary 
exile, and Rashid Karami and Mufti Sheikh Hasan Khalid 
assassinated), in addition to the political disappearance of the only 
militia that represented the Sunni community, the Murabitun of 
Ibrahim Qulaylat. It was liquidated by the joint efforts of Amal and 
the PSP, presumably upon Syrian request. The LNM, dissolved by 
its president, Walid Jumblatt, progressively ceded the arena to an 
increased sectarianisation of Muslim political forces. 
Musa al-Sadr’s ‘disappearance’,13 the failure of the reformist 
programme of the LNM, the outbreak of the Islamic revolution 
Traboulsi T02610 01 text   235 23/04/2012   08:07
236 A HIsTOry Of MOdErN LEBANON
in Iran and the combined effects of the Israeli occupation and the 
dismantling of the Palestinian mini-state, gave a new configuration 
to political Shi`ism and posed new challenges. With the Assad 
leadership marginalised, Husayn al-Husayni, elected president of 
Amal after the disappearance of Imam Sadr, attempted to renew 
Shi`i leadership by parliamentary and political means. Husayni 
resigned two years later in favour of Nabih Birri, refusing to 
compromise himself in an armed conflict against the Palestinians. 
Three currents were fighting for the heritage of Imam Musa al-Sadr. 
Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, vice-president of the 
Higher Islamic Shi`ite Council (HISC), supported a political solution 
that would reveal the numerical weight of the Shi`a, better to take 
place in time of peace than in time of war. At the opposite extreme 
was the leading Shi`i mujtahid of Lebanon, Sayid Muhammad 
Husayn Fadlallah. Unconvinced by Khomeini’s ‘governance of 
the jurisprudent’ (Wilayat al-Faqih) and hesitant to recognise the 
authority of Qom and the Iranian mullahs at the expense of the Najaf 
in Iraq, Fadlallah was nevertheless the spiritual guide of Hezbollah, 
which advocated an Islamic Republic in Lebanon. Though present 
in the south and Beirut’s southern suburb, Hezbollah’s bastion was 
in the Biqa`. As Amal was progressively subjected to the interests of 
the parvenu bourgeoisie, especially those who made their fortunes in 
Africa, the middle classes and the intelligentsia destined for public 
service, Hezbollah’s radicalism attracted the more deprived and the 
younger segments of the Shi`a population. 
Another bone of contention between the two organisations 
concerned the anti-Israeli resistance and the Palestinian presence 
in Lebanon. After the Israeli withdrawal of 1985, Amal was content 
to suspend most of its resistance activities, while Hezbollah’s role 
progressed at the expense of the other organisations, especially 
the Left. The new force was soon to become the sole resistance 
movement, strongly backed by the Syrian authorities, which 
deployed all available efforts to block the participation of the 
Communists in the resistance. On the other hand, Hezbollah had 
publicly disavowed Amal’s ‘war of the camps’, a war encouraged 
and armed by Damascus and backed by a parliamentary vote 
abrogating the Cairo Accords.
Amal, in both discourse and practice, held an intermediary 
position between the two poles of the community, the ‘legalist’ and 
the ‘radical’. Birri’s contribution can be likened to that of Bashir 
Jumayil. Like the LF commander in rebellion against the image of 
the Christian-businessman-pacifist who always turned the other 
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cheek, Birri represented the rebellion against the traditional image 
of the Shi`a as millenarian oppositionists, permanent victims and 
scapegoats of Muslim history. Representing a political and armed 
brand of Shi`ism, Birri was intent on eliminating this historical 
image in favour of a positive image of a community claiming its 
share of political power.
On the Druze side, a slow but steady radical revision of Kamal 
Jumblatt’s democratic and secular project was taking shape. The 
‘Battle of the Mountain’ figured in the speeches of Walid Jumblatt 
as revenge by the Druze against Maronite ‘expansionism’ that had 
been perpetuating itself for centuries. Its climax, the occupation of 
Bashir Shihab’s palace in Bayt al-Din, was the occasion for a reversal 
of roles among the three Bashirs. Bashir Jumayil was associated 
with Bashir Shihab II, seen as the emir who reversed power in the 
Mountain in favour of the Christians after he had Bashir Jumblatt 
assassinated in 1825. Bashir Jumblatt was thus promoted to the 
rank of mythical ancestor of the Druze community and rehabilitated 
by an act of historical revenge executed by one of his descendants 
more than a century and a half later. Thus, Walid Jumblatt could 
finally declare: ‘The only Bashir we recognise is Bashir Jumblatt’! 
But, as always, sectarian distinction cannot function without its 
class component. For the historical reversal to be completed, the 
historical identification had to be pushed to its ultimate logic. A 
popular poem by the Druze poet Tali` Hamdan, celebrating his 
community’s victory in the War of the Mountain, identified the Druze 
community with its feudal status and reduced its adversaries to their 
former status as commoners and peasants. The Christians found 
themselves attacked in Hamdan’s poem as peasants, share-croppers 
and servants whom ‘we brought to our [Druze] region’ but who 
revealed their ungrateful nature as ‘venomous serpents’ who turned 
against their benefactors. 
In contrast to Jumblatt’s socio-sectarian model of the muqata`ji-
sect, the superior aristocratic-tribal community that was 
condescending vis-à-vis those who plough the earth and engage 
in manual labour, Nabih Birri’s sect was primarily defined by its 
populist, anti-feudalist connotations. In the Lebanon of the second 
half of the twentieth century, Amal’s war against ‘political feudalism’ 
(represented primarily by the As`ad clan) brought together the 
bourgeois parvenus and the intellectuals – blocked in their social 
mobility – to occupy the place they deserved in the political and 
economic system. 
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It is highly significant that militia legitimacy began to erode as 
the militias took over control of their own ‘territory’. In the relative 
absence of external enemies to frighten their subjects with, militia 
violence was internalised in order to control its ‘subjects’ inside the 
communitarian ghettos carved out and cloistered by violence. In the 
ambient chaos of 1985–90, Lebanon was under the domination of 
armed mafias who had renounced fighting each other and indeed 
collaborated in order to better exploit the country’s resources for 
their own ends. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMy Of MILITIA CONTrOL
It has been said that wars have no sense, but they have functions. In 
fulfilling a series of extra-military functions, the Lebanese civil war 
created its own order, an order that was a monstrous mutation of 
its prewar political and economic system: the autonomy of the sects 
mutated into armed control and ‘sectarian cleansing’, whilst the 
wild laissez-faire economy transformed into mafia predation. This 
new order was a new form of war: the war waged by the militias 
against the state and its citizens. 
Political and military power became the principal means of 
extracting the economic surplus and the constitution of new 
economic interests and social relations. The tribute-collecting and 
tax-farming role of the warlords achieved the supreme capitalist 
phantasm – the generation of revenues and profits without capital 
investment – through the militias’ parasitical politico-military levy 
on practically all economic activities.14 
Cantons and ports: a new configuration of space 
Beirut’s central and centralising role – in the economic, political 
and administrative fields – exploded in favour of no fewer than ten 
militia-controlled cantons mostly built around a number of ‘illegal’ 
ports. Similarly, the central market towns of the interior lost their 
function or were replaced by new ones. Catholic Zahleh ceded its 
monopoly role as the economic and administrative capital of the 
Biqa` to a number of localities, among them Ba`albak (Shi`i), while 
Maronite Dayr al-Qamar, in the Shouf, lost much of its role to 
Ba`aqlin (Druze).
The first illegal ports on the Lebanese coast emerged at the 
beginning of the war and were used to smuggle arms. Later, they 
became economic enterprises in their own right and controlled 
foreign trade. In the extreme north, the small port of al-`Abdeh was 
Traboulsi T02610 01 text   238 23/04/2012   08:07
THE WAr OrdEr (1983–1990) 239
primarily engaged in imports destined for the Syrian market. The 
Port of Tripoli was still run by the Lebanese government but with 
Syrian control and ‘protection’. Businessman Tariq Fakhr al-Din, 
on behalf of the fundamentalist Islamist organisation al-Tawhid, 
administered al-Mahdi port. Shikka’s port primarily exported 
the products of its cement factories, under the protection of the 
Franjiyeh’s Marada, the SSNP and other pro-Syrian groups. Juniyeh 
port imported foodstuffs for Marounistan and ran a regular ferry to 
Cyprus. The Port of Beirut’s fifth basin was under the control of the 
Phalange party and the Lebanese Forces. Uza`i, south of Beirut, was 
run by the Amal militia from 1984, while the neighbouring ports of 
Khaldeh and Jiyeh were operated by Jumblatt’s PSP as outlets for 
the Druze canton in the Shouf. Users of the Port of Sidon had to 
pay their duties twice, to the government authorities and to Mustafa 
Sa`d’s Popular Nasserite Organisation (PNO). A part of the port’s 
revenues were also paid to the SLA of dissident General Lahd as the 
port was within reach of SLA artillery. The Port of Zahrani, under 
the control of Birri’s Amal, was mainly used to import fuel oil. Its 
revenues were divided between Amal and the Lebanese government 
and a share also went as ‘protection money’ to General Lahd. The 
port at Naqura, on the Lebanese–Israeli border, had since 1978 
been managed by the SLA and the Israeli army. It imported goods 
for the Israeli-controlled southern strip.
Marginalisation of the state 
Robbed of its monopoly on violence, with its army divided along 
sectarian lines, the Lebanese state – whose power was at times 
reduced to the parameters of the Presidential Palace in Ba`bda – had 
to coexist as the weaker partner in a true duality of power with 
the militias, which were the effective rulers of the greater part of 
Lebanese territory. Militias took over the majority of the state’s 
income-generating functions, especially those that provided the 
bulk of state revenues – customs duties and indirect taxes. At least 
a quarter of the state’s revenues were thus diverted to the militia 
funds. Further, the state’s monopoly over the audio-visual media 
was shattered as a number of militia-owned TV stations and FM 
radios went on the air. 
sectarian division and purification
When the militias finally ‘cleansed’ their territories and came to 
control ‘their own people’ and run their affairs, pressure on the 
individual to define himself/herself in terms of a unique social 
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and cultural sectarian identity reached its climax. Militia power 
not only practised ethnic, sectarian and political ‘cleansing’ of 
territories but also committed what Juan Goytisolo has aptly called 
‘memoricide’, the eradication of all memories of coexistence and 
common interests among Lebanese. Instead, they imposed their 
discourse of ‘protection’ on their own ‘people’: the other wants to 
kill you, but we are here to save your lives.
Paradoxically, however, when the sectarian system achieved its 
paramount goal – self-rule of each community on its own territory 
– the contradictions inherent in the system exploded in the most 
violent forms. War shifted from inter-sectarian fighting to a bitter 
struggle for power and control inside each community. The notion 
of a unique political and military representation of the community, 
undertaken for a brief period under Bashir Jumayil, became the 
dream of each and every militia leader. This period witnessed the 
bloodiest confrontations of the war: the ‘war of the camps’ between 
Amal and the Palestinian organisations (in West Beirut and southern 
Lebanon), periodic fighting between Amal and the PSP of Walid 
Jumblatt and the parties of the former LNM (for the control over 
West Beirut), bitter and prolonged fighting between Amal and 
Hezbollah (in Beirut, the Biqa` and the south) for the monopoly of 
representation of the Shi`a, and so on. In addition, fighting erupted 
regularly inside the Christian camp between the Phalange party and 
the Lebanese Forces and between the Ja`ja` and Hobeika factions 
of the Lebanese Forces, and culminated in two destructive wars 
between the Lebanese Forces and the army of General Michel ̀ Awn.
Pillage, piracy and plunder
Difficult as it is to calculate the sums involved in the arms traffic 
during the Lebanese wars,15 a large enough surplus of arms and 
ammunitions existed throughout the conflict to turn the PLO 
organisations and the warring Lebanese into international arms 
dealers. Afghan guerrillas, the Yemeni tribes and the protagonists of 
the war in the former Yugoslavia were among their many customers.
Drug trafficking was the economic activity in which all militias 
collaborated. During the war period, the area devoted to hashish 
cultivation doubled and came to occupy more than 40 per cent of 
the cultivable land in the Biqa`. More importantly, opium culture 
was introduced for the first time, its production estimated at a dozen 
tons of heroin processed in a number of clandestine laboratories 
that even processed Colombian cocaine. The estimated value of 
narcotics produced in Lebanon was around $6 billion and their 
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market value reached as high as $150 billion.16 The yearly tributes 
accruing to the various parties that controlled the traffic have been 
estimated at between $500 million and $1 billion.17 
The Lebanese war was the scene of the most famous thievery 
of recent times: the pillage of the Port of Beirut by the Phalangist 
party (estimated at $1 billion) and the robbery by a Palestinian 
organisation of the British Bank of the Middle East which entered 
the Guinness Book of Records as the biggest bank robbery of all 
time (estimated at £20–50 million). To these we should add the 
regular practice of stealing cars, which became a lucrative trade 
in itself throughout the war. According to police files, during only 
eight months in 1985–86, a total of 1,945 cars were registered as 
stolen, the majority in Beirut.
Georges Corm has estimated the total revenue accruing from 
pillage and robbery during the Lebanese civil war at $5–7 billion.18
The illegal ports engaged in smuggling cigarettes, drugs and arms; 
they also moved contraband commercial goods and livestock. It has 
been calculated that the value of goods smuggled into Syria, Israel 
and Cyprus through Lebanon amounted to LL 21 billion in 1986. 
A modern form of piracy also took hold during the Lebanese war 
as merchants’ ships along the coast were deviated from their course, 
their merchandise siezed and the ships sunk or returned to service 
under a different name, registration and flag. The LF mainly carried 
out this activity, allegedly in collaboration with the Italian mafia. 
Between 1986 and 1989, 140 ships en route to the Indian Ocean 
disappeared along the Lebanese coast. By 1989, British insurance 
companies had paid no less than £120 million in compensation 
to ship owners who had lost vessels and goods to piracy on the 
Lebanese coast. 
Militia-controlled ports were also engaged in the import of 
toxic waste from Europe, dumped inland in return for large sums 
of money.19
Tribute and protection money
The most noticeable aspect of this new configuration of space were 
the armed checkpoints and passageways on the ‘borders’ between the 
different cantons, which had the dual function of controlling entry 
and exit to the zone under militia control and serving as customs 
posts. The various militias imposed their tolls on passengers, vehicles 
and merchandise. Passengers paid ‘per head’ while cars were taxed 
on the estimated value of the goods transported and the nature of 
the vehicle itself (tourist car, van or truck). At the LF checkpoints, 
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goods were taxed at 2 per cent of their estimated value. On the road 
to south Lebanon, one had to pass the checkpoint of Mustafa Sa`d’s 
PNO, on the outskirts of Sidon; further on, one would find Amal 
militiamen imposing a fixed tax on trucks leaving the IPC refinery 
at Zahrani. Further south, the five checkpoints of the SLA were 
designed to seal off the Israeli-occupied zone economically from the 
rest of Lebanon and help divert its economy towards northern Israel.
Most militias imposed a head tax. Protection money and income 
taxes were imposed on economic activities: agricultural enterprises, 
commercial and industrial firms, the liberal professions, and so 
on. A direct lump sum tax of $30 per month was imposed on all 
industrial or commercial enterprises. Thereafter, enterprises were 
taxed according to their importance. Tourist centres and beaches, 
for example, were taxed at the rate of LL 350–550 per square 
metre of the centre’s installations, and cottages at the rate of LL 
2,500–5,000 per square metre. Sand extraction along the coast 
was also taxed per cubic metre by the LF and Amal. This activity 
turned out to be so profitable that Amal created its own company 
for sand extraction in partnership with migrant capital. The bulk 
of the revenues of the northern canton of the Marada came from 
protection money imposed on the cement plants of Shikka, taxed at 
the rate of $3–5 per tonne. Most big companies, like Middle East 
Airlines and the Régie, paid enormous sums in protection money to 
almost all of the militias. In the agricultural areas of the south, the 
Amal militia levied a tax on land ownership at the rate of $2 per 
dunum. Consumer goods were equally taxed: cigarettes (5 per cent 
of the price), cigars ($3 per box), cinema and theatre tickets (3 per 
cent of the price), restaurant bills (5 per cent of the total), and so on.
Another important source of militia fiscal revenues were taxes 
and dues levied on administrative formalities previously gathered 
by the state: registration of transfers of landed property, registration 
of cars, building permits, work permits, residence permits for 
foreigners, and so on. The decrease in state revenues led to the 
increase of the public debt, which doubled five times in five years, 
from LL 7 billion in 1981 to LL 35 billion in 1985. It has been 
estimated that the militias expropriated at least 20 per cent of the 
state’s revenues.20
Militias as business enterprises 
In addition to robbing the state’s revenues and heavily taxing their 
‘own’ communities, the militias in power articulated their economic 
activities around the dominant and more profitable sectors of the 
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economy. After 1983, the main militias took control of a large part 
of the import trade and all distribution of fuel and flour. In addition 
to their monopoly control over those vital products, they imposed 
high taxes on their consumption and reaped enormous profits from 
speculation on the differences in the prices of those commodities 
between different Lebanese regions. 
Practically all foreign trade was in militia hands. The newly 
created ports had become militia-owned enterprises. The Phalange 
and LF managed to buy the majority of the shares in the company 
that ran the Port of Beirut. Containers were taxed at the rate of 
$800 per unit. Imported cars were taxed at the rate of 20 per cent of 
their price. In Naqura, Lebanese businessman Samir al-Hajj engaged 
in the re-export business: Israeli merchandise destined for Arab 
markets, camouflaged as Lebanese products. He paid $15 million 
in yearly protection money to the SLA, which gives an idea of the 
volume of his trade. 
Cooperation between the militias in drug trafficking and in 
distribution rackets laid the foundation for future cooperation in 
other fields. The same militia representatives who would sit on 
joint ‘security’ committees as representatives of belligerents at war 
would, perhaps in the same day, reconvene as members of the board 
of directors of companies that they now collectively controlled – 
TMA, the national air transport company, for one – or meet to 
divide their revenues from the distribution of butane gas. Strange 
bedfellows like the general secretary of the pro-Syrian Ba`th party 
and the sons of the Christian right-wing leader Kamil Sham`un were 
partners in the lottery business, which held monopoly rights over 
all Lebanese territory.
Not only did militias ‘exchange services’ with sections of the 
bourgeoisie (protection money in return for import and export 
quotas or sheer profiteering), but they soon became large business 
enterprises in their own right and an integral part of that class, 
entering into close business partnerships with many of its members, 
especially in the flour and fuel trade. And as war neared its final 
phase, the warlords had ‘laundered’ part of their capital into 
privately owned companies. 
WAr ANd sOCIAL MOBILITy
How were the revenues of these enormous enterprises distributed? 
One part was invested in the war effort. Another became the 
personal fortune of the warlords, deposited in Swiss banks or 
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invested abroad. Yet another portion was reinvested in a number of 
‘holding companies’ duly registered in Lebanon, the three main ones 
being under the control of the Lebanese Forces, the Amal movement 
and the PSP of Walid Jumblatt. A striking example of sectarianism 
in business, these Maronite, Shi`i and Druze holdings came to 
own a number of companies operating in all economic sectors: 
private ports, import–export trade, cement factories, tourism, real 
estate agencies, FM radios, television companies, newspapers and 
publishing houses, to name but a few.
In the early phase of the war the sacking of the Port of Beirut and 
the city centre were orgiastic forms of redistribution of wealth. Later 
on, redistribution became more stratified as the ‘masses’ gradually 
withdrew from the stage. Although the above-mentioned methods 
of income redistribution by military and political means were not 
restricted to the warlords, the amounts that trickled down to the 
rank-and-file militiamen are more difficult to identify, especially since 
social mobility related to emigration cannot easily be differentiated 
from that arising from the war itself. We can safely say that mafism 
in Lebanon, the highest stage of clientelism, follows the same logic 
as any other form of clientelism, that of ‘uneven exchange’ and 
‘uneven distribution’ between patrons and clients, except for the 
fact that the main role of clients in war is to die for their patrons.
WAr As dEMOGrAPHIC PUrGE
Wars, civil or regular, share a common anthropological function; 
that of the expulsion of human surplus and the establishment of 
demographic equilibrium. 
It has been estimated that the bloody 15-year purge in Lebanon 
resulted in 71,328 killed and 97,184 injured. The purge of the 
country’s human surplus took three basic forms. 
The first, sectarian ‘cleansing’ to create religiously homogeneous 
enclaves (mainly involving expelling Shi`a Muslims from the 
Christian areas and Christians from the ‘Druze’ mountain), led 
to some 157,500 displaced Muslims and 670,000 displaced 
Christians.21 This sectarian ‘cleansing’ was coupled with a political 
one, the expulsion of political ‘strangers’ and those members of the 
community who did not comply with the policies or dictates of the 
dominant militia. 
Second, there was the expulsion of ‘foreigners’ or ‘intruders’, 
which in this case refers mainly to the Palestinians. Bashir Jumayil 
had a famous phrase for the Palestinians as ‘a people too many in 
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the Middle East’. The massacres of Sabra–Shatila and the wars of 
Amal against the Palestinian camps, not to mention Israeli military 
operations and the two outright invasions of 1978 and 1982, can 
be seen as military procedures to get rid of that ‘people too many’. 
Third was migration: nearly a third of Lebanon’s population, 
estimated by Labaki and Abou Rjeili at 894,717 people, were driven 
out of the country. The economic and social consequences of this 
massive outflow of the working population, mainly the young, have 
been enormous: a majority of the Lebanese workforce are employed 
outside their country; the balance of power among the sectors of 
the economy has tipped even more in favour of tertiary and rentier 
activities at the expense of productive sectors (which suffered most 
from the destruction); the extroverted character of the economy has 
been intensified, and so has the specific logic of capital investment 
directed toward speculation in real estate and foreign currency. 
However, it still can be said that the war did its job in establishing 
a new demographic equilibrium by the double means of death 
and emigration. 
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Ambiguities and Contradictions of  
the Ta’if Agreement
The Ta’if Agreement, signed on 22 October 1989 in Saudi Arabia 
by the Lebanese parliamentarians, inaugurated a process that 
put an end to the Lebanese civil war and set the country on the 
path to peace and reconstruction. A year later, a Syrian–American 
rapprochement, in preparation for negotiations on peace in the 
Middle East, reinforced by the participation of Syrian troops in 
Operation Desert Shield,1 in October 1990, allowed Damascus 
to launch a final assault to dislodge General Michel `Awn from 
the Presidential Palace in Ba`abda and put an end to two years of 
dissidence and ‘dual legitimacy’. General `Awn took refuge in the 
French embassy, and after long deliberations between the French 
and Lebanese governments, he was allowed to leave for France as 
an exile in August 1991. 
`Awn’s dissidence had started in October 1988 when Amin 
Jumayil’s term of office ended without the election of a new 
president, as most of the concerned factions had rejected Mikha’il 
al-Dhahir, a compromise candidate agreed upon by Syria and the 
United States. Jumayil named army commander-in-chief Michel 
`Awn as prime minister, despite the fact that he is a Christian and the 
post is normally held by a Sunni. The appointment was immediately 
contested by Muslim politicians. Salim al-Huss, who had resigned as 
prime minister, went back on his decision and declared himself the 
legitimate holder of the post. Thus Lebanon lived for two years with 
a vacant presidency and a duality of power between two competing 
prime ministers. 
Michel `Awn could well be called Bashir II, as his policies, in 
more than one sense, were replays of Bashir Jumayil’s: in his quest 
to monopolise Christian representation; his military methods 
and his identification of ‘Lebanese’ with ‘Christian’. The title of 
a brochure prepared by one of his advisers says it all: ‘The Army 
is the Solution’. But whereas Bashir sought to integrate the army 
in his project for taking over power by the LF, `Awn, while calling 
for the end of all militias, eventually sought to suppress the LF 
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and integrate them into the army’s project to take over power. In 
his quest for regional and international ‘legitimacy’, `Awn received 
massive aid from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, yet he opened negotiations 
with Damascus on his candidacy for the presidency. Earlier on, he 
had helped the LF of Samir Ja`ja` eliminate Amin Jumayil’s partisans 
and establish full control over Marounistan. But he soon turned 
against them, in February 1989, most probably to prove to his 
Syrian negotiators that he was the sole authority in the Christian 
regions. The confrontation between the two ended in a draw. 
Upon the failure of his negotiations with Damascus, `Awn made 
a complete about-turn in March 1989 and launched his ‘war of 
liberation’ by shelling Syrian positions in West Beirut. The ensuing 
conflict, which enlisted LF participation on `Awn’s side, lasted for 
six months and witnessed the most bloody artillery duels between 
the two regions during the entire war. 
Meanwhile, an Arab League initiative, backed by the US, 
brokered a cease-fire in Lebanon and organised the meeting of 
Lebanese parliamentarians in the city of Ta’if in Saudi Arabia. After 
a month of deliberations, the deputies agreed upon a Document of 
National Understanding, known as the Ta’if Agreement. `Awn n 
rejected the agreement because it did not allow for a complete Syrian 
military withdrawal from Lebanon and decreased the president’s 
prerogatives in favour of the prime minister, without any other 
reforms of the political system. `Awn summoned the MPs, who 
were stationed in Paris, to come and discuss the agreement with 
him. When they refused, suggesting instead negotiations through 
emissaries, he declared himself the sole legitimate authority in 
Lebanon in September 1989. `Awn then dismissed Prime Minister 
Huss and dissolved Parliament, accusing its members of being 
‘warlords’ and promising to substitute them with ‘new leaders 
elected on the basis of their programmes’. However, the General 
gave himself the right to delay ‘other reforms’ until after ‘liberation’: 
‘What reforms would we have’, he asked, ‘if we do not know 
whether the Biqa` and the south are going to remain in Lebanon 
or not?’ As for his rejection of the Syrian mandate, the General 
claimed he could not imagine his country ruled by a ‘society that 
lives in the Middle Ages’.2 
During the two years of his disputed rule General `Awn enjoyed 
undeniable popularity among the Christian public, exasperated by 
the exactions of the LF and the corruption under Amin Jumayil, 
and easily mobilised against Syrian presence. He even attracted the 
sympathy, at times the enthusiastic support, of many Muslims who 
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suffered from the militias and the Syrian mandate and looked up 
to the army as a symbol of the country’s unity. But the populism 
that animated him was reductionist and one-sided. After one of his 
enthralling rallies around the Presidential Palace – in which `Awn 
became the object of a new cult, with huge posters representing 
him as Saint George slaying the dragon – his official organ, L’Eveil 
(Consciousness) wrote: ‘The people was only born sixty days ago. 
But it is not participating in the fighting against the LF.’ Not only 
did the General substitute himself and his army for the ‘people’, 
but the country was also reduced to a ‘liberated Christian nucleus’ 
and the Lebanese reduced to the ‘Christian people’: ‘[The General] 
relies first on the people itself’, explains L’Eveil, ‘then on the Muslim 
groups when they acquire the capacity to express themselves freely.’3 
More clearly, the Muslims had not joined the Christians in the fight 
against the Lebanese Forces.
Entrenched in his Presidential Palace in Ba`abda, ̀ Awn refused to 
recognise President René Mu`awad when the latter was elected on 
5 November 1989 in an air force base in the north of the country. 
And when Mu`awad was killed in a car bomb on Independence 
Day (22 November), `Awn persisted in refusing to recognise his 
successor, the deputy for Zahleh, Iliyas Harawi. 
The General’s last war was launched against the LF of Ja`ja` to 
punish the party’s leader for his positive attitude toward the Ta’if 
Agreement, and in a last bid for exclusive control of the Christian 
enclave. The war for ‘unifying the guns’, as it was baptised, 
transformed East Beirut and the heart of the Christian region from 
January to May 1990 into a real battlefield, severely divided the 
Christians, and dealt a severe blow to their position in the country’s 
sectarian balance of power. The General’s wars incurred great 
losses: 1,500 killed and 3,500 wounded; 25,000 homes destroyed; 
the fall of the Lebanese currency from LL 550 to $1, to LL 1,100; 
and more than 100,000 Lebanese, mostly Christians, emigrating to 
Canada, the USA and Australia. In addition, capital flight because 
of the fighting inside the Christian camp had been estimated at 
$1 billion. 
With `Awn in exile,4 Iliyas Harawi started exercising his powers 
over the entire country and designated `Umar Karami as prime 
minister. The militias disbanded with the help of the Syrian forces 
and handed in their arms to the Lebanese authorities. Many of the 
militiamen were incorporated into the army, the security services 
and the administration. Armed Palestinians were disarmed and 
driven back into the camps. Only Hezbollah was allowed to keep 
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its weapons, because of its role in the armed resistance against 
Israeli occupation. Simultaneously, the legitimate army, reorganised 
under General Emile Lahud, accomplished its deployment in the 
entire country except the Israeli border enclave. In May 1991, 
Presidents Harawi and Assad signed a Brotherhood, Cooperation 
and Coordination Agreement, ratified by the Lebanese Parliament 
six months later, which was followed, on 1 September 1991, by a 
Common Defence and Security Agreement. 
On 21 September of that year, Parliament voted a constitutional 
law to incorporate the reforms of Ta’if into a new constitution 
designed to put an end to the old duality of the constitution/National 
Pact. Its preamble proposed a new compromise on the country’s 
identity, defining Lebanon as ‘Arab in its belonging’ and ‘the final 
homeland for the Lebanese’. The finality of Lebanon, meaning that 
it would never enter any union with any other state, namely Syria, 
had been a major demand by Christians since the formulation of 
the National Pact of 1943. On the other hand, Lebanon’s Arab 
identity was upgraded from the ‘Arab character’ in the National 
Pact to ‘Arab belonging’. The preamble also included general lines 
of economic policy: the decisive adoption of the ‘system of free 
enterprise’ linked to the equitable and concerted development of 
all Lebanese regions and to social justice.5
The Document of National Understanding adopted in Ta’if had 
envisaged a solution to the Lebanese crisis in two stages. The Second 
Republic it gave birth to was to lead to a Third Republic in which 
political sectarianism would be abolished. Article 95 was modified 
to commit the first elected Parliament to create a special council for 
that purpose, without fixing a time limit for the achievement of the 
abolition. The Third Republic, liberated from political sectarianism, 
would be inaugurated by the election of a non-sectarian Parliament. 
The sects would be represented in a Senate similar to that of the 
1926 constitution, which would have a decisive vote on issues 
of a national character. However, the council for the abolition 
of sectarianism is yet to be created, faced with open opposition 
of the Christian leaders and tacit opposition from the rest of the 
sectarian leaders. 
In practical terms, the Ta’if regime reproduced the sectarian system, 
but with a sizeable modification in the balance of power among its 
constituents. To begin with, parity between Christians and Muslims 
replaced the previous 6:5 ratio in the distribution of Parliament 
seats, which were increased to 128, and of cabinet portfolios. In 
addition, sectarian quotas were abolished in civil service posts, the 
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judiciary, the army and the police. The only exception to this was 
‘degree one’ posts, that is, the general directors of ministries, where 
a system of parity and rotation was to be applied so no degree-one 
post would be reserved for a specific sect. 
More importantly, the prerogatives of the president of the 
republic were severely curtailed in favour of the prime minister, the 
cabinet, and the Parliament and its speaker, all confirmed in their 
representation of the Maronite, Shi`i and Sunni sects respectively. 
Though he remained the head of state, symbol of the country’s unity 
and guardian of the constitution, the president had essentially lost 
most of his executive powers. He would attend cabinet meetings 
but without the right to vote, compared to the previous situation 
in which he would preside over cabinet meetings and the cabinet 
could not issue decrees in his absence. The prime minister, previously 
appointed by the president of the republic, would henceforth be 
designated by ‘obligatory consultations’ that the president entered 
into with the MPs, and he was bound by the decision of the majority 
(modified Article 53). In addition, the right to dissolve Parliament 
passed from the president to the cabinet (Article 55 modified), and 
the decrees he previously signed in a bilateral agreement with the 
minister concerned would now require the additional signature of 
the prime minister (Article 54 modified). 
This ruling troika arrangement created one of the most unstable 
power relations imaginable. In that sense, the Ta’if Agreement 
merely created another system of discord. Conflicts among the 
holders of the three top posts became endemic. But this time, there 
was an arbiter: President Assad in Damascus. Thus, in the best 
tribal manner, mediation in conflicts and what we now call ‘conflict 
resolution’ became in itself a potent lever of Syrian power over 
Lebanon and its people. 
But there was much more than that to the Syrian role in Lebanon. 
Postwar Lebanon had been entrusted to Damascus as a mandatory 
power by the US and Europe. Although the Ta’if Agreement had 
Syria and Saudi Arabia as regional patrons, the decisive role was 
taken over by Damascus, especially as its Saudi partner became 
increasingly bogged down in the Gulf crisis. The withdrawal of 
Syrian troops to the Biqa`, supposed to take place before September 
1992, did not materialise, and the designation by Syria of 40 new 
deputies in the transitory Parliament greatly influenced the coming 
elections and the advent of a legislature with a pro-Syrian majority. 
That imbalance was aggravated by a dramatic decision by the major 
Christian forces to boycott the 1992 elections. 
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On the eve of the publication of the fraternity agreement, General 
Ghazi Kan`an, security chief of the Syrian troops stationed in 
Lebanon, made a revealing declaration to the Lebanese press: 
You Lebanese, you are shrewd, creative and successful merchants. 
Soon, you are going to have 12 million neighbours coming toward 
you. Create light industries. Engage in trade and commerce. 
Indulge in light media, which does not affect security. Shine all 
over the world by your inventiveness, and leave politics to us. 
Each has his domain in Lebanon: yours is trade; ours, politics 
and security.6
Therein lies a comprehensive programme. Not only was security 
entrusted to Syria’s officials and troops in Lebanon, but the whole 
Lebanese state also. As for the linkage between media and security, 
it was not the product of some professional deformation from which 
Kan`an suffered. Freedom of the press in Lebanon was dealt with as 
a security matter in the Defence and Security Agreement between the 
two countries, submitting it to the decades-long phobias of Syrian 
rulers vis-à-vis the role of the Lebanese press in affecting political 
change in the sister country. All this assumed that Syrian officials 
in Lebanon and in Syria would respect the division of labour that 
allotted the economy to the ‘creative and successful merchants’, 
leaving ‘light industry’, ‘trade and commerce’ and ‘light media’ in 
the hands of the Lebanese. This, of course, had not been the case 
during the war and it would not be the case in the postwar period. 
But that is another story.
It remains that Ta’if, with its ambiguities and contradictions, 
nevertheless managed to put an end to the armed conflicts. A new 
period in the history of Lebanon had begun. 
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634–641 Arab Muslim conquest of Syria. Mount Lebanon and 
the Coast (Tripoli to Sayda) are part of the Jund of 
Damascus
663 Umayyads settle Persians in Jabal, Kisrawan and Tripoli 
and Yemeni tribes (Tanukhs and Arsalans) in western 
Mount Lebanon to defend coast against Byzantine 
attacks
 Islamisation of southern Lebanon tribes while northern 
tribes remain Melchite Christians (believers in dual 
nature of Christ), including Maronites, followers of 
the hermit Mar Maroun (fourth to fifth centuries) in 
the Hums region. 
680–681 Maronites split from Byzantine Church; elect Yuhanna 
Maroun as their patriarch. Seat in `Assi (Orontes) 
valley where they remain for three centuries
750–1258 The Abbassid Caliphate 
759–760 Revolt of ‘King Bandar’ (Christian) in Jubbat 
al-Munaytira (Jbeil highlands) 
765 Death of Imam Ja`far al-Sadiq initiates Shi`i split 
between Imamists (Twelvers) and Isma`ilis
874 Ghayba of Imam Muhammad bin al-Husayn, twelfth 
Imam for the Twelver Shi`as 
 Spread of Shi`ism in Lebanese territories
901–922 Qarmates in Syria: besiege Damascus, destroy Hums, 
control Biqa` and parts of Mount Lebanon 
908  Qarmates defeated by Fatimides in `Assi valley 
969 Byzantines invade northern Syria. Migration of 
Maronites from ̀ Assi valley to Mount Lebanon, fleeing 
Byzantine advance
 Fatimids overthrow Akhshidi rule in Egypt
977 The Fatimids in Syria. Defeat Qarmates
 Tyre rebels against Fatimids under Amir `Ullaqa 
1000 Maronites move into northern Mount Lebanon
1017 Beginning of Druze Da`wa in Cairo: Anshiktin Darazi 
calls for deification of Fatimid ruler, Al-Hakim bi Amr 
Illah. He is killed by Fatimids. Hamza bin ̀ Ali organises 
Druze as Muwahiddin sect. Druzism spreads in Syria
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1019 Fatimids in Syria. Control Mediterranean trade between 
Syrian coast and Italian city-states 
 Tripoli (under the Bani `amma) and Tyre affluent 
enough to attain self-rule
1058 Seljuks in Syria, fight weakened Byzantine and Abbassid 
empires
1086 Seljuks achieve control of Syria and Mediterranean 
trade 
 Fatimids raid Syria and reconquer coastal cities, except 
Beirut 
1096–99 Pope Urbanus II launches First Crusade against Islam 
(and Byzantine heterodoxy)
 Crusaders take Constantinople and Antioch and march 
toward al-Quds
1110–24 Cities of the Syrian coast fall to Crusaders 
 Crusaders open al-Quds; Muslim influence reduced to 
Damascus and Aleppo
1110–1282 Maronites divided on alliance with Crusaders: 
Maronites of coast, loyal to Crusaders; Maronites 
under Patriarch Gregorius al-Halati (1130–41) vow 
allegience to Rome; highlanders in Jubbat Bisharri Jbeil 
and Batrun refuse allegience
1110–1230 Civil war between Maronite factions
1282 Continued schism inside Maronite community leads to 
election of two separate patriarchs; divisions remain 
until departure of Crusaders; rise of muqaddams 
benefiting from Church weakness
1516 Ottoman rule
1523–1697 The Ma`n dynasty in Mount Lebanon
1590–1635 Reign of Fakhr al-Din Ma`n II
1697–1841 The Shihab dynasty
1697–1707 Reign of Bashir I
1707–32 Reign of Haydar Chihab 
1711 Final victory of Qaysis over Yamanis in `Ayn Dara 
battle
 Druze internal strife for succession
1750--1775 Dahir al-`Umar in Acre
1775–1804 Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar in Acre
1788–1840 Reign of Bashir Shihab II
1820–21 Antiliyas–Lihfid commoners’ revolt crushed by joint 
forces of Bashir Shihab and Bashir Jumblatt 
1825 Assassination of Bashir Jumblatt
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1831–40  Ibrahim Pasha in Syria 
1838 Druze revolt against Bashir Shihab and Ibrahim Pasha
1840 Revolt against Bashir and Egyptians; military 
intervention of foreign powers in Mount Lebanon ends 
Egyptian rule; Bashir II banished to Malta 
1841 Civil strife in Mount Lebanon 
1842 13 January: Ottomans declare end of Emirate of Mount 
Lebanon
1843 Double Qa’im maqamiya; Mount Lebanon divided 
into a Christian region and a Druze region
1845 Renewed civil strife in Mount Lebanon
1858–61 Kisrawan commoners’ revolt
1860 Civil war in mixed regions of Mount Lebanon and 
massacre of Christians in Damascus
1861–1915 The Mutasarrifiya of Mount Lebanon
1915 Ottomans abolish Mutasarrifiya; appoint Ottoman 
governor 
1916 Famine hits Beirut and Mount Lebanon
1918 French armies in Lebanon
1920 San Remo conference grants France mandate over Syria 
and Lebanon
 24 July: battle of Maysalun; French troops overthrow 
Arab rule in Damascus
 31 August and 1 September: Declaration of Greater 
Lebanon
1926 Lebanese Constitution
1936 French–Lebanese Independence Treaty
1943 November crisis: Lebanese Parliament terminates 
French mandate
 French delegate Helou dissolves Lebanese Parliament, 
arrests President Bishara al-Khoury, Prime Minister 
Sulh and ministers Ussayran and Taqla
 22 November: Khoury and companions released; 
official date of Lebanese independence
1947 25 May 25: rigged parliamentary elections (Black May)
1948 15 May: Palestine war
1949 March: Husni Za`im’s coup d’état in Syria 
 June: renewal of Khoury’s mandate
 9 June: Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) armed 
rebellion; SSNP leader Antoun Sa`adeh flees to 
Damascus 
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 6–7 July: Sa`adeh delivered by Syrian authorities; 
executed 8 July
 Lebanese–Israeli truce treaty
1950 Breakup of Syrian–Lebanese customs union
1951 April: general elections give sizeable representation to 
anti-Khoury opposition
 16 July: assassination of Riad al-Sulh in Amman airport 
by SSNP commando
 21 October: Lebanon officially asked to join Middle 
East (ME) Military United Command; Khoury rejects 
offer
1952 23 July: Free Officers’ coup in Egypt
 17 September: general political strike forces resignation 
of Khoury 
 23 September: Kamil Sham`un elected president of 
Lebanese Republic
1953 Summer: parliamentary elections; women granted right 
to vote
1954 24 February: Iraq and Turkey sign ‘Baghdad Pact’
1956 26 July: nationalisation of Suez Canal 
 30 October: Suez War
 November: Arab Summit in Beirut 
1957 March: Lebanon joins Eisenhower Doctrine 
 May–June: parliamentary elections; major Muslim 
leaders fail to be re-elected 
1958 8/22 February: declaration of United Arab Republic 
(UAR)
 9 March: Nasser in Damascus; massive popular 
Lebanese delegation to greet him
 May: armed revolt against Kamil Sham`un
 6 June: UN Security Council sends observers to 
Lebanon 
 14 July: republican coup in Baghdad
 15 July: US marines land in Lebanon
 31 July: election of Fu’ad Shihab as president of 
Lebanese Republic
 23 September: Shihab appoints Rashid Karami prime 
minister; Phalange party declares ‘counter-revolution’ 
 Mid to end October: four-man ministry under Karami 
ends ‘counter-revolution’; US marines leave Lebanon
1959 Shihab–Nasir meeting on Syrian–Lebanese borders
1960 June/July: general elections for a 99-seat Parliament 
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1961 28 September: breakup of UAR
1961–62 New Year’s Eve: SSNP failed coup d’état 
1963 8 March: military coup d’état by Ba`thists and Arab 
Nationalists in Syria
1964 Charles Helou elected president of republic
1965 Intra Bank crash
1967 June: Arab–Israeli war.
 Tripartite Alliance between Jumayil, Sham`un and 
Edde, against ‘Arabism, Zionism and Communism’
1968 First Palestinian commandos enter Lebanese territory
 28 December: Israeli raid on Beirut International 
Airport
1969 23 April: massive demonstration in support of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO); security 
forces open fire; many killed and wounded
 3 November: Cairo Agreement between Lebanese 
government and PLO
 26 November: Karami forms government of national 
unity
1970  September: ‘Black September’ in Jordan; election of 
Sulayman Franjiyeh as president of republic 
 November: corrective move in Syria puts Hafiz al-Assad 
in power
1973 May: fighting erupts between Lebanese army and 
fedayeen; Syria closes its borders with Lebanon 
 Pierre Jumayil visits Damascus at head of Phalange 
delegation
 October War
1975 7 January: President Assad visits Lebanon, declares 
Syria ready for military support to Lebanon in case of 
Israeli aggression
 March: assassination of Ma`ruf Sa`d in Sayda
 13 April: `Ayn al-Rummaneh incident. Beginning of 
civil war
 23 May: Franjiyeh appoints military cabinet, survives 
for three days 
 6 July: Karami forms six-man cabinet excluding 
Jumblatt and Phalange
 August, Lebanese National Movement (LNM) launches 
‘Transitional Programme for the Democratic Reform 
of the Lebanese System’
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 August: fourth and fifth rounds of fighting in Zahleh 
and Zgharta
 Committee for National Dialogue
 6 December: Jumayil in Damascus; ‘Black Saturday’ in 
East Beirut, at least 200 Muslims killed; LNM reacts 
by launching ‘Battle of Hotels’
1976 13 January: fall of Dbayyeh Palestinian camp; Karantina 
and Maslakh quarters besieged by Phalangists; LNM–
PLO besiege Damour
 20 January: fall of Karantina and Maslakh
 22 January: fall of Damour
 23 January: new Syrian mediation and cease-fire
 7 February: President Franjiyeh, in accord with 
President Assad, declares constitutional document
 11 March: coup d’état of Brigadier Ahdab; 68 MPs 
demand resignation of Franjiyeh; Franjiyeh refuses, 
backed by Damascus
 22 March: fall of Holiday Inn hotel; Phalange lose last 
stronghold in West Beirut
 25 March: Ba`abda Presidential Palace shelled; 
Franjiyeh takes refuge in East Beirut
 March: seven-hour Assad–Jumblatt meeting ends with 
discord
 1 April: US emissary Dean Brown in Beirut
 11 April: Syria–PLO agreement on restoring order in 
Beirut
 13 March: Assad’s speech attacking LNM
 8 May: Iliyas Sarkis elected president
 End May: Syrian troops enter Lebanon
 June: Israel opens ‘Good Frontier’ in south; defection 
of Major Sa`ad Haddad and formation of Army of Free 
Lebanon (AFL)
 12 August: fall of Tall al-Za`tar Palestinian camp and 
predominantly Shi`ite Nab`a suburb in eastern Beirut
 23 September: end of Franjiyeh term of office; Iliyas 
Sarkis president
 16 October: six-man Arab summit in Riyadh declares 
cease-fire in Lebanon starting 21 October
 25 October: Arab summit in Cairo confirms Riyadh 
decisions; Syrian troops named Arab Deterrent Force 
(ADF)
 Mid-November: ADF enter Beirut 
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 December: government of technocrats under Salim 
al-Huss
1977 16 March 16: assassination of Kamal Jumblatt
 19–21 November: Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem
1978 February: Syrian–Phalangist fighting in Ashrafieh
 14–15 March: Operation Litani: Israeli army invades 
south Lebanon and establishes buffer zone under 
Haddad; UN created UNIFIL
 June: Tony Franjiyeh, his wife and daughters killed 
during a Phalange raid in Ihdin led by Samir Ja`ja`
 Summer–September: Camp David Accords between 
Egypt and Israel; 100 days’ battle between Syrian 
troops and Phalanges in East Beirut
1979 January: Islamic revolution in Iran overthrows Shah 
regime
 March: Sadat and Begin sign peace treaty in Washington
1980 March: Battle of Zahleh; Israeli–Syrian ‘missile crisis’ 
diffused by US envoy Philip Habib
 7 July: Bashir Jumayil eliminates National Liberation 
Party (NLP) ‘Tigers’ (the Numur); creation of Lebanese 
Forces (LF) under his command
1982 4–6 June: Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Beirut besieged; 
Syrian troops retreat to northern Lebanon and the 
Biqa`
 23 August: Bashir Jumayil elected president; evacuation 
of PLO troops by US-led Multinational Force (MNF)
 14 September: assassination of Bashir Jumayil
 15 September: Israeli troops enter Beirut
 15–17: Sabra and Shatila massacres
 16 September: Left parties launch Lebanese National 
Resistance Front (LNRF)
 21 September: Amin Jumayil elected president
1983 17 May: Lebanese–Israeli treaty
 ‘War of the Mountain’ by Jumblatt’s Druze forces; 
massacres and displacement of majority of Christians 
from southern parts of Mount Lebanon
 Lausanne Conference between warring Lebanese 
factions
1984 Amal militia controls West Beirut; MNF leave Beirut
 Official declaration of the creation of Hezbollah, 
Party of the Islamic Revolution, already active in the 
resistance against Israeli occupation since 1982
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1985 Tripartite Agreement between Jumblatt’s Progressive 
Socialist Party (PSP), Nabih Birri’s Amal movement 
and the LF, commanded by Elie Hobeika, under Syrian 
auspices
 January: coup d’état by Samir Ja`ja` against Tripartite 
Agreement; Elie Hobeika and his partisans ousted from 
East Beirut
 ‘War of the Camps’ launched by Amal militia against 
Palestinian camps in Beirut and the south
1986 Trade unions lead civil society demonstrations in 
opposition to the war
1987 Syrian troops return to Beirut after devastating fighting 
between Amal and PSP militias
1988 Amin Jumayil, at the end of his presidential term, 
appoints General Michel ̀ Awn interim prime minister. 
Post of president of republic vacant; two prime 
ministers, Salim al-Huss and Michel `Awn, compete 
for recognition
1989 February: first confrontation between army units loyal 
to `Awn and LF militia
 March: `Awn bombards West Beirut; declares 
‘Liberation War’ against Syrian troops
 22 October: Lebanese Parliament convened in 
Ta’if (Saudi Arabia) issues Document of National 
Understanding 
 5 November: Parliament, meeting at Qulay`at military 
base, approves Ta’if Accord and elects René Mu`awad 
president
 22 November: Mu`awad assassinated by bomb
 Iliyas Hrawi elected president
1990 Second round of `Awn–LF fighting
 Iraq invades Kuwait; Syria joins US-led coalition, given 
green light to pacify Lebanon
 October: Syrian troops assault Ba`abda Presidential 
Palace; Michel `Awn takes refuge in French embassy; 
allowed to depart to exile in France in August 1991
1991 Syrian troops begin disarming Lebanese militias
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Glossary
`abaya: traditional Arab dress for the upper classes and tribal chiefs
`amma: commoners, all inhabitants of Mount Lebanon who do not 
hold a noble title 
`ammiya: commoners’ movement or revolt
`araq: popular drink made of alcohol distilled from grapes and 
tempered with anis
Bilad al-Sham: natural Syria
beyk: initially the title of a sanjak ruler, came to be a title in itself
caza: subdivision of a sanjak
diwan: administrative council
emir liwa’: ruler of a sanjak or liwa’
fedayeen: Palestinian commandos
gharadiya (or ismiya): partisan allegiance of commoners to their 
lords
hawch: seigneurial closure in nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon
iqta` (or iltizam): Ottoman tax-farming and land tenure concession
intifada: uprising
jizya: protection tax for the ‘people of the Book’, according to the 
millet system
manasib: muqata`ji orders: emirs, sheikhs and muqaddams
muqata`ji: holder of a tax-farming concession
millet system: a two-tier hierarchy in the Ottoman Empire between 
a higher community, made up of Muslims, and a lower ‘protected’ 
community, made up of the ‘people of the Book’, Christians and 
Jews. The latter enjoyed a measure of freedom of religious belief 
and religious rites in return for the payment of a protection tax, 
the jizya
mudabbir: secretary to a muqata`ji, usually Christian.
muqasama (and mugharasa): form of tenancy farming in which 
the share-cropper comes to own a plot of the land after having 
cultivated it for a number of years, usually between six and ten
musha`: village commons
nahiya: subdivision of a caza
Qa’im maqamiya: division of Mount Lebanon into two political and 
administrative units each governed by a qa’im maqam (1842–61)
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Qaysi/Yamani: political factionalism prevalent in Bilad al-Sham 
until the late eighteenth century between tribes claiming descent 
from northern Arabia and tribes claiming descent from Yemen 
sanjak (or liwa’): subdivision of a wilaya, ruled by an emir liwa’ 
or a sanjakbey.
sharaka (partnership): share-cropping
sheikhs shabab: local leaders of the commoners’ revolts. Under the 
Mutasarrifiya (1861–1915), elected representatives of Mount 
Lebanon villages and towns who formed the electoral college for 
the election of the Administrative Council 
Tanzimat: Ottoman centralising and modernising reforms, 1839 
and 1856
`uhda: muqata`ji estate
wakil: elected village representative during the commoners’ revolts 
in Mount Lebanon
waqf: non-commercial properties donated to religious institutions 
for pious and charitable purposes
wilaya: main Ottoman administrative unit, ruled by a wali. The 
wilaya is divided into a number of sanjaks and the latter into a 
number of nahiyas
za`im: political boss
zajaliya: popular poem in colloquial Arabic
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CHAPTEr 1
 1. The principal Ottoman political/administrative divisions were the wilaya (ruled 
by a wali), divided into a number of sanjaks or liwa’s (ruled by an emir liwa’), 
the sanjak was divided into cazas, and the cazas into nahiyas. 
 2. For the entire Ma`n period, see Abdul-Rahim abu-Husayn, Provincial Leadership 
in Syria, 1575–1650 (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1985) and Lubnan 
wa-l-Imara al-Durziya fi-l-`Ahd al-`Uthmani (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 2005).
 3. Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leadership in Syria, pp. 114–21.
 4. Husayn Ghadhban Abu Shaqra and Yusuf Khattar Abu Shaqra, Al-Harakat fi 
Lubnan ila `Ahd al-Mutasarrifiya (Beirut: Matba`at al-Ittihad, 1952), p. 157.
 5. William Polk, The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788–1840 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1963) pp. 63–81.
 6. Iliya Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711–1845 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 167–99.
 7. The contract signed by the villagers of the village of Bshi`li illustrates well this 
function – ‘united as one man and speaking with one voice – ready to share 
equally the losses and sacrifices that might result from their adventure, the 
[undersigned] delegate to one of them the task of representing them and vow 
to obey him and fight under his command as long as he acts “according to his 
conscience” and remains faithful to “our interests and public interest”’. Harik, 
Politics and Change, pp. 213–14.
 8. Ibid., pp. 290–5.
 9. David Urquhart, The Lebanon: A History and a Diary, 2 vols (London, 1860), 
p. 252. 
10. Jacques Weulersse, Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient (Paris: 1946).
11. Mikha’il Mashaqqa, Kitab Mashhad al-A`yan bi – Hawadith Suriya wa Lubnan 
(Cairo, 1908), p. 13.
12. Mas`ud Dhahir, Al-Judhur al-Tarikhiyya li-l-Mas’ala al-Zira`iyya al-Lubaniyya, 
1900–1950 (Beirut: Dar al-Farabi, 1981).
13. Urquhart, The Lebanon, pp. 117–18; Eugène Poujade, Le Liban et la Syrie, 
1845–1860 (Paris, 1867), pp. 166 ff.
14. Leila Fawaz, ‘Zahleh and Dayr al-Qamar: The Market Towns of Mount 
Lebanon During the Civil War of 1860’, in Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar 
Mills (eds), Lebanon: A History of Concensus and Conflict (Oxford and New 
York: Centre for Lebanese Studies and I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 49–63; see also 
her An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 
(London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994). 
15. Témoin oculaire, Souvenirs de Syrie: Expédition française de 1860 (Paris: 
Librairie Plon, 1903), pp. 58–9.
16. Cf. `Issa Iskandar al-Ma`luf, Tarikh Zahla, 2nd edn (Zahla: Zahla al-Fatat 
Editions, 1977) and Alixa Naff, ‘A Social History of Zahle, the Principal Market 
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Town in Nineteenth Century Lebanon’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Los Angeles, 
University of California, 1972).
17. John Bowring, Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria (London: HMSO, 
1840), p. 118.
18. Cf. Leila Tarazi Fawaz: Merchants and Migrants in 19th Century Beirut 
(Cambridge, MA/ London: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 31–61; and 
Ratib al-Husamy, ‘The Commerce of Beirut and the Bayhum Merchant House 
Some 100 Years Ago, 1828–1856’ (unpublished MA thesis, American University 
of Beirut, January 1942).
19. This double dependence is well expressed by the pathetic testimony of a Druze 
sheikh complaining to a British trader that British ships now arrive full of 
textiles and leave with the captain’s cabin full of gold. ‘“In the past, we used 
to sell you tobacco and our silk, and make our own clothes ourselves,” says 
he, “and now we buy all our clothing from you, except the `abayas, and you 
do not buy any of our products.”’ Urquhart, The Lebanon, p. 38.
20. Mas`ud Dhahir, Al-Intifadat al-Lubnaniya dhidd al-Nizam al-Muqata`ji (Beirut: 
Dar al-Farabi, 1988), pp. 131–72.
CHAPTEr 2
 1. The Abi-l-Lama`s, Druze emirs of the Matn, followed the majority of their 
Maronite subjects and converted to Christianity. 
 2. Colonel Charles Churchill, The Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish 
Rule from 1840 to 1860 (London: Bernard Quarick, 1982), p. 75.
 3. Eugene Poujade, Le Liban et la Syrie, 1845–1860 (Paris, 1867), pp. 245–6.
 4. Iliya Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711–1845 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) p. 249.
 5. Cf. ̀ Isa Iskandar al-Ma`luf, Tarikh Zahla , 2nd edn (Zahla: Manshourat Zahla 
al-Fatat, 1977).
 6. Témoin oculaire, Souvenirs de Syrie (Paris, 1861) p. 26. 
 7. Both parties were arming themselves at a rapid rate. Marwan Buheiry’s research 
into the Belgian archives revealed that no fewer than 14,325 firearms had 
been sold to Lebanon in 1855 from Belgium alone; two years later, the figure 
had reached 21,225. Marwan Buheiry, ‘The Peasant Revolt of 1858 in Mount 
Lebanon: Rising Expectations, Economic Malaise and the Incentive to Arm’, 
in Tarif Khalidi (ed.), Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle 
East (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984), p. 299.
 8. Cited in Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism, Community, History 
and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2000), p. 135.
 9. Cf. Dominique Chevallier, La Société du Mont-Liban à l’époque de la révolution 
industrielle en Europe (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1971), and 
‘Que possédait un cheikh maronite en 1859?’, Arabica, vol. 7 (1960), p. 77.
10. Gérard de Nerval, Voyages en Orient (Paris: Flammarion, 1980).
11. Cf. Yehoshua Porath, ‘The Peasant Revolt of 1858–1861 in Kisrawan’, Asian 
and African Studies, vol. 2 (1966), pp. 77–157.
12. Cf. Issam Khalifa, ‘La révolution française et les révoltes sociales au Mont-Liban, 
1820–1859’, in Mouvement Culturel-Liban et Mouvement Culturel-France, La 
Révolution française et l’Orient, 1789–1989 (Paris: Cariscript, 1989).
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13. Antoun Dhahir al-`Aqiqi, Thawra wa Fitna fi Jabal Lubnan, ed. Yusuf Ibrahim 
Hazbik (Beirut: Matba`at al-Ittihad, 1938), p. 60.
14. Louis Shaykhou (ed.), Nubdhah Mukhtasara fi Hawadith Lubnan wa-l-Sham, 
1840–1862 (Beirut: L’Imprimerie Catholique, 1927), p. 7. Shaykhou attributes 
the testimony to Antoun Khanjiyan, chaplin of the Armenian Catholic 
community in Beirut.
15. `Aqiqi, Thawra wa Fitna, p. 194.
16. Chevallier, ‘Que possédait un cheikh maronite en 1858?’, pp. 72–84.
17. `Aqiqi, Thawra wa Fitna, p. 208.
18. Karam was born in Ihdin in 1823 and grew up in a house accustomed to 
receiving French tourists on visit to the Cedars. He pretended to be the godson 
of the French crown prince. An ardent Maronite, he distinguished himself in 
the ‘witch hunt’ against the ‘heretical’ Protestants. Though an unconditional 
supporter of Bkirki – his slogan was ‘Our Sultan is the patriarch’ – he had not 
backed Mas`ad for the patriarchal seat, preferring a northern candidate.
19. Bentivoglio reported to his government that the Patriarch and his bishops 
were ‘losing all influence on the inhabitants, incapable of inspiring them with 
the necessary trust for the exercise of any form of authority’. Adel Ismaïl, 
Histoire du Liban du XVII° siècle à nos jours. Tome IV: Redressement et déclin 
du féodalisme Libanais, 1840–1861 (Beyrouth, 1958), p. 329. Furthermore, 
Father Bulus al-Ashqar relates how, coming to collect the Church tax from the 
inhabitants of Zuq Mikhail, he was expelled from the town by the delegate 
Elias Habalin, at the head of armed men, who told him: ‘Let the one who 
appointed you in this village pay you, we do not owe you anything.’ Khalifa, 
‘La révolution francaise’, pp. 53–4.
20. Yusuf Karam was stopped en route, seemingly by joint pressure from the 
European consuls and the Abi-l-Lama`s. The latter were too eager to take 
their revenge from the town that had expelled them and expropriated their 
properties. As for the consuls, they were too respectful of the ‘red lines’, as 
Zahleh lay outside the confines of the Qa’im maqamiya, that is, in purely 
Ottoman territory.
21. By that time, the Christians of Damascus had surpassed their Jewish competitors, 
which explains why the latter were spared during the riots. 
22. Unpublished lecture and private communication to the author. Worthy of note 
is the fact that the rioters did not include any textile workers or artisans, which 
damages the hypothesis that the riots were mainly a reaction to the invasion of 
imported European textiles and the collapse of local textile production.
23. Marcel Emerit, ‘La crise syrienne et l’expansion économique française en 1860’, 
Revue Historique, vol. 207 (195), pp. 211–32. 
24. Iskandar Ya`qub Abqarius, Nawadir al-Zaman fi Waqa’i` Jabal Lubnan 
(London: Riad el-Rayyes Books, 1987), p. 144.
CHAPTEr 3
 1. The project was initiated by the French consul in Cairo in 1841, then relaunched 
by a French journalist in the 1850s and finally championed by a Prussian 
countess in 1860 to save Lebanon’s Christians. Mir`i al-Dahdah, a rich Lebanese 
merchant in Marseilles and friend of Karam, was among its supporters and 
enlisted his friend’s help. A variety of economic and political arguments were 
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proposed in favour of the transfer project. Maronite settlers would be cheaper 
to install in Algeria than European colons, their skills would encourage the 
development of sericulture and cotton production, or alternatively, they would 
be used to create a commercial network in favour of French interests. Finally, 
the Maronites, Arab and Christian, speaking both Arabic and French, would 
be ideal intermediaries between the colonial administration and the native 
population. However, the Quai d’Orsay was opposed to the project from the 
start, arguing that the Maronites were France’s most loyal allies in the Orient 
and the basis of its colonial policy, they should therefore remain in their territory 
to counter the Druze, heavily supported by the British.
 2. Boutros Labaki, Introduction a l’histoire économique du Liban. Soie, et 
commerce extérieur en fin de période ottomane, 1840–1914 (Beyrouth: 
Publications de l’Université libanaise, 1984), pp. 210–14.
 3. Between 1783 and 1860, the population of Mount Lebanon increased from 
120,000 to 200,000, a growth of 67 per cent in 77 years, yet it doubled in 
only three decades between 1880 and 1913 (200,000 to 414,000). See Akram 
Khater, Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender and the Making of the Lebanese 
Middle Class, 1861–1921 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
 4. Elie Safa, L’émigration libanaise (Beyrouth: Publications de l’Université 
Saint-Joseph, 1960), pp. 187–90.
 5. Paul Jouplain, La question du Liban. Etude d’histoire et de droit international 
(Paris, 1908), p. 573.
 6. Ferdinand Tyan, France et Liban: Défense des intérets francais en Syrie (Paris, 
1917), p. 84.
 7. The table below shows the population statistics for the Mutasarrifiya in 1865 
and 1895. John Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon (London: Ithaca 
Press, 1977), p. 24.
  1865   1895
Maronites  171,800 229,680
Greek Orthodox  29,326  54,208
Druze   28,560   49,812
Catholics   19,370  34,472
Shi`ites  9,820   16,846
Sunnis  7,611  13,576
Total  266,487  398,594
 8. Hani Faris, Al-Niza`at al-Ta’ifiya fi Tarikh Lubnan al-Hadith (Beirut: Al-Ahliya 
li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi`, 1980), p. 81.
 9. ‘Feudal’ families held 23 (62 per cent) of the 37 district governorships under 
the Mutasarrifiya, and 260 (77 per cent) of the 337 sub-district governorships. 
Toufic Touma, Paysans et institutions féodales chez les druzes et les maronites du 
Liban du XVIIIème siècle à 1914, 2 vols (Beyrouth: Publications de l’Université 
libanaise, 1971), p. 338.
10. Engin Akarli, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920 (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1993), pp. 416–17.
11. Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon, pp. 163–4.
12. Ibid., pp. 290–1. 
13. Yusuf al-Sawda, Fi Sabil al-Istiqlal, vol. 1, 1906–1922 (Beirut, 1967), pp. 50–63.
14. Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon, p. 276 and passim.
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CHAPTEr 4
 1. Marwan Buheiry, ‘British Official Sources and the Economic History of Lebanon: 
1835–1914’, in Lawrence I. Conrad (ed.), The Formation and Perception of the 
Modern Arab World: Studies by Marwan R. Buheiry (Princeton: The Darwin 
Press, 1989), p. 492.
 2. Jacques Thobie, Intérêts et impérialisme français dans l’empire ottoman, 
1895–1914 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1977), p. 164.
 3. Salim al-Bustani, Al-A`mal al-Majhula, ed. Michel Giha (London and Beirut: 
Riad el-Rayyes Books, 1990), pp. 183–6.
 4. See Mas`ud Dhahir, Al-Judhur al-Tarikhiyah li-l-Mas’ala al-Ta’ifiya al-Lubnaniya 
(Beirut: Ma`had al-Inma’ al-`Arabi, 1981).
 5. See Leila Tarazi Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth Century 
Lebanon (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1982).
 6. L’Indicateur Libano – Syrien (Beyrouth: Société Syrienne de publicité, 1922).
 7. As early as 1850, Bustrus Cousins distributed Manchester-manufactured 
products, while another branch of the family, Mussa Bustrus and Nephews, were 
agents of European transport companies (the British Liverpool Steamers among 
others). The Trads, backers of Emir Fakhr al-Din II, specialised in finance. 
The Tuwaynis started their career under Al-Jazzar. Lutfallah Tuwayni arrived 
to Beirut after having amassed a large fortune in Sidon from olive oil presses, 
soap manufacture and commerce. Girgis Tuwayni was a commercial partner 
of the Sursuqs (Sursocks). These latter were undoubtedly the wealthiest and 
most prestigious among the Beiruti families. Dimitri Sursuq was moneylender 
for Khedive Isma`il of Egypt who granted him the title of Pasha and repaid his 
debts in the form of shares in the Compagnie du Canal de Suez. Nicolas Sursuq’s 
annual income was estimated at £60,000 and he was a major shareholder in 
the DHP and the Port Company.
 8. Gaston Ducousso, L’industrie de la Soie en Syrie et au Liban (Beyrouth, 1913).
 9. Al-Janna, al-Junayna and al-Jinan are variations on the word ‘garden’ in Arabic 
and synonyms of ‘bustan’, hence the family name ‘Bustani’ (gardener).
10. Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, Al-Saq `Ala-l-Saq Fi Ma Huwa al-Fariyaq, 1st edn 
Paris, 1855 (Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, 1966), pp. 188 and 194.
11. `Adil Al-Sulh, Sutur Min al-Risala (Beirut, 1966), pp. 124–5.
12. Al-Khoury Antun Yammin, Lubnan Ba`d al-Harb, 1914–1919 (Beirut: 
Al-Matba`ah al-Adabiya, 1919), pp. 121–4.
CHAPTEr 5
 1. ‘His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing 
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing 
non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed 
by Jews in any other country.’
 2. Engin Akarli, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920 (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1993), p. 474.
 3. Ferdinand Tyan, France et Liban: Défense des intérets francais en Syrie (Paris, 
1917), p. 84.
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 4. John Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon (London: Ithaca Press, 1977), 
p. 304.
 5. Yusuf al-Sawda, Fi Sabil al-Istiqlal, vol. 1, 1906–1922 (Beirut, 1967), pp. 72–3.
 6. Auguste Adib, Lubnan Ba`d al-Harb (Cairo, 1919), pp. 109–17.
 7. Sawda, Fi Sabil al-Istiqlal, pp. 204–5.
 8. Marwan Buheiry, ‘The Role of Beirut in the Political Economy of the French 
Mandate, 1919–1939’, in Lebanon Papers (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese 
Studies, 1986), p. 589.
 9. Akarli, The Long Peace, pp. 181–2.
10. Its administrative bureau was composed of 15 members, among whom were 
Jean de Freij (Latin), president; Na`um Bakhus, vice-president; Emile Edde, 
secretary; Emile Kachou`, director of the Banque de Syrie, treasurer; members: 
Bishara al-Khoury, Shukri Qirdahi, Alfred Naqqash, Yusuf Jumayil (Maronites), 
Salim Asfar, Michel Chiha, Emile ̀ Arab and Alphonse Zayni (Greek Catholics).
11. In a satirical poem addressed to the Maronites, Shibl Dammus (Greek Catholic 
deputy for Zahla) related the inversely proportional relationship between 
Greater Lebanon and Maronite ‘greatness’: 
Sons of Maroun …
You thought that Lebanon’s ‘Greatness’ would do you honour …
By God, your fate resides in the menu
By enlarging Lebanon, you have reduced Maroun!
12. Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon (London and Sydney: Croom 
Helm, 1985) p. 113.
13. 20 August 1920, Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, vol. 32, pp. 188–9.
14. Gérard Khoury, La France et l’Orient Arabe: Naissance du Liban Moderne, 
1914–1920 (Paris: Armand Collin, 1993), p. 396.
15. Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon, pp. 75–7, 90.
16. Most proponents of an enlarged Lebanon adopted the map drawn by the 
French military command in the years 1860–61 as their reference for Lebanon’s 
borders. That map defined Lebanon’s southern borders just south of the Litani 
river course as it exited into the Mediterranean south of Sidon, and included 
the Hula plain but excluded Tyre and Jabal `Amil. Only Bulus Nujaym and 
Auguste Adib had included the latter two regions in their Greater Lebanon. Adib 
was the only advocate of a Greater Lebanon to put the Lebanese–Palestinian 
frontiers at Naqura, the actual southern border of Lebanon with Palestine. See 
`Isam Khalifa, Al-Hudud al-Junubiya li-Lubnan (Beirut, 1985).
17. Samir Kassir and Farouk Mardam-Bey, Itinéraires de Paris à Jérusalem: La 
France et le conflit israélo-arabe, 2 vols (Washington, DC, and Paris: Les livres 
de la Revue d’études palestiniennes, 1992 and 1993), pp. 51–2.
CHAPTEr 6
 1. Al-Batriyark Antun`Arida, Lubnan wa Faransa, ed. Mas`ud Dhahir (Beirut: 
Dar al-Farabi, 1987), p. 22.  
 2. Michel Van Leew, ‘Un cas particulier de nationalisme: Emile Edde’, Cahiers du 
GREMAMO, no. 7 (1990), pp. 9–10, 18–19.
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 3. The 1932 census showed a slight Christian majority of 402,000 to 383,000 
for the Muslims. The population distribution by sects was as follows: 226,000 
Maronites (28 per cent), 76,000 Greek Orthodox (10 per cent), 46,000 Greek 
Catholics (6 per cent), 53,500 Other Christians (7 per cent), 176,000 Sunnis 
(22 per cent), 154,000 Shi`is (20 per cent), 53,000 Druzes (7 per cent).
 4. The Common Interests for Syria and Lebanon were: Administration Générale 
des Douanes; Société du Chemin de Fer de Damas-Hamah et Prolongements 
(DHP); Société des Tramways et Eclairage de Beyrouth; and the Compagnie 
des Eaux de Beyrouth. The main franchise-holding companies were: Banque de 
Syrie et du Liban (BSL); Crédit Foncier d’Algérie et de Tunisie; Banque Française 
de Syrie; Crédit Foncier de Syrie; Compagnie du Port, des Quais et Entrepôts 
de Beyrouth; Société des Grands Hôtels du Levant; Compagnie Générale du 
Levant; Régie Co-intéressée Libano-Syrienne des Tabacs et des Tombacs; Radio 
Orient; and so on.
 5. Roger Owen, ‘The Political Economy of the Great Lebanon, 1920–1970’, in 
Roger Owen (ed.), Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon (London: Ithaca Press, 
1976), p. 24.
 6. Amin al-Rihani, Qalb Lubnan (Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 1965), p. 99. 
 7. `Arida, Lubnan wa Faransa, p. 63.
 8. In May 1936, as the Palestinian rebellion was in full swing, Edde addressed 
a message to the Orient Fair in Tel Aviv recalling the traditional friendship 
between the two countries, ‘always turned toward each other’, and promised 
greater cooperation between Lebanon and Palestine. Nevertheless, the fair was 
boycotted by the majority of Lebanon’s businessmen. For his part, Bishara 
al-Khoury declared his support for the Palestinian rebellion and criticised the 
indifference of the Lebanese government toward it. 
 9. Kazim Al-Sulh, Mushkilat al-Ittisal wa-l-Infisal fi Lubnan (Beirut, March 1936).
10. Ibid.
11. Whatever the case, Christian independentists did not limit themselves to the 
positions of Khoury’s Constitutionalist Bloc. Jibran Tuwayni, founder and 
editor of the daily Al-Nahar, gave priority to independence over the return 
to the constitution. He insisted on the creation of an independent national 
Lebanese army. More importantly, Tuwayni demanded the opening of direct 
negotiations between Syria and Lebanon to conclude a treaty that would define 
economic and social relations between them and establish a unified institution 
to administer the Common Interests. Similarly, the National Front of Yusuf 
al-Sawda and Amin Taqi al-Din called for the conclusion of a treaty with 
France on the basis of Lebanon’s sovereignty and the strengthening economic 
and social ties with Syria.
12. Nicolas Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1957), p. 195.
13. Taqrir wa Muqarrarat al-Mu’tamar al-Watani al-Dimuqrati fi Lubnan (Beirut, 
27 November 1938).
14. It was not surprising that the conservative Le Jour of Michel Chiha supported 
the transport strikes of 1931 and 1935 against the TEB. The Kettaneh family, 
a major funder of the paper, were agents of American truck companies and 
owners of a large truck transport company for the entire Middle East (including 
Iran). They made no bones about their desire to privatise transport and buy 
the DHP.
15. The wartime French restrictions were sizeable: prior permission was required 
from the Mandatory Control Service for any transfer of capital outside the franc 
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and sterling zones; an official rate of currency exchange was imposed; import 
and export licences were made obligatory, and so on. This excessive control 
encouraged the development of an extensive black market which accounted for 
40–50 per cent of imports financed by foreign currency for the years 1944–46. 
That same market was also responsible for handling the remittances of émigrés 
and the currencies arising from transit and re-export trade that illegally entered 
the country. This money was offered by non-authorised brokers to importers 
looking for foreign currency and unable to obtain it through the Office des 
Changes. Cf. Samir Makdisi, ‘Post-War Lebanese Foreign Trade’, unpublished 
MA thesis (Beirut: Economy Department, American University of Beirut, June 
1955); and Carolyn Gates, The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an 
Open Economy (Oxford and New York: Centre for Lebanese Studies and I.B. 
Tauris, 1989). 
16. General Spears’ Papers, Middle East Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford, Box 
III/2.
17. Edde’s willingness to serve as frontman for the dying French mandate cost him 
dearly: he was deprived of his parliamentary mandate by a vote in the Chamber 
of Deputies and retired from politics. He died in 1949.
CHAPTEr 7
 1. Although the Lebanese constitution does not openly provide for a state religion, 
Article 9 introduces the Divinity into political and civil life: ‘Freedom of belief 
is absolute. The State – in performing its obligations of reverence to God 
almighty – respects all religions and all sects and guarantees [takfal] the freedom 
of practice of religious rites under its protection, provided that this does not 
disturb public order and [the State] also insures [tadmann] the respect of the 
system of personal status and religious interests for all the subjects [Ahlin] in 
their diverse sects.’
 2. Nawwaf Salam, Mythes et politiques au Liban (Beirut: Editions FMA, 1987), 
p. 69.
 3. Edmond Rabbath, La formation historique du Liban politique et constitution-
nel: Essai de synthèse (Beyrouth: Publications de l’Université Libanaise, 1973), 
p. 173.
 4. Karami and Pharaon’s alliance was sealed in 1944 by the creation of Hizb 
al-Hurriya (The Freedom Party).
 5. General Spears was replaced in December 1944, blamed for being too hostile 
to the French, and his protégé Kamil Sham`un was sent, in response to French 
pressure, as ambassador to the Court of St James’s.
 6. The movement of goods in its port increased from 301,500 tons in 1946 to 
1,051,400 in 1950 and 1,887,000 in 1955. In 1955, the volume of transit trade 
passing through Beirut port had risen 27-fold from the start of the Arab–Israeli 
war of 1948 (from 21,000 tons in 1947 to 574,100 tons in 1955).
 7. According to Wilbor Eveland, an ex-CIA operative in the Middle East, Miles 
Copeland, a major CIA operative in the Middle East, and Stephen Mead, 
assistant military attaché at the US embassy in Damascus, were largely 
responsible for engineering Za`im’s coup in order to drive Syria to sign an 
agreement with TAPLINE, the US company that built and operated the pipeline 
carrying Saudi oil to the Mediterranean. The Syrian Parliament had found the 
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transit fees too low and refused to ratify the agreement. See Irene Gendzier’s 
interview with Eveland in Notes from the Minefield: The United States–Lebanon 
Connection, 1944–1958 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 
98; and Douglas Little, ‘Cold War and Covert Action: The US and Syria, 
1945–1958’, Middle East Journal, vol. 44, no. 1 (Winter 1990), p. 55. 
  Husni al-Za`im ruled for 137 days, during which he signed the TAPLINE 
agreement and the Syrian–Israeli Armistice Agreement, before being overthrown 
and killed by a military coup led by Colonel Hinnawi on 14 August 1949.
 8. Data on the Consortium have been computed from a variety of sources, both 
written and oral. Among them should be cited two reports by the Foreign Service 
of the United States of America (FSOUSA), Declassified Material: (1) Lane to 
Department of State: Memorandum of an Interview with Prime Minister of 
Lebanon Prepared by the Commercial Attache, no. 1048, secret, Beirut, 17 
December 1945; (2) The Political Control Exercised by the Commercial Class 
in Lebanon, dispatch no. 372, 21 January 1952, by Harold B. Minor. Minor’s 
exceptional report is based on information supplied by a number of Lebanese 
and foreign businessmen, politicians and high state functionaries. It contains 
information on 25 members of the ‘commercial class’, including those whom 
Minor calls the ‘president’s clique’: Husayn al-`Uwayni, Fu’ad al-Khoury, Michel 
Doumit, Jean Fattal, the Kettaneh brothers and Sheikh Khalil al-Khoury, the 
president’s son. Minor’s list served us as a base for the present work.
 9. Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community 
and the Lebanese State, 1840–1985 (London: Ithaca Press, 1986), p. 4.
10. Among these banks were Banque Misr-Syrie-Lebanon; Arab Bank; Trad-Crédit 
Lyonnais; Sabbagh – Banque d’Indochine; Pharaon-Chiha; Banque Commerciale 
Italia; Al-Ahli (Salim, Sahnawi, Doumit, Karam, Salha, Fattal and Kettaneh).
11. When family firms were recycled into joint-stock companies in the 1960s and 
1970s, the Consortium families still held a position of command and control 
in the main sectors of the economy.
12. See Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernisation in 
Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1968).
13. In 1951–53, 50 per cent of imports came from the US dollar zone, 22 per 
cent from the sterling bloc, 11 per cent from the franc bloc and 17 per cent 
from Syria, while 37 per cent of the exports were destined for the sterling 
zone, 34 per cent for the dollar zone, 21 per cent for Syria and only 8 per cent 
for the franc zone. Revenues from transit trade (including the transit of oil) 
exceeded the value of imports, exports and re-exports combined in 1951–52. 
Jibra’il Munassa, Fi Sabil Nahda Iqtisadiya Lubnaniya Yusahim Fiha Lubnan 
al-Mughtarib (Beirut, 1950), pp. 40, 56.
14. ‘Transmitting a Survey of the Economic Problems of Lebanon’ address delivered 
by Naim Amiouné, assistant director of the Lebanese Ministry of National 
Economy, at American Junior College, FSOUSA, no. 1258, Beirut, 3 July 1946.
15. L’Orient, 18 March 1950.
16. See Mlle Durand, ‘La rupture de l’union syro-libansie’, in Mélanges Proche 
Orientaux d’Economie Politique (Beyrouth: Faculté de Droit, Université 
Saint-Joseph, 1956), pp. 293–358.
17. Michel Chiha, Propos d’économie libanaise (Beyrouth: Editions du Trident, 
1965), pp. 126, 136, 162.
18. Nicolas Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (London: Ernest Benn, 1957), p. 111.
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19. A typical example of the financial scandals under Khoury was related to the 
construction of Beirut Airport. The scandal, reported in a dispatch by the 
commercial attaché of the US embassy in Beirut, relies mainly on information 
furnished by Gabriel al-Murr, engineer, deputy and government minister. The 
minister of public works at that time was southern za`im Ahmad al-As`ad and 
the main contractors were the Kettanehs. Four different teams of American 
experts had decided that the project should cost no more than LL 24 million. In 
1952, it had already cost LL 45 million and was still incomplete. Government 
expenditure on land expropriation, estimated at LL 5.5 million in 1948, had 
reached LL 13 million in 1952 and was not terminated. A big beneficiary of these 
indemnities was Sa’ib Salam, owner of the al-Ghadir area in which the airport 
was being built. The cost of excavations and sand extraction was estimated 
at 110 piastres/cubic metre and the contract was fixed at 170 for the Régie 
des Travaux owned by Michel Doumit, Alfred Kettaneh and the Sabbaghs, all 
belonging to the ‘president’s men’. The cement contract was awarded exclusively 
to the Shikka plant of Fu’ad al-Khoury, the president’s brother and a member 
of the governmental commission that supervised the construction of the Beirut 
International Airport. The Shikka plant delivered cement at a higher price 
than that of imported cement from the US, which included transport costs and 
customs duties. ‘The Political Control Exercised by the Commercial Class in 
Lebanon’, FSOUSA, despatch no. 372, 21 January 1952, by Harold B. Minor.
20. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 118–19.
21. Michel Chiha, Politique Interieure (Beyrouth: Editions du Trident, 1957), 
p. 234.
22. As early as 1945, when the French troops departed, Charles Malik, spokesman 
for the Lebanese delegation in Washington, established contacts with the State 
Department to ensure US political and military engagement on the side of 
Lebanon. Lebanon, about to be ‘detached’ from France, could not survive 
without the presence or support of the leader of the ‘free world’, he argued. 
Malik went back to the State Department to propose a military alliance in 1947 
and 1949. During this last visit, the ambassador emphasised Lebanon’s need for 
American protection to ward off the threat of the nascent State of Israel. In May 
1949, Francis Kettaneh proposed to the State Department the establishment of 
US military bases in Lebanon in return for the sum of $5 million which were the 
estimated losses incurred by the Lebanese economy in the event of the breakup 
of economic union with Syria. Both Malik and Kettaneh expressed Michel 
Chiha’s belief that the new power in the world that should protect Lebanon was 
the US and not Britain. While Charles Malik pursued his Washington contacts, 
Riad al-Sulh spent most of 1948–49 in France and Britain, trying to convince 
its leaders to sign bilateral agreements for the defence of Lebanon without it 
having to join the Western military pacts.
23. Upon the advice of Chiha, the deputies of the ‘Le Jour group’, Pharaon, de 
Freige and Abi Shahla, voted for Sham`un.
CHAPTEr 8
 1. For the Sham`un era, consult the painstaking and rich work of Irene Gendzier, 
Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle 
East, 1945–1958 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
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 2. Camille Chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), p. 248. 
 3. L’Orient, 17 June 1956, cited in Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: 
Political Modernisation in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 290, 
who himself spoke of Sham`un’s ‘dictatorial’ tendencies.
 4. Irene L. Gendzier: ‘The Declassified Lebanon, 1948–1958: Elements of 
Continuity and Contrast in US Policy Toward Lebanon’, in Halim Barakat 
(ed.), Toward a Viable Lebanon (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1988), 
pp. 178–209.
 5. The main operative of the CIA in Beirut also revealed that the Company paid 
$25,000 to help Charles Malik become deputy for the Kura district. A similar 
sum was paid to Sham`un to ‘convince’ the rival candidate to step down in 
favour of Malik. W.C. Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America’s Failure in the Middle 
East (London and New York: W.W. Norton, 1980), pp. 252, 266.
 6. Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield, p. 237.
 7. Notable examples are the sugar refinery in the Biqa` and the second cement 
plant in Shikka whose licence had been granted to the Dumit family, related 
by marriage to Michel Chiha and President Khoury’s wife, and associated with 
German capital. For this Kamal Jumblatt accused Sham`un of receiving 1,640 
shares for the net value of LL 1 million as the ‘price’ of the Shikka plant licence. 
Jumblatt himself had applied in 1947 for a licence for a second cement factory 
in Siblin (Iqlim al-Kharrub) but his application had been blocked by Khuri to 
preserve the monopoly of the Shikka plant, owned by Khoury’s brother Fu’ad 
and his in-laws, the Haddads. Under Sham`un, Jumblatt found himself deprived 
of that licence again. Ironically, Jumblatt’s lawyer in that affair, under Khoury’s 
term of office, was no other than Kamil Sham`un himself! See Jumblatt’s press 
conference, Al-Muharrir, 7 September 1973.
 8. Georges Naccache, ‘A l’heure de Mme. Afaf’, L’Orient, 17 January1958.
 9. The military capability of the rebels, estimated at 12,000 men, was superior to 
that of the army. See Adel Freiha: L’armée et l’Etat au Lebanon, 1945–1980 
(Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1980).
10. Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield, p. 203. 
11. Sham`un received Jordanian and Iraqi military units which were stationed to 
defend the airport.
12. Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield, pp. 297–99. See also Ben Fenton, 
‘Macmillan backed Syria assassination plot: Documents show White House 
and No. 10 conspired over oil-fueled invasion plan’, Guardian, 27 September 
2003. 
13. Sham`un’s adherence to the Eisenhower doctrine did not help him much, as the 
doctrine only provided for American military intervention in case of aggression 
by a ‘country under the domination of international communism’. The official 
justification for the marines’ intervention was to ‘defend American citizens’ 
and counter the UAR’s ‘indirect aggression against Lebanon’s independence’. 
CHAPTEr 9
 1. Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernisation in Lebanon 
(New York: Random House, 1968), p. 174.
 2. Kamal Salibi, ‘Lebanon under Fuad Chehab, 1958–1964’, Middle East Studies, 
vol. 2, no. 3 (April 1966), p. 210.
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 3. The two notable exceptions were the textile factories’ mass strike in the 
summer of 1963, broken when the workers were threatened with layoffs, and 
the 1,600-strong Post, Telegraph and Telephone employees’ strike of 1964, 
during which the army took over the installations and maintained the service 
until the employees were forced back to work.
 4. Waddah Sharara, Al-Silm al-Ahli al-Barid: Lubnan al-Mujtama` wa-l-Dawla, 
1964–1967, 2 vols (Beirut: Ma`had al-Inma’ al-`Arabi, 1980), p. 19.
 5. See Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal ̀ Abd al-Nasir and his Rivals: 
1958–1970 (New York: 1971).
 6. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 328.
 7. The social housing projects were never built and the building of the LU 
university campus was only completed in the autumn of 2005!
 8. In addition to `Uwayni himself, the cabinet included businessmen `Ali `Arab, a 
rich Shi`i émigré from Africa; Antoine Sahnawi, a member of the Consortium; 
and Najib Saliha, the business partner of ̀ Uwayni from Saudi days and a major 
shareholder in the Intra group.
 9. In 1965, 800 villages planted tobacco in the south, and in Jbeil and Batrun; the 
peasants and farmers in that sector numbered around 30,000. In addition, the 
Régie employed 600 functionaries and 3,000 workers, and ruled the destinies 
of 15,000 licensed retailers.
10. Among the demands were lowering electricity and cold storage charges; the 
direct import by the state of fertilisers and insecticides to break the power of 
the monopolies; an Arab common market; the development of exchanges of 
agricultural products between Lebanon and the socialist countries; and finally, 
the creation of a federation of Lebanese farmers.
11. The massive naturalisation of Palestinians, mainly Christians, was carried out 
under Sham`un.
12. Sharara, Al-Silm al-Ahli, footnote to pp. 740–1.
13. Al-`Amal, 8 October 1966. Maysalun and Wadi al-Harir are on the Syrian side 
of the Lebanese–Syrian borders.
14. Lisan al-Hal, 9 October 1966.
15. Al-Nahar, 19 October 1966.
16. Al-Nahar, 16 December 1966.
17. Al-Nahar, 29 January 1967.
18. Al-Nahar, special annual edition, 1966.
19. Le Monde, 16–17 November 1969.
CHAPTEr 10
 1. Claude Dubar and Salim Nasr, Les Classes Sociales au Liban (Paris: Fondation 
nationale des sciences politiques, 1976), p. 68.
 2. Cf. Zuhayr Hawwari, Al-Ijtiyah al-Iqtisadi al-Isra’ili li-Lubnan (Beirut: Al 
Mu’assasa al `Arabiyya lil-Dirasat wa-l-Nashr, 1985), pp. 118–19. 
 3. Cf. Selim Nasr, ‘Bayrut al-Kubra 1975: Hudud al Indimaj al Ijtima`’, Al Waqi`, 
no. 3 (1981), pp. 69–110.
 4. Lebanese Communist Party, ‘Report of the Central Committee to the 4th 
National Congress’, Al-Tariq , No. 4 (August 1979), p. 15.
 5. Ibid., pp. 8–16, 272–80.
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 6. Boutros Labaki, cited in C. Dubar and S. Nasr, Les classes sociales au Liban 
(Paris: Fondation nationales des sciences politiques, 1976). 
 7. Ibid., p. 357. 
 8. Ibid., p. 322.
 9. Ibid., p. 297.
10. David Gordon, Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation (London: Picador, 1980), 
pp. 136–7.
11. Grégoire Haddad, ‘Primum vivere’, L’Orient–Le Jour (15 July 1975).
12. Gordon, Fragmented Nation.
13. A. el-Amine and N. Wehbi, Système d’enseignement et division sociale au Liban 
(Paris: Editions le Sycomore, 1980), pp. 43 ff.
14. Yusef Sayegh, Entrepreneurs of Lebanon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1962), pp. 69 ff.
15. Boutros Labaki, ‘L’économie politique du Liban indépendant, 1943–1975’, in 
D. Haffar and N. Shehadi (eds), Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Concensus 
(Oxford and New York: Centre for Lebanon Studies and I.B. Tauris, 1988), 
pp. 166 ff.
16. Ibid.
17. Cf: Ahmad Beydoun, Le Liban: itinéraires d’une guerre incivile (Paris: Editions 
Karthala, 1993), pp. 103–25.
18. Gordon, Fragmented Nation.
19. Al-Nahar, 23 April 1974.
20. In 1970, at the initiative of labour minister Jamil Lahhud, the GWUL was 
unified; it was comprised of ten trade union federations (and 126 trade unions) 
run by an executive committee of 37 members presided over by Gabriel Khoury, 
with a total membership of 54,070 workers. 
21. USADOS, Annual Labour Report, 1972–73, 20 July 1973, E.O. 11652: GDS. 
22. Al-Safa, 7 February 1973.
23. Le Monde, 16 February 1972.
24. Le Monde, 26 April 1972.
25. Antoine Massarra, La structure sociale du Parlement libanais de 1920 à 1973 
(Beyrouth: Publications de l’Université Saint-Joseph, 1975).
26. Le Monde, 30 May 1972.
27. Kamal S. Salibi, Cross-Roads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1958–1976 (New York: 
Caravan Books, 1976), p. 57.
28. Jonathan Randall, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers 
and the War in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 164.
29. Le Monde, 2 September 1972.
30. The newspapers of the Phalange, the Communist Party, the Ba`ath, the 
Progressive Socialist Party, the SSNP, and others.
31. Notable among the foreign-language newspapers were L’Orient–Le Jour, which 
was formed from the merger of two mandate-era papers, the English-language 
Daily Star and a number of Armenian newspapers.
32. Famous weeklies included Freiha’s Al-Sayyad, the satirical Al-Dabbour, Salim 
al-Lawzi’s Al-Hawadeth, Nabil Khoury’s Al-Mustaqbal, Walid Abou Daher’s 
Al-Watan al-Arabi, Al-Ahad edited by Riad Taha, and Al-Usbu` al-`Arabi 
of the Abou `Adhal business group, edited by Yasser Hawwari. In French 
there was Magazine, also by the Abou `Adhal group, and, in English, Monday 
Morning. Weekly magazines published by the party organs included Al-Akhbar 
of the Lebanese Communist Party and Al-Hurriyah, of the Movement of Arab 
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Nationalists, later taken over by the leftist Organisation of Communist Action–
Lebanon.
33. Robert Solé, ‘Le Liban, bastion chrétien?’, Le Monde, 5–7 December 1972.
34. Haddad, ‘Primum vivere’.
35. Fuad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca, 
NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 112.
36. Ibid., pp. 48–9.
37. Ibid., p. 189.
38. Al-`Amal, 20 February 1973.
39. On 18 October 1973, a commando unit of the Revolutionary Socialist 
Organisation occupied the local branch of Bank of America, took a number 
of hostages and demanded the liberation of one of their imprisoned comrades, 
a $10 million ransom and their safe departure to Algeria. Police stormed the 
bank the next day after the kidnappers executed the first hostage, an American 
employee of the bank. The operation ended with four killed, including a 
policeman and the leader of the commando unit, Ali Shu`ayb.
CHAPTEr 11
 1. The Lebanese Front, successor to the Front of Liberty and Man, was led by 
Sulayman Franjiyeh, Sharbil Qassis (president of the Maronite Brotherhoods) 
Pierre Jumayil, Kamil Sham`un, Charles Malik, Edward Hunayn (MP and 
secretary-general of the Front) and Fu’ad Bustani (historian and ex-president 
of the Lebanese University). The immobilism advocated by the Lebanese Front 
is best expressed in the following statement addressed to the French envoy 
Maurice Couve de Merville: ‘The New Lebanon the Lebanese Front wants is 
the original and millenial Lebanon with its 6,000 years’ continuous heritage 
… and including its miraculous achievements.’
 2. The Lebanese National Movement, headed by Kamal Jumblatt and his 
Progressive Socialist Party, represented an alliance of leftist and nationalist 
parties: the Lebanese Communist Party (general secretary Nicolas Shawi, 
later George Hawi), the radical leftist Organisation for Communist Action 
in Lebanon (general secretary Muhsin Ibrahim, later the LNM’s executive 
secretary), the SSNP (represented by `Abd Allah Sa`adeh and In`am Ra`d), the 
Independent Nasserite Movement (al-Murabitun, headed by Ibrahim Qulaylat), 
the Popular Nasserite Organisation of Mustafa Sa`d, the Nasserite Arab Socialist 
Union of ̀ Abd al-Rahim Murad, and a number of independent figures, including 
Albert Mansur, Usama Fakhuri and Samir Franjiyeh.
 3. L’Orient–Le Jour, 8 and 13 June 1975.
 4. A Lebanese Front memorandum said it clearly: ‘the Muslim majority is 
oppressive nolens, volens, which constitutes a danger for the sheer existence 
of the Christians in all of Lebanon’ (Al-Nahar, 20 December 1977).
 5. See the complete minutes of the CDN sessions in Al-Tariq, nos 1–8 (January–
August 1976), pp. 97–321.
 6. Interview on Radio France International, reported in Al-Safir, 9 August 1975.
 7. ‘Amal’ is an acronym for Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya (Battalions of 
Lebanese Resistance).
 8. Declaration of the Phalange politburo, 10 January 1976.
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 9. Jonathan Randall, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers 
and the War in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 96.
10. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Diane Pub. Co., 1999), p. 1045. 
11. In a secret memorandum to French emissary Couve de Murville, revealed to 
the public by the leftist weekly Al-Hurriya, the Kaslik monks called for a 
return to a Christian ‘Little Lebanon’. In fact, special French envoy Georges 
Gorse was in Beirut during Brown’s mission with a message from President 
Mitterrand expressing France’s willingness to form a joint French–Syrian 
military intervention force to end the Lebanese war, a proposal that was 
sabotaged by the Americans. 
12. Alain Ménargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (Paris: Albin Michel, 2004), 
pp. 73–4.
13. Joseph Abu Khalil, Qissat al-Mawarina fi-l-Harb: Syrah Zatiyyah, 3rd edn 
(Beirut: Sharikat al-Matbu’at li-l Tawzi’ wa-l Nashr, 1990).
14. ‘For Secretary from Brown’, 1 April 1976, FSOUSA (Secret), Beirut, no. 02866.
15. Department of State telegram, April 1976, FOUSA, Beirut, no. 02935 041901Z.
16. ‘For Secretary from Brown’, 13 April 1976, FSOUSA (Secret), Beirut, no. 3266.
17. ‘For Secretary from Brown’, 13 April 1976, FSOUSA (Secret), Beirut, no. 3545, 
21 April 1976.
18. Cf. Y. Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence 
Dialogue. (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
19. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 1042.
20. Ibid., p.1048. 
21. Al-Hurriya, no. 773, 17 June 1976. See also Abou Iyad, Palestinien sans patrie 
(Paris: Fayrolle, 1978).
22. Al-Hurriya, no. 775, 31 June 1976.
23. John Bulloch, Death of a Country: The Civil War in Lebanon (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977), p. 180.
24. Cf. Pierre Vallaud:, Le Liban au bout du fusil (Paris: Hachette, 1976), pp. 96 –8.
CHAPTEr 12
 1. He was succeeded to this post by the commander-in-chief of the army, General 
Victor Khoury, who had replaced General Hanna Su`ayd who was known to 
be too close to the rebel troops in the south.
 2. Percy Kemp, ‘La stratégie de Bashir Jumayil’, Hérodote , nos 29/30 (1983), 
pp. 55–82.
 3. Bashir confessed to the American TV journalist Barbara Newman that he 
received the Israeli ‘green light’ for executing the Ihdin operation. Barbara 
Newman, The Covenant: Love and Death in Beirut (New York: Crown 
Publishers Inc., 1989), pp. 140–1.
 4. See the full text in Alain Ménargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (Paris: 
Albin Michel, 2004), annex no. 1, pp. 501–5.
 5. Ibid., p. 508.
 6. Ibid., p. 198.
 7. The opposition to Bashir, incapable of preventing the elections proper, worked to 
sabotage the quorum. There was an attempt made on the life of a Sunni deputy 
for Ba`albak with the intention of reducing the quorum, while his Catholic 
partner had to flee East Beirut in order to escape Phalange threats on his life. 
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Joseph Skaff, the political boss of Zahleh, was transported to Beirut by private 
plane from his Paris hospital, where he was due to undergo surgery, to vote for 
Bashir. 
 8. Ménargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban, pp. 422–31. 
 9. Quoting his father Pierre, Bashir said: ‘Without us, the Orient would not have 
been the Orient, its peoples would have been reduced [by one people] and it 
would have been deprived of the Renaissance and lost their contact with God.’ 
The speech was prepared for Bashir by one of his close collaborators, Sij`an 
Qazzi. See the full text in Al-Nahar, 15 September 1992.
10. See the confessions of As`ad Shaftary, LF intelligence chief, in Al-Hayat, 14, 
15 and 16 February 2002. The conservative ‘feudal’ beyk of `Akkar seemed to 
be the favourite of organisers of coups d’état. He had already been designated 
prime minister by the organisers of the failed coup d’état of the SSNP against 
Shihab in 1962!
11. Cf. Fawaz Traboulsi, ‘al-Fashiya fi-l-Iqtisad’, Bayrut al-Masa’, 8 May 1982.
12. Thomas Friedman estimated that a quarter of those killed in the camps were 
Lebanese: cited in Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, 
Israel and the Palestinians (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1999), p. 370.
13. Associated Press report, 15 September 1982.
14. Alexander Cockburn, cited in Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, p. 389. See also 
George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), p. 105.
15. During the siege of West Beirut, in a discussion on the situation after the 
departure of the Palestinian fedayeen, Bashir mentioned to Sharon his intention 
of introducing bulldozers into West Beirut, erasing the Palestinian camps and 
transforming them into a ‘vast zoo’ or ‘tennis courts’. Shimon Shiffer, Opération 
Boule de Neige: Les secrets de l’intervention israélienne au Liban (Paris: J.C. 
Lattés, 1984), pp. 172–3; and Ménargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban, 
p. 487. 
16. Jonathan Randall, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers 
and the War in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 15.
17. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 106–9.
CHAPTEr 13
 1. Le Monde, 14 September 1983.
 2. Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 
1989), p. 194.
 3. Zahi Bustani, Bashir’s political adviser, was named director of general security; 
a close collaborator of Amin, `Abdalla Abu Habib, became ambassador in 
Washington, while Elie Salem, AUB professor and legal counsellor to Bashir 
during the negotiations with the Israelis, was appointed minister of foreign 
affairs. See ‘La mainmise phalangiste sur les rouages de l’Etat’, Le Monde 
Diplomatique (October 1983).
 4. On 7 July 1982, a Phalange officer revealed the plan to the Parisian daily Le 
Matin. ‘After the withdrawal of the PLO,’ he said, ‘the Lebanese army will enter 
Beirut and we will enter with them, and there will be excesses by the middle 
cadres and the rank and file as we have bloody accounts to settle. We will try 
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to avoid a bloodbath, but it will be difficult to prevent an explosion of hatred 
which will be brief and limited.’
 5. A large number of the Amal partisans in the Biqa` split under the leadership 
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CHAPTEr 14
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Saddam Hussein’s troops invaded Kuwait. Its name was changed to ‘Operation 
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Gulf War began.
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